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EUROPE AND BEYOND

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EUROPE AND BEYOND

A PRELIMINARY SURVEY OF
WORLD-POLITICS 1870-1939

BY
SIR J. A. R. MARRIOTT

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WITH EIGHT MAPS

FIFTH EDITION, REVISED



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P R E F A C E

THIS book is intended as a sequel to my earlier volume on *The Remaking of Modern Europe* (1789–1871), first published in 1909,¹ and has been written in response to requests for a continuation of that narrative. I must, however, beg my readers to remember that I offer it only as a preliminary survey of a large tract of country. The last half-century has not yet fallen into perspective, but as there is a natural and legitimate curiosity among many students of foreign affairs to know something of the days immediately preceding our own—a knowledge not always easily attainable—I have reduced to a reasonably brief and mainly (though not strictly) consecutive narrative the substance of studies on which I have long been engaged.

In various chapters of this book I have borrowed a few paragraphs from previously published works of my own: notably from *The Evolution of Prussia*—written in conjunction with my friend and former colleague, Sir Charles Grant Robertson (Clarendon Press, 1915); *The Eastern Question* (Clarendon Press, 1917), *The European Commonwealth* (Clarendon Press, 1919),—all these by kind permission of the Delegates of the Clarendon Press; and *England since Waterloo* (first published in 1913).² The substance of Chapter VII. appeared as an article in *The Edinburgh Review* for April 1919, and some paragraphs of Chapter XIV. originally appeared in articles contributed by me to *The Fortnightly Review*. For permission to reprint them I have to thank the proprietors and editors of these *Reviews*.

My indebtedness to other writers, and particularly to the accomplished historians and publicists of France, is, I think, sufficiently indicated and acknowledged in the short bibliographies which I have suffixed to each chapter.

¹ Methuen & Co. Ltd. Twenty-second Edition, 1938.

² Methuen & Co. Ltd. Twelfth Edition, 1942.

These bibliographies will, I hope, be found useful alike by teachers in universities and schools, and by those general readers whose wants I have tried to keep in mind, not less than those of professed students of history.

J. A. R. MARRIOTT

OXFORD 1921

PREFACE TO THE FIFTH EDITION 1942

THIS book was carefully revised for the Fourth Edition (1933), but no attempt was then made to bring the narrative up to date. In the present edition this has been done: the concluding chapter has been entirely re-written; the narrative now ends with the outbreak of war in September 1939. But, as the new chapter had to be kept within the space allotted to its predecessor no more than a summary of events between 1918 and 1939 could be attempted. For further treatment of this period the reader is respectfully referred to my *The Tragedy of Europe* (Blackie & Son, 1941), on which the summary contained in Chapter XIV. is largely based.

The Chronological Table has also been brought down to September 1939; considerable additions have been made to the List of Authorities appended to Chapter XIV. and (in less degree) to some of the preceding chapters. The index has been revised to correspond with the text. I have to thank many kindly correspondents for *corrigenda* supplied for previous editions, and to the public at large for gratifying proof that a sequel to my *Remaking of Modern Europe* (now in its Twenty-second Edition) has not shared the fate which too often attends sequels. If *corrigenda* are detected in this edition I hope correspondents will point them out and ascribe them to the author's enforced absence from London and consequent denial of access to great libraries, and even to his own books and memoranda.

J. A. R. M.

YORK, October 1942

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1875. Establishment of the Third Republic in France.
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England purchases Suez Canal shares.
Proclamation of Queen Victoria as Empress of India.
Balkan risings.
1876. Berlin Memorandum.
Serbia and Montenegro declare war on Turkey (July).
Revolution at Constantinople.
Bulgarian atrocities.
Annexation of the Transvaal.
1877. Russo-Turkish War.
1878. Treaty of San Stephano (Mar. 3).
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Afghan War.
1879. Dual Alliance (Germany and Austria-Hungary) (Oct. 7).
Zulu War.
1880. Boer War.
Russian Nihilism—Assassination of Alexander II. (Mar. 13).
1881. Restoration of Transvaal Republic.
French Protectorate in Tunis.
1882. British occupation of Egypt.
Triple Alliance (renewed 1887, 1891, 1902, 1912).
Foundation of *Die Deutsche Kolonial-Gesellschaft*.
1883. Revolt of the Soudan.
1884. Gordon at Khartoum : his death (1885).
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Conference of Berlin : partition of Africa.
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1885. Italian colony at Massowah.

1885. England and Russia in Central Asia : Penjdeh incident.
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1886. Boulanger, Minister of War (Jan. 7).
Royal Niger Company.
Transvaal goldfields.
Alexander of Battenberg kidnapped in Bulgaria.
1887. Italian defeat at Massowah.
Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg elected Prince of Bulgaria.
The " Schnaebele Incident " (April 20).
Boulanger plot fails (Oct.).
1888. British East Africa Company.
Death of Emperor William I. (Mar. 9).
Reign of Frederick (Mar. 9 to June 15).
Accession of William II. (June 15).
British Protectorate over North Borneo and Sarawak.
1890. Fall of Bismarck (Mar. 20).
Anglo-German agreement (July 1).
Heligoland ceded to Germany.
French Protectorate over Madagascar recognised.
British Protectorate over Zanzibar recognised.
Anglo-French treaty about Central Africa.
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1895. Treaty of Shimonoseki.
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Cecil Rhodes, Premier of Cape Colony.
Venezuela boundary difficulty.
Jameson raid into the Transvaal (Dec. 28).
1896. Kaiser's telegram to Kruger.
Defeat of Italians at Adowa.
1897. Kitchener begins reconquest of the Soudan.
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1898. Battle of Omdurman (Sept. 2).
 The Fashoda crisis.
 The Kaiser visits Constantinople and Jerusalem.
 Spanish-American War.
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 Russia occupies Port Arthur.
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1899. Anglo-French agreement about Africa.
 Outbreak of South African War. British reverses.
 Boxer rising in China.
1900. European intervention in China.
 Lord Roberts and Lord Kitchener in South Africa.
 British victories against the Boers.
1901. Death of Queen Victoria (Jan. 22).
1902. Anglo-Italian agreement about North Africa.
 Opening of Trans-Siberian Railway (begun 1891).
 Russo-Persian Convention.
 Anglo-Japanese Treaty (renewed 1905).
 Peace of Vereeniging.
1904. Anglo-French Entente.
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1905. Surrender of Port Arthur (Jan. 1).
 Treaty of Portsmouth.
 The Kaiser at Tangier.
 Dismissal of M. Delcassé.
 Separation of Norway from Sweden.
 Revolutionary movement in Russia—"Bloody Sunday" (Jan. 22) in St. Petersburg.
1906. The First Duma (May 10).
 France and Morocco.
 Algeciras Conference (Jan. 15 to April 7).
 Macedonian "Committee of Union and Progress."
1907. Second Hague Conference.
 Anglo-Russian Convention—Triple Entente.
 The Second Duma in Russia (Mar. 5). Third Duma (Nov. 14).
1908. Portuguese Revolution.
 Young Turk Revolution at Constantinople (July).
 Tsar Ferdinand proclaims Bulgaria independent (Oct. 5).
 Austria annexes Bosnia and the Herzegovina (Oct. 7).

1908. Crete declares itself united with Greece (Oct. 12).
 1909. Counter-revolution at Constantinople (April).
 Deposition of Sultan Abdul Hamid (April).
 Armenian massacres (April).
 1910. Union of South Africa.
 Venizelos, Prime Minister of Greece (Oct.).
 1911. Morocco troubles—Agadir crisis.
 Italy declares war on Turkey (Sept. 29).
 1912. Rising in Albania.
 Treaty between Serbia and Bulgaria (Mar. 13).
 Treaty between Greece and Bulgaria (May 10).
 Montenegro declares war on Turkey (Oct. 8).
 Treaty of Lausanne (Italy and Turkey) (Oct. 18).
 War between Turkey and the Balkan League (Oct. to Dec.).
 Armistice and London Conferences (Dec.).
 1913. Enver Bey's *coup d'état* at Constantinople (Jan. 23).
 Balkan War renewed (Feb.).
 Albanian autonomy.
 Treaty of London (May 30) ends War of Balkan League.
 Balkan War of Partition (June to July).
 Intervention of Rumania (July).
 Treaty of Bucharest (Aug. 10).
 1914. June 12. Visit of Kaiser and Von Tirpitz to Archduke Franz
 Ferdinand at Konopisht.
 23. Kiel Canal reopened.
 28. Franz Ferdinand shot at Serajevo.
 July 23. Austro-Hungarian note to Serbia.
 28. Austria declares war on Serbia; on Russia (Aug. 3).
 Aug. 1. Germany declares war on Russia; on France (Aug.
 3); on Belgium (Aug. 4).
 4. Great Britain declares war on Germany.
 12. Great Britain and France declare war on Austria-
 Hungary.
 15. Fall of Liège.
 16. British Army landed in France.
 23. Japan declares war on Germany.
 Sept. 5. First Battle of the Marne begins.
 Oct. 9. Fall of Antwerp.
 20. First Battle of Ypres begins.
 Nov. 5. Great Britain declares war on Turkey.
 Dec. 8. Sir D. Sturdee's victory off the Falklands.
 1915. Feb. 18. U-boat blockade of England.
 25. Naval attack on Dardanelles.
 April 25. Allies land in Gallipoli.

1915. May 7. *Lusitania* torpedoed.
 23. Italy declares war on Austria.
 July 9. Botha conquers South-West Africa.
 Aug. 6. Landing at Suvla Bay.
 Oct. 5. Allied landing at Salonika.
 9. Austro-Germans occupy Belgrade.
 14. Bulgaria at war with Serbia.
 Dec. 19. Withdrawal from Gallipoli.
1916. Feb. 18. Cameroons conquered.
 21. Battle of Verdun begins.
 April 24. Rebellion in Ireland.
 29. Fall of Kut-el-Amara.
 May 31. Battle of Jutland.
 June 5. Lord Kitchener lost at sea.
 July 1. Somme battle begins.
 Aug. 27. Rumania enters the war.
 Dec. 7. Mr. Lloyd George succeeds Mr. Asquith as Premier.
 15. French victory at Verdun.
 20. President Wilson's Peace Note.
1917. Feb. 1. Unrestricted U-boat war begins.
 Mar. 12. Revolution in Russia.
 April 6. America declares war on Germany.
 Nov. 8. Bolshevik regime in Russia.
1918. Feb. 9. Treaty of Brest-Litovsk.
 Mar. 21. German offensive in the West begun.
 April 14. General Foch allied Generalissimo.
 July 18. Allied counter-attack.
 Sept. 27. Hindenburg line broken.
 29. Bulgaria surrenders; King abdicates (Oct. 4).
 4. Austria surrenders.
 7. Bavarian Republic proclaimed.
 9. Berlin Revolution; the Kaiser abdicates.
 11. Armistice terms accepted.
 15. Czecho-Slovakia proclaims itself a Republic.
 17. Hungary proclaims a republic; reconstituted a Kingdom (1920).
1919. Jan. 12. Meeting of Peace Conference at Paris.
 12. Independence of Poland and Czecho-Slovakia recognised.
 Feb. 11. Ebert elected President of Germany.
 April 28. Covenant of League of Nations adopted and published.
 May 7. Peace Treaty presented to German delegates.
 June 2. Triune Kingdom of Jugo-Slavia recognised by England and France (already by Germany).
 28. Peace Treaty with Germany signed at Versailles.

CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE

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1919. June 28. Anglo-French-American Alliance signed.
 July 10. President Ebert ratifies Peace Treaty.
 31. New German Constitution adopted.
 Sept. 10. Austrian Peace Treaty signed at Versailles.
 10. Treaty with Yugoslavia signed. •
 Oct. 7. Peace Treaty ratified by Italy; by King George V.
 (Oct. 10); by President Poincaré (Oct. 12).
 Nov. 19. U.S. Senate fails to ratify Treaty.
 27. Peace Treaty with Bulgaria signed at Neuilly.
 10. Rumania signs Austrian Treaty.
1920. Jan. 10. Protocol of Peace Treaty signed at Paris—War ended.
 16. First Meeting of Council of League of Nations at Paris.
 June 4. Hungarian Treaty signed.
 Aug. 16. Turkish Treaty signed at Sèvres.
 Nov. 12. Treaty of Rapallo.
1920. Russo-Polish War.
 Wirth-Rathenau Government in Germany.
 Turkish National Assembly at Angora.
 Greeks land in Asia Minor.
- 1920-24. France concludes Treaties with Poland and the "Little Entente."
1922. British Protectorate over Egypt ended.
 Turkey declared Republic.
 Chanak crisis.
 Ottoman Sultanate abolished.
 Germany and Russia conclude Treaty at Rapallo.
- 1922-34. Recognition of U.S.S.R.
1923. France and Belgium occupy the Ruhr.
 Primo di Rivera dictator in Spain.
 Treaty of Lausanne.
 U.S.S.R. Constitution adopted.
 "Rhineland Republic."
 First Socialist Ministry in England.
1924. *Cartel des Gauches* in France.
 Caliphate abolished.
 Lenin dies: Stalin succeeds.
 Greece declared Republic.
1925. Locarno Agreement.
1926. Germany admitted to League of Nations.
 Pilsuski established Dictatorship in Poland.
1928. Briand-Kellog Pact.
- 1928-32. Venizelos in power.
1929. Lateran Treaties.
 "Five Year Plan" in Russia.

1930. Military occupation of Germany ends.
Economic blizzard.
1931. Alphonso XIII. leaves Spain.
Hoover Moratorium.
1932. Disarmament Conference—1934.
Turkey elected to League of Nations.
Iraq elected to League of Nations.
Japan established in Manchukuo.
1933. Hitler Chancellor of Germany.
Japan and Germany withdraw from League of Nations.
1934. Murder of Dollfuss.
Schuschnigg Chancellor of Austria.
Balkan Pact.
Hitler's Dictatorship accepted.
U.S.S.R. admitted to League of Nations.
Murder of King Alexander of Yugoslavia.
1935. General Rearmament.
The Saar reunited with Germany.
The "Stresa Front."
Italy attacks Abyssinia and condemned by League.
"Sanctions" against Italy.
"Peace Ballot in England."
Sino-Japanese War.
1936. Death of King George V.
Germany occupies Rhineland.
Germany and Japan conclude Anti-Comintern Pact.
Italy annexes Abyssinia.
Spanish Civil War.
Straits Convention signed at Montreux.
1937. Italy joins Anti-Comintern Pact.
1938. Germany annexes Austria.
French and Russian guarantee to Czechoslovakia.
Four Power Agreement at Munich.
Germany annexes Sudetenland.
Death of Kemal Attaturk.
1939. France and England recognize Franco as ruler of Spain.
Germany occupies Czechoslovakia.
Germany occupies Memel.
Italy occupies Albania.
Great Britain and France guarantee protection to Poland.
Russo-German Pact.
Germany invades Poland.
Great Britain and France declare war on Germany.

CENTRAL & SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE 1871



EUROPE AND BEYOND

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTORY

THE NEW ERA

Yes ; this is a new age ; a new world.—BISMARCK.

The cardinal fact of geography in the twentieth century is the shortening of distances and the shrinkage of the globe. . . . The result is that problems which a century ago or even fifty years ago were exclusively European now concern the whole world.—J. C. SMUTS.

THE fashion of the day demands that History should be divided into periods and studied as a succession of epochs ; and the practice has a great deal to recommend it. By this method, attention is drawn to the essential truth, that History is not a mere aggregation of disconnected facts nor a series of interesting but isolated dramatic episodes, but that it is an organic whole to which each great period in world-history has made its appropriate and indispensable contribution. "All epochs," as Turgot justly observed, "are fastened together by a sequence of causes and effects linking the present condition of the world to all the conditions that have preceded it. The human race, observed from its beginning, seems in the eye of the philosopher to be one vast whole, which, like each individual in it, has its infancy and growth. No great change comes without having its causes in preceding centuries, and it is the true object of History to observe in connection with each epoch those secret dispositions of events which prepare the way for great changes, as

The
Scientific
Method in
History

well as the momentous conjunctions which more especially bring them to pass."

The words of the philosopher-statesman of the *ancien régime* would seem to suggest the spirit in which the study of any particular period should be approached. In the larger movements of History there is nothing accidental, nothing casual, nothing which cannot be distinguished either as cause or as effect. "The present," said Leibnitz, "is the creation of the past, and is big with the future." These words contain a profound truth. It is the primary function of the Historian to seek in the myriad phenomena of human society the operation of law, and to endeavour to discern in the distracting multiplicity of details the essential unities which underlie them. Thus, and thus only, can the study of History be redeemed from the charges of triviality and barrenness, which are sometimes alleged against it, and be brought into line with the scientific spirit which has infused and dominated all the higher studies of our time.

The Period 1870-1920 Does the history of the last half-century afford a basis for such treatment? Can this period be truly described as a distinct epoch in world-history? If so, what are its essential and outstanding features? What is the precise contribution which it has made to the sum of the ages? To attempt an answer to these questions would seem to be the appropriate function of an introductory study, and such a study is all that can be attempted in the following pages.

The Watershed of the Nineteenth Century The year 1870-71, with which this narrative opens, forms beyond dispute one of the great watersheds of Modern History. In the 'seventies of the nineteenth century a prolonged process of historical evolution reached its climax. Between 1815-71 many Nation-States came to the birth, and the map of Europe was transfigured. This transfiguration was, in the main, the resultant of two forces, seemingly antagonistic, but in effect not infrequently convergent: the force, on the one hand, of disintegration; on the other, of a fresh integration. One obvious illustration of this process is afforded by the

decay and disruption of the Ottoman Empire. That Empire was itself a wholly artificial product. It represented an alien mass superimposed upon vital elements, which, though submerged for centuries, were never wholly destroyed. The collapse of the Ottoman Empire permitted the submerged nationalities to re-emerge and take their place as independent Nation-States in the European polity. In 1821 the Greeks raised the standard of revolt, and after a period of many vicissitudes the Kingdom of the Hellenes was finally established by the Treaty of London, 1832, and placed under the protection of Great Britain, France, and Russia. British statesmanship was also responsible, in large measure, for the birth of the modern kingdom of Belgium. The attempt made by the diplomatists of Vienna to set up a powerful middle kingdom by the union of the Spanish or Austrian Netherlands and the United Provinces had broken down; the Belgian people asserted their independence, and that independence was guaranteed by the Treaty of London, 1839. A third Nation-State came into being as a result of the Crimean War. By the Treaty of Paris, 1856, the Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia virtually obtained their independence; but as separate States. So Europe decreed; the Roumanian people, however, had other views; they took the matter into their own hands, and, powerfully aided by the good offices of Napoleon III., they formally proclaimed the union of the two Roumanian principalities in 1861, and achieved final independence by the Treaty of Berlin (1878). In the same Treaty, two other Balkan States, Serbia and Bulgaria, found their formal charter of emancipation, though the independence of the former had been virtually achieved in 1867, while the latter did not finally throw off the suzerainty of the Sultan until 1908.

Nation-making

Meanwhile, two of the great powers had simultaneously attained the goal of national unity. The Franco-German War, 1870-71, put the coping-stone upon the work of Bismarck in Germany, and upon that of Mazzini, Cavour, Garibaldi, and Victor Emmanuel in Italy. The German attack upon France compelled Napoleon III. to withdraw

Unification
of Germany
and Italy

the French garrison from Rome and enabled Victor Emmanuel to transfer his capital from Florence to the city, which was unmistakably indicated as the capital of a united Italy. The German victories in France enabled Bismarck to transform the North-German confederation into the new German Empire and to persuade the German States south of the Main (except German-Austria) to come into it. Thus was the unity of Italy and of Germany at last achieved, and the doctrine of Nationalism triumphantly vindicated.

The
British
Common-
wealth of
Nations

Nor was the triumph of the doctrine confined to Europe. Nation-States have come into being under the ægis of the British Crown in North America, in South Africa, and in the Pacific. The Canadian Dominion, the Commonwealth of Australia, the Union of South Africa, and New Zealand, are not the less Nation-States because they are, and ardently desire to remain, constituent parts of the British Commonwealth. The South American republics have attained to the dignity of statehood in independence of the European States to which they owed their birth.

The
Advent of
the Nation-
State,
Fifteenth
Century to
Nineteenth

The making of Nation-States may thus be regarded as the characteristic work of the nineteenth century, and more particularly of the period between 1815 and 1878. That work proceeded under the domination of two forces, both of which received a decided impulse from the first French Revolution and indirectly and undesignedly from the Napoleonic Conquests: the idea of nationality and the principle of liberty. Yet, as regards nation-building, the nineteenth century merely placed the coping-stone upon an edifice which had been in gradual course of erection ever since the last years of the fifteenth century. The main process of European history during the four centuries that closed in 1870-78 may be scientifically described as the evolution of the States-system, or alternatively as the triumph of Nationalism. The emergence of the Nation-State was greatly facilitated, if not actually caused, by the break up of the Mediæval Empire and by the decadence of the œcumenical authority of the Papacy. The old Roman Empire had embodied the principle of unity and centralisa-

The
Empire and
Papacy

tion. On its fall in the fifth century it bequeathed to mankind the idea of a World-State and a universal Church, but the immediate result of the overthrow of the Roman Empire was World-anarchy. From that anarchy, Europe was eventually rescued by two institutions both in outward form majestic and imposing, and one in fact powerful and pervasive: the Holy Roman Empire and the Holy Catholic Church. Pope and Cæsar occupied, not always to their mutual comfort, a joint throne; but as an œcumenical force the Pope proved himself by far the stronger of the two. The revived Roman Empire, itself the creature of the Papacy, became inseparably associated with the German kingship, and as Western Europe began to dispose itself in more or less homogeneous States, the Empire lost whatever of international or supranational position it had enjoyed. Still, throughout the greater part of what we loosely term the "Middle Ages" Western Europe maintained a quasi-unity under the dual authority of Empire and Papacy.

These two institutions, which in theory represented but two aspects of one body, were, in practice, always rivals and not infrequently foes. As their authority, gravely impaired by protracted conflict, gradually declined, a new type of political formation began to emerge, the Sovereign Nation-State. England and Hungary were among the first of modern European nations to attain to political self-consciousness. France, thanks in the main to the centralising policy, steadily pursued, of a succession of remarkable kings, realised her national unity towards the end of the fifteenth century. The Spanish kingdoms were at last united under a single ruler in the early years of the sixteenth century. The United Provinces of the Netherlands threw off their allegiance to the Spanish Crown and attained to the dignity of independent statehood before the same century closed, and "Austria," as distinct from the Empire to which it gave an Emperor, may be said in fact though not in theory to have emerged about the same time. Portugal regained its independent national existence in 1640; Prussia entered the charmed circle of

The
Triumph of
National-
ism

kingdoms in 1701, and was thereafter accepted as a "Power." Russia, as a united nation and a European Power, also dates from the early years of the eighteenth century.

This book is concerned primarily with European history. How difficult, nay impossible, it is, during the period covered by this volume, to observe the limitation will presently appear. It may not, therefore, be irrelevant to notice that the eighteenth century, infertile as regards nation-making in the old world, gave birth to a new Nation-State which sprang from the loins of England on the other side of the Atlantic. Having renounced their allegiance to the Motherland in 1776, the thirteen colonies first entered into a loose confederation between themselves, and subsequently attained to the status of a federal Nation-State by an acceptance of the Constitution of 1788.

The catalogic summary now completed will at least suffice to establish the truth that the 'seventies of the last century witnessed the consummation of a world movement of profound significance and form a conspicuous watershed in European politics. At last, after a process which, as we have seen, extended over four centuries, Europe was exhaustively parcelled out into some sixteen or seventeen Sovereign States, broadly corresponding to the main divisions of races. Some of these States had in process of formation absorbed various alien nationalities, and retained in restless and reluctant subjection peoples who had no affinities to the ruling race. Some, like the Empire of the Habsburgs, possessed no racial unity, and though rightly designated States, had no claim to be included in the catalogue of Nations. Others, like France and Great Britain, had by union of races evolved a new nationality. But whatever the particular road by which they had travelled, the States of Europe at length attained a common goal, and the European polity came to consist of a congeries of Sovereign Nation-States nominally equal in status and acknowledging no common superior.

Neither the demarcation of Nation-States nor the striving for power (*Macht-streben*) among these self-conscious

units has, however, completely exhausted the best energy and thought of Europe during the last four centuries. Hardly was the dominance of the idea of the Sovereign State established before men began to perceive its inconvenient and indeed disastrous consequences. There was no longer in Europe any Supreme Court of Appeal; European society was dissolved into its constituent atoms. From the development of nationalism there naturally proceeded inter-nationalism: inter-national trade, inter-national diplomacy, above all, inter-national war. The cruel persistence of inter-national war led in time to a feeling after the possibility of inter-national law. Where was mankind to find a path of escape from conditions which even in the seventeenth century seemed to the finer minds to be intolerable? Two paths, and two only, appeared to open out. On the one hand, the re-establishment of a world-sovereignty; on the other, the common acceptance of a system of law equally binding on all nations. From the seventeenth century to the twentieth these two ideas have struggled for ascendancy. The one looking back with regret to the lost unity of the Middle Ages; the other looking forward to a Federation of States, or possibly to a League of Peoples. Certain of the finer minds naturally looked back. "The thing which at Münster and Osnabrück (the settlement effected by the Peace of Westphalia in 1648) stereotyped itself in the world's history was," writes Father William Barry, "the world's catastrophe, the break up of Christendom."¹ That a Roman Catholic divine should regard the Protestant Reformation as responsible for the dissipation of European harmony and the inauguration of European anarchy is not surprising. More surprising is it to find an essentially modern philosopher in accord with the mediævalist:—

Internat
ional
Affairs

"There was a time," writes Mr. Lowes Dickinson, "when the whole civilised world of the West lay at peace under a single ruler; when the idea of separate Sovereign States always at war or in armed peace would have seemed as monstrous and absurd as it now seems inevit-

¹ *The World's Debate*, p. 17.

able, and that great achievement of the Roman Empire left, when it sank, a sunset glow over the turmoil of the Middle Ages. Never would a mediæval churchman or statesman have admitted that the independence of States was an ideal. It was an obstinate tendency struggling into existence against all the preconceptions and beliefs of the time. One Church, one Empire, was the ideal of Charlemagne, of Otto, of Barbarossa, of Hildebrand, of Thomas Aquinas, of Dante. The forces struggling against that ideal were the enemy to be defeated. They won. And thought, always parasitic on action, endorsed the victory. So that now there is hardly a philosopher or historian who does not urge that the sovereignty of independent States is the last word of political fact, political wisdom."¹

International Law

Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury sought escape from a state of society in which war was perpetual and the life of the individual "was nasty, brutish, and short." He found it in the conclusion of a social compact issuing in the autocracy of the Sovereign, the great Leviathan. While Hobbes found a way of escape from intolerable domestic disorder in a social contract, others were looking for a means of ending international anarchy by the acceptance of a system of international law. Hugo Grotius, the great Dutch jurist, published his famous work, *de Jure Belli et Pacis*, in 1625. Oppressed by the recent memory of the wars of Religion in France and Germany; of the bloody contest between the United Netherlands and Spain; confronted by the desolation wrought by the Thirty Years War in Germany, Grotius might well come to the conclusion that the break up of the mediæval unities had dissolved Europe in perpetual anarchy. Grotius was the real founder of the science of International Law, and his work has had a profound influence upon the thought and indeed upon the practice of modern Europe.

Projects of Peace

Some years before Grotius made his famous attempt to establish a system of International Law on the basis of the *jus naturæ*, Henry IV. of France, or rather his

¹ G. L. Dickinson : *After the War*, pp. 20, 21.

minister, Sully, had drafted his *Great Design*. In this also we have striking evidence of the anxiety of thoughtful men to discover a way of escape from the prevailing anarchy and strife. Henry IV. conceived of Western Europe as a peaceful confederacy of free States. The affairs of this Federal Commonwealth were to be administered by a perpetual Senate, renewable every three years, and presided over by the Emperor. This Senate was to consist of sixty-four Plenipotentiaries, representing the component States, and was to be competent to decide all disputes arising between the several Powers and to determine any questions of common import.

Neither Grotius nor Henry IV. produced any immediate effect. There ensued a full half-century of war, due mainly to the aggressions of Louis XIV. of France and his ambition to establish the ascendancy of France over continental Europe. The Treaty of Utrecht (1713) registered the failure of his attempt, and the year which witnessed the conclusion of the Peace witnessed also the publication by the Abbé de Sainte-Pierre of his famous *Projet de Traité pour rendre la Paix perpétuelle*. Like Henry IV. the Abbé proposed to establish a confederation of Europe based upon a perpetual and irrevocable alliance between the sovereigns. Each sovereign was to send Plenipotentiaries to a Congress which was to define the cases which would involve offending States being put under the ban of Europe. The Powers were to enter into a mutual compact to take common action against any State thus banned until the offender should have submitted to the common will.

Events mocked the efforts of the Abbé de Sainte-Pierre as they had mocked those of Sully. Throughout all the middle years of the eighteenth century Europe, not to say the world, was at war. In Europe, war was due mainly to the restless ambition of Frederick the Great of Prussia; in Asia and America to the prolonged contest between England and France for supremacy in the Far East and the Far West. After this half-century of war Immanuel Kant published in 1795 his *Essay on Perpetual*

Peace. Kant repudiated the idea of a Universal Empire: "It is," he writes, "the desire of every State, or of its ruler, to attain to a permanent condition of peace in this very way; that is to say, by subjecting the whole world as far as possible to its sway, but Nature wills it otherwise; Nature brings about union not by the weakening of competitive forces but through the equilibrium of these forces in their most active rivalry." Kant therefore proposed that there should be a Law of Nations founded on a Federation of Free States.

The Holy
Alliance

When Kant published his *Perpetual Peace* Europe was already in the third year of a war destined to last for another twenty years. Long before it ended, the Czar Alexander I. was busy with a scheme for the reconstitution of the European Polity upon the lines of a great Christian Republic. The idea thus adumbrated subsequently took shape in the Holy Alliance of 1815. The Holy Alliance was a genuine attempt, inspired by a contemplation of the horrors and havoc of war, to induce the rulers of the world to take "for their sole guide the precepts of that holy Religion, namely, the precepts of justice, Christian charity, and peace, which far from being applicable only to private concerns must have an immediate influence upon the counsels of Princes and guide all their steps." But the Holy Alliance, though genuinely founded with this object, rapidly degenerated into a League of Autocrats for the suppression not only of revolutionary movements but of all liberal progress. Yet autocracy was not of the essence of the experiment, nor was it the cause of its failure. Fundamentally the Alliance foundered upon the rock of intervention. The Holy Allies laid it down at Troppau (1820) that—"States which have undergone a change of government due to revolution, the result of which threatens other States, *ipso facto* cease to be members of the European Alliance, and remain excluded from it until their situation gives guarantee for legal order and stability. . . . If, owing to such alterations, immediate danger threatens other States, the Powers bind themselves by peaceful means, or, if need be, by arms, to bring back

the guilty State into the bosom of the Great Alliance." The principle thus laid down was difficult to reconcile with the legitimate claims of national independence. How can a State be adjudged guilty if there be no tribunal before which it may be brought? what is the use of a tribunal unless it possess a sanction? but the employment of sanctions involves intervention, and intervention may degenerate into interference. It is not easy to draw the line between external affairs and matters of purely domestic concern; upon that rock the Holy Alliance foundered.

The conflicting ideals roughly adumbrated above have been striving for supremacy during the last hundred years. On the one hand, the idea of Dominion founded on Power; on the other, of Confederacy founded on Law. Germany has, during the last half-century, been the leading exponent of the former principle. The Hohenzollern have regarded themselves as the apostolic successors of that Augustine Empire which gave peace to a distracted world—as the legitimate heirs of the Ghibellines, and destined to realise, as Hohenstauffen and Luxemburgs failed to realise, the sublime ideal embodied by Dante in the *De Monarchia*. The ultimate ideal of the modern German Empire was, be it admitted, universal peace. But it was to be a world-peace achieved by the supremacy of the German sword. In contrast and conflict with this ideal there has gradually developed the ideal of a peaceful confederacy of Free States, bound together by the common acceptance of international law. The latter idea has made more progress than is commonly recognised. Partly by the meeting of periodical congresses, partly by the intercourse of scholars and men of science, partly by an attempt to establish, as in the matter of copyright or the conduct of war, common legislation and common practice, most of all by the progress of international arbitration, the world has been slowly advancing towards a realisation of the ideal embodied in the schemes of Sully and of the Abbé de Sainte-Pierre, of Kant and the Holy Allies.

The World-War of 1914 brought the two ideals—World-Dominion and World-Confederacy—into sharp conflict.

The former has been discredited by the broken sword of Germany; it remains to be seen whether the latter can be realised by the League of Nations.

The New
Era

But to resume. Hardly had the era of the Nation-State reached its climax before signs were discernible that a new era had already opened. "Yes," said Bismarck, before his fall, "this is a new era." The half-century which has elapsed since the Franco-German War may, it is claimed, be clearly differentiated from the centuries which preceded it. The world has passed under the domination of new and untamed forces. Is it possible to discern their characteristics and to trace their operation? It is the purpose of the following pages to attempt the task, but it is one which at the best can only be at present provisionally accomplished.

Welt-
Politik

The outstanding feature of European history during the last fifty years is a shifting if not in the centre of political gravity, at least in its distribution: European history has ceased to be exclusively European. The inventions of physical science have completely revolutionised the conditions of world-history. The development of the means of transport and communication has brought the ends of the world together. "The cardinal fact of geography in the twentieth century is the shortening of distances and the shrinkage of the globe. . . . The result is that problems, which a century ago, or even fifty years ago, were exclusively European, now concern the whole world."¹ So obviously is this proposition true that the history of the recent epoch has been summed up in a brilliant formula as the expansion of Europe.² Down to this latest period the several continents were more or less self-contained. It is true that the geographical Renaissance of the later fifteenth century led to great discoveries, and in time to the establishment of great extra-European Empires by Portugal, Spain, Holland, France, and England. It is true that the Colonial struggle between
¹ England and Holland in the seventeenth century, between

¹ General Smuts: *Address to the Royal Geographical Society*.

² Ramsay Muir: *The Expansion of Europe* (Constable).

England and the Bourbon Powers in the eighteenth, reacted upon European politics. Still, apart from England and her oceanic Empire, and apart from Russia, with a vast land Empire, half-European and half-Asiatic, Europe was in the main self-contained. During the last half-century all this has been altered. During that period there was no great European war. There was no war at all in Europe beyond the limits of the Ottoman Empire. Outside the Balkans there were hardly any changes in the political map of Europe. Cyprus was virtually ceded to England in 1878, Heligoland was handed over to Germany in 1890, Norway severed itself from Sweden in 1905. This is the sum of the changes which took place between 1871 and 1914. The real activities of the European Powers have been for the most part displayed in the extra-European sphere. European diplomacy has been transformed into *Welt-Politik*, and the ideal of the *Welt-Politik* has been *Welt-macht*.

It is not without significance that the dominating ideas of the new era should have to be expressed in the German language. For the peculiar characteristics of the new era must in large measure be ascribed to the astoundingly rapid rise of Germany, and German policy in the period of its domination has been largely inspired by three motives which, though most conspicuously illustrated in Germany, have also been in operation elsewhere and have driven the great nations towards the abyss of Armageddon. The forces which have thus moulded the history of the most recent era are those of industrialism, of commercialism, and imperialism. Industrially, the face of Europe has been transformed by the development of productive capacity under the domination of science. The age of coal and iron, of steam and electricity, to mention only the most obvious forces, has succeeded to the age of hand-labour, of pasturage and tillage. The country-dwellers have been brought together into towns and factories. The resulting development of productive capacity has contributed to an overmastering desire on the one hand for the command of those raw materials without which

The Rise of
Germany

Industrial-
ism

modern productive processes are impotent, and on the other for markets in which to dispose of the surplus commodities produced in profusion by modern industrial processes. "Formerly," says General Smuts, "we did not fully appreciate the Tropics as in the economy of civilisation. It is only quite recently that people have come to realise that without an abundance of the raw materials which the Tropics alone can supply, the highly developed industries of to-day would be impossible. Vegetable and mineral oils, cotton, sisal, rubber, jute, and similar products in vast quantities are essential requirements of the industrial world."

Commer-
cialism

But the modern world looks to the Tropics not merely for the supply of the raw material but as a market for the disposal of their manufactured products. Thus we have had in recent days a revival of the old idea of "plantations," of oversea estates to be worked for the benefit of the home-proprietors. In a word, the old colonial system denounced by Burke and Adam Smith as unworthy of any nation save a nation of shopkeepers and unworthy even of them.

Thus the new Industrialism has largely contributed to a revival of commercial-nationalism, the neo-protectionism first popularised in Germany by Friedrich List. In this way the dream of the statesmen and economists of the Manchester School has been dismally dissipated. The early triumphs of Cobdenite Free Trade were hailed in England and to some extent elsewhere as the inauguration of a new area in international relations. Free Trade would render war if not impossible at least ridiculous. International commerce if not international law would silence arms. The demolition of commercial barriers was to be the prelude to a universal peace. Such was the dream which inspired the most characteristic of the mid-Victorian poets, when he addressed to the cosmopolitan patrons of the great Exhibition of 1862 the famous adjuration:—

O ye, the wise who think, the wise who reign,
From growing commerce loose her latest chain,

And let the fair white-wing'd peacemaker fly
 To happy havens under all the sky,
 And mix the seasons and the golden hours,
 Till each man find his own in all men's good,
 And all men work in noble brotherhood,
 Breaking their mailed fleets and armed towers,
 And ruling by obeying Nature's powers,
 And gathering all the fruits of earth,
 And crowned with all her flowers.

But the dream faded. The fiscal policy of England found few imitators. So far from "breaking their mailed fleets and armed towers," the wise who reigned (to say nothing of the wise who thought) piled armaments on armaments. So far from loosing from commerce her latest chain, they raised higher and higher their protective tariffs. Statesmen of the "realistic" school turned not to Adam Smith but to Friedrich List for inspiration. Not cosmopolitanism but economic nationalism became the fashionable philosophy.

Under the conditions of the modern world a further consequence almost necessarily ensued. To the forces of industrialism and commercialism was added that of Imperialism—a desire for the extension of territory. The British Empire is largely the product less of actual conquest than of simple settlement—the occupation and colonisation of the waste places of the earth. But by the time that the European States system was completed, by the time that Germany and Italy had attained to nationhood, these waste places had been largely occupied. Consequently the desire for territorial expansion could be satisfied on the part of the late-comers only by war and conquest. *Welt-Politik* thus came to involve *Welt-macht*. Germany it seemed could satisfy her desire for Colonial Empire only by successfully asserting her hegemony in Europe.

Not content with the favourable position accorded to her by the partition of Africa, Germany was bent upon the establishment of a great empire in tropical Africa, extending from the Atlantic right across the continent to the Indian Ocean, and involving the annexation of a large portion of French equatorial Africa, of Portuguese

Imperialism

German
Mittel-
Afrika

West Africa, of Uganda and British East Africa, not to mention the great central mass of the Belgian Congo. The German Empire of Central Africa was demanded by the Colonial School on various grounds, of which the most conspicuous were commercial, military, and strategical. The Germans coveted that Empire, primarily in order to have a supply of raw materials for their industries independent of foreign competitors, partly in order to obtain naval outposts, and partly as a reserve of manpower. "The first and most important of all the national demands," writes Dr. Hans Delbrück, "which we must raise at the future Peace Congress must be for a really big colonial empire, a German India. The Empire must be large enough to be capable of conducting its own defence in the event of war. A really big territory feeds its own troops and contains abundant man-power for reserves and militia. A really big territory can have its harbours and coaling-stations." "We are fighting," wrote Hermann Oncken, "for an Empire in Central Africa." "Many colonial politicians," writes Dr. Leutwein, "have come more and more to the conviction that an extensive territory in Central Africa, bordering both on the Indian Ocean and on the Atlantic, would afford the most favourable conditions for our future colonial activity. This domain would have to include our most important possessions, the Cameroons, East Africa, and the northern half of South-West Africa, and be amalgamated into a single whole by the addition of the Belgian Congo, together with strips of territory from the British, French, and Portuguese possessions and from British South Africa." Such an Empire would have satisfied most of the aims of the German Colonial School. Without a *Mittel-Afrika* the dream of *Mittel-Europa* could hardly have been safely realised. "German East Africa," writes Emil Zimmermann, "has shown itself to be the real rampart of nearer Asia. Without adequate flank protection in Africa, Asiatic Turkey cannot survive. Without this protection all the money which we have advanced to Turkey during the War will be lost." Other considerations presented

themselves to the same writer. "For our present unfavourable position in the Far East, England, apart from Japan, is chiefly responsible. The principal opponent of our expansion in the Pacific is Australia, but we shall never be able to exercise pressure to Australia from a base in the South Seas. We might very well do so from East Africa. . . . If we have a position of strength in *Mittel-Afrika* with which India and Australia must reckon, then we can compel both of them to respect our wishes in the South Seas and in Eastern Asia, and we thereby drive the first wedge into the compact front of our opponents in Eastern Asia." Nor does the advantage end there. "German Africa will be a valuable ally for South America against North American aggression. . . . The United States could not permanently thwart our interests in Eastern Asia and the South Seas if a strong German *Mittel-Afrika* made its influence felt upon developments in South America."

The above quotations, though tedious in iteration, suggest some at least of the motive forces which have impelled Germany to the struggle for *Welt-macht* and thus exercised a powerful if not a dominating influence upon world-politics during the last half-century.

In the policy which such doctrines have inspired, we have the clearest possible demonstration of the modern German spirit, the spirit not of Service but of Power, the doctrine of the State *in excelsis*. That policy rested fundamentally upon the adoption and exaltation of the ideas of materialism and militarism, or in old-fashioned language upon the deification of Mammon. Mirabeau and Voltaire perceived and proclaimed, as far back as the eighteenth century, that the national industry of Prussia was War; since 1870 war has become the State-religion of Germany. "War," said Treitschke, "is political science *par excellence*." Worship of the majesty of the State has in recent years superseded in Germany the service both of God and of man. "The State organised as absolute power responsible to no one, with no duties to its neighbour and with only nominal duties to a slightly

The
Doctrine
of Power

subordinate God, has challenged the soul of man in its dearest possessions." Such, as Sir Walter Raleigh has observed, is the supreme delusion in which Germany entangled herself, and from which escape was impossible save through the arbitrament of the sword in which she placed—and vainly placed—her trust.

Democracy This book must necessarily be concerned in the main with the relations of State with State. We must not, however, neglect to notice briefly the principles which have dominated the domestic affairs of the great nations during the period under review. In this sphere, also, it is possible to discern a striking uniformity of development. Domestic politics have been largely moulded, during the last half-century, by the oncoming of the principle of democracy. The principle has manifested itself mainly in two directions : political, and social or economic. Politically, power has passed in almost every State from the one or the few to the many ; and the many have naturally attempted to use the power recently acquired for the amelioration of the lives of the most numerous class. Unfortunately, the extension of political power has in most cases outstripped the diffusion of education. Consequently, the many have not always perceived the direction in which their own interests would really guide them. Looking, not unnaturally, with envious eyes upon the wealth which to the superficial observer seems to be concentrated in the hands of the few, the many have sought to use the power now vested in them to secure greater equality of economic and social conditions. The weapon has often broken in their hands, and the disappointment ensuing upon disillusionment has powerfully contributed to the unrest which in almost all the countries of the world has been a marked feature of social life.

Socialism Other causes have contributed to a like result ; and of these some brief account must, later on, be given. Summarily, however, it may be said that the doctrine of *Macht* in international affairs—the exaltation of the majesty of the State—has, in domestic politics, translated itself into the doctrine of State socialism. In this sphere, also,

mainly through the influence of Karl Marx, German theory has largely dominated contemporary thought.

Having thus analysed, in summary fashion, the main principles and forces which seem to have determined the current of political affairs during the last half-century, it now remains to make a rough preliminary survey of the country through which we shall have to travel before we reach the goal of the Great War and the subsequent Peace.

The first twenty years of our period, extending from 1870 to 1890, may be fitly described as the age of Bismarck. Not only in Germany but in Europe, and even beyond the confines of Europe, Bismarck's influence was dominant. The supreme object of his policy was to conserve and to consolidate the position which he had won for Germany. To this end he sincerely desired the maintenance of peace in Europe; and peace in his view was most likely to be attained by a close accord between the autocratic rulers of the three great States of central and eastern Europe. Hence the *Dreikaiserbund* (the league of the three Emperors) formed by him in 1872. The League between the sovereign rulers of Germany, Austria, and Russia rested, however, on no very stable foundation. Between Russia and Austria there was a real antagonism of interests, and between Russia and Germany there was considerable political tension despite the personal affection with which the Czar Alexander II. regarded his venerable uncle, the German Emperor. Even in 1872, at the moment when Bismarck was forming his League of Emperors, the Czar assured President Thiers that France had nothing to fear from such a League. Gortchakoff, the Russian Chancellor, was even more specific in his language: "We are not indifferent to your army or to your reconstruction. On this point Germany has not the right to address any criticism to you. I have said, and I repeat with pleasure, that we need a strong France." Nor, as we shall see, did Russia fail to honour her word to France when the crisis of 1875 arose. If, however, Russia was alienated

Outline of
the Period
1870-1920

(i) The
Rule of
Bismarck,
1870-90

from Germany by Bismarck's treatment of France, she was outraged by Bismarck's partiality for Austria as manifested in the Treaty of Berlin. Essentially it was the clash of Russian and Austrian interests in the Balkans which broke up the *Dreikaiserbund*. Bismarck had to choose between his two Allies. The result was the formation in 1879 of the dual alliance (Germany and Austria), to which Italy was admitted in 1882 as the third partner.

(ii) The
Franco-
Russian
Alliance,
1890-98

A second period dates from the fall of Bismarck in 1890, and may perhaps be conveniently ended by the meeting of the first Hague Conference in 1898. The Emperor William II. was, during the first ten years of his reign, hardly less anxious for peace than Bismarck; but he desired it less for the purpose of conservation than for that of preparation. The domination attained by Germany in Europe was to be extended to other continents. The alarm, inspired by the young Emperor's policy, brought his two neighbours, Russia and France, into close alliance, and the gradual consolidation of that alliance gives its special character to the years between 1890 and 1898.

1898

1898 was one of the most critical years of the whole period. It witnessed, on the one hand, the culmination of England's forward policy in Egypt and the Sudan; it brought England and France to the brink of war over the Fashoda crisis; it witnessed the outbreak of war between the United States and Spain—a war which for the first time involved the United States in world politics, and which on that account may be said to have inaugurated a new era in international affairs. Events seemed also to indicate the impending break up of the Chinese Empire, and the beginning of a scramble among the Powers of Western Europe for territorial ascendancy in the Far East. In 1898, Germany occupied Kiaochow; Russia occupied Port Arthur; and England, Wei-Hai-Wei.

(iii) The
Triple
Entente,
1899-1908

A year later (1899) England, after pursuing for more than twenty years a shifting and vacillating policy in South Africa, became involved in a war destined to be decisive against the Dutch Republics. In the same year the rising of the Boxers in China led to the intervention alike of the

great European Powers and of the United States, in the domestic affairs of China. In 1902, Russia signed an important Convention with Persia, and Great Britain concluded her Treaty with Japan. Two years later (1904) Russia embarked on a disastrous war with Japan, and was compelled to accept in 1905 the Treaty of Portsmouth. Meanwhile, in Europe, the attitude of Germany became ever more menacing. France became convinced that her old enemy was bent upon her destruction, not merely as a European, but as a Colonial Power. England was reluctantly forced to the adoption of a similar view as regards the attitude of Germany towards herself. France, as we have seen, had already concluded a defensive alliance with Russia, and in 1904 an understanding was arrived at between France and Great Britain. The intrigues of the German Emperor in North Africa; the dismissal of M. Delcassé, and the proceedings at the Algeciras Conference convinced the least suspicious that trouble was brewing, and in 1907 England concluded the Convention with Russia which inaugurated the *Triple Entente*.

The year 1908 inaugurated the last period of the armed peace. The significance of successive events could hardly be mistaken, least of all by so close an observer of continental politics as King Edward VII., who in the autumn of that year foresaw and foretold the eruption that was to ensue.¹ The storm-centre was in the Balkans. In July, the Young Turk revolution was effected at Constantinople; on 5th October, the Czar Ferdinand renounced the suzerainty of the Porte and proclaimed Bulgarian independence; on 7th October, Austria tore into fragments the Treaty of Berlin by the annexation of Bosnia and the Herzegovina; on 12th October, Crete declared itself united with Greece.

During the next four years, Europe awaited the bursting of the storm. The first ominous rumble was heard when, in September, 1911, Italy declared war on Turkey and invaded Tripoli. The Tripoli War was brought formally

(iv) The
Armed
Peace,
1908-12

(v) The
Bursting
of the
Storm,
1912-14

¹ Cf. Lord Redesdale: *Memories*, i. 178-179; see also interview with M. Cambon (*Times*, 22nd December, 1920).

to an end by the Treaty of Lausanne (18th October, 1912). Ten days before that Treaty was signed, Montenegro had declared war on Turkey, and before October was out Turkey was involved in war, not only with Montenegro, but with the leagued Balkan States of Serbia, Bulgaria, and Greece. Before this combination, the Ottoman Empire collapsed. An armistice was arranged in December, and during the next four months Diplomacy—in particular British Diplomacy—did its utmost to isolate Balkan politics; to arrange a compromise between Turkey and her enemies, and, above all, to prevent the conflagration first lighted in the Balkans from spreading to Western Europe. In February, 1913, however, the war of the Balkan League was renewed, and was brought to an end (30th May, 1913) by the Treaty of London. The success of the Balkan States against their traditional enemy had been, however, too rapid and too complete. In June, the Bulgarians made a sudden and most treacherous attack upon their Serbian Allies, and the second Balkan War—the War of Partition—had begun. The Bulgarians went down before the combined attack of Serbs and Greeks. Roumania also threw in her weight against Bulgaria; the Turks took the opportunity of recapturing Adrianople, and on 10th August, 1913, Peace was signed at Bucharest.

Had Italy been willing to join Austria and Germany in an offensive against Serbia, the great European War would have been antedated by nearly twelve months. Italy, however, refused to recognise the proposed aggression of Austria-Hungary against Serbia as a *casus fœderis*. Consequently, Armageddon was postponed. On 28th June, 1914, however, the Archduke Ferdinand, the heir to the Dual Monarchy, was with his wife assassinated in the Bosnian capital Serajevo. Austria's ultimatum was presented to Serbia on 23rd July, and on 28th July, Austria declared war upon Serbia. Russia had been intimidated by Germany into acquiescence in the Habsburg aggressions in the Balkans in 1908. It was recognised that she could not afford a second humiliation. Germany consequently declared war upon Russia on

1st August, and upon France on 3rd August ; she invaded Belgium on 4th August, and on the same day Great Britain declared war on Germany. The spark which lighted the great conflagration had come, not without significance, from the Balkans.

With the Great War and the ensuing Peace, this narrative will end. The Treaty of Versailles (1919) closed an epoch of European, indeed, of world history. It will be for the historian of the future to say whether it opened another. The half-century which opened with the German victory over France closed with the decisive victory of France and her Allies over Germany. The German victory inaugurated a period of perpetual and profound unrest in international affairs ; the victory of the Allies was signalised by the formation of a League among the nations designed to inaugurate a period of peace. The issue of that great experiment is on the knees of the gods.

SOME GENERAL BOOKS ON THE PERIOD

(Lists of Special Authorities will be appended to the Chapters on which they bear.)

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CHAPTER II

THE NEW GERMANY AND THE NEW FRANCE (1871-75)

Political questions are questions of power.—BISMARCK.

Germany must remain armed to the teeth for fifty years in order to keep what took her six months to win.—MOLTKE in 1875.

La Republique est le Gouvernement qui nous divise le moins.—THIERS.

The
Franco-
German
War and its
Results

THE Franco-German War produced results of immense significance not merely to the combatants immediately engaged in it, but to Europe at large. It set the seal upon the accomplishment of German unity under the hegemony of Prussia; it facilitated the final act in the romantic drama of Italian unity; it inflicted upon France humiliation and mutilation; it gave Russia the opportunity of denouncing some of the most important clauses of the Treaty of Paris (1856) and thus at once to cancel the neutralisation of the Black Sea and to impose upon England a serious diplomatic rebuff; at the same time it gave England a chance, which was not neglected, of establishing, on a basis more secure than ever, her supremacy in the domain of commerce and finance.

It is, however, with the sequelæ of the war in Germany and France that this chapter is primarily concerned.

The
German
Empire

The Germany which emerged from the Franco-German War was in literal truth a New Germany. The Napoleonic Wars had dissolved the Holy Roman Empire, and with it disappeared the older Germany which had subsisted for nearly a thousand years. The new Germany was not

yet born. In 1815, Germany was reconstituted as a loose Confederation of thirty-nine States under the Presidency of the Emperor of Austria. The spirit of nationalism and the spirit of liberalism were, however, beginning to operate in many of the German States. Liberalism made an effort to assert itself in 1830, and in 1848 it co-operated with nationalism to secure the meeting of a constituent national assembly at Frankfort, from which there issued the abortive constitution of 1849. Frederick William IV. of Prussia declined an Imperial Crown at the hands of a democratic Assembly, he refused to proclaim himself "The Serf of the Revolution," or, least of all, "to dissolve Prussia in Germany."

Where the votes and parchments of the Frankfort Parliament had failed, Bismarck by blood and iron succeeded. By his statecraft, aided by the military genius of Roon and Moltke, Germany was merged into Prussia. The annexation of the Danish Duchies; the attack upon Austria; the dissolution of the *Bund* of 1815, and the formation of the North German Confederation under the Presidency of the King of Prussia—these were the preliminary steps towards the achievement of Bismarck's ultimate purpose. Napoleon III. was then lured into a series of diplomatic indiscretions, which effectually isolated France and alienated from her the sympathies of Belgium, of England, and, above all, of the South German States.

In 1870, France was provoked into a declaration of war upon Prussia; Russia's benevolent neutrality had been secured; Austria stood aloof; the South Germans enlisted under the banners of Prussia; after a month's decisive campaign Napoleon III. was forced to surrender with 80,000 Frenchmen at Sedan; the Second Empire fell, and the Third Republic was proclaimed in Paris (4th September). The surrender of Napoleon did not, however, end the war. France rallied to the call of the Provisional Government; Favre declared that he would not "yield an inch of French soil, nor a stone of French fortresses," but on 28th September, Strassburg was compelled to

The
Franco-
German
War

surrender; a month later Bazaine delivered the great fortress of Metz, together with 150,000 men and immense war stores, into the hands of the Germans; and on 28th January, Paris itself, which had been besieged since 20th September, was compelled to capitulate. Thiers, called to supreme power in France, made a desperate effort to mitigate the harshness of the terms which the enemy sought to impose upon his country, but Bismarck and Moltke were inexorable, and preliminaries of peace were signed on 26th February, and were ratified at Frankfurt on 10th May, 1871. By the Treaty of Frankfurt, France agreed to cede the whole of Alsace, except Belfort and eastern Lorraine, together with the fortresses of Metz and Strassburg. The indemnity was fixed at five milliards of francs, and was to be paid within three years. German troops were to remain in occupation of defined French districts until the indemnity was paid.

Bismarck had not gone to war in 1870 for the purpose of acquiring or recovering Alsace-Lorraine. He went to war to complete the unification of Germany, to humiliate France as he had already humbled Austria, and by France's humiliation to put the new German Empire in a position of indisputable primacy in continental Europe. The acquisition of Alsace-Lorraine was at once the symbol of France's humiliation and the guarantee of German security. If Metz in German hands meant an open road into France, Strassburg in French hands meant an open door into Germany, and that door France had frequently used. Bismarck was determined to lock the Strassburg door against France; Moltke was equally determined to keep in German pockets the key of Metz. One great concession Thiers had, however, obtained: the retention by France of the great and commanding fortress of Belfort. He had also got the indemnity reduced from 6,000,000,000 francs to 5,000,000,000, and had induced Bismarck to accept some part of it in securities instead of cash.

Bismarck, however, had his eyes from the first fixed on one supreme object, and before the peace with France was signed that object had been achieved.

In the autumn of 1870 the staff of the Wilhelmstrasse was transferred to Versailles, and there, in the great palace of Louis XIV., the final stages in the building of a stupendous political edifice were completed. Baden was only too anxious to join the North German Confederation. Bavaria was much more tenacious of its independence, and ultimately came in only on the understanding that certain rights (*Sonderrechte*) were to be strictly reserved to it. The King of Bavaria was still to command his army in time of peace; Bavaria was to have a permanent place upon those standing committees of the Bundesrat which deal with foreign affairs and the army respectively; to control its own railway, post, and telegraphic systems; to retain its own laws in regard to marriage and citizenship; and to be exempt from Imperial excise on brandy and beer. Würtemberg came in on similar terms, and by November, 1870, the difficult diplomatic work was done. "The unity of Germany," said Bismarck, "is completed, and with it Kaiser und Reich."¹

The *Sonderrechte*

As to the title of *Kaiser* there was considerable difference of opinion. Bismarck laid great stress upon the assumption of the Imperial title; he regarded it, indeed, as "a political necessity." Still more did the Crown Prince of Prussia, whose views were even more unitary than those of the Chancellor. The older Prussian nobility and the King himself were, on the contrary, averse from the change. The southern kings would, however, brook no superior. It was agreed, therefore, that the Prussian King should become, not Emperor of Germany or of the Germans, but *Kaiser in Deutschland*—German Emperor.

The Imperial Title

This title King William agreed to accept from his brother sovereigns in Germany,² and by this title he was acclaimed in the Hall of Mirrors in the Palace of Versailles on 18th January, 1871. That the final act in the evolution of a

¹ Cf. Junon: "La Bavière et l'Empire allemand" (*Annales de l'Ecole Libre des Sciences politiques*, 1892).

² The offer was actually conveyed in a letter (drafted by Bismarck) from King Ludwig of Bavaria.

long drama should have been played at Versailles is a fact not lacking in dramatic irony.

The *Instrument* of the new Constitution was laid before the Reichstag on 14th April, 1871, and was formally promulgated on 16th April. It was based upon (i) the Constitution, as amended, of the North German Confederation, and (ii) the Treaties of 15th, 23rd, and 25th November between that confederation and the Southern States.

The Constitution of the North German Confederation was adapted, without difficulty, to the new conditions.

The
Kaiser

The Kaiser's position was constitutionally a peculiar one. He was not strictly an hereditary sovereign. He was not indeed "sovereign" at all. Article xi. stated : "The presidency of the union belongs to the King of Prussia who, in this capacity, shall be entitled German Emperor." There was, therefore, no German crown, no German civil-list; the "sovereignty" was vested in the aggregate of the German governments as represented in the Bundesrat. In the Bundesrat Prussia was all-powerful, and it was through the Bundesrat that the King of Prussia technically exercised his rights as German Emperor. The Emperor enjoyed the threefold position which attached to the President of the North German Confederation : Bundespräsidium, Bundesfeldherr, and King of Prussia ; he represented the Empire in relation to foreign powers and to the constituent States ; he controlled, with the aid of a committee of the Bundesrat, foreign affairs, concluded alliances, received foreign envoys, declared war, and made peace ; but for every declaration of an offensive war the consent of the Bundesrat was essential. To him it belonged to summon and adjourn the Legislature and, with the consent of the Bundesrat, to dissolve the Reichstag, to levy federal execution upon any recalcitrant State, and to promulgate and execute the laws of the Empire.

The Exec-
utive

The executive was vested in the Emperor and the Chancellor (*Reichskanzler*) was appointed by him. The Chancellor, though he was the only federal Minister, was assisted in his work by a number of subordinate officials,

such as the Foreign and Colonial Secretaries. Bismarck always refused to have a Cabinet. The Chancellor was the sole responsible official of the Empire; but neither the Bundesrat nor any one else except the Kaiser could get rid of him.¹ As Imperial Chancellor he presided in the Bundesrat, but if he voted it was as the Prussian delegate; as Chancellor he had no vote. In the Reichstag also he had no seat; he sat and spoke there as Prussian delegate to the Bundesrat.

On its administrative side the Empire, as equipped by the Constitution, was extraordinarily weak. For the execution of federal laws it had to depend upon State officials. Only in foreign affairs and in military and naval matters did it exercise effective control. In legislation, on the other hand, the Empire was all-powerful.

The Legislature consisted of (i) the Bundesrat or Imperial Council, and (ii) the Reichstag.² The latter had very little real power. It was elected for five years by universal manhood suffrage. It had a veto on legislation and, constitutionally, the right of initiative. But, as a fact, legislation, including the annual budget, originated as a rule in the Bundesrat.

Far more extensive, at any rate on paper, were the powers of the Bundesrat. An American commentator described the Bundesrat as "the central and characteristic organ of the Empire."³ Like the American Senate, it represented not the people of the Empire, but the States. Unlike the American Senate, however, it represented them unequally. Prussia claimed seventeen votes in her own right; Bavaria six; Saxony and Württemberg four each; Baden and Hesse three; and the rest of the States one apiece. Its functions were legislative, executive, and judicial. It fixed the Imperial Budget, audited the accounts between the Empire and the States, and supervised the

¹ The position of the executive was not legally affected by the Bülow incident of 1908.

² Whether the Imperial Legislature is technically bi-cameral or uni-cameral is a moot point, for discussion of which *cp. Marriott: Second Chambers*, pp. 116 *seq.*

³ President Woodrow Wilson.

collection of customs and revenue generally. It had the power, with the Emperor, of declaring war, of dissolving the Reichstag, and had a voice in the conclusion of treaties and the appointment of judges of the Supreme Court and other officials.

In many respects it acted as an administrative court ; it had the right, by issuing ordinances, to remedy defects in legislation ; it acted as Supreme Court of Appeal from the State Courts, and decided points of controversy between State and State, and between the Imperial Government and an individual State. No revision of the Constitution could take place, if fourteen negative votes were cast against the amendment in the Bundesrat. Thus any constitutional amendment could be defeated by Prussia alone ; or by the combined vote of the middle States ; or by the vote of the single-member States, acting with tolerable unanimity.

The nominal powers of the Bundesrat were, then, enormous : but it was always a debatable point how far the practice corresponded with the theory.

The Judi-
ciary

In the Imperial Judiciary the Bundesrat had an important place. Apart from it there was one great Federal Supreme Court, which was not created until 1877—the *Reichsgericht*. This Court exercised original jurisdiction in cases of treason, and acted as a court of appeal on points of Imperial law from the State Courts. It lacked, however, the supremely important function assigned to the Supreme Court of the United States—the power to decide whether an Act of the Legislature is or is not “constitutional.”

Such a court is an essential attribute of true federalism. The German Constitution fell, therefore, in this and other respects very far short of the genuine federal type. In legislation the power of the Central Government was almost unitarian ; in administration it was conspicuously weak. Again, German federalism was not based upon the equality of the component States, but presupposed marked inequality. Finally, no provision was made for an authoritative interpretation of the constitution external to and independent of the Legislature.

The truth is, and the events of the next twenty years were to prove it, that Prussia, instead of being, as in 1849 she well might have been, lost in Germany, contrived to absorb all Germany, save the Teutonic portions of the Austrian Empire. That in the process much was lost that the world would fain have preserved must be obvious to any one who recalls the characteristic products of the German particularism of the eighteenth century. Yet the Germany of that day lacked something. It possessed no guarantee for permanent political independence. Where was that guarantee to be found? "The Gordian knot of German circumstance," wrote Bismarck, "could only be cut by the sword. . . . The German's love of Fatherland has need of a prince on whom it can concentrate its attachment. . . . Dynastic interests are justified in Germany so far as they fit in with the common national Imperial interests."

That final identification was the work of Bismarck, aided by the technical genius of Roon and Moltke, and supported, though not without wavering, by his honest and simple-minded sovereign. The Constitution of 1871, the main features of which have been summarised in the preceding paragraphs, embodied Bismarck's constructive work.

For the next twenty years Bismarck was the foremost figure in the politics not merely of Germany but of Europe. That the Emperor William I. chafed at times against the domineering temper of his imperious Chancellor is not to be questioned, but it is equally clear that although he recoiled from the diplomatic methods employed by the Minister, he supported him throughout his reign with unvarying loyalty. And there were moments when Bismarck needed all the support the Emperor could afford him. Over the army, its chiefs and its administration, he had no control, and even in the Reichstag he encountered from time to time considerable opposition. Not that the government of Germany was in any real sense "parliamentary"; in Prussia, as Bismarck had said in 1862, the King not only reigns but governs, and after

Bismarck's
Ascend-
ancy,
1871-90

1871 the aphorism was equally true as applied to Germany. Only to the Emperor was the Chancellor responsible ; and only to the Chancellor were the Ministers responsible. Cabinet there was none ; the Imperial Secretaries and other departmental " Ministers " were the Chancellor's servants, not his colleagues. This system, considerably modified after 1890, was maintained until Bismarck's fall. But the Military Cabinet, the General Staff, and the War Ministry were wholly independent not only of the Reichstag but of the Chancellor, and many of his legislative projects were largely modified and even defeated by the Reichstag.

*The Kultur-
kampf*

Of all the domestic difficulties which Bismarck had to face, the most obstinate were those which centred round the age-long problem of " Church and State." If it had been found difficult in the Middle Ages to reconcile the claims of the Empire and the Papacy, it was hardly more easy to adjust those of the New German Empire and the New Papacy. The " syllabus " of 1864, followed by the Vatican Council of 1870 and the Decree of Papal infallibility, seemed to indicate, on the part of the Roman Church, a renewal of propagandist activity. Political Ultramontanism had lately been gaining ground notably in Austria and in France. The relations between the French Empress and Rome were notoriously close, and the hostility of the Papacy to the unification of Germany was as intelligible as it was undoubted. Equally distasteful to Bismarck was the activity of the Roman Church among the Poles of Prussian Poland. Most of all was he incensed by the demand put forward by the ultramontane Bishops in Germany that the dogma of Papal infallibility should be taught in the universities and schools. This was to touch to the quick the traditional policy of Prussia. The schools were the nurseries of patriotism ; the higher studies of the universities had long been devoted to the cult of Hohenzollern hegemony. Nor was the contest simply one between Cæsarism and Catholicism. The " Old Catholics," led by Dr. Döllinger, one of the greatest of German scholars, were not less reluctant than the Imperialists to accept the Vatican Decrees, or to put liberal education in Germany

under the heel of the hierarchy. Bismarck was no iconoclast, but his political creed excluded the idea of a divided supremacy. "There is," he said, "only one standpoint for Prussia, constitutionally as well as politically; that of the Church's absolute liberty in matters ecclesiastical, and of determined resistance to her every encroachment upon State-rights." In this spirit the legislation known as the "May Laws" was conceived.

Between 1872 and 1876 the Jesuits were expelled; civil marriage was made compulsory; the Pulpit Paragraph was added to the Imperial Penal Code by which priests were forbidden to interfere officially in political matters; the Catholic Bureau in the Ministry of Education was suppressed, and the inspection of schools was withdrawn from the clergy and placed in the hands of State inspectors; priests were forbidden to abuse ecclesiastical punishments, *e.g.*, excommunication: all ecclesiastical seminaries were placed under State control; no priest was to hold office in the Church unless he were a German, educated in a German university, and had passed a university examination in history, philosophy, literature, and classics; exercise of office by unauthorised persons was made punishable by loss of civic rights, and power was given to suspend in any diocese where the bishop was recalcitrant the payment to the Roman Church authorised since 1817.

Bismarck announced in a famous phrase that "we will not go to Canossa either in the flesh or in the spirit." But he had miscalculated the strength and determination of his opponents. The Empress and the Court were against him; the Emperor viewed with dismay the schism which clove Germany into two camps of embittered opponents; many Protestants resented and disliked the extreme claims for the secular power embodied in "the May Laws"; the old Conservatives broke away and reproached Bismarck with deserting the principle of a Christian State, and the power of the National Liberals drove many Bismarckians who hated Liberalism and all its works into the arms of the opposition. Most formidable of all was the stubborn refusal of Roman Catholics to obey the law. They defied

the executive, with the result that in 1876 six bishops (including the Cardinal-Archbishop of Posen, Ledochowski, the Archbishop of Cologne, and the Bishop of Trier, were in prison, and 1,300 parishes had no public worship. The Roman Catholic population, in fact, was in open revolt, and the most drastic police measures and the penalties of the Courts failed either to diminish its spirit or to break down its refusal to accept the law as valid. In the Reichstag the Centre Party, led by Windthorst, the ablest Parliamentarian whom Germany has produced, attacked and opposed the Chancellor, his Ministers, and their measures. In the general election of 1874 the Clericals increased their members in the Reichstag from sixty-three to ninety-one, and polled 1,500,000 votes.

A Change
of System,
1878

Thus by 1878 Bismarck was confronted with a dangerous and a difficult situation. The Conservatives, after a split in 1876, had reunited. Bismarck's heart was with them. He was sick of the *Kulturkampf* which he chose to regard as hopelessly mismanaged by Falk and the National Liberals, and with the intuition which was one of his greatest gifts he divined truly that Liberalism was a spent force. The death of Pio Nono (1878) and the election of Leo XIII. inaugurated a new era at the Vatican. Negotiations were commenced. Bismarck went to Canossa by a devious and slow route, and called it a compromise. Falk resigned, and Puttkamer, a Conservative, took his place. In 1881 the Government was granted a discretionary power in the enforcement of the penal legislation; in 1886 the State examination of priests was given up, as was also the State control of seminaries, while from 1881 onwards a series of arrangements with the Vatican, by which appointments were to be made by agreement between Pope and King-Emperor, brought the struggle to an end. In return, Bismarck obtained a general though not an unvarying support from the Centre Party.

Protection
and State
Socialism

Meanwhile Bismarck, having broken with the National Liberals, had entered on a comprehensive policy of protection and State socialism. The main reasons for this change of policy were three. With 1877 began the epoch

of agricultural depression which hit the agricultural interest, led by Prussian Conservatism, very hard. Protection against the competition of the New World was demanded, and protection of agriculture involved protection of industry. Imperial finance was in sore straits, and three remedies only seemed possible: direct Imperial taxation, which would have met with strenuous resistance; an increased matricular contribution from the federated States, which would have been very unpopular; and indirect taxation through an Imperial tariff imposed both for revenue and for protection. Bismarck chose the third because it combined, in his judgment, every advantage—the line of least resistance, a large and elastic revenue, the alliance of the protected interests, and ample material for political bargains. The growth of Social Democracy inspired the elaborate social legislation which after years of strenuous discussion and criticism resulted in the Acts which provided for compulsory insurance against sickness (1883), insurance against accident in employment (1884), and insurance against old age (1889) in the shape of old-age pensions. By these measures Bismarck intended to fight Social Democracy with its own weapons, and prove that the Empire could do more for the working classes than their parliamentary representatives.

By 1890 Social Democracy had become a very formidable political and economic force.

Social
Demo-
cracy

Bismarck did his best to stamp the movement out in its infancy, but repression served only to stimulate its growth. In 1872 Bebel and Liebknecht—its two representatives in the Reichstag—were sent to prison for two years. But in 1874 nine Social Democrats were returned; in 1877 twelve. The attempt on the Emperor's life by Nobiling in 1878 was unjustly attributed to the Socialists, and a ferocious law was passed prohibiting Socialist books, meetings, or unions, and empowering the Bundesrat to proclaim a state of siege in any town, and this law was thrice renewed in 1881, 1886, and 1888. It was rigorously applied; the whole Socialist organisation was broken up and its members punished, harassed, and ruined by

the police—but with the result that in 1881 the Socialist Democrats secured twelve, in 1887 thirty-five, in 1893 forty-four, in 1898 fifty-six, in 1903 eighty-one, and in 1913 one hundred and sixteen seats in the Reichstag. But as long as Bismarck remained in office his supremacy, though spasmodically attacked, was unshaken.

Bismarck's
Ascend-
ancy in
Europe

Master of the Imperial machine in Germany, Bismarck exercised upon European politics an influence greater than that of any ruler since Napoleon I., perhaps since Louis XIV. The principle of his policy during the period before us was simplicity itself: *Divide et impera*. France, despite the disastrous defeat of 1870-71, was still the enemy; France, therefore, was to be kept weak at home and isolated in Europe. To attain the former object Bismarck favoured the republican party in France, thinking, unlike Thiers, that the Republic would divide France most. As for her position in European society the utmost vigilance must be exercised to prevent any *rapprochement* between France and England (Egypt came handy for this purpose), between France and Italy (Tunis would serve here), most of all between France and Russia.

The Drei-
kaiserbund,
1872

A secondary object of his policy was to prevent any undue cordiality between Vienna and Petersburg, while himself maintaining intimate relations with both. It was an accepted aphorism of Prussian policy that "the wire between Berlin and Petersburg must always be kept open," but to do this without sacrificing the friendship of Austria was a task which demanded all Bismarck's vigilance and skill. The task was, however, facilitated on the one hand by the prudent generosity with which, ever since the Prussian victory at Sadowa, Bismarck had treated Austria; on the other by the excellent personal relations which the Emperor William had always maintained with the Czar Alexander II., and which he succeeded, after 1871, in establishing with the Emperor Francis Joseph of Austria. In August, 1871, the German Emperor made a ceremonial visit to his brother of Austria at Ischl, which the latter returned in the following year in the Prussian capital.

At Berlin, the Czar was also present, with his Chancellor

Gortschakoff, and there the "league of the three Emperors" was arranged. Bismarck always maintained that "the liaison of the three Emperors, though habitually termed an alliance, rested on no written agreement," and involved no mutual obligations. That there was no written document is likely enough; nevertheless the understanding was complete, and it formed the solid bed-rock of German diplomacy, until it was dissipated by the clash of Russian and Austrian interests in the Balkans. The three Emperors cordially agreed to maintain the territorial *status quo* as established in 1871; to find if possible a solution of the Near Eastern problem mutually acceptable to the three Empires, and above all to suppress in their respective countries the growing power of revolutionary socialism. Such were the terms of the new Holy Alliance, confirmed by annual meetings, between the august Allies at Vienna and Petersburg (1873), at Ischl (1874), and at Berlin in 1875.

In the meantime the friendship between Germany and Russia was severely tested by the attitude assumed by the Czar during the "scare" which threatened a renewal of war between France and Germany in the spring of 1875.

Before proceeding to examine this significant episode it will be convenient to recapitulate events in France since the conclusion of the Treaty of Frankfort.

The debacle at Sedan (2nd September) was immediately followed by the outbreak of revolution in Paris; the Empire collapsed like a pack of cards; the Empress-Regent appealed to M. Thiers to save the dynasty, but Thiers was more intent on saving France, and promptly set off on a tour to the neutral courts in a vain effort to obtain succour for his unhappy country; the Empress fled with the Prince Imperial to England, and the Republic was again proclaimed in France (4th September).

A "Government of National Defence," hastily set up under Jules Favre, Gambetta, and General Trochu, Governor of Paris, made an heroic effort to restore the national morale and to avert the worst consequences of a crushing military disaster; but the effort was vain, and

France
after 1870

France was compelled to accept the terms dictated by the conqueror.

The
Commune

By the Treaty of Frankfort France was humiliated and dismembered but she was not crushed. With hardly an instant's delay her thrifty and patriotic citizens set their hands to the task of staunching the wounds inflicted by the enemy and rebuilding the body politic. But her cup of agony was not yet full. Before the preliminaries of peace were ratified an insurrectionary movement broke out in Paris; the Provisional Government withdrew to Versailles, and Paris was handed over to the tender mercies of the Commune. A curious situation ensued. The German flag still waved over St. Denis; the tricolour of the Republic over Versailles; the red flag of the Commune over Paris. The Government was compelled therefore to reconquer its own capital; for six weeks Paris was, for the second time, besieged, and when the Republican troops at last forced an entry (21st May) they found the devoted city in ruins and ablaze. Fierce fighting followed in the streets, but at last order was restored; 10,000 persons were imprisoned or exiled, and perhaps 30,000 in all were slain, though it is difficult to arrive at precise estimates. Nor is it easy to determine the exact character of the insurrection thus successfully suppressed. It was partly patriotic—a demonstration against those who would surrender the soil of France to the enemy; partly anarchical—"the first attempt" (in the words of an apologist) "of the proletariat to govern itself."¹ Whatever the motive which inspired the movement, it could not fail to weaken and embarrass France at a critical juncture of her fortunes. Gradually, however, order was restored in Paris, though it was full four years before the Republic was definitely established.

The losses in men and money which external war and internal strife inflicted upon France were enormous: 1,597,000 citizens were transferred from the French to

¹ For the Commune, cf. E. Lepelletier: *Histoire de la Commune* (2 vols., 1911-12), or *History of the Commune of 1871* by Lissagaray (Eng. trans. E. M. Aveling, 1886). The latter an uncritical apologetic.

the German flag; 491,000 persons were killed in the war and the Commune; while the loss in money is reckoned at £614,000,000.¹

The rapidity with which France repaired this havoc was marvellous. The enthusiasm and energy of Thiers, now a veteran of seventy-four, infected the whole nation. Nominated as Head of the National Executive in February, 1871, Thiers in August exchanged the title for that of President of the Republic. This was a broad hint to the Monarchists and Imperialists who, could they have composed their domestic differences, would have found little difficulty at this time of re-establishing in some form a monarchical régime. Between the Legitimists, the Orleanists, and the Bonapartists feeling still, however, ran high. The National Assembly, elected during the war, was predominantly monarchical and, in July, 1871, repealed by a large majority the laws which condemned to exile the Bourbon and Orleanist princes. In the same summer an effort was made to effect a reconciliation between the Comte de Chambord, as representing the elder, and the Comte de Paris, who represented the younger, line. But nothing came of it.

The country proved itself decidedly more republican than its elected representatives. In the bye-elections of July, 1871, the Republicans captured 100 seats out of 111,¹ and of the candidates elected in the Departmental elections (October) two-thirds were of the same persuasion. Thiers, therefore, with his superb instinct for politics, moved, though very slowly, towards the Left, and with the help of men like Casimir-Périer and Rémusat was able to form gradually a Left Centre Party, pledged to the support of a Government "which though republican in form was conservative in policy." Such a Government could most effectively carry through the immediate task of recuperation—political, financial, military, social, and commercial.

In the short space of four years that task was accomplished. The German indemnity was paid off by instalments, and with each payment the area of occupation

The
Recovery
of France

Thiers and
his Task

¹ Hanotaux : *Contemporary France*, i. 323-27.

was reduced. A loan of £80,000,000 issued in June, 1871, was covered two and a half times; a second, for £120,000,000, in July, 1872, was covered twelve times. By the autumn of 1873 not a German soldier remained on French soil, and Thiers was deservedly acclaimed as "The Liberator of the *Patrie*." Financial equilibrium was restored by fresh taxation, mostly indirect. Meanwhile, by the Constitutional Laws of August and September, 1871, a Provisional Constitution was established; executive power was vested in a President of the Republic, who was to appoint and dismiss the Ministers, but the latter, like the President himself, were to be "responsible" to the Assembly which was to sit at Versailles. Local Government was reorganised by the Municipal Act of 1871—a skilful compromise which kept the larger towns under *Préfets* appointed from Paris, while permitting the democratic luxury of election to the smaller communes. The new frontier was re-fortified, and in 1872 compulsory military service, on the Prussian model, was introduced.

Presidency
of Mac-
Mahon,
1873-79

The services rendered to France by Thiers were, indeed, beyond computation; yet his power rested on a dangerously narrow base. Confronted, on the one hand, by the Monarchists, numerous though divided; attacked on the other, by the extreme Republicans who, lacking numbers, found in Gambetta a leader of brilliant parts and proud patriotism, Thiers with difficulty maintained his position until May, 1873. Defeated in the Assembly on a vote of confidence, Thiers, instead of dismissing his Ministers, preferred to resign the Presidency, and Marshal MacMahon, an avowed Royalist, was elected in his stead. Thiers had always refused to accept the principle of ministerial responsibility on the ground that "though it was perfectly consistent with the dignity of a constitutional king, it was for him, a little bourgeois, entirely out of the question." Conformably with this view of his position, he accepted his dismissal at the hands of the Assembly.

MacMahon appointed a Ministry representative of all the monarchical parties under the leadership of the Duc de Broglie, and frantic efforts were made to consolidate

the monarchical forces. But in vain. The Comte de Chambord, being childless, did indeed recognise the Comte de Paris as heir-presumptive in return for a promise of Orleanist support to the Legitimist claims during his own lifetime (August, 1873); but there was no real reconciliation. Still there is little doubt that if "Henri V." could have been persuaded to acknowledge the tricolour, the monarchy would have been restored. How long it would have lasted is another question. The obstinacy of "Henri V." forbade the experiment; he preferred the "White Flag" to the throne of France. In May, 1874, Broglie's Ministry was defeated owing to monarchical dissensions, and the Republicans, encouraged by a series of consistently favourable bye-elections, felt themselves strong enough to demand revision, and on 30th January, 1875, the principle of a Republic (though only by a majority of one) was definitively accepted by the Assembly.

A series of organic laws, passed in the course of 1875, defined the Republican Constitution under which, with some few and unimportant modifications, France is still governed.

The President is elected for a term of seven years by a National Assembly, and is a "constitutional" chief of the State. As M. Raymond Poincaré writes: "The President presides, but does not govern; he can form no decision save in agreement with his Ministers; and the responsibility is theirs. . . . The President, therefore, exercises no power alone."¹ Sir Henry Maine declared, with some exaggeration, that there was no living functionary who occupied a more pitiable position than a French President. It is true that he neither reigns nor governs, but his position plainly depends largely on his personality; and many French Presidents, not excluding M. Poincaré himself, have played not merely a dignified but an important part in the public life of France. The President is "responsible" only in case of high treason, and acts invariably on the advice of Ministers responsible to the Legislature.

¹ *How France is Governed* (Eng. trans.), p. 173.

(b) The Legislature / The Legislature consists of two Houses : a Senate and a Chamber of Deputies. Together they form the National Assembly by which the President is elected and the Constitution revised. The Senate contains 300 (now ¹ 317) members. Of the original 300 Senators 75 were elected for life by the National Assembly and the remaining 225 for nine years by electoral colleges in the Departments and Colonies. The Chamber, comprising 610 members, is elected for four years, virtually by manhood suffrage. The President can dissolve the Chamber before the expiration of its legal term only with the concurrence of the Senate. The prerogative thus attaching to the Senate is plainly one of great importance, since it gives it great influence over the Executive. Only by its leave can the Executive make a special appeal to the electorate.

The Constitution thus defined has stood the test of experience with singular success, only five amendments of any importance having been carried in forty-five years. In 1883, the Republican form of Government was declared to be fundamental and not subject to revision ; in 1884, the principle of Life-Senatorships was denounced, the places of the Life-Senators being filled, as vacancies occur, by indirect election ; in 1886, members of families which have reigned in France were declared ineligible for the Presidency of the Republic ; in 1889, single districts were re-established for the election of deputies, and multiple candidatures were prohibited ; in 1919 the *scrutin de liste* with proportional representation was again restored. In December, 1875, the National Assembly was finally dissolved, and the elections of 1876 gave to the Republicans an overwhelming majority in the Chamber and a large party in the Senate. The Third Republic was established.

The Constitution of 1875 as a whole represented a compromise between the Conservative majority, who were too divided to procure the restoration of any form of monarchy, and the Republican minority. They combined to draft a simple form of Constitution which neither party imagined would be other than temporary. Both the ex-

¹ 1920.

treme parties have been disappointed in their expectations : the Constitution of 1875 has already lasted more than twice as long as any Constitution in France since the outbreak of the Revolution in 1789.

Bismarck watched the rapid recuperation of France with astonishment and chagrin. The indemnity which was intended to cripple France for a generation was paid off in two years, and the payment inflicted less harm upon France than upon Germany. The acquisition of Alsace and Lorraine opened the French frontier to German attack and contributed immensely to the industrial prosperity of Germany. But would France permanently acquiesce in the loss of these Provinces ? Would the inhabitants permanently accept the harsh German rule ? What might not happen if the recovery of France should proceed with the same rapidity as it had exhibited in the half-decade since the *débâcle* ? France could do little without allies ; but might she not get them ? A day must come when Germany would have to choose between the friendship of Austria and that of Russia. If she chose Austria, would not Russia be flung into the arms of France ? And England ? England, in 1874, abjured the domination of the Manchester School, and the old aristocracy in alliance with the newly enfranchised artisans placed the Conservatives in power for the first time since 1830. Under Disraeli England might emerge from her splendid isolation, and again take a hand in continental diplomacy.

Under these circumstances might it not be the wisest policy for Germany to attack France before her strength was renewed, and while she was still isolated in Europe ? This time, if fortune favoured German arms, France should be "bled white" ; the "French mortgage" should be once for all cleared off. France had indeed given no sort of pretext for attack ; she had more than punctually discharged all her obligations, and had wisely heeded Gambetta's warning : "to think of *Revanche* always, and never to speak of it." Despite this, there is little doubt that Bismarck in the winter of 1874-75 tried to pick a quarrel with France. His own master confided to Prince

Bismarck
and
France

The
War-scare
of 1875

Hohenlohe: "I do not wish war with France . . . but I fear that Bismarck may drag me into it little by little." "Bismarck," wrote Lord Odo Russell from Berlin to Lord Derby, "is at his old tricks again." On 15th April, 1875, there appeared in the *Berlin Post* an article, obviously inspired: "Krieg in sicht?" On 4th May the Duc Décazes, the French Premier, informed de Blowitz, the *Times* correspondent in Paris, that Germany intended to "bleed France white," to demand from her a fine of ten milliards of francs (about £400,000,000), payable in twenty instalments, and to keep an army of occupation in her eastern Departments until the fine was paid. Similar reports appear to have reached the Czar Alexander in St. Petersburg and to have been privately transmitted to Queen Victoria by her daughters in Berlin and Darmstadt. The Queen wrote to Alexander begging him to use his influence with the Emperor to avert war, and the Czar, accompanied by Gortschakoff, hurried to Berlin. In June the Queen wrote a personal letter to the German Emperor offering her mediation. The Emperor assured her in reply that her fears were groundless. It was true. Bismarck had been outplayed by Décazes and Gortschakoff at his own game. The scare was over.

The
Eastern
Question
again

Hardly, however, had the fear of renewed war in Western Europe been averted, when the rumblings of a coming storm began to be heard in the Near East. The rumblings deepened, and for the next three years the centre of political interest shifted from Berlin and Paris to Constantinople. The *Eastern Question* was reopened.

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CHAPTER III

THE EASTERN QUESTION (1875-98)

RUSSIA AND TURKEY. THE BALKAN STATES

Amongst the great problems of our age none is more fitted to occupy the thoughts, not only of the professional statesman but of every keen-sighted individual who takes an interest in politics, than the so-called Eastern Question. It is the pivot upon which the general politics of the century now drawing to an end are turning, and it will be so for the coming century also. . . . It is not a question which has disturbed the peace of Europe only yesterday: it is not even a production of this century. It has exercised a powerful influence upon the course of the world's history for about five hundred years.—J. I. VON DÖLLINGER.

Tout contribue à développer entre ces deux pays l'antagonisme et la haine. Les Russes ont reçu leur foi de Byzance, c'est leur métropole, et les Turcs la souillent de leur présence. Les Turcs oppriment les coreligionnaires des Russes, et chaque Russe considère comme une œuvre de foi la délivrance de ses frères. Les passions populaires s'accordent ici avec les conseils de la politique: c'est vers la mer Noire, vers le Danube, vers Constantinople que les souverains russes sont naturellement portés à s'étendre: délivrer et conquérir deviennent pour eux synonymes. Les tsars ont cette rare fortune que l'instinct national soutient leurs calculs d'ambition, et qu'ils peuvent retourner contre l'empire Ottoman ce fanatisme religieux qui a précipité les Turcs sur l'Europe et rendait naguère leurs invasions si formidables.—SOREL.

The Christian East has had enough of Turkish misrule. . . . High diplomacy will never solve the Eastern Question; it can be solved only in the East, in the theatre of war, with the co-operation of the peoples directly concerned.—PRINCE CAROL OF ROUMANIA.

These newly emancipated races want to breathe free air, and not through Russian nostrils.—SIR WILLIAM WHITE, 1885.

The
Eastern
Question

THE quotations prefixed to this chapter may serve to indicate in rough fashion the many-sided complexity of "that shifting, intractable, and interwoven tangle of conflicting interests, rival peoples, and antagonistic

faiths that is veiled under the easy name of the Eastern Question.”¹ That question has, in one form or another, been perplexing Europe for more than five hundred years. It is only with its latest phases that this book is concerned, but to render those phases intelligible a brief retrospect is not merely permissible, but essential.

The root of the problem is to be found in the presence, embedded in the living flesh of Europe, of an alien substance—the Ottoman Turk. Akin to the European family neither in creed, in race, in language, in social custom, nor in political aptitudes and traditions, the Ottomans have long presented to the European Powers a problem, now tragic, now comic, now bordering on burlesque, but always baffling and paradoxical. How to deal with this alien substance has been for five hundred years the essence and core of the Problem of the Near East.

Crossing the Hellespont into Europe in the middle of the fourteenth century, the Turks, in the course of two hundred years, made themselves masters of all the lands bordering on the Eastern Mediterranean. Adrianople was snatched from the feeble hands of the Byzantine Empire in 1361; the historic victory at Kossovo (1389) meant at once the dissolution of a great Slavonic combination and the overthrow of the Serbian Empire; the destruction of Tirnovo in 1393 marked the extinction of Bulgarian independence; finally, in 1453, the Imperial capital surrendered to the Turks; and Constantinople, with all that it meant to Europe in commerce, in communications, and in ecclesiastical sentiment was in the hands of the Infidel. For two hundred and fifty years after the capture of Constantinople the Turks were a terror to Christian Europe, but towards the end of the seventeenth century the problem changed. The decrepitude of the Turks was manifest to all men, and the rapid decline of their power presented to Europe a problem almost as baffling as their marvellous rise. Ever since the early years of the eighteenth century, Europe has been haunted by the apprehension of the consequences likely to ensue

Origins
of the
Problem

Advance
of the
Ottoman
Turks

↓
Their
Decline

¹ Lord Morley.

upon the demise of the "sick man," and the subsequent disposition of his heritage.

Progress of
Russia

The first claimant was Russia, and from 1702 to 1820 the Eastern Question largely turned upon the relations of Russia and Turkey. United to many of the subjects of the Sultan by ties of religion and of race, the Russian Sovereigns made rapid progress in the course of the eighteenth century towards the domination of the Black Sea. Their obvious goal, if not Constantinople itself, was the command of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. When Peter the Great took up the reins of government in 1689, Russia had little claim to be regarded as a European power. She had access neither to the Baltic nor to the Black Sea. The foundation of St. Petersburg secured the one, the conquest of Azov (1696) opened the door to the other. Temporarily lost in 1711, Azov was finally secured by Russia by the Treaty of Belgrade (1739). By the same Treaty the Russians were permitted to trade on the Sea of Azov and the Black Sea, provided, however, that all their goods were carried in Turkish vessels. The Empress, Catherine II., carried on the work begun by Peter the Great. At the bidding of France, whose diplomacy had for nearly two hundred years been dominant at Constantinople, the Turks attacked Russia in 1768, and brought upon themselves a crushing defeat which was signalised by the conclusion of the Treaty of Kutschuk-Kainardji.

Treaty of
Kutschuk-
Kainardji,
1774

By that famous Treaty, Russia obtained a firm grip upon the northern shores of the Black Sea; the right to establish Consuls and Vice-Consuls wherever she might think fit; free commercial navigation on the Black Sea, and a strong diplomatic footing in Constantinople itself. The Crimea was annexed by Catherine in 1782, and ten years later the Russian frontier was advanced to the Dniester, an advance which gave Russia the great fortress of Oczakov. Thus, by the close of the century, Russia was firmly entrenched upon the shores of the Euxine and was already beginning to look beyond them. "I came to Russia," said Catherine, "a poor girl. Russia has

dowered me richly, but I have paid her back with Azov, the Crimea, and the Ukraine." Proudly spoken, it was less than the truth.

The next phase of the Eastern Question was dominated by Napoleon. He it was who first directed the attention of the French people to the high significance of the problem of the Near East. The acquisition of the Ionian Isles, the expedition to Egypt and Syria, the grandiose schemes for an attack on Buddhist India, the agreement with the Czar Alexander for a partition of the Ottoman Empire—all combined to stir the imagination alike of traders and diplomatists in France. And not in France only. If Napoleon was a great educator of the French, hardly less was he an educator of the English. Hitherto the English had been curiously careless as to the fate of the Near East. Napoleon was quick to perceive where their vital interests lay. "Really to conquer England," said Napoleon, "we must make ourselves masters of Egypt." His schemes failed, but the attempt opened the eyes of the English, though it was not until the Greek insurrection of 1821 that the English Foreign Office or the English public began to take a sustained interest in the development of events in South-Eastern Europe.

With the Greek insurrection the Eastern Question enters on an entirely new phase. Hitherto, it had meant the relations of the dominant Turks with the Habsburgs, with Venice, with France, and with Russia. Of the submerged and conquered peoples of the Balkans, Europe had taken no heed. In the course of the nineteenth century, however, the Eastern Question was largely concerned with the re-emergence of these conquered peoples—Greeks, Serbs, Bulgarians, and Roumanians. Greece led the way. In 1832 the Greeks succeeded, thanks in large measure to the cordial sympathy of England and France, and in even larger measure to the renewal of war between Russia and the Porte, in establishing themselves as an independent kingdom.

In that same year the Sultan appealed to the Powers against his own overmighty vassal, Mehemet Ali, the

Napoleon
and the
Near East

The Greek
Insurrec-
tion, 1821

Mehemet
Ali

Pasha of Egypt. Rewarded for services rendered to his Suzerain during the Greek revolt by the island of Crete, this brilliant Albanian adventurer began to conceive a larger ambition. He aspired to an independent rule in Egypt, to the Pashalik of Syria, perhaps to the lordship of Constantinople itself. The attempt to realise these ambitions kept Europe in a state of almost continuous unrest for ten years (1831-41).

Treaty of
Unkiar-
Skelessi,
1833

To save himself from Mehemet Ali, the Sultan appealed to the Powers. Russia alone responded to the appeal, and in return for her services imposed upon the Porte the humiliating Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi (1833). By that Treaty Russia became virtually mistress of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. The Sultan undertook, while permitting free egress to the Russian Fleet, to close the straits to the ships of war of all nations. The Black Sea had become to all intents and purposes a Russian Lake, and the key of the narrow straits had passed into Russian keeping.

England
and
Russia

The triumph of Russia aroused the jealous interest of England. For the first time England became seriously alarmed by Russian progress in South-Eastern Europe; and for the next half-century the problem of the Near East revolved round the antagonism of these two Powers. The Czar Nicholas of Russia made more than one effort to bring about an accommodation with England, but he failed to dispel the mistrust with which the designs of Russia had come to be regarded in this country.

The
Crimean
War

The first result of this failure was the Crimean War. The significance of that war has been very variously estimated. Sir Robert Morier described it as "the only perfectly useless modern war that has been waged." Lord Cromer, on the other hand, maintained that if it had not been "for the Crimean War and the policy subsequently adopted by Lord Beaconsfield's government, the independence of the Balkan States would never have been achieved, and the Russians would now be in possession of Constantinople." Be that as it may, this much, at any rate, is certain: the Crimean War, for good or evil,

registered a definite set-back to the policy of Russia in the Near East. It also gave the Sultan an opportunity to put his house in order had he been minded to do so. For twenty years he was relieved of all anxiety on the side of Russia. The event proved that the Sultan's zeal for reform was in direct ratio to his anxiety for self-preservation. To relieve him from the one was to remove the only incentive to the other. Consequently little or nothing was done to ameliorate the lot of the subject populations, and towards the end of the nineteenth century those populations began to take matters into their own hands. Crete, "the Great Greek Island," had been indeed in a state of perpetual revolt ever since in 1840 it had been replaced under the direct government of the Sultan. In 1875 the unrest spread to the Peninsula, and the whole Eastern Question was again reopened by the outbreak of insurrection among the peoples of Bosnia and the Herzegovina. Thence it spread to their kinsmen in Serbia and Montenegro.

How far this insurrection was spontaneous, how far it was stimulated from St. Petersburg, is a question which it is not easy to decide. Plainly, Russia was not sorry to have the opportunity of fishing again in troubled waters. It had been obvious for some time past that the Czar Alexander did not intend to accept as final the results of the Crimean War. He had, as we have seen, taken advantage in 1870 of the preoccupation of Europe to denounce, with the connivance of Bismarck, those clauses of the Treaty of Paris which decreed the neutrality of the Black Sea. That neutrality Disraeli declared to be "the very basis and gist of the Treaty of Paris." The rising of the Southern Slavs in 1875 gave the Czar a still larger opportunity.

Turkish misgovernment in the European provinces had become a crying scandal. The subject peoples groaned under the oppressiveness and uncertainty of a fiscal system which nevertheless ruined the Treasury, for it is one of the salutary paradoxes incidental to misgovernment that it is as ruinous to the sovereign as it is hurtful to the subject.

The
Balkan
Insurrec-
tion, 1875

Turkish
Misgovern-
ment

The inherent extravagance of a bad system combined with the peculation of an army of officials to bring disaster upon Turkey, and in October, 1875, the Sultan was compelled to inform his creditors that he could not pay the full interest on the debt. Partial repudiation complicated an international situation already sufficiently embarrassing. The three Emperors took counsel together, and on 30th December, 1875, the Austrian Chancellor, Count Andrassy, issued from Budapest the Note which bears his name.

The
Andrassy
Note

The Andrassy Note expressed the anxiety of the Powers to curtail the area of the insurrection, and to maintain the peace of Europe; it drew attention to the failure of the Porte to carry out reforms long overdue, and it insisted that pressure must be put upon the Sultan effectually to redeem his promises. In particular, he must be pressed to grant complete religious liberty; to abolish tax farming; to apply the direct taxes, locally levied in Bosnia and Herzegovina, to the local needs of those Provinces; to improve the condition of the rural population by multiplying peasant owners, and above all to appoint a special commission, composed in equal numbers of Mussulmans and Christians, to control the execution not only of the reforms now demanded by the Powers, but also of those spontaneously promised by the Sultan in the decrees of 2nd October and 12th December. To this Note the British Government gave in their general adhesion, though they pointed out that the Sultan had, during the last few months, promised the more important of the reforms indicated therein.

The Note was accordingly presented to the Porte at the end of January, 1876, and the Sultan, with almost suspicious promptitude, accepted four out of the five points—the exception being the application of the direct taxes to local objects.

The friendly efforts of the diplomatists were foiled, however, by the attitude of the insurgents. The latter refused, not unnaturally, to be satisfied with mere assurances, or to lay down their arms without substantial guarantees. The Sultan insisted again, not without

reason, that it was impossible to initiate a scheme of reform while the Provinces were actually in armed rebellion. Meanwhile, the mischief was spreading. Bulgaria broke out into revolt in April; on 7th May a fanatical Muhammadan *émeute* at Salonika led to the murder of the French and German Consuls; the Sultan Abdul Aziz was deposed on 30th May, and on 4th June was found dead, "having apparently committed suicide." More drastic measures were obviously necessary, if a great European conflagration was to be avoided.

On 11th May the Austrian and Russian Chancellors were in conference with Prince Bismarck at Berlin, and determined to make further and more peremptory demands upon the Sultan. There was to be an immediate armistice of two months' duration, during which certain measures of pacification and repatriation were to be executed under the superintendence of the delegates of the Powers. If by the expiry of the armistice the object of the Powers had not been attained, diplomatic action would have to be reinforced. France and Italy assented to the Note, but the British Government regarded the terms as unduly peremptory; they resented the independent action of the three Imperial Powers, and declined to be a party to the Memorandum. Accordingly the proposed intervention was abandoned.

The Berlin
Memoran-
dum

Mr. Disraeli's refusal created, as was inevitable, profound perturbation abroad, and evoked a storm of criticism at home. There can be no question that the European Concert, whatever it was worth, was broken by the policy of Great Britain. Had the British Cabinet gone wholeheartedly with the other Powers, irresistible pressure would have been put upon the Porte, and some terrible atrocities might, perhaps, have been averted. On the other hand, it is clear that the Imperial Chancellors were guilty, to say the least, of grave discourtesy towards Great Britain; nor can it be denied that, assuming a sincere desire for the preservation of peace, they committed an inexcusable blunder in not inviting the co-operation of England before formulating the demands of the Berlin Memorandum.

Attitude of
the Eng-
lish Gov-
ernment

Spread of
the Balkan
Insurrec-
tion

Events were in the meantime moving rapidly in the Balkans. On 30th June, 1876, Serbia formally declared war upon the Porte, and on 1st July Prince Nicholas of Montenegro followed the example. Nor was the insurrection confined to Slavs of the purest blood. On 1st May some of the Bulgarian Christians, imitating the peasants of the Herzegovina, defied the orders of the Turkish officials, and put one hundred of them to death. This was a serious matter. The Herzegovina was relatively remote, but now the spirit of insubordination seemed to be infecting the heart of the Empire. The Porte, already engaged in war with Serbia and Montenegro, was terrified at the idea of an attack upon the right flank of its army, and determined upon a prompt and terrible suppression of the Bulgarian revolt. A force of 18,000 regulars was marched into Bulgaria, and hordes of irregulars, Bashi-Bazouks, and Circassians were let loose to wreak the vengeance of the Sultan upon a peasantry unprepared for resistance and mostly unarmed. Whole villages were wiped out, and in the town of Batak only 2,000 out of 7,000 inhabitants escaped massacre.

Bulgarian
Atrocities

On 23rd June a London newspaper published the first account of the horrors alleged to have been perpetrated by the Turks in Bulgaria. How much of exaggeration there was in the tale of atrocities with which England and the world soon rang it was and is impossible to say. But something much less than the ascertained facts would be sufficient to account for the profound emotion which moved the whole Christian world.

Turco-Serb
War

Meanwhile another complication had arisen. At the end of June, Serbia and Montenegro, as we have seen, had declared war upon the Porte. How far would that conflict extend? Could it be confined within the original limits? The Serbian Army consisted largely of Russian volunteers and was commanded by a Russian general. How long would it be before the Russian Government became a party to the quarrel? The Serbian Army, even reinforced by the volunteers, could offer but a feeble resistance to the Turk, and in August Prince Milan, acting on a hint

from England, asked for the mediation of the Powers.¹ England, thereupon, urged the Sultan to come to terms with Serbia and Montenegro, lest a worse thing should befall him. The Sultan declined an armistice, but formulated his terms, and intimated that if the Powers approved them he would grant an immediate suspension of hostilities. But Serbia would accept nothing less than an armistice, and, after six weeks' suspension, hostilities recommenced. Nevertheless, the English Government was untiring in its efforts to promote a pacification, and suggested to the Powers some heads of proposals (21st September): the *status quo* in Serbia and Montenegro; local or administrative autonomy for Bosnia and Herzegovina; guarantees against maladministration in Bulgaria, and a comprehensive scheme of reform, all to be embodied in a protocol concluded between the Porte and the Powers. Russia then proposed (26th September) that, in the event of a refusal from Turkey, the allied fleets should enter the Bosphorus, that Bosnia should be temporarily occupied by Austria, and Bulgaria by Russia. Turkey, thereupon, renewed her dilatory tactics, but Russia's patience was almost exhausted; General Ignatieff arrived at Constantinople, on a special mission from the Czar, on 15th October, and on the 30th presented his ultimatum. If an armistice were not concluded with Serbia within forty-eight hours, the Russian Embassy was to be immediately withdrawn. On 2nd November the Porte gave way; Serbia was saved; a breathing-space was permitted to the operations of diplomacy.

The interval was utilised by the meeting of a Conference of the Powers at Constantinople. The Powers agreed to the terms suggested by Lord Derby in September, but the Sultan, though prodigal in the concession of reforms, on paper, was determined that no one but himself should have a hand in executing them. On this point he was inexorable. Thereupon General Ignatieff, refusing to take further part in a solemn farce, withdrew from the Conference. The Czar had already (10th November) announced

Conference
at Constantinople,
Dec. 1876

¹ *Turkey*, 1877 (No. 1), p. 380.

his intention to proceed single-handed if the Porte refused the demands of the Powers ; his army was already mobilised on the Pruth, and war appeared imminent.

The diplomatists, however, made one more effort to avert it. Their demands were reduced to a minimum : putting aside an extension of territory for Serbia or Montenegro, they insisted upon the concession of autonomy to Bosnia, to the Herzegovina, and to Bulgaria, under the control of an international commission. On 20th January the Sultan categorically refused, and on the 21st the Conference broke up. Great Britain, nevertheless, persisted in her efforts to preserve peace, and on 31st March, 1877, the Powers signed in London a protocol proposed by Count Schouvaloff. The Turk, in high dudgeon, rejected the London Protocol (10th April), and on 14th April the Czar, having secured the friendly neutrality of Austria,¹ declared war.

Russia had behaved, in face of prolonged provocation, with commendable patience and restraint, and had shown a genuine desire to maintain the European Concert. The Turk had exhibited throughout his usual mixture of shrewdness and obstinacy, but it is difficult to believe that he would have maintained his obstinate front but for expectations based upon the supposed goodwill of the British Government. Had the English Cabinet, even in January, 1877, frankly and unambiguously gone hand in hand with Russia there would have been no war.

Russo-
Turkish
War

Meanwhile the armistice arranged in November between Turkey and Serbia had been further prolonged on 28th December, and on 27th February, 1877, peace was concluded at Constantinople. But on 12th June, Montenegro, encouraged by the action of Russia, recommenced hostilities, and on 22nd June the Russian Army effected the passage of the Danube.

No other way towards Constantinople was open to

¹ By the Agreement of Reichstadt (8th July, 1876), confirmed by definite treaty, 15th January, 1877. The terms of the Austro-Russian agreement have never been authoritatively revealed : cf. Rose: *Development of European Nations*, p. 180.

them, for the Russian Navy had not yet had time since 1871 to regain the position in the Black Sea denied to it in 1856. The co-operation of Roumania was, therefore, indispensable. The Roumanian Army held the right flank for Russia, but an offer of more active co-operation was declined with some hauteur by the Czar. From the Danube the Russians pushed on slowly but successfully until their advanced guard suffered a serious check before Plevna on 30th July. On the following day Osman Pasha, strongly entrenched at Plevna, inflicted a very serious reverse upon them.

Instead, therefore, of carrying Plevna by storm the Russians were compelled to besiege it, and the task proved to be a tough one. In chastened mood the Czar accepted, in August, the contemned offer of Prince Carol, who was appointed to the supreme command of the Russo-Roumanian Army. For five months Osman held 120,000 Russians and Roumanians at bay, inflicting meantime very heavy losses upon them; but at last his resistance was worn down, and on 10th December the remnant of the gallant garrison—some 40,000 half-starved men—were compelled to surrender.

Four days later Serbia, for the second time, declared war upon the Porte, and recaptured Prizrend, the ancient capital of the kingdom. The Russians, meanwhile, were pushing the Turks back towards Constantinople; they occupied Sofia on 5th January, and Adrianople on the 20th. In the Caucasus their success was not less complete; the great fortress of Kars had fallen on 18th November; the Turkish Empire seemed to lie at their mercy, and in March, Russia dictated to the Porte the Treaty of San Stephano.

A basis of agreement had already been reached at Adrianople (31st January); the terms were now embodied in a treaty signed, on 3rd March, at a village not far from Constantinople. Montenegro, enlarged by the acquisition of some strips of Bosnia and the Adriatic port of Antivari, was to be recognised definitely as independent of the Porte; so also was Serbia, which was to acquire the districts of

Siege of
Plevna

Re-entry
of Serbia
into the
War

Treaty of
San Ste-
phano,
March,
1878

Nish and Mitrovitzá; the reforms recommended to the Porte at the Conference of Constantinople were to be immediately introduced into Bosnia and the Herzegovina, and to be executed under the conjoint control of Russia and Austria; the fortresses on the Danube were to be razed; reforms were to be granted to the Armenians; Russia was to acquire, in lieu of the greater part of the money indemnity which she claimed, Batoum, Kars, and other territory in Asia, and part of Dobrudja, which was to be exchanged with Roumania (whose independence was recognised by the Porte) for the strip of Bessarabia retroceded in 1856. The most striking feature of the treaty was the creation of a greater Bulgaria, which was to be constituted an autonomous tributary principality with a Christian government and a national militia, and was to extend from the Danube to the Ægean, nearly as far south as Midia (on the Black Sea) and Adrianople, and to include, on the west, the district round Monastir but not Salonika.¹ The Ottoman Empire in Europe was practically annihilated.

Attitude of
Great
Britain

These events caused, as we have seen, grave disquietude in Great Britain. Before the Russian armies crossed the Danube the Czar had undertaken to respect English interests in Egypt and in the Canal, and not to occupy Constantinople or the Straits (8th June, 1877); but the Russian victories in the closing months of 1877 excited in England some alarm as to the precise fulfilment of his promises. Accordingly, in January, 1878, Lord Derby, then Foreign Secretary, deemed it at once friendly and prudent to remind the Czar of his promise, and to warn him that any treaty concluded between Russia and Turkey which might affect the engagements of 1856 and 1871 "would not be valid without the assent of the Powers who were parties to those Treaties." (14th January.)

In order to emphasise the gravity of the warning, the Fleet, which had been at Besika Bay, was ordered to pass the Dardanelles (23rd January), and the Government asked Parliament for a vote of credit of £6,000,000.

¹ See *Turkey Papers*, No. 22, 1878; Holland: *European Concert*, pp. 335 *seq.*

A fortnight later the British Cabinet, in response to urgent telegrams from Mr. Layard, the British Ambassador in Constantinople, decided to send a detachment of the Fleet into the Sea of Marmora for the protection of British subjects in Constantinople. Russia retorted, that if British ships sailed up the Straits, Russian troops would enter Constantinople for the purpose of protecting the lives of Christians of every race. But the Sultan, equally afraid of friends and foes, begged the English Fleet to retire, and it returned, accordingly, to Besika Bay.

The extreme tension was thus for the moment relaxed. Austria then demanded that the whole matter should be referred to a European Congress, and Great Britain assented on the express condition that all questions dealt with in the Treaty of San Stephano "should be considered as subjects to be considered in the Congress."

To the condition that the treaty in its entirety should be submitted to a congress, Russia demurred. Great Britain insisted. Again peace hung in the balance. Apart from the dispute between England and Russia there was a great deal of inflammable material about, to which a spark would set light. Greece, Serbia, and, above all, Roumania, who with incredible tactlessness and base ingratitude had been excluded from the peace negotiations, were all gravely dissatisfied with the terms of the Treaty of San Stephano. Greece had indeed actually invaded Thessaly at the beginning of February, and only consented to abstain from further hostilities upon the assurance of the Powers that her claims should have favourable consideration in the definitive Treaty of Peace.

Lord Beaconsfield then announced, on 17th April, that he had ordered 7000 Indian troops to embark for Malta. The *coup* was denounced in England as "sensational," un-English, unconstitutional, even illegal; but if it alarmed England it impressed Europe, and there can be no question that it made for peace.

The operation of other forces was tending in the same direction. The terms of settlement proposed by Russia were not less distasteful to Austria than to England. An

Russia,
Germany,
and
Austria

Austrian Army was mobilised on the Russian flank in the Carpathians, and on 4th February the Emperor Francis Joseph demanded that the terms of peace should be referred to a Congress at Vienna. Austria might well take a firm line, for behind Austria was Germany.

Bismarck's
Policy

Bismarck had made up his mind. He would fain have preserved in its integrity the *Dreikaiserbund* of 1872; he was under deep obligations to Russia, and was only too glad to assist and even to stimulate her ambitions so long as they conflicted only with those of Great Britain or France. But when it came to a possible conflict between Russia and Germany matters were different. It was true that Russia had protected Prussia's right flank in 1864, and her left flank in 1866, and—highest service of all—had "contained" Austria in 1870. The Czar thought, not unnaturally, that in the spring of 1878 the time had arrived for a repayment of the debt, and requested Bismarck to contain Austria. Bismarck was still anxious to "keep open the wire between Berlin and St. Petersburg," provided it was not at the expense of that between Berlin and Vienna. He replied, therefore, to the Czar that Germany must keep watch on the Rhine, and could not spare troops to contain Austria as well. The excuse was transparent. Bismarck had, in fact, decided to give Austria a free hand in the Balkans, and even to push her along the road towards Salonika. His attitude was regarded in Russia as a great betrayal, a dishonourable repudiation of an acknowledged debt. It is not, however, too much to say that it averted a European conflagration. The Czar decided not to fight Austria and England, but, instead, to accept the invitation to a Congress at Berlin.

The Treaty
of Berlin

On 30th May Lord Salisbury and Count Schouvaloff came to an agreement upon the main points at issue, and on 13th June the Congress opened at Berlin. Prince Bismarck presided, and filled his chosen rôle of "the honest broker"; but it was Lord Beaconsfield whose personality dominated the Congress. "Der alte Jude, das ist der Mann," was Bismarck's shrewd summary of the situation.

Little time was spent in discussion; the treaty was signed on 13th July. Russia's sole acquisition in Europe was the strip of Bessarabia which had been retroceded to Roumania in 1856, and was now, by an act of grave impolicy and base ingratitude, snatched away from her by the Czar. In Asia she retained Batoum, Ardahan, and Kars. Bosnia and the Herzegovina were handed over for an undefined term to Austria, who was also to be allowed to occupy for military, but not administrative, purposes the Sanjak of Novi Bazar. England, under a separate Convention concluded with Turkey on 4th June, was to occupy and administer the island of Cyprus, so long as Russia retained Kars and Batoum. Turkey was to receive the surplus revenues of the island, to carry out reforms in her Asiatic dominions, and to be protected in the possession of them by Great Britain. France sought for authority to occupy Tunis in the future; Italy hinted at claims upon Albania and Tripoli. Germany asked for nothing, but was more than compensated for her modesty by securing the gratitude and friendship of the Sultan. Never did Bismarck make a better investment.

The Cyprus
Convention

Greece with no false modesty claimed Crete, Thessaly, Epirus, and part of Macedonia; but Lord Beaconsfield, in resisting the claim, suggested that Greece being "a country with a future could afford to wait." The Congress of Berlin did indeed invite the Sultan to grant to Greece such a rectification of frontiers as would include Janina and Larissa in Greek territory; but the Sultan, not unnaturally, ignored the invitation. Two years later (1880), the Powers suggested to the Porte the cession of Thessaly and Epirus; and at last, in 1881, the tact and firmness of Mr. Goschen wrung from the unwilling Sultan one-third of the latter province and the whole of the former. Macedonia was still left, fortunately for Greece, under the heel of the Sultan. Lord Beaconsfield did not exhibit much positive benevolence towards Greece, but negatively she, like Serbia, owes him a considerable debt. If he had not torn up the Treaty of San Stephano, Bulgaria would have obtained a commanding position in Macedonia, Serbia

The Bal-
kan States

would never have got Uskub and Monastir, Greece would still be sighing for Kavala and perhaps for Salonika.

At the moment, however, the Southern Slavs were bitterly disappointed by the terms of the settlement. Serbia did indeed gain some territory at the expense of Bulgaria, but the gain was more than off-set by the position assigned to Austria. The Sanjak of Novi Bazar, still governed by the Turks but garrisoned by Austrians, cut off the Southern Slavs of Serbia from their brethren in Montenegro, while the Austrian "occupation" of Bosnia and the Herzegovina made a further breach in the solidarity of the Jugo-Slav and brought the Habsburgs into the heart of Balkan affairs.

Roumania was equally dissatisfied. Treated with discourtesy and gross ingratitude by Russia at San Stephano, she fared no better at Berlin. Bismarck, indifferent to the dynastic ties which united Prussia and Roumania, was not sorry to see Russia neglecting a golden opportunity for binding Roumania in gratitude to herself. A Roumania alienated from Russia would be the less likely to quarrel with the Dual Monarchy and to press her claims to the inclusion of the unredeemed Roumanians in Transylvania and the Bukovina. Lord Beaconsfield professed much Platonic sympathy for the disappointment of their wishes in regard to Bessarabia, but frankly confessed that he could not turn aside from the pursuit of the larger issues to befriend a State in whose fortunes Great Britain was not directly interested. It was a gross blunder, the consequences of which are not yet exhausted. For the loss of Southern Bessarabia, Roumania deemed herself ill-compensated by the organisation of part of the Dobrudja, but she secured complete independence from the Porte, as did Serbia and Montenegro, who received most of the districts promised to them at San Stephano.

Bulgaria did not. And herein lay the essential difference between the Treaty of Berlin and that of San Stephano.

"Bulgaria," as defined at Berlin, was not more than a third of the Bulgaria mapped out at San Stephano. It was to consist of a relatively narrow strip between the Danube

and the Balkans, and to be an independent State under Turkish suzerainty. South of it there was to be a province, Eastern Roumelia, which was to be restored to the Sultan, who agreed to place it under a Christian governor approved by the Powers. By this change the Sultan recovered 2,500,000 of population and 30,000 square miles of territory; Bulgaria was cut off from the *Ægean*; Macedonia remained intact.

Such were the main terms of the Treaty of Berlin. That Treaty forms a great landmark in the history of the Eastern Question; but its most important features were not those which at the time attracted most attention. The enduring significance of the Treaty is to be found, not in the fact that Lord Beaconsfield snatched from the brink of destruction a remnant of the Ottoman Empire, but that he left a door open to the new nations which were arising upon the ruins of that Empire. The official attitude of Great Britain during the critical years 1875-78 might seem to have committed the English people to the cause of reaction and the Turkish misgovernment: In effect, the policy of Lord Beaconsfield, whatever its motive, was far from obstructive to the development of the Balkan Nationalities. Two of them at least have reason to cherish the memory of the statesman who tore up the Treaty of San Stephano. Had that Treaty been allowed to stand, both Greece and Serbia would have had to renounce their ambitions in Macedonia, while the enormous accessions of territory secured by that Treaty to Bulgaria might ultimately have proved, even to her, a doubtful advantage.

The partition of Bulgaria was, however, manifestly an artificial arrangement, and did not long survive the death (in 1881) of its real author, Lord Beaconsfield. But Bulgaria proper had in the meantime to be provided with a Constitution and a ruler. A single-chamber Legislature and a responsible Executive were bestowed by the Organic Law of 1879 upon a people entirely unfitted for "constitutional" government. That business accomplished, the Czar recommended and the Assembly in April,

Union of
the two
Bulgarias

1879, elected as ruler Prince Alexander of Battenberg, a scion by a morganatic marriage of the House of Darmstadt, a nephew of the Czar, and an officer in the Prussian Army. It was hoped that the "Battenberg" would prove a pliant instrument of Russian diplomacy; but during the years which succeeded the Treaty of Berlin a remarkable change took place in Bulgaria. The accession of the new Czar Alexander III. (1881) altered for the worse the personal relations between St. Petersburg and Sophia; the arrogance of the Russian officials towards the Bulgarian peasants obliterated the remembrance of the service rendered to them by their "liberators" in 1877; above all, a "strong man" had appeared in Bulgaria in the person of Stephen Stambuloff, who in 1884 became President of the Sobranje. In the two Bulgarias there was a keen desire for union, and Stambuloff ardently espoused the cause.

In September 1885 Gamil Pasha, the Turkish Governor of Eastern Roumelia, was expelled, and the Province announced its union with Bulgaria proper. Prince Alexander had no option but to yield to the clearly expressed will of the people, and at once agreed to the union of the two Bulgarias. The diplomatic position was, however, curiously paradoxical: the parts were reversed; Russia was now indignant; Great Britain not merely acquiescent but approving. The explanation is simple. Russia had played her cards in Bulgaria as badly as they could be played. In opposition to her high-handed and self-seeking methods, there had grown up a strong national party. The "Greater Bulgaria" of 1878 would have been a Russian Province, within striking distance of Constantinople. The Bulgaria of 1885 was, as Lord Salisbury (again in office) clearly perceived, a sure bulwark against Russia. "If," wrote Sir Robert Morier from St. Petersburg to Sir William White at Constantinople, "you can help to build up these peoples into a bulwark of independent States and thus screen the 'sick man' from the fury of the Northern blast, for God's sake do it." With Lord Salisbury's help Sir William White did it, and thus in Morier's words: "A State has been evolved out of the

protoplasm of Balkan chaos." It is fair to remember that but for Lord Beaconsfield's action in 1878 that evolution would have been impossible.

Prince Alexander waited for no leave from the Powers. Stambuloff had bluntly told him that there were only two paths open to him: the one to Philippopolis, and as far beyond as God may lead; the other to Darmstadt." Alexander's choice was soon made, and on 20th September he announced his acceptance of the throne of united Bulgaria. Meanwhile Bulgaria was threatened with a new danger. If Russia began to see in a united Bulgaria a barrier in her advance towards the Straits, Austria had no mind to see the multiplication of barriers between Budapest and Salonika.

On 14th November, King Milan of Serbia, who in 1882 had followed the example of Prince Carol of Roumania and had assumed a royal crown, suddenly seized an obviously frivolous pretext to declare war upon Bulgaria. Whether Austria actually instigated this attack, it is impossible to say. There were perhaps sufficient reasons apart from this for Serbian jealousy against the aggrandisement of Bulgaria. The Serbian attack was, however, repulsed by Bulgaria, which in its turn took the offensive against Serbia. Thereupon Austria intervened, and the Bulgarians were informed that a further advance would bring them "face to face no longer with Serbian, but with Austrian troops." Serbia was saved, but so also was the union of the two Bulgarias. Early in 1886 the Porte formally recognised the union of the two Bulgarias, and appointed Prince Alexander to be "Governor-General of Eastern Roumelia." Alexander did not long enjoy his new honour. Alexander III. was deeply mortified by the turn events had taken in the Balkans, and inspired by implacable enmity against his cousin determined to dethrone him. On 21st August, 1886, Prince Alexander was kidnapped by a band of Russian officers and carried off into captivity. A provisional government was hastily set up at Sofia under Stambuloff, and its first act was to recall the kidnapped prince. Permitted temporarily to return to Bulgaria,

Serbo-
Bulgarian
War

Russian
coup at
Sofia, Aug.
1886

Alexander played his cards badly, and on 7th September, under renewed pressure from the Czar, he abdicated and left Bulgaria for ever. The Bulgarians were obliged to seek a new prince, and after several mishaps eventually found a ruler in Prince Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, a grandson of King Louis Philippe. Russia refused to recognise Ferdinand, but strong in the support of Bismarck and the Emperor Francis Joseph, the young Prince defied the opposition of Russia, and on 14th August, 1887, ascended the Bulgarian throne.

Stambuloff For the next seven years, however, Bulgaria was ruled by Stephen Stambuloff, a rough, coarse-grained peasant of indomitable will, strong passions, and burning patriotism. Stambuloff effected a great work for Bulgaria. He introduced internal order and discipline; he laid the foundations of a modern civilised State, and he emancipated his country from foreign tutelage. In 1894, however, he was dismissed by Prince Ferdinand, that crafty diplomatist, after an apprenticeship of seven years, having determined to take up the reins of government. Stambuloff bitterly resented his dismissal, and took no pains to hide the fact; but in July, 1895, he was finally removed from the scene by assassination.

Prince Ferdinand was now master in his own house, and the first use he made of power was to effect a reconciliation with Russia. By this time, however, the centre of interest in the Near East had shifted from Bulgaria to Greece.

The Problem of Crete

Handed back to the Porte in 1840, Crete had been for more than half a century in almost perpetual insurrection. All these insurrections had one supreme object—the reunion of the “Great Greek island” with the Greeks of the mainland.

Cretan Insurrection, 1896-97.

In the spring of 1896 the islanders were once more in arms. Civil war broke out between Moslems and Christians in Canea, and the Powers, to prevent the spread of disturbances, put pressure upon the Sultan to make concessions. The latter accordingly agreed to grant an amnesty, to summon a National Assembly, and to appoint

a Christian governor. But neither Moslems nor Christians took the Sultan's promises seriously, and in February, 1897, war again broke out at Canea, and the Christians again proclaimed union with Greece.

No power on earth could now have prevented the Greek patriots from going to the assistance of the islanders. Prince George, the king's second son, was accordingly sent (10th February) with a torpedo-boat flotilla to intercept Turkish reinforcements, and three days later an army was landed under Colonel Vassos. The admirals of the Powers then occupied Canea with an international landing party, and compelled the insurgents to desist from further fighting.

Interest then shifted back to the mainland. The "patriots" believed that the moment for decisive action against the Turks had at last come, and King George yielded to the warlike sentiments of his people, perhaps with the secret hope that the Powers would again intervene to avert war. But if the Greek hot-heads wanted war, the Sultan was prepared for it, and his august ally at Berlin urged him to put to the test the new weapon which German soldiers had forged for him, and, once for all, teach the insolent Greeks their place.

On 17th April the Porte accordingly declared war. "The Thirty Days War" ensued. It was all over before the end of May. Russia had warned her friends in the Balkans that there must be no intervention. The Greeks were diplomatically isolated; they made no use of their superior sea-power, and on land the forces which had invaded Thessaly were quickly pushed back over their own frontiers. The Turkish Army under Edhem Pasha occupied Larissa, and won two decisive victories at Pharsalos and Domokos. So disorganised were the Greek forces that Athens became alarmed for its own safety, and turned savagely upon the King. The Powers, however, having no mind to embark, for the third time, upon the tedious task of providing the Greeks with a king, imposed an armistice upon the combatants (20th May). The definite peace was signed in December.

The war was nothing less than disastrous to Greece:

The
"Thirty
Days War,"
17th April
to 20th
May 1897

Crete

it discredited the dynasty; it involved the retrocession of a strip of Thessaly; and it imposed upon a State, already on the verge of bankruptcy, the burden of a considerable war indemnity. Nor was Greece spared the further humiliation of International Control, exercised by means of a mixed Commission, over her external finance. On the other hand, the war brought to Crete final, though not formal, emancipation.

It was some time, however, before the position in Crete was regularised. In 1898 an ingenious arrangement was devised under which the four protecting Powers—Great Britain, France, Russia, and Italy—nominated Prince George of Greece to act as their High Commissioner in the island. In 1899 a new Constitution on liberal lines was approved by a Constituent Assembly. Its author was a young lawyer destined to fill a conspicuous place in the history, not merely of Greece, but of Europe, Eleutherios Venizelos, and thanks largely to him Crete enjoyed real self-government. In 1905 the islanders, led by Venizelos, proclaimed the union of Crete with the Hellenic Kingdom; but it was not until after the whilom rebel had become Prime Minister of Greece (1910) that the union was formally acknowledged.

Long before this the Eastern Question had entered upon a new phase, and the Ottoman Sultan had found a new ally in the German Emperor. But much was to happen in Germany and elsewhere before the German factor became dominant in the Balkan problem, and to these events we must now return.

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CHAPTER IV

THE ASCENDANCY OF GERMANY (1879-90). THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE. THE GERMAN EMPIRE IN AFRICA

THE CLOSE OF A CHAPTER

To Bismarck the conclusion of the Treaty of 20th May, 1882, was the culmination of his system. . . . The Triple Alliance completed Central Europe ; it closed the Alpine passes ; it barred the great gate to Vienna through which Napoleon had marched in 1796 ; it opened the Mediterranean to Germany ; it rent away from France the ally of the sister Latin race ; . . . Best of all, it shivered the serious menace of 1869 and 1871.—C. GRANT ROBERTSON.

All distant possessions are a burden to the State. A village on the frontier is worth a principality two hundred and fifty miles away.—FREDERICK THE GREAT.

This colonial business would be for us Germans like the wearing of sables by Polish noblemen who have no shirt to their backs.—BISMARCK.

Tropical Africa, which was the dark continent and a great field of geographical discovery a little more than a generation ago, has marched with great suddenness to the centre of the European stage, and must henceforth profoundly influence the problems of its statesmanship.—GENERAL SMUTS.

THE Balkan crisis of 1875 broke in awkwardly upon Bismarck's diplomatic schemes. To the Eastern Question he always expressed complete indifference. "I never take the trouble," he said, "to open the mail bag from Constantinople." "The whole of the Balkans," he petulantly declared, "is not worth the bones of a single Pomeranian grenadier." Whatever the value of these professions, Bismarck lost no opportunity of turning the Near East to account as a convenient arena in which to reward the services of friends or to assuage the disappointment of temporary opponents without expense to Prussian pockets or detriment to Prussian interests.

Bismarck's
Diplomacy

Two illustrations of this policy will suffice. In 1866, Bismarck not only turned Austria out of Germany, but, in order to secure the assistance of Victor Emmanuel, he deprived the Habsburgs of the last remnant of their heritage in Italy. He had, however, no desire to see Austria unnecessarily humiliated, still less permanently disabled. Provided it were clearly understood that henceforward she had no part or lot in German affairs, Austria might regard him as a friend and ally.

The *Drang
nach Osten*
of the
Habsburgs

Two results ensued. The new frontier of Italy was drawn with a niggardly hand. If Bismarck had really been animated in 1866 by friendly feelings towards Italy, he would unquestionably have insisted, without any nice regard for ethnography, upon the transference to the Italian kingdom of the whole of the Venetian inheritance, including Istria and Dalmatia. As it was, even "Venetia" itself was interpreted in the narrowest possible sense, and the northern frontier of the Italian kingdom was so drawn as to deprive Italy of a compact mass of 370,000 Italians, to exclude these people and their products from their natural market in North Italy, and to thrust into the heart of an Italian province the military outpost of an unfriendly neighbour. From this niggardly interpretation of "Venetia" arose the Trentino problem, which found a solution only in the Treaty of Paris (1919).

Bismarck, however, was concerned much less with the future of Italy than with the future of Austria-Hungary, and he deliberately encouraged the *Drang nach Osten*, which, from 1866 onwards, became a marked feature of Habsburg policy. Istria and Dalmatia, therefore, were retained by Austria. Thus did Bismarck conciliate a temporary enemy and a potential ally. Four years later he took the opportunity of rewarding the services of a most constant friend. The Black Sea clauses of the Treaty of Paris were, as we have seen, torn up in favour of Russia. That transaction was not, of course, inspired entirely by benevolence towards Russia. Bismarck's supreme object was to keep Russia at arm's length from France, and, what was at the moment more important, from England.

Bismarck
and
Russia

Nothing was more likely to conduce to this end than to encourage the pretensions of Russia in the Near East, and, indeed, in the Further East. The Black Sea served his purpose in 1870; the "Penjdeh incident" was similarly utilised in 1885.

Another critical situation arose in 1877. Since 1872 The Crisis of 1877-78 the *Dreikaiserbund* had formed the pivot of Bismarck's foreign policy. But the interests of two out of the three emperors were now in sharp conflict in the Balkans. It is true that in July, 1876, the Emperors of Russia and Austria had met at Reichstadt, and that the Emperor Francis Joseph had agreed to give the Czar a free hand in the Balkans on condition that Bosnia and the Herzegovina were guaranteed to Austria. But by 1878, Russia was in occupation of Bulgaria and Roumelia, and in less complaisant mood than in 1876; an immense impulse had been given to the idea of Pan-Slavism by recent events; the Southern Slavs were beginning to dream of the possibility of a Jugo-Slav empire in the west of the peninsula. Under the new circumstances, Bosnia and the Herzegovina might easily slip from Austria's grip; the *Drang nach Osten* might receive a serious set-back; the road to the Ægean might be finally barred; even access to the Adriatic might be endangered. Thus Bismarck had virtually to choose between his two friends. At the Berlin Congress he played, as we saw, the rôle of the "honest broker." For aught he cared Russia might go to Constantinople, a move which would have the advantage of embroiling her with England; but Austria must have Bosnia and the Herzegovina. Austria got them, and the road to Salonika was kept open.

Prince Gortschakoff never forgave his pupil for the rupture of the *Dreikaiserbund*; but the mind of Bismarck was already turning towards another diplomatic combination. He had devoted ten years of his life to the task of creating a united Germany under the hegemony of Prussia; the remaining twenty he gave to the consolidation of the position thus acquired.

The main plank in his diplomatic platform was friend-

The Dual
Alliance,
1879

ship with the Habsburg Empire. After the Treaty of Berlin, Europe was in a condition of very unstable equilibrium; no single Power, except perhaps Austria-Hungary, was satisfied with the "settlement"; least of all Russia. Russia cherished not unnatural resentment against all the Great Powers; primarily against Great Britain and Austria, but most deeply against Germany, who had been guilty not merely of betrayal, but of the basest ingratitude. Even France did not entirely escape; for Russia imagined that her pretensions in the Near East had been at the outset encouraged by France, though the latter had failed to support them when the crisis actually arrived. Two other factors not to be neglected were, on the one hand, the embarrassments caused to England by events in Afghanistan, in South Africa, and in Ireland; and, on the other, the increasing tension between France and Italy, due partly to rivalry in North Africa, but more immediately to the failure of negotiations for a commercial treaty, and the consequent eruption of a tariff war.

In August, 1879, Bismarck met Count Andrassy, the Austrian Chancellor, at Gastein, and on 7th October an alliance between the two empires was concluded. Bismarck's greatest difficulty in effecting this most significant arrangement arose not on the side of the Austrian but of the German Emperor. His Imperial master could not forget the injury he had inflicted upon Austria in 1866, nor would he forget the debt he had incurred to Russia in 1863, in 1866, and in 1870. Moreover, the Czar Alexander II. had, on 15th August, addressed a personal letter to the Emperor William protesting his own friendship for Germany and his concern at the growing unfriendliness of Bismarck. Early in September the two sovereigns met at Alexandrovno in Poland, and the German Emperor returned from the interview convinced of his nephew's good faith, and resolved to take no step calculated to cause a breach in the good relations between the two countries. But Bismarck was inexorable; there was no room either for eternal hatreds or for eternal gratitude in politics.

He was convinced that there had been negotiations between St. Petersburg and Paris, and that the Czar, partly to pay Bismarck out for his conduct in regard to the Balkans, partly to divert the attention of his own subjects from questions of domestic reform, partly to lay the spectre of Nihilism by a brilliant feat of arms, was contemplating an attack upon Germany. At last the Kaiser reluctantly and regretfully gave way, and gave his consent to the momentous treaty with Austria (15th October). Its terms were to be kept secret, and not until 1888 were they officially published. The compact provided that if either ally were attacked by Russia, the other must assist it with all its forces; if any Power, other than Russia, were the assailant, then the ally was to observe neutrality, and was not bound to mobilise until Russia entered the field. In plain English, if France attacked Germany, Austria must contain Russia.¹

Bismarck always maintained that the Dual Alliance in no wise involved the dissolution of the *Dreikaiserbund* of 1872, and his contention was, in some degree, substantiated by the conclusion, in 1884, of the famous "reinsurance" treaty between the three Emperors. By this compact it is believed that the three Powers mutually bound themselves to maintain a benevolent neutrality if any one of the three made war upon a fourth Power, and to oppose stoutly any assault upon the institution of monarchy. There were also, it would seem, provisions in regard to the Balkans. The Treaty was to hold good for three years.² This compact was a conspicuous triumph for Bismarckian diplomacy. The Czar Alexander III. was tied to the tail of the Triple Alliance, without being admitted to the confidence of the Allies. Between 1879 and 1884, however, events had happened which it is necessary to recapitulate, and which may in part explain this paradoxical situation.

During the last twenty years of the nineteenth century

¹ P. Albin : *Les Grand Traités Politique*, pp. 58-60.

² For a discussion of the "Reinsurance Treaties," cf. Robertson : *Bismarck*, pp. 435 *seq.*, and Appendix B.

"Reinsurance"
Treaty of
Skiernie-
wice, 14th
September,
1884

The Ex-
pansion of
Europe

a new factor began to intrude itself into the problem of international politics of Europe. Ever since the sixteenth century the relations of the European Powers—notably those of Spain, England, France, and the United Provinces—had been materially affected by their rivalry in distant oceans and in non-European continents. But the continents and oceans were distant, and the reactions they evoked in European affairs were, therefore, relatively feeble. It was otherwise in the last years of the nineteenth century. The uttermost parts of the earth were no longer distant from Europe, but were in close and almost continuous contact with the nerve-centres of world-affairs: with London, Paris, and Berlin.

From the 'eighties onwards, therefore, we must be prepared to give a larger interpretation to "European History" and "European Politics." Africa and Asia, the Atlantic and the Pacific, begin to react upon Europe in a way they had never done before. Not in England only did men begin "to think in continents." Imperialistic ambition—the lust for territory—was in large measure the outcome of economic necessity. The industrialisation of the great European countries, in particular Great Britain and Germany, brought in its train three results: a demand for food for the new town populations, a demand which German agriculturists could barely meet and which British agriculturists entirely failed to supply; a demand for raw materials, most of which were produced only in non-European lands, and a demand for markets for the disposal of their manufactured products. Had the dream of the Manchester School materialised; had

"the wise who think, the wise who reign,

From growing commerce loose(d) her latest chain,"

the competition among the European peoples for commodities and for markets might have been peaceable if not entirely friendly. The reaction against Free Trade and the advent of high Protectionism rendered it practically certain that the struggle would be bitter and probably not bloodless.

The scramble began in Africa. Africa was near; Africa

was full of wealth ; it offered strategical points of immense potential importance, and though it teemed with native peoples it was, in a European sense, "almost unoccupied." From this description the northern coast must clearly be excepted ; but the northern coast of Africa, from Morocco to the peninsula of Sinai and Syria, where it joins the continent of Asia, geographically belongs, as Principal Grant Robertson has observed, "to the Mediterranean area and system, cut off by the girdle of mountains and the deserts of their hinterland from the rest of the vast continent of which it is a part. The history of this portion is primarily European, secondarily Asiatic, and only in the last degree African."¹ But of the rest of Africa it was true that prior to the period at which we have arrived, European enterprise was represented by a fringe of settlements and trading stations. The Portuguese had been at Delagoa Bay for nearly four hundred years ; the Dutch, at the Cape of Good Hope for nearly two hundred and fifty ; the English, in Cape Colony and Natal during the greater part of the century ; while French, Dutch, British, and Portuguese trading stations had been dotted along the coasts from Senegal round to the Straits of Bab-el-Mandeb.

The
Scramble
for Africa

A new era in the history of Africa opens with the 'eighties. The struggle between Britons and Boers for supremacy in South Africa (1880-1902), and the regeneration of Egypt and the Soudan under British rule (1882-98), will form the subject of subsequent chapters. We are concerned here with the partition of Africa between the several European Powers carried out between 1880 and 1890.

France opened the ball. The French had long been interested in North Africa, which they regarded as within the sphere of their Mediterranean influence. The conquest and organisation of Algeria (1830-47) was the most notable achievement of the Orleans monarchy. French interest in Egypt was of even longer standing, and had been more lately manifested by the construction of the

The French
in Tunis

¹ Robertson and Bartholomew : *Historical Atlas of Modern Europe*, p. 20.

Suez Canal (1859-69), an enterprise initiated by a French engineer and carried through mainly by French capital. The administration of their Algerian colony brought the French into inevitable contact with Tunis, then ruled in virtual autonomy by its Beys under the suzerainty of the Sultan. For some years past the economic penetration of Tunis by Frenchmen and Italians had proceeded apace. Most of the public works, railways, telegraphs, and aqueducts had either been constructed or were maintained by French capitalists, and of the 123 millions of public debt, 100 was held in France. The native administration was shockingly bad, and on several occasions France and Italy had had to intervene to save the State from bankruptcy. As early as 1878, Bismarck had broadly hinted to Italy that the Tunisian pear was ripe; but Italy, out of regard for French susceptibilities, refused to pluck it. If Italy could not be made to quarrel with France, France must be induced to offend Italy. At the Congress of Berlin, Bismarck suggested to Lord Salisbury that an offer of Tunis to France might smooth the path for England in the Near East. Lord Salisbury accordingly assured France that if she wished to establish a Protectorate over Tunis she would encounter no opposition from England.

Bismarck
and Tunis

Bismarck was supremely anxious to divert the attention of France from Alsace-Lorraine, and hardly less anxious to stir up strife between France and Italy. If he could at the same time bring Italy into the bosom of the Triple Alliance, set England and France by the ears, sow the seeds of discord between England and Russia, his diplomatic purpose would be finally achieved. Tunis served to secure the first three ends; Egypt the fourth; the Near and the Middle East the fifth.

Jules Ferry, who had become Prime Minister of France in September, 1880, cherished large colonial ambitions, and proved, therefore, an easy prey to the wiles of Bismarck. Pretexts were not wanting to the French for an attack on Tunis. The undisciplined tribesmen who owned the suzerainty of the Bey were troublesome neighbours to the rulers of Algiers. Reparations were demanded;

the Bey appealed to the Sultan Abdul Hamid ; the latter showed a disposition to fight, but, having no friends in Europe, restrained his ardour. Italy entered a strong protest against the action of France, and appealed to the Powers. The Czar Alexander III., who had but now (1881) succeeded to the unsteady throne of his murdered father, was not in a position to respond ; England was morally pledged to France ; Germany and Austria were her only possible friends.

Bismarck spared no effort to estrange Italy and France, The Triple Alliance and to encourage King Humbert to enter into closer relations with the Dual Allies. As far as Germany was concerned there was no serious obstacle to friendship ; but friendship with Germany meant friendship with Austria ; and between Austria and Italy there was interposed the barrier of Italian irredentism. The Trentino, Gorizia, Trieste ; the Istrian peninsula ; Pola and Fiume ; the Dalmatian coast and archipelago—were not these part of the Venetian heritage ? Or if not Venetian, Italian in tradition and blood ? What right had Austria in the Adriatic ? How could Italy be mistress in her own house so long as Trieste and Pola were in Austrian hands ? Between Italy and Austria there was an antagonism of interest (as the outbreak of the World-War was to make manifest) too fundamental to be overcome even by the mingled honey and gall of Bismarck's diplomacy.

In 1881, however, Italy sorely needed a friend. Except in Germany, where was she to find one ? England, her traditional friend, was, on the Tunisian question, irrevocably committed to France. Moreover, Bismarck had another card up his sleeve ; whether he actually played it will never, perhaps, be known. Bismarck had adhered to his resolution never to go to Canossa ; but since the death of Pius IX. in 1878 he had met his successor Leo XIII. at a half-way house. The days of the *Kulturkampf* were over ; Falk, the instrument of that policy, had been dismissed ; the " May Laws " were in suspense. The prisoner of the Vatican was a nightmare to the Quirinal ; what if Bismarck were to espouse the cause of the

Temporal Power? He was moving towards the Catholic Centre party in Germany; Austria was the last refuge of extreme Ultramontaniam; the Clericals did not even despair of France. That one of the arguments used by Bismarck to estrange Italy from France was the possibility of republican France resuming the Napoleonic rôle of protector of the Temporal Power is almost certain. Is it impossible that he should have clenched the argument by a hint that if France declined the rôle, Germany might assume it? Be this as it may, Italy came to heel; the compact was signed on 20th May, 1882, and the Dual was converted into the Triple Alliance. Concluded in the first instance for five years, it was renewed in 1887, and again in 1891, 1902, and 1912. The precise terms of the Treaty have never been officially published; but it is well understood that Italy promised her full support to Austria and Germany if either were attacked by a third Power; while a similar guarantee was given to Italy by the Central Empires. A year later the Hohenzollern King (Carol) of Roumania was virtually admitted as a sleeping partner into the same firm.

Bismarck's
Diplomacy

The conclusion of the Triple Alliance constituted a veritable triumph for the Iron Chancellor. Germany was now as safe as friendships carefully cultivated, and enmities sedulously fomented, could make her. "Henceforward," as Principal Robertson writes, "German hegemony in Central Europe moved securely on the pivotal point of the Triple Alliance, which gradually and naturally grew into the one grand combination in the European State System, with which all other possible combinations or *ententes* had to reckon."¹

Of such counter-combinations there seemed at the moment little probability. Early in 1880 there were some signs of a *rapprochement* between Russia, France, and Great Britain, but the terrible crime of 1881 frightened Russia off from any closer association with the Western democracies, the existence of which constituted, so Bismarck was always careful to insist, a persistent menace

¹ *Bismarck*, p. 407.

to all respectable monarchies. Besides, England was sufficiently preoccupied with Ireland, South Africa, and Egypt. France was in more cautious mood after the fall of the Ferry Cabinet (November, 1881); and, apart from that, had her own quarrel with England in Egypt.

Bismarck, therefore, could feel reasonably secure, and in 1884 secured his position still further, as we have seen, by the "Reinsurance Treaty" with Russia. Accordingly, there seemed to be no reason why he should not turn a more friendly eye upon the younger enthusiasts in Germany who were beginning to complain that the old Fatherland was too "cribb'd, cabined, and confined," and that Germany was as much entitled to a place in the sun as any of her European neighbours. "I am not a Colony man" Bismarck was wont to say when pressed to overseas enterprise by German merchants. But by 1884 he was confronted by the inexorable facts of a new economic situation, the significance of which he could not gainsay.

Much later than England, or even than France, Germany had at last felt the impulse of the new industrialism. Hamburg, Bremen, Cologne, and Frankfort—to name only a few of her great cities—had long been among the most important commercial and financial centres in the world; but Germany as a whole was predominantly a rural community. After 1871 a change set in, and during the next thirty years the social and economic life of Germany was revolutionised.

In 1871 the population of Germany was 41,000,000; it had risen by 1910 to just short of 65,000,000. During the same period the ratio of urban (*i.e.* living in towns of upwards of 5000 inhabitants) to rural population was completely altered. In 1871 the percentage of urban inhabitants was 23·7, of rural 76·3; in 1890, 32·2 and 67·8 respectively; in 1900, 42·26 and 57·74; and in 1910, 48·8 and 51·2 respectively. In other words, between 1871 and 1900 the urban population increased by 18·56 per cent., and the rural population decreased by 18·25 per cent. In 1871 the population of Berlin was 800,000; in 1890, 1,578,000; in 1905, 2,040,000; while in 1910 the

Germany's
Colonial
Ambitions

The
Industrial
Revolution
in Germany

Urban
and Rural
Population

number of "large" towns, which in 1871 was only 8, had risen to 48, of which 6 had over half a million, and 17 over a quarter of a million, of inhabitants. The statistics of the occupation censuses of 1882 and 1895 reinforce these results. It has been calculated that in 1871 about 60 per cent. of the population earning a livelihood were engaged in agriculture and kindred occupations, and 40 per cent. in industry, trade, and commerce. In 1895 the 60 per cent. had fallen to 37·5. The occupation census of 1907 showed that broadly 9,750,000 of the population were engaged in "agriculture," while 14,750,000 were engaged in industry, mining, trade, and commerce—a complete reversal of the distribution obtaining in 1871.

Foreign
Trade

The statistics of foreign trade tell the same tale. In 1880 the imports were valued at £141,000,000, the exports at £144,800,000—interesting figures, for in that year Germany was still a debtor country, exporting more than she imported. By 1907 the imports were £443,000,000 and the exports £356,000,000. Apart from the gigantic increases, piled up steadily with every decade after 1880, Germany was now a creditor country, balancing the excess of her imports by her invisible exports, interest on capital invested abroad, and profits of her shipping, etc. The advance of that shipping has been as remarkable as other advances. In 1871 German shipping was 892,000 tons, and her share of the mercantile marine of the world was 5·2 per cent.; in 1905 she had 2,200,000 tons of shipping, representing 9·9 per cent. of the world's mercantile marine. In 1913 the tonnage had risen to over 5,000,000 tons, and Germany had attained the second place in the shipping of the world. Moreover, an analysis of the trade returns between 1870 and 1890 discloses four significant facts: first, the rapid increase in the import of raw materials for industry; secondly, the steady increase in the export of manufactured goods; thirdly, the relative decrease in the ratio of imported to exported manufactured goods; and, finally, the steady increase in the import of food, luxuries, and cattle. These tendencies were all accentuated after 1890. With every decade after 1870

Germany has become more and more a workshop of the world, less and less able to feed her increasing population from her own resources, more and more dependent on the import of raw materials for her industries, more and more dependent on keeping and opening up foreign markets for her exports, and spheres of investment for her capital. Dr. Rohrbach in 1903 emphasised the bearing of these data on German policy. A yearly increase of population of 800,000 demanded answers to these questions: Where will this population live? How will it be employed? How will it be fed?

Bismarck saw only the beginning of these things, but he saw enough to convince him that an entirely new situation had arisen; that the increase of Germany's overseas trade justified the demand for a development of sea-power; that the steady outflow of German capital for investment abroad made her economic interests world-wide; and that her increasing dependence on the import of raw materials and upon foreign markets for the disposal of her surplus manufactured products rendered irresistible, if they did not actually justify, the cry for a forward Colonial policy.

There was another reason which appealed even more powerfully to Bismarck. Of all forms of capital, human capital was in his eyes the most valuable. The rapid growth of population stimulated the tide of emigration. After 1876, Germans began to leave the homeland at the rate of about 200,000 a year, and on leaving Germany they were mostly lost to Germany. Until 1884 there was no German flag flying abroad. Bismarck deplored the loss of citizens and soldiers: "A German who can put off his Fatherland like an old coat is no longer a German for me." The Fatherland therefore must be expanded to receive its citizens. Where was the new Fatherland to be found? The first inclination was to look towards Brazil, where there was already a large and increasing German population; but the entrance to South America was barred by the Monroe doctrine, and Germany therefore turned to Africa.

Colonial
Enterprise

Africa offered everything which Germany was seeking: untold wealth in raw material; inexhaustible man-power, which, if brought under German discipline, might well be utilised for European warfare; strategical points of immense significance—especially in relation to the eventual conflict with the British Empire to which the thoughts of far-seeing Germans were already beginning to turn. The way was carefully prepared. In December, 1882, there was founded at Frankfort the *Deutscher Kolonialverein*. The idea was taken up with immense enthusiasm and was carefully fostered by an elaborate Press campaign. On 22nd April, 1884, the *Kölnische Zeitung* published an article containing the following words: "Africa is a large pudding which the English have prepared for themselves at other people's expense, and the crust of which is already fit for eating. Let us hope that our sailors will put a few pepper-corns into it on the Guinea Coast so that our friends on the Thames may not digest it too rapidly."

The Press campaign was only one of many indications that the Colonial enterprise of Germany was directed from above. This point has been strongly emphasised by a recent writer. "In a degree unparalleled in the history of European Imperialism, the German Colonial Empire was the result of force, and of design, not of a gradual evolution. It was not the product of German enterprise outside of Europe, for, owing to the conditions of her history, Germany had hitherto taken no direct part in the expansion of Europe; it was the product of Germany's dominating position in Europe and the expression of her resolve to build up an external Empire by the same means which she had employed to create this position."¹ That is the reason why it has been deemed proper to treat German colonisation in a chapter mainly devoted to European diplomacy.

The Ex-
ploration
of Africa

Germans, however, had long since taken their full share in African exploration. As far back as 1796 Friedrich Hornemann made a remarkable journey from Tripoli to

¹ Ramsay Muir: *Expansion of Europe*, p. 140.

the Niger. A little later Heinrich Barth, a citizen of Hamburg, also starting from Tripoli, "crossed the Sahara by a new route, reached Lake Chad, visited the mysterious city of Timbuctoo, and helped to fill up gaps in our knowledge of the Central Niger regions."¹ In 1860 Baron Karl Von Der Decken performed a notable service to geographical science by his survey of Mount Kilimanjaro. As Mr. Lewin points out, Von Der Decken was one of the first to conceive the idea of a German colony in East Africa. "I am persuaded," he wrote, "that in a short time a Colony established here would be most successful, and after two or three years would be self-supporting. . . . It would become of great importance after the opening of the Suez Canal. It is unfortunate that we Germans allow such opportunities of acquiring colonies to slip, especially at a time when it would be of importance to the Navy." German explorers were equally active in South Africa. In 1869 Mohr undertook a remarkable journey to the Victoria Falls, and about the same time Karl Mauch was travelling "in the Zambesi regions, visited the Mashonaland goldfields, and discovered the Zinbabwe ruins." Nor did these and other explorers conceal their chagrin that England was ahead of Germany in South Africa. "Would to God," said Mauch, on his return from the Transvaal, "that this fine country might soon become a German colony." "Is it not deplorable," asked Gerhard Rohlfs, after a journey to the Cameroons, "that we are obliged to assist inactive and without the power to intervene in the extension of England in Central Africa?"²

England, however, was not alone among the promoters of African exploration and settlement. In 1876 King Leopold of the Belgians summoned an International Conference at Brussels, in order to discuss various problems connected with the future of Africa. As a result of this

Brussels
International Con-
ference,
1876

¹ Cf. Evans Lewin: *The Germans in Africa* (Oxford Pamphlets), p. 10. A work to which I am, in the following paragraphs, deeply indebted.

² Quoted, *op. cit.*

Conference, the International Congo Association was founded, an Association which was afterwards responsible for the development of the Congo Free State. In 1878 Stanley returned from his famous journey in the Congo, and his reports served still further to stimulate European interest in the future of the dark continent. A bare enumeration of dates is at this point highly suggestive. In 1879 the Belgians began their occupation of the Congo. In 1880 the French resumed their activities in West Africa, and in 1881 established their Protectorate over Tunis. In 1882 England established a virtual Protectorate over Egypt. In the same year the Port of Assab, on the Abyssinian coast, was transferred from a private trading company to Italy. In 1883 the French began to occupy Madagascar. In 1885 Massowah was occupied by the Italians and was subsequently developed by them into the colony of Eritrea. Meanwhile the English, as will be disclosed in a subsequent chapter, after a long period of apparent carelessness and indifference, had resumed their advance in South Africa.

Germany
and South
Africa

Under these circumstances it is small wonder that the Germans, having established an almost unparalleled position for themselves in Europe, should have declined to be left in the shade in Africa. Besides, the notorious unrest among the Dutch in South Africa seemed to offer a favourable opportunity for German activities. To this opportunity Ernst von Weber had called attention in 1879. He strongly advocated the acquisition of Delagoa Bay from Portugal, and the economic penetration of the Transvaal and British South Africa. "In South-East Africa we Germans," so he wrote in the *Geographische Nachrichten*, "have a peculiar interest, for here dwell a splendid race of people nearly allied to us by speech and habits . . . pious folk with their energetic, strongly marked, and expressive heads, they recall the portraits of Rubens, Teniers, Ostade, and Van Eyck . . . and one may speak of a nation of Afrianders or low-German Africans which forms one sympathetic race from Table Mountain to the Limpopo. What could not such a country

become if in the course of time it were filled with German emigrants? The constant mass immigration of Germans would gradually bring about a decided numerical preponderance of Germans, and of itself would by degrees effect the Germanisation of the country in a peaceful manner."

Von Weber was not writing in the sand. Paul Kruger had already visited Berlin to seek German intervention at the time of the first British annexation of the Transvaal. He visited it again in 1884, and was cordially welcomed both by the Emperor and his Chancellor. Meanwhile a resolute attempt had been made by Germany to secure a footing at Delagoa Bay, at St. Lucia Bay and in Pondoland, and it was subsequently stated by Sir Donald Currie, speaking with knowledge, that "the German Government would have secured St. Lucia Bay, and the coastline between Natal and the possessions of Portugal, had not the British Government telegraphed instructions to dispatch a gunboat from Cape Town with orders to hoist the British flag at St. Lucia Bay."¹

In 1884 German effort in Africa was abundantly rewarded. In the course of less than two years (1884-85), Germany leapt into the position of the third European Power in Africa. She established a Protectorate over Damaraland and Namaqualand, a district which was afterwards known as German South-West Africa. That territory, with an area of 332,450 sq. miles and a population—terribly depleted by German cruelties—of 79,556, passed into British keeping in July, 1915. A second German Colony was established by the annexation of Togoland and the Cameroons. The former, with an area of 33,700 sq. miles and a population of over a million, was conquered by Great Britain in August 1914; the latter, with an area of 191,130 sq. miles and a population of 2,643,720, fell into British hands in February, 1916. Most important of all, however, alike from the point of view of strategy, of man-power, and of raw materials, was the great province on the East Coast which became known as German East

German
Africa

¹ Quoted by Lewin, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

Africa. That province, with an area of 384,180 sq. miles and a population of 7,645,770 persons, mostly belonging to strong fighting races, was conquered by Great Britain in December, 1917.

Germany
in the
Pacific

Sinfultaneous with these German annexations in Africa was the establishment of German possessions in the Pacific. The northern coast of New Guinea, subsequently known as Kaiser Wilhelm's Land, and the group of islands collectively known as the Bismarck Archipelago were acquired by Germany in 1884. They passed to the British Empire, together with Samoa, which Germany had divided with the United States (1900), in the first weeks of the Great War.

The
Colonial
Empire of
Germany

The achievement of Germany, though destined to be transitory, was nevertheless remarkable. In the space of less than two years, Germany had become a great world-power. Colonies in the English sense, however, she did not seek, and has never obtained. "My aim," said Bismarck in 1885, "is the governing merchant and not the governing official in those regions. Our privy councillors and expectant subalterns are excellent enough at home, but in the Colonial territories I anticipate more from the Hanseatics." In one sense the hopes of Bismarck were entirely disappointed. The German colonies were never self-supporting, they never became the home on any considerable scale of German colonists; they were exploited to the great profit of German capitalists and merchants, but from first to last they were the affair of the German Government, and never really evoked the interest of the German people.¹

One thing more must be added. The German Colonial Empire came into being with the express sanction, if not with the blessing, of the dominant Colonial Power. The German settlements in South Africa and in the Pacific were not effected without loud protests from the Englishmen on the spot. But to these protests the Government at home refused to listen. "If Germany is to become a great

¹ For German aims in Africa, cf. F. Zimmerman : *The German Empire of Central Africa* ; for her treatment of natives, cf. Cd. 9210 (1919).

colonising power, all I say is, God speed her. She becomes our ally and partner in the execution of the great purposes of Providence for the advantage of mankind." So spake Mr. Gladstone in the House of Commons. The natives of Africa, after a few years' experience of the German rule, entertained very different sentiments. "The Germans," wrote Bishop Weston of Zanzibar to General Smuts, "rule entirely by fear, and cruel punishments are their means of spreading terror throughout the land."¹ There was indeed universal testimony from the late German colonies in Africa that "their return to German rule would be regarded by every native tribe in Africa as the greatest disaster in their tribal history."

In 1884, however, this could not be foreseen, and in November of that year an International Conference met at Berlin under the presidency of Prince Bismarck to discuss the whole African situation. The General Act of the Conference, which is contained in a long and elaborate document, was approved by Great Britain, France, Germany, Belgium, Portugal, as well as other Powers. The Act laid down regulations as to the traffic in slaves; in regard to freedom of trade in the Congo Basin; to the neutrality of territories in the same region; to the navigation of the Congo and the Niger; and finally in regard to the treatment of the native populations.² The Congo State under King Leopold was recognised, and in 1908 was transferred to the Belgian Kingdom.

Six years later, an even more comprehensive agreement was concluded between Germany and Great Britain. Great Britain transferred to Germany the island of Heligoland, and recognised German claims to the land north of Lake Nyassa. On the other hand, Germany acknowledged the claims of Great Britain to the northern half of the shores and waters of Lake Victoria Nyanza, to the valley of the Upper Nile, and to the coast of the Indian Ocean about Vitu and thence northwards to Kis-

¹ *The Black Slaves of Prussia*, p. 5.

² For text of the *General Act*, cf. P. Albin: *Les Grands traités politiques*, pp. 368-406.

The Berlin Conference, 1884-85

Anglo-German Agreement, 1890

mayu. Germany also recognised the British Protectorate over the islands held by the Sultan of Zanzibar.

Partition
of Africa

The final partition of Africa left France in a territorial sense the largest of African Powers—her territories, including the Sahara Desert, extending over an area of 3,804,974 square miles. British territory, excluding Egypt and the Soudan, covered before the World-War an area of 2,713,910 square miles. Germany came third, with something less than 1,000,000.¹ Statistics of area give, however, a very false impression of relative values. In any scientific computation the advantage unquestionably rested with Great Britain. For the British possessions, as Principal Grant Robertson has pointed out, have three distinctive features. Firstly, “they are grouped on the shores of each of the waters that wash the continent, the Mediterranean, the Red Sea, the Indian Ocean, and the Atlantic, and at four critical points aided by possessions outside Africa proper they control strategic lines of the first importance. Gibraltar, Aden, and Socotra, Zanzibar, St. Helena, and Cape Town have and confer a military and naval significance indisputable and incomparable. Secondly, in the solid block of British South Africa, Great Britain possesses the one great area fitted to be a colony for the White races. Thirdly, of the four great African rivers, the Nile, the Niger, the Zambesi, and the Congo, British territory controls or shares in the control of the three first. Mastery of the arterial rivers of a huge continent, as the history of the American continent proves, is a brief expression of the great truth that political power follows and rests on the trunk waterways. What the Danube, the Rhine, and the Vistula have been to the Europe of the past, the Nile, the Zambesi, the Niger, and the Congo will be to the Africa of the future, for a great river can be the perpetual cradle of a great civilisation.”² It is truly and finely said—but we are anticipating the sequence of events, and must return to Europe.

Close of
Bismarck's
Reign,
1890

Before the Anglo-German agreement of 1890 was con-

¹ These are the figures of Mr. Scott Keltie : ap. *Encyclopædia Britannica*.

² *Historical Atlas*, p. 21.

cluded, the greatest figure had been removed from the stage of European politics. In 1888 the Emperor William I. had died, and after a few months' interval during which his son, the gifted but stricken Emperor Frederick, nominally reigned, had been succeeded by his grandson, the Emperor William II. The young Emperor had taken to heart the advice given by his ancestress to his great-great-grandfather, George III. of England, "George, be King." As in England there was no room for George III. and William Pitt, so in Germany there was no room for William II. and Bismarck. In 1890 the young Emperor dropped "the old pilot." Bismarck's long reign was ended.

In the history of the nineteenth century, Bismarck will always claim a foremost place; in the sphere of diplomacy no one except Cavour could dispute his claim to the first place. That he was a great patriot will be denied only by those to whom patriotism is an exploded superstition. He desired to see Germany united, and after the tragic failure of 1848, he believed, rightly or wrongly, that it could never be united by parliamentary action; that it must be made by blood and iron. These were the traditional instruments, not of German, but of Prussian statecraft, and Bismarck was primarily a Prussian patriot. Germany must be made not by the merging of Prussia in Germany, but by the merging of Germany in Prussia. That was Bismarck's supreme aim, and that was his remarkable achievement. The end was reached by methods which no plain man can approve: by diplomacy, which was a masterpiece of bluff duplicity, and by overwhelming force unscrupulously applied. Every move in a complicated game was carefully planned from the outset: calculated assistance to Russia in Poland in 1863; a quarrel picked with Denmark for the twofold purpose of acquiring Kiel and of estranging his master from Austria and from the Germanic Confederation; the rupture with Austria and the dissolution of the *Bund*; the formation of a North German Confederation under the presidency of Prussia; the luring of the Emperor Napoleon III. to his fate; the Hohenzollern candidature in Spain; the quarrel fastened

Bismarck's
Place in
History

upon France in 1870; the crushing German victory; the formation of the new German Empire; the undisputed hegemony of Prussia in Germany; the almost undisputed ascendancy of Germany in Europe—the sequence was logical, and unbroken. Did Bismarck ever look beyond Europe? The question has been often asked. It cannot yet be authoritatively answered. He himself declared that “the Colonial business would be for us in Germany like the wearing of sabres by Polish noblemen who had no shirts to their backs.” As late as 1889 he repeated: “I am still no Colony man.” Lord Odo Russell always maintained that Bismarck’s discouragement of Colonial enterprise was not mere diplomatic bluff but represented his genuine conviction; and Mr. Sarolea agrees with him. “Bismarck,” he writes, “was a realist and a materialist. He did not indulge like Talleyrand in visions of a distant future, in dreams of a German Oceana. . . . Bismarck’s ambition was to control the Continent, to establish a Napoleonic Empire in Europe.”¹ Mr. Lewin, on the other hand, insists that when Bismarck was convinced that the time for action had arrived, he was as eager for expansion as the most advanced exponents of Colonialism.² But with or without Bismarck the leaven of Imperialism was already working in Germany, and was destined to produce results of world-wide significance. Bismarck had made Prussia supreme in Germany, and Germany supreme upon the continent of Europe. The young ruler who dismissed him in 1890 was determined to make Germany supreme in world-politics.

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¹ *The Anglo-German Problem*, p. 236.

² *Op. cit.* p. 5.

THE NILE



CHAPTER V

THE EGYPTIAN PROBLEM

THE BRITISH OCCUPATION—THE REGENERATION OF EGYPT AND THE CONQUEST OF THE SOUDAN

L'Égypte vaut moins par elle-même que par sa situation. Au centre de l'ancien Continent ayant vue à la fois sur l'Europe, l'Asie et l'Afrique dominant le bassin oriental de la Méditerranée et la mer des Indes, base d'opération incomparable pour envahir la Syrie, menacer ou protéger le Sultan, donnant la maîtrise des voies de terre et d'eau entre l'Europe et l'Extrême-Orient aussi bien canal de Suez que des chemins de fer dirigés vers le golfe Persique l'Égypte voit son rôle international grandir tous les jours.—C. DE FREYCINET.

Really to conquer England we must make ourselves masters of Egypt.—NAPOLEON I.

Egypt is the keystone of English ascendancy in the Indian Ocean.—PAUL ROHRBACH (1912).

En somme l'Égypte était perdue pour nous, par notre faute, et nous étions brouillés avec l'Angleterre, comme nous l'étions depuis 1881 avec l'Italie.—DÉBIDOUR.

ON 12th May, 1881, France signed with the Bey of Tunis the Treaty of Bardo, or Kassar-Saïd. That Treaty confirmed the French Protectorate over Tunis, and determined in that country the influence of Italy. Fourteen months later Great Britain embarked on an enterprise which eventuated in the substitution of British for French influence in a country far more important to France and to the world than Tunis.

For centuries past France had manifested an interest in Egypt, Syria, and the Levant. It was powerfully quickened by the military and political strategy of Napoleon and by the romantic career of Mehemet Ali. In the dull days of the July monarchy there sprang up in France a

British
Occupation
of Egypt

France and
Egypt

curious cult for that brilliant adventurer, who was regarded by the Bonapartists as a disciple of Napoleon, almost as his apostolic successor in Egypt.

England and Egypt The indifference of England was almost as marked as the interest of France. On two occasions did the Czar Nicholas I. suggest to English statesmen his readiness for a "deal" in Near Eastern affairs on the basis of England's annexation of Egypt. Both overtures met, however, with a chilling response. England was either too scrupulous or too indifferent even to take the suggestion into consideration.

In the later years of the century a different attitude prevailed in England. Apart from the general progress of Imperialist sentiment two causes in particular contributed to this change: the rapid advance of Russia in South-Eastern Europe, and the opening (1869) of the Suez Canal. The significance of the latter event was emphasised by the announcement (25th November, 1875) that the British Government had purchased from the Khedive for the sum of £4,000,000 sterling his 176,000 shares in the Canal. This shrewd and brilliant stroke of policy was due to Disraeli's imaginative insight, but was facilitated by his friendship with the Rothschilds. Financially it proved to be an excellent bargain, for the value of the shares has increased nearly tenfold, and they have yielded a revenue of over £1,000,000 a year.

The sale of the shares was due to the increasing financial embarrassments of the Khedive Ismail, a grandson of Mehemet Ali. The debt which at his accession (1863) stood at £3,293,000, had increased by 1876 to £94,000,000. To this "carnival of extravagance and oppression"¹ we may trace the European intervention in the affairs of Egypt, and thus the whole of the latest phase in its long history. In 1876 Mr. Stephen Cave, who had been sent out to make a report upon Egyptian finance, described the country as suffering "from the ignorance, dishonesty, waste, and extravagance of the East . . . and at the same time from the vast expense caused by hasty and

¹ The phrase is Lord Milner's.

inconsiderate endeavours to adopt the civilisation of the West." No description could have been more apt. The English and French creditors of the Khedive, naturally alarmed as to the security of their loans, sent out Mr. Goschen and M. Joubert to look after their interests. The immediate result was the establishment of the *Caisse de la dette* (2nd May, 1876). This international Commission was originally empowered only to receive the revenue set apart for the service of the debt, and to sanction or veto fresh loans; but its functions were rapidly enlarged to embrace the whole financial administration of the country. France, Austria, and Italy appointed commissioners. Lord Derby refused to follow their example, but Mr. Goschen, devoid of Lord Derby's official responsibility, suggested at the Khedive's request the name of Captain Evelyn Baring, a member of the famous financial house and until recently Private Secretary to Lord Northbrook in India. In this characteristic fashion there was introduced into Egypt the man destined to be the regenerator of the country, "the Great Pharaoh of Modern Egypt."

"The state of Egypt," says Lord Sanderson, quoting Lord Cromer's own words, 'at this time was deplorable.' About one-fifth of the arable land of the country had passed into the hands of the Khedive, was administered directly by him, and cultivated to a great extent by forced labour. There was no appeal from the arbitrary demands of the officials charged with the collection of the taxes, and these demands were enforced with the most pitiless severity. In addition to the heavy payments required for the service of the funded debt, large sums were due to contractors and others for goods supplied to the Egyptian Government, and the pay of most of the employees was greatly in arrear."¹

By 1879 Ismail's tyranny and extravagance had become insupportable, and on 26th June his suzerain the Sultan was induced by the Powers to procure his abdication. His abdication, writes Lord Cromer, "sounded the death-knell of arbitrary personal rule in Egypt."² But his

¹ Lord Sanderson : *Evelyn, Earl of Cromer*, p. 10.

² *Modern Egypt*, i. 145.

son and successor, Tewfik, though honest and well-meaning, was not the man to cope with the situation by which he was confronted.

Rebellion
of Arabi
Bey, 1881

The country, and more particularly the army, was seething with discontent. Of this discontent an obscure colonel, named Arabi Bey, became the mouthpiece and representative. It is not, even now, easy to determine the precise character and significance of the movement which Arabi led. Primarily a military revolt, it was directed partly against Turkish suzerainty, partly against Occidental intervention. "Egypt for the Egyptians" was the battle-cry of the rebels, but how far either Egypt or the Egyptians would have been profited by their success it is difficult to say.

On 9th September, 1881, the Khedive found his palace surrounded by a large force under the command of Arabi, and was compelled to assent to their demands. He promised to dismiss two of his leading Ministers, to accept a responsible Ministry, to convoke an Assembly of Notables before the end of the year, and to limit the functions of the *Caisse* to the service of the debt. The democratic catchwords adopted by Arabi and his faction were, of course, a thin veneer, calculated to cover a movement of the regular Oriental type. Europe became more and more uneasy at the situation. Order must be restored in Egypt; but how? By Turkey? By the European Concert? By France and England conjointly, or by either of these alone? At this moment a difficult situation was not rendered easier by a change of government in France. In November, 1881, the Ministry of Jules Ferry fell, and Gambetta came into power. In regard to Egypt, Gambetta was confronted with three alternative courses: to go on in full and friendly accord with England and to see the thing through; to invoke the intervention of the Powers and so "internationalise" the Egyptian situation; or to abandon Egypt altogether and, in return for a free hand for France in Tunis and Morocco, to leave England to work her will in Egypt. Gambetta himself strongly favoured the first course, joint action with England; but a fresh obstacle then presented itself. Bismarck, anxious on the one hand

to ingratiate himself at Constantinople, and on the other to set England and France by the ears, encouraged the Sultan to assert his suzerain authority, and to inform the Powers that the restoration of order in Egypt was his business, and his alone. Meanwhile, Gambetta had fallen (January, 1882), and been replaced by Freycinet, who favoured internationalisation. It was decided, therefore, to summon a European Conference. The Conference met in Constantinople at the end of June and proved entirely abortive. Meanwhile, an *émeute* at Alexandria precipitated the crisis. On 11th June the Arabs attacked the European population and slaughtered fifty or more of them, mostly Greeks, in cold blood. "Manifestly," says Lord Cromer, "something had to be done, for the whole framework of society in Egypt was on the point of collapsing. By 17th June, 14,000 Christians had left the country."¹ Tewfik was powerless to restrain the fanaticism aroused by Arabi, now one of his "responsible" Ministers. The Concert of Europe was equally impotent. Great Britain decided to act, if necessary, alone. Sir Beauchamp Seymour, commanding the British fleet off Alexandria, was instructed to demand that the construction of fortifications should cease.

The demand being ignored, the Admiral proceeded (11th July) to bombard and demolish the forts. Arabi let loose the convicts, and then with his troops abandoned the town, which for two whole days was delivered up to fire, pillage, and massacre. At length the British Admiral landed a body of bluejackets and marines, and order was tardily restored in the ruined city.

From the moment it became clear that decisive action was necessary, France refused to co-operate, and her Fleet left Alexandria for Port Said. England had, therefore, to go through with the task alone, and the first units of an expeditionary force left England on 27th July. Almost simultaneously troops were dispatched from India, and among these the Government, following the precedent of Lord Beaconsfield, decided to include a native con-

Bombard-
ment of
Alexandria

The
Egyptian
Expedition

¹ *Op. cit.* i. 289.

tingent. The command was entrusted to Sir Garnet Wolseley, who fulfilled his commission with promptitude and skill. Debouching not from Alexandria but from Port Said, he landed in Egypt on 19th August, and marching on Cairo across the desert, he inflicted a crushing defeat on Arabi, storming the formidable lines of Tel-el-Kebir on 13th September. So masterly were his strategy and tactics that the total British loss in killed was only 54, and in wounded only 342. On 14th September, Cairo surrendered to a couple of squadrons of British cavalry. The "series of military operations," to adopt Mr. Gladstone's periphrasis, was now complete. Arabi was captured, brought to trial, sentenced to death, and finally deported to Ceylon. England was now *vis-à-vis* the Khedive, and to all intents and purposes mistress of Egypt. France had abdicated, and on attempting to resume *condominium* was politely informed that she had forfeited her rights. The fact was indisputable, and no candid Frenchman could deny it. "En somme," writes Débidour, "l'Egypte était perdue pour nous, par notre faute et nous étions brouillés avec l'Angleterre, comme nous l'étions depuis 1881, avec l'Italie."¹

The Re-
storation
of Order

A British army was left in occupation of Egypt in order to complete the restoration of order, or, in official phrase, the "authority of the Khedive." When that task had been accomplished the occupation would cease. That such was the genuine desire and intention of the Government, there is not a shadow of doubt. "We shall not keep our troops in Egypt any longer than is necessary; but it would be an act of treachery to ourselves, to Egypt, and to Europe if we withdrew them without having a certainty—or . . . until there is reasonable expectation—of a stable, a permanent, and a beneficial Government being established in Egypt."² Thus spoke Lord Granville in the House of Lords, and his famous dispatch on 3rd January, 1883, announced that policy to the Great Powers. That dispatch further intimated that "the position in which Her Majesty's Government is placed

¹ *Hist. Diplomatique*, i. 67.

² Hansard, colxxvi. 41.

towards His Highness (the Khedive) imposes upon them the duty of giving advice, with the object of securing that the order of things to be established shall be of a satisfactory character and possess the elements of stability and progress." "Giving advice" is, as Lord Milner observes, a "charming euphemism of the best Granvillian brand";¹ but Lord Granville was at one with his colleagues in his anxiety that the function should be temporary.

The anomaly of the whole position was strikingly illustrated by the events which ensued in the Egyptian Soudan. The Arabs of the South, as of the North had long groaned beneath the burdens imposed upon them by their Egyptian taskmasters. Colonel Charles Gordon, who had acted as Governor of the Soudan under Ismail, retired in 1879, and from that moment the condition of its inhabitants was pitiful. Consequently, when Muhammad Ahmed announced himself as the Mahdi or promised Messiah, the Soudanese rallied to his standard and drove the Egyptian troops into the fortresses. In September, 1883, General Hicks was dispatched by the Khedive, in command of a wholly inadequate Egyptian force, to reconquer the Soudan. In November, Hicks Pasha, his European staff, and his Egyptian soldiers were cut to pieces by the Mahdi near Shekan. Sir Evelyn Baring, who in September, 1883, had returned to Egypt as Consul-General, advised the abandonment of the Soudan. Lord Dufferin, in his report of 1883, had advised that the Western Soudan should be abandoned, and that Egypt should be content to hold Khartoum and Sennaar. Lord Wolseley concurred in this opinion. After the Hicks disaster, however, Lord Wolseley urged that a strong garrison should be established at Assouan, and that reinforcements should be sent to Suakim, Berber, and Khartoum.

Uncertain as to the wisest course to follow under these difficult circumstances, the Cabinet sought the advice of General Gordon. Gordon replied: "I should send out myself." The distracted Cabinet caught at the idea

The
Soudan

Gordon's
Mission,
January,
1884

¹ *England in Egypt*, p. 33.

and on 18th January, 1884, General Gordon was sent out to Khartoum to report on the situation with a view to immediate evacuation.¹ The Khedive appointed him Governor-General of the Soudan, the Home Government acquiesced in the appointment, and in that capacity he started for Khartoum. Meanwhile the facts of the local situation were hardening. Gordon had hardly left Cairo for Khartoum when Colonel Valentine Baker, the head of the Egyptian Gendarmerie, was defeated in an attempt to relieve Tokar, near the Red Sea coast (4th February). Gordon now found himself besieged by the Mahdists in Khartoum. Lord Wolseley was quick to perceive the danger of the situation, and urged upon Ministers the immediate dispatch of reinforcements to Suakim, and the advance of an English Brigade to Wady Halfa.

Gordon at
Khartoum

Weeks and even months were, however, allowed to pass before any decision was arrived at. The miserable troops on whom alone Gordon could rely were defeated outside Khartoum on 16th March, and it became clear that if ever Gordon was to leave Khartoum alive he would have to be succoured by his own countrymen. Berber, the half-way house between Suakim and Khartoum, was captured by the Mahdi (26th May)—an event which still further jeopardised Gordon's position in Khartoum.

Not until August did the Gladstone Government decide to send out an expedition, under Wolseley's command, to rescue Gordon. Wolseley left England at the end of August, and started from Cairo to lead an expedition up the Nile at the beginning of October. Wolseley made all the haste possible under circumstances of great difficulty, but the procrastination of the Cabinet had delayed the expedition until it was too late. On reaching Korti (29th December), Lord Wolseley dispatched Sir Herbert Stewart with a small force by land to avoid the wide bend of the Nile. Stewart, after a hard fight at Abu Klea (17th January, 1885), forced his way to the Nile,

¹ There is still some confusion as to whether Gordon's orders were to "report" or to "evacuate." For text of instruction, cf. Morley, *Life of Gladstone*, iii. 554.

not far below Khartoum, but on 19th January was mortally wounded. The command then devolved on Sir Charles Wilson. Exactly a week later (26th January) the Mahdi stormed Khartoum and General Gordon was killed. Wilson came in sight of the city two days after it had fallen.

The news of the tragedy caused mingled grief and indignation in England, but the Government, after many vacillations, decided in April, 1885, to abandon the Soudan south of Wady Halfa, and, though retaining the port of Suakim, to abandon the construction, already commenced, of a railway from Suakim to Berber. This resolution was due to the threat of danger in another quarter. On 30th March, Russia, quick to take advantage of England's preoccupation, had occupied Penjdeh on the frontier of Afghanistan.

The danger in Afghanistan passed, and with its passing there was some disposition to modify the policy of complete evacuation of the Soudan, and to retain the province of Dongola. Baring, Wolseley, and Kitchener were all strongly in favour of its retention, but the Ministry decided to withdraw the British force in the summer of 1885, and for another twelve years the Soudan was a prey to anarchy. When the Mahdi was poisoned in 1885, the Khalifa whom he had nominated as his successor continued his tyranny.

Meanwhile Egypt itself had, under the skilful, firm, and prudent administration of Sir E. Baring, who in 1892 was created Lord Cromer, been literally remade. There is no episode in her history which England can regard with more unfeigned satisfaction than the regeneration of Egypt; but the story belongs to English or Egyptian history, not to that of Europe. A word must, however, be added as to the reconquest of the Soudan, since it involved grave diplomatic consequences and brought England and France to the brink of war. By 1896, thanks to the patient labours of General Grenfell and General Kitchener, the Egyptian Army was completely reorganised, and the Government of the Khedive determined to attempt the reconquest of the Soudan. This decision coincided

Death of
Gordon

The Sequel
of the Story
of the
Soudan

with, and may have been precipitated by, the withdrawal of the Italians from Kassala.¹ General Kitchener was appointed to the command of the Nile Expedition, and slowly and patiently advanced towards the completion of his great design. Before the end of September, 1896, Kitchener was in possession of Dongola; Abu Hamed was taken in August, 1897, and at the Atbara the Dervishes were scattered (7th April, 1898). On 2nd September the power of Mahdism was finally annihilated by the great victory of Omdurman. Two days later the British and Egyptian forces were paraded before the ruined palace of Khartoum and the shattered tomb of the Mahdi, and there, on the spot where Gordon had perished, a funeral service was held in solemn memory of the dead hero and saint.

Fashoda Hardly, however, had General Kitchener reached Khartoum when the diplomatic sky was suddenly overcast by a threatening cloud. The French Government had never forgiven themselves for their withdrawal from Egypt at the critical moment in 1882. For more than a dozen years they had impeded, in every way, the work of financial and political reconstruction undertaken by Great Britain in Egypt. That task, unwillingly assumed but patiently fulfilled, seemed now to be on the point of final triumph and consummation.

At the dramatic moment the French reappeared upon the scene. For many years past, French adventurers had been displaying remarkable activity in Central Africa. The Anglo-German agreement of 1890 had been followed by a similar attempt to delimit the French and British spheres of influence in the neighbourhood of Lake Chad. In 1894 the British, operating from the east, established a Protectorate over Uganda, and in the same year the French, operating in West Africa, captured the city of Timbuctoo. In May, 1894, Great Britain had also concluded an Anglo-Congolese Convention, according to which England ceded to the Congo Free State the left bank of the Upper Nile in

¹ Occupied by them after a successful encounter with the Khalifa (Dec. 1893).

return for a recognition of the acquisition of the right bank by Great Britain. In deference to French susceptibilities, the Convention was annulled, and France in her turn secured from the Free State the recognition of her rights, with certain limitations, to the left bank of the Upper Nile. In March, 1895, however, Sir Edward Grey declared that the dispatch of a French expedition to the Upper Nile would be regarded by Great Britain, who must in this matter regard herself as the trustee of the Khedive, as "an unfriendly act." Obviously the situation was already a delicate one when, in June, 1896, Major Marchand left France to take command of the expeditionary force which was at that time being organised in the French Congo. In the course of two years and in the face of incredible difficulties this intrepid French soldier pushed his way from the French Congo across Central Africa. It would seem that Marchand in leading his expedition from the west was counting on a junction with another French force which was to make its way from the east coast by way of Abyssinia to the Upper Nile. The Russians, too, were active in the same region; but both the Russian force and the French had been compelled to retire, and consequently Marchand, on his arrival at Fashoda, found himself unsupported, and face to face with the British forces under General Kitchener.

General Kitchener, steaming up from Khartoum, denied Marchand's right to be at Fashoda as the political representative of France. The victory of Omdurman was a potent argument, but even to it Marchand refused to yield. The quarrel was then referred to the diplomatists. Lord Salisbury claimed for the Khedive all the lands over which the Khalifa had borne sway, and made it clear to the French Government that the claim would be asserted by the whole force of Great Britain. In the autumn of 1898 the two nations were on the brink of war. France, however, gave way, recalled Marchand, and in March, 1899, concluded with Great Britain a comprehensive agreement in regard to the Soudan. By this treaty the rights of Great Britain over

the whole Nile basin, from the source of that river to its mouth, were acknowledged; France was confirmed in possession of a great West African Empire, but the whole of the Egyptian Soudan was to be subject to the power which ruled at Cairo. Thus the way to the Cape was still open, unblocked by any other European Power. From that moment Anglo-French relations rapidly improved, and in 1904 the diplomacy of the Salisbury-Balfour Government was crowned by the conclusion of the Anglo-French agreement, whereby France agreed to give Great Britain for thirty years a free hand in Egypt.

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CHAPTER VI

THE EXPANSION OF RUSSIA

THE FRANCO-RUSSIAN ALLIANCE (1890-93)

ENGLAND AND RUSSIA IN CENTRAL ASIA

Les tsars ont cette rare fortune que l'instinct national soutient leurs calculs d'ambition. . . . La propagande révolutionnaire ne pouvait pas atteindre la Russie. . . . Rien n'y était mûr ni pour la liberté politique, ni pour la liberté civile.—ALBERT SOREL, 1887.

WE have strayed in the preceding chapter from the chronological sequence of events, and it is time therefore to retrace our steps. Upon the dismissal of Bismarck in 1890, three important results ensued. In the first place, the young and impetuous ruler of Germany made it clear to the world that a new era had dawned; that the old ways and old methods were to be abandoned; that Germany was no longer to be content with supremacy upon the continent of Europe, but was determined to assert her position as a World-Power. Secondly, Russia drew further and further apart from Germany; and, thirdly, Russia and France, after a prolonged flirtation, contracted a regular and lasting alliance.

One of the first acts of the Emperor, William II., was to decline to renew Bismarck's reinsurance treaty with Russia. Only by virtue of that treaty had Russia in recent years been connected with the politics of Western Europe. Ever since the Treaty of Berlin (1878), Russia, geographically cut off from the West by the solid block of the Central Empires and diplomatically isolated in Europe, had concentrated her attention upon Asia. It

Russia and
Germany

was, indeed, part of the deliberate but defensive tactics of Bismarck to thrust Russia eastward, partly in order to divert her attention from Western politics—from a possible *rapprochement* with France, and partly in order to involve her, if possible, in a quarrel with England in Central Asia. The Penjdeh incident was indicative of his partial success ; but even Bismarck could not for an indefinite period play fast and loose with Russian susceptibilities, and between 1885 and 1888 many circumstances combined to weaken the good accord between Berlin and St. Petersburg.

The
Schnaebele
Incident

Among these, two in particular may properly be emphasised. The first was the Schnaebele incident, which aroused the suspicions of the Czar Alexander in regard to the pacific intentions of Germany. On 20th April, 1887, Schnaebele, a French Police commissioner, was, with every circumstance of insolence and brutality, arrested by two German agents on the Alsatian frontier and flung into prison. The affair created intense excitement in France, which had lately exhibited unmistakable signs of a desire to abandon the colonial activities in which she had been involved by the policy of Jules Ferry, and once more to concentrate all her efforts upon the reversal of the verdict of 1870. Jules Ferry fell in 1885, and in 1886 there took office in the Freycinet Cabinet a man who for some years gave a new direction to French policy, and who in 1887 might well have involved Europe in a great war. General Boulanger was an adventurer of mediocre ability to whom the changes and chances of French politics under the Third Republic almost gave a great opportunity. Fortunately for Europe, and on the whole for France, Boulanger was not big enough to redeem it. Boulanger seems to have aspired to play the part of Monk, and to effect through the army a restoration of the monarchy. The details of his dealings with the exiled princes are obscure, but it is certain that Boulanger was one of the first to proclaim in France the necessity of a better understanding with Russia.

Boulanger

Russia and
France

In Russia there was not lacking a disposition for closer relations with France. On 20th February, 1887, there

appeared in *Le Nord*, the organ of the Russian Minister, De Giers, a remarkable article containing the following passage: "Henceforth Russia will watch the events on the Rhine, and will relegate the Eastern Question to the second place. The interests of Russia forbid her in the event of another Franco-German war to observe the same benevolent neutrality which she previously maintained. The Cabinet of St. Petersburg will, in no case, permit a further weakening of France. In order to keep her freedom of action for this event Russia will avoid all conflict with Austria and England, and will allow matters to take their course in Bulgaria." Two months later, after the news of the Schnaebeler incident had reached St. Petersburg, the Czar, Alexander III., addressed an autograph letter to the Emperor William, in which he formally announced to his august kinsman that he no longer regarded himself as bound by the "Reinsurance Treaty" of 1884, and in particular that he held himself under no obligation to maintain neutrality in the event of a war between Germany and France. The Emperor William was so far impressed by the communication as to give immediate orders without even consulting his Chancellor for the release of the French police commissioner—Schnaebeler. So the immediate incident was closed. The Czar's letter had, however, a larger significance. Taken in conjunction with the article in *Le Nord* it showed clearly enough in what direction the wind was blowing in St. Petersburg.

Not less disquieting to the Czar than the Schnaebeler incident was the turn which events were taking in Bulgaria. Here again he insisted upon tracing the hand of Germany, ever at work to destroy the prestige and undermine the influence of Russia.

After the final abdication of Prince Alexander, Russia, it will be remembered, made a supreme effort to establish permanently her ascendancy in Bulgaria. But the Czar overreached himself. General Kaulbars, who had been dispatched from St. Petersburg to act as "adviser" to the Regency, behaved with consummate insolence, but failed ignominiously to rouse the country to revolt against

Russia and
Bulgaria

the regents. Government and people alike refused to be browbeaten by the Russian agent, and Kaulbars was recalled. An appeal to the electorate resulted in the return of an overwhelming Russophobe majority to the Sobranje. Their first business was to elect a Prince in place of Alexander. Several candidates were approached in vain, but at last the Sobranje, after a stout refusal to elect the Czar's nominee, the Prince of Mingrelia, offered the throne to a German princeling, Prince Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, by whom it was accepted. Prince Ferdinand was a son of Princess Clementine of Orleans, and a grandson, therefore, of King Louis Philippe, but he had served in the Austrian Army, and was to all intents and purposes an Austrian Prince. The Czar was deeply mortified by the election, and refused to recognise Prince Ferdinand; but strong in the support both of Berlin and Vienna, and urged to the task by an exceedingly able and ambitious mother, Prince Ferdinand adhered to his decision to accept the throne (July, 1887).

A year later, during the brief reign of the Emperor Frederick, a further slight was inflicted upon the Czar, who resented it so bitterly that the two Empires were brought to the brink of war. The Empress Frederick, encouraged by her mother, Queen Victoria, sanctioned the engagement of her daughter to Prince Alexander of Battenberg, the Prince whom the Czar had virtually dismissed from the Bulgarian throne. The ill-advised project was peremptorily and even brutally vetoed by Bismarck, but the mischief was done. The Czar deemed himself to have been deliberately insulted by the German Court, and never forgave the offence.

Even before the fall of Bismarck, therefore, indications were not wanting that forces were operating in the direction of an entirely new combination in European politics.

The Relations of
France and
Russia

Between France and Russia there had not hitherto been any real tradition of political friendship. It is true that, at the zenith of his career, Napoleon I. cast his glamour over more than one Russian ruler. But the historic traditions of French diplomacy pointed to the maintenance of

a close understanding not with St. Petersburg, but with Stockholm, Warsaw, and Constantinople. The diplomatic system of the old régime had, of course, its origin in the secular rivalry between Bourbon and Habsburg, not between Bourbon and Romanoff. But a system primarily devised to check the ambitions of the Habsburgs might well serve the secondary purpose of restraining the westward advance of Russia. For that purpose it proved tolerably effective until the lynch-pin was knocked out of it by the destruction of Poland. The defeat of France in 1870 and the rapid rise of Germany to a position of ascendancy in Europe entirely altered the balance of diplomatic forces. Dimly perceived during the régime of Bismarck, it was unmistakably apprehended after the accession of the Kaiser William II. A French writer goes, indeed, so far as to assert that the conclusion of the Franco-Russian alliance was the most important event in European history during the quarter of a century which preceded the outbreak of the Great War. This may perhaps be regarded as a somewhat continental view of high politics, but no student of history can ignore the significance of the *rapprochement*, deepening into formal alliance, between the vast and half-barbaric empire of Russia and the Third French Republic.

Events, as we have seen, had been for some time past moving in this direction. The intervention of Alexander II. during the crisis of 1875 was in itself significant; not less were his words to Le Flo: "Our relations will become more and more cordial. We have common interests. We must hold together." Equally significant was the intervention of Alexander III. in regard to the Schnaebele affair; but the first overt indication of the new orientation of Russian policy dates from the years between 1889 and 1891. The new intimacy had a financial origin—Russia, as usual, was badly in want of money. Berlin had in January, 1888, refused to lend to Russia, but from 1888 onwards a series of Russian loans were issued in Paris and very largely taken up by French financiers. A 4 per cent. loan for 500 millions issued at 86·45 fr. in December, 1888, was so largely over-subscribed that in 1889 two further loans were issued.

French
Loans to
Russia

the one for 700 million francs, the other for 1,200 millions. In 1890 there were three issues: one of 260 millions, one of 360, and one of 41. In 1891 there were two loans aggregating 820 millions. In 1893 another of 178 millions, in 1894 over 1000 millions, and in 1896 400 millions. After the turn of the new century a Russian loan was issued in Paris with almost tiresome regularity every few years. The financial assistance thus rendered to Russia was invaluable. It enabled her to convert the whole of her external debt into a 4 per cent. denomination, to improve the equipment of the army and the navy, and to extend her gravely defective railway system.

Russian
Railway
Extension

The Trans-Siberian Railway, projected some twenty-five years before, was at last put in hand, and in 1891 work commenced on seven sections simultaneously. "In the course of that year, the line was carried across the Ural Mountains to the western terminus at Cheliabinsk. At the end of March, 1899, it was open to traffic as far as Irkutsk, 2029 miles from Cheliabinsk; while on the eastern section Vladivostok was linked with Khabarovsk on the Amur." Another railway enterprise was rapidly pushed on. The construction of a line intended to connect the Caspian with Merv was authorised in April, 1885. By 1888 the line was carried as far as Samarkand, the ancient capital of Tamerlane, and in 1898 extensions of the Trans-Caspian Railway from Samarkand to Tashkent and Andijan were opened to traffic, while another branch running south from Merv to the frontier of Afghanistan was completed.¹ The construction of these railways, particularly the Trans-Caspian, was primarily due to strategic considerations, but that constitutes no reason for overlooking their economic significance.

Bismarck
and Russia

The *rapprochement* between France and Russia was, however, more than financial and economic. Russia was becoming more and more alarmed by the menacing tone adopted by German statesmen. In 1888, Bismarck thought that the time had come for publishing the text of the Triple Alliance. Russia was startled and alarmed

¹ F. H. Skrine: *Expansion of Russia*, pp. 314-316.

by the terms of a document to which in 1884 she had almost made herself party. Nor were her fears removed by a speech made by Bismarck only a few days after the publication of the text. "The fears," said the Chancellor, "that have arisen in the course of the present year have been caused by Russia, more even than by France, chiefly through an exchange of provocations, threats, insults, and reciprocal investigations, which have occurred during the past summer in the Russian and French Press. . . . God has given us on our flank the French, who are the most warlike and turbulent nation that exists, and He has permitted the development in Russia of warlike propensities which until lately did not manifest themselves to the same extent. . . . By means of courtesy and kind methods we may be easily, too easily perhaps, influenced, but by means of threats, never. We Germans fear God and nothing else in the world."¹ The terms of this speech were no doubt carefully calculated to give both to France and to Russia serious pause in any steps they might be contemplating towards a closer diplomatic or military understanding. But in 1890, Bismarck was removed, and power passed into the hands of the young Emperor.

From this moment things began to move even more rapidly towards a Franco-Russian Alliance. In 1890 the Russian Government had to acknowledge two striking acts of courtesy at the hands of the French Ministry. The great Armament factory, Chatellerault, was placed by the French Government at the disposal of Russia, and about the same time a notorious gang of Nihilist conspirators engaged in France in the manufacture of bombs, for eventual use in Russia, were cleverly arrested by the French police.

A year later there was an even more conspicuous demonstration of the friendly relations which were so rapidly developing between the two countries. In July, 1891, a French fleet, under the command of Admiral Gervais, paid a ceremonial visit to Cronstadt. It was received

Develop-
ment of
Franco-
Russian
Entente

French
Fleet at
Cronstadt

¹ Quoted by Seymour, *Diplomatic Background of the War*, pp 47-48.

by the Russian authorities with the greatest enthusiasm. The Czar dined on board the French flagship and stood uncovered while the French national anthem was played. The French Admiral and his officers were magnificently entertained at Cronstadt by the Russian Fleet and by the Czar and his officials when they subsequently visited St. Petersburg and Moscow. And the welcome came not only from the Government, but from the people. Nowhere since 1871 had the representatives of France received so cordial a welcome abroad, and the French people were deeply touched.

Franco-
Russian
Alliance

Nor was the ceremonial visit empty of diplomatic consequences. On 21st August an alliance is believed to have been definitely concluded; it was followed in 1892 by the signature of a military convention of a purely defensive character, and in June, 1893, by a commercial treaty of far-reaching importance. The cordial relations between the two countries were further emphasised in the same year by a visit paid by the Russian Mediterranean squadron to Toulon.

Exchange
of Visits

In 1894 the diplomatic position of Russia was rendered rather more uncertain by the premature death of the Czar Alexander III. and the accession of Nicholas II. The young Czar was passionately devoted to the cause of peace. He became the husband, in November, 1894, of a German princess (Princess Alice of Hesse-Darmstadt), and made no secret of his admiration for the German Emperor. His accession caused no interruption, however, to the cordial relations which subsisted between France and his own country. On 10th June, 1895, Monsieur Hanotaux, who had succeeded to the Foreign Office in 1894, made public reference to the Franco-Russian Alliance, and in the following year the Alliance was officially acknowledged. In the autumn of 1896, the Czar and his young bride paid official visits to Berlin, to Queen Victoria (the bride's grandmother), and finally, in October, to Paris. The welcome accorded to the Czar and Czarina in the French capital was unprecedentedly enthusiastic. The French people acclaimed their visitors

not merely as a bridal pair, but as staunch and honoured allies. The Czar reviewed 100,000 French troops on the plain of Chalons, and subsequently declared that the army whose manœuvres he had witnessed was "a powerful support of the principles of equity upon which peace, order, and the well-being of nations were founded," and declared that the Empire and the Republic were united in indissoluble friendship. Ten months later, in August, 1897, these courtesies were reciprocated by a visit paid by President Faure to Cronstadt. The significance of this exchange of courtesies was enhanced by the presence at Cronstadt of the French Minister, M. Hanotaux. In a speech on board the French flagship at Cronstadt, the Czar pointedly referred to France and Russia as "friendly and allied powers," and insisted that "they were equally resolved to maintain the world's peace in a spirit of right and equity." A French writer has emphasised the significance of the Franco-Russian Alliance from the French point of view in the following words: "It assured us in Europe a moral authority, which since our defeats had been wanting to us. It augmented our diplomatic value. It opened to us the field of political combinations from which our isolation had excluded us. From mere observation we could pass to action, thanks to the recovered balance of power. . . ."¹

If the results of the alliance were important to France, they were certainly of not less significance for Russia. For two hundred years Russia had pursued a foreign policy of singular consistency. That, indeed, is small wonder, if we remember that her policy was dictated by the hard and unchanging facts of physical geography. The dominant facts of Russian geography are three. First, the absence of a coast-line open to the warm water. Secondly, a great river system tending to the disintegration of the country; and thirdly, a vast expanse of wind-swept plain; the absence of any natural barriers except the Urals and the Caucasus, and the consequent liability of Russia

¹ Tardieu: *France and her Alliances*, p. 14; quoted by Seymour: *op. cit.* p. 53.

to invasion, alike from the east, whence the Tartars in distant days had come, and from the west, where, in the days of Polish greatness, she had been open to the attacks of the Poles, and since the destruction of Poland, of the Germans. Policy, therefore, was dictated by geography, and the policy of Russia during the last two hundred years may be summarised in the two words "Unification" and "Expansion." To those two ends a succession of remarkable rulers from Peter the Great to Alexander II. had devoted themselves. With the unification of Russia this narrative is not immediately concerned. It is her expansion which concerns the international politics of Europe, and not less, indeed, of Asia. Russia's supreme object was to reach an open sea not closed to her commerce by ice. The obvious door was through the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles; but that door had, as we have seen, been thrice banged in her face by England: by the Treaty of Paris in 1856, by the Treaties of London in 1840-41, and by the Treaty of Berlin in 1878. For the check to her ambition imposed by the Treaty of Berlin, Russia could forgive neither England nor Germany. But Bismarck, with great subtlety, pointed out to the Czar that England, though not open to attack by Russia in Europe, was by no means invulnerable in Asia. The idea was not, indeed, original to Bismarck. It formed the basis of the accord which had been established at Tilsit between Napoleon I. and Alexander I. But, thanks to the development of railway communication, Alexander III. was in a position far more favourable than his predecessors to follow the hints repeatedly dropped by Bismarck.

The
Expansion
of Russia

The expansion of Russia has, during the last century, proceeded upon three main lines: first, the Caucasus or Cis-Caspian; secondly, the Trans-Caspian; and thirdly, the Trans-Siberian. Russia, as we have seen in another connection, had established her hold upon the Black Sea in the latter part of the eighteenth century. Later on, the north-eastern and eastern shores of the Black Sea were secured by a gradual advance towards the Caucasus and the Caspian. "In 1725 the Russian frontier ran in an

irregular line from Azof to the river Terek on the Caspian ; by 1815, Kuban (1784), Derbend, and Baku (1806), Georgia, Mingrelia, and Karabagh (1803) had been annexed, so that the western shore of the Caspians as far as the Persian frontier was Russian. The nineteenth century has witnessed a steady progress and consolidation. In 1828 Erivan was ceded by Persia ; the conquest and absorption of Kuban, Circassia, and Daghestan were completed between 1859 and 1864, and though Kars was captured in 1855 its final cession with the free port of Batoum was not made until the Treaty of Berlin of 1878.”¹ By this advance Russia was brought into immediate contact with two of the greatest Muhammedan Powers, Persia and the Ottoman Empire in Asia.

More significant, however, was the Trans-Caspian advance of Russia, since it was destined to raise in an acute form the relations between Russia and England. The probability of a conflict in Central Asia between the two great European Powers had long been foreseen by Russian diplomatists. In 1844, the Czar Nicholas visited England with the avowed intention of reaching some agreement with her in regard to outstanding questions in the Near and the Middle East. His proposals in regard to the future disposition of the Turkish heritage in Europe do not immediately concern us. His proposals, however, were not confined to Europe ; on the contrary, he suggested that it would be to the best interests of both empires to arrive at a frank understanding in regard to their relations in Central Asia. The Czar undertook to refrain from any movement against the Khanates of Turkestan, and to leave them as a neutral zone in order to keep the Russian and British possessions in Asia from “dangerous contact.” The overtures of the Czar, which were, it would seem, inspired by a genuine desire for peace, were at the time coldly received by English statesmen. The matter was reopened by Nicholas on the eve of the Crimean War, in his historic interviews with Sir Hamilton Seymour at St. Petersburg ; but with a similar result. The failure of

Russia in
Central
Asia

¹ Robertson : *op. cit.* p. 19.

The
Khanates
of Turke-
stan

those negotiations precipitated the Crimean War, and as a result of that war a definite check was imposed upon Russian ambition in regard to the control of Constantinople and the Narrow Straits. Denied access to European waters by way of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, Russia renewed her activities in Central Asia. The tendency at Calcutta in the 'sixties was to regard those activities with a careless eye, and Lord Lawrence¹ expressed the opinion that Russia "might prove a safer neighbour than the wild tribes of Central Asia." For the time being, therefore, Russia was left free to fish in the troubled waters of Central Asian politics. Constant strife among the Turkoman and Kirghiz tribesmen of Turkestan, and between the Muhammadan Khanates of Bokhara, Khiva, Samarkand, and Khokand, gave Russian emissaries an opportunity which they did not neglect. Russian troops occupied Tashkend in 1864, and four years later captured Samarkand, the capital of the Khanate of Bokhara, and once the capital of the famous empire of Tamerlane. After the capture of his capital, the Khan of Bokhara ceded to Russia the whole province of Samarkand.

Afghani-
stan

Russian agents had meanwhile been showing considerable activity in Afghanistan. One of the first acts of Lord Auckland, as Governor-General of India (1836-42), was to dispatch Captain Alexander Burnes on a mission to Kabul. On arriving at Kabul, Burnes found that his mission had been anticipated by a Russian envoy, Vicovitch. Vicovitch had the ear of Dost Muhammed, the brilliant Afghan adventurer who had recently made himself master of the fierce tribes of Afghanistan, and who was then ruling them with an iron hand as Amir of Kabul. Burnes could offer him nothing but the platonic friendship and half-hearted diplomatic support of England. Lord Auckland thereupon decided to withdraw the Burnes Mission, and to replace Dost Muhammed on the throne of Afghanistan by a puppet of his own. An expedition was dispatched from India, and in May, 1839, legitimacy was restored in Afghanistan in the person of Shah Suja. The inwardness

¹ Governor-General of India, 1863-69.

of Auckland's policy is clearly revealed by a dispatch from Lord Palmerston. "By taking the Afghans under our protection," he wrote, "and in garrisoning if necessary Herat, we shall regain our ascendancy in Persia. . . . British security in Persia gives security on the eastward to Turkey, and tends to make the Sultan more independent, and to place the Dardanelles more securely out of the grasp of Nicholas." The immediate enterprise in Afghanistan proved, however, a terrible failure, issuing in the ghastly tragedy which, opening with the assassination of two distinguished Englishmen, Burnes and Macnaughten (1841), ended in the costly and humiliating retreat from Kabul.

After the disasters of the early 'forties, the English Government pursued for some thirty years a consistent policy of masterly inactivity in Central Asia. Russia employed the opportunity for steady though stealthy advance. The Afghans did not understand the policy of masterly inactivity, and again and again applied to Calcutta for assistance. Successive English rulers at Calcutta were profuse in professions of platonic goodwill, but nothing more substantial was forthcoming. Meanwhile the conquest of Samarkand had brought Russia up to the northern frontiers of Afghanistan, and the Governments of Great Britain and Russia deemed it wise therefore to make some attempt to delimit the frontiers between the two Powers in Asia. In January, 1873, the frontiers were formally defined by treaty; but the ink upon the treaty was hardly dry, when the news arrived that Russian troops had occupied Khiva (June, 1873). Count Schuvaloff assured the British Government that the occupation was a purely temporary expedient, but the moment of evacuation has not yet arrived. At Khiva, Russia was within four hundred miles of the north-western frontier of British India.

On the eve of his departure from India (1869), Lord Lawrence indited a dispatch which seemed to indicate a change of attitude, if not of policy; he advised a "clear understanding with the Court of St. Petersburg as to its projects and designs in Central Asia, and that it might be

British
Policy in
Central
Asia

Russians
at Khiva

British
Policy in
Afghani-
stan

given to understand in firm and courteous language that it cannot be permitted to interfere in the affairs of Afghanistan, or in those of any State which lies contiguous to our frontier." Such an intimation to Russia was clearly inconsistent with the policy of masterly inactivity to which Lawrence had previously adhered. But that policy still commended itself to the Home Government. Sher Ali, then ruler of Afghanistan, was seriously alarmed by the advance of Russia, and when, in 1873, the Russians were marching on Khiva, he tried to persuade the Viceroy that "the interests of the Afghan and English Government are identical, and that the border of Afghanistan is in truth the border of India." The Government in Whitehall thought otherwise, and instructed the Viceroy to inform the Amir that the British Government could not share his alarm, and considered that there was no cause for it. Nevertheless we promised to "maintain our settled policy in favour of Afghanistan if the Amir abides by our advice in external affairs." Repulsed by Calcutta, Sher Ali threw in his lot with Russia.

Russia meanwhile was steadily advancing. In January, 1874, Russia went out of her way to inform Great Britain that she "continued to consider Afghanistan as entirely beyond her sphere of action." Her deeds, however, appeared to belie her words, with the result that Lord Lytton, who in 1876 had been appointed by Disraeli to the Viceroyalty of India, attempted to induce the Amir of Afghanistan to receive British residents at Kandahar and Herat. The Amir demurred. Meanwhile the Russians had made themselves masters of Khokand, while the British Government had concluded with the Khan of Kelat in Baluchistan the important Treaty of Jacobabad (December, 1876). That treaty gave us the right of garrisoning Quetta, a position which turns the flank of the Afghan frontier, opposed to India, along the mountains across the Indus. The Treaty of Jacobabad alarmed the Amir, but not sufficiently to induce him to receive a British resident, though he deemed it not inconsistent to receive in 1878 a mission from Russia. Under

these circumstances there could be but one answer to the Amir's refusal. A large British force marched into Afghanistan, and in May, 1879, dictated the Treaty of Gandamak. Sher Ali, realising the hopelessness of resistance, had fled into Turkestan with such members of the Russian Mission as lingered at Kabul. His son, Yakub Khan, agreed to receive a permanent British Embassy, with a suitable escort at Kabul; to conduct his foreign policy under the advice of Great Britain; to give facilities for trade, and to allow such a rectification of the north-western frontier as was demanded by the scientific school of British strategists. In return, he was to be supported against external aggression, and to receive an annual subsidy of six lacs of rupees.

The circumstances of Burnes' fatal mission were then almost precisely reproduced. Sir Louis Cavagnari, having accepted the mission to Kabul, arrived in the city in July, 1879. In September he and all his comrades were murdered by the mutinous soldiery of the Amir. The news reached Simla on 4th September, and two days later Major-General Roberts left Simla to take command of the Kabul Field Force. Roberts reached Kabul early in October. He found Kabul "much more Russian than English, the officers arrayed in uniform of Russian pattern, Russian money in the Treasury, and Russian wares in the bazaar." Before he left, he brought to light much evidence as to Russian designs in Afghanistan, and he placed it on formal record that in his opinion the recent rupture with Sher Ali had "been the means of unmasking and checking a very serious conspiracy against the peace and security of our Indian Empire."

Cavagnari's
Mission and
Death

Afghanistan itself remained a problem. To retain it in perpetuity was out of the question. Only two alternatives presented themselves, either to erect Afghanistan into a strong buffer State, or to retain English influence in the country by breaking it up among several rulers. The latter policy was favoured by Lord Lytton, but the attempt to carry it out proved unexpectedly difficult. A strong ruler having appeared in Afghanistan in the person

Alternative
Policies in
Afghani-
stan

of Abdur Rahman, the British Government ultimately decided to evacuate Kandahar (which had in the meantime been relieved after a superb march by General Roberts) and to rely upon the friendship of Abdur Rahman and the policy of the buffer State.

Merv Meanwhile Russia, simultaneously headed off from Afghanistan and from Constantinople (Treaty of Berlin, 1878) mainly by England and her minions, again turned her activities towards Central Asia. A disastrous campaign against the Tekke-Turkomans in the autumn of 1878 was followed in 1879 by an unsuccessful attack upon the strong fortress of Denghil-Tepe and a disorderly retreat to the Caspian. These disasters were, however, amply retrieved in 1881 by the brilliant campaign of General Scobelev; by the capture of Denghil-Tepe, and by a terrible punishment inflicted upon the predatory tribes which had found in it their stronghold. This renewal of Russian activity excited serious alarm both in London and in Calcutta. There were rumours that Russia was preparing to occupy Merv. Russia disavowed the intention; but early in 1884, Russia, relying upon England's pre-occupation in the Soudan, occupied Merv and Saraks, and thus came within 200 miles of Herat. This step was in direct violation of Gortchakoff's assurance given to the British Government in 1882, that Merv "lay outside the sphere of Russian influence."¹

Nevertheless, the British Government assented, somewhat tamely, to the proposal for the appointment of a joint Commission to delimit the northern frontier of Afghanistan. The disputed boundary line lay between the rivers Hari Rud and Oxus. Sir Peter Lumsden, the British Commissioner, reached the Afghan Frontier on 19th November, 1884. His Russian colleague, M. Zelinov, excused himself on the score of illness until February. February came, but still no Zelinov. The affront was unmistakable, and British patience was almost exhausted, the more excusably as the Russians usefully employed the interval by occupying various eligible points in dispute.

¹ Fitzmaurice: *Life of Lord Granville*, ii. p. 420.

Matters came to a crisis when, in March, 1885, the Russians seized Penjdeh, a village about a hundred miles due south of Merv. The news of the seizure of Penjdeh aroused public excitement in England to the highest pitch. "We know," said Gladstone, "that the attack was a Russian attack; we know that the Afghans suffered in life, in spirit, and in repute; we know that a blow was struck at the credit and authority of the Sovereign, our protected ally, who had committed no offence . . . we must do our best to have right done in the matter." The British Government acted with unusual promptitude. They called out the Reserves, and moved a vote of credit for £11,000,000, £4,500,000 of which was for the Sudan Expedition. The Vote was agreed to without a dissentient voice—a broad hint to Russia which contributed not a little to a peaceful issue. Lord Dufferin, who had become Viceroy in 1884, exercised all his great diplomatic skill to the same end, and converted Abdur Rahman, who fortunately happened to be at the moment his guest at Rawal Pindi, to a similar view. "My country," the Amir afterwards wrote, "is like a poor goat on whom the lion and the bear have both fixed their eyes, and without the protection of the Almighty Deliverer the victim cannot escape very long." For the moment, however, war between England and Russia was averted. Penjdeh, for which Abdur Rahman cared comparatively little, was left in the hands of Russia, but in compensation the Amir secured the exclusive control of the Zulfikar Pass, for which he cared much.

The Penj-
deh Affair,
1884-85

Between Russia and Afghanistan the matter was thus satisfactorily adjusted. Between Russia and England, on the contrary, negotiations were protracted until July, 1887, when a protocol between the two Powers was signed at St. Petersburg. By the agreement then reached a definite check was put upon Russian advance towards Herat, and the frontier was settled up to the line of the Oxus. The same year witnessed the annexation to India of the Quetta district under the designation of British Baluchistan. Checked on the western frontier of Afghanistan, the Russians

Anglo-
Russian
Agree-
ments,
1887-1907

continued their advance northwards and eastwards, and in 1895 annexed the Pamirs. Their frontier thus came to march with that of Chinese Turkestan to the east, and on the south with that of the British North-West Frontier Provinces, the frontier being defined by another Anglo-Russian Convention signed in 1895. "The boundary pillars," writes Sir Alfred Lyall, "now set up by British and Russian officers on the Hindu Kush and by the Oxus, record the first deliberate and practical attempts made by the two European Powers to stave off the contact of their incessantly expanding Asiatic Empires." Not, however, until the conclusion of the comprehensive Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 was a complete understanding reached between the two Empires. Afghanistan was then definitely recognised by Russia as falling within the British sphere of influence; Russia undertook that all negotiations with the Amir should be conducted through Great Britain, and Afghanistan at last became what one school of British statesmen had always desired to make it, a real buffer State, calculated to resist the impact of Russia on the one side and Great Britain on the other, though "protected" by the latter.

Russian activities were not, however, confined to Central Asia and the borders of Afghanistan. For a century past, Russia had been pushing steadily on towards the Pacific. By the beginning of the nineteenth century the whole of Siberia up to the frontiers of the Chinese Empire had been brought under the sovereignty of the Czars. A further period of advance was marked by the appointment in 1847 of one of the most remarkable of Russian soldier adventurers, General Muraviev, as Governor-General of Eastern Siberia. In 1849, Muraviev constructed on the eastern shore of Kamtskatka the fortress of Petropavlovsk, and so well was his work done that the fortress resisted the attack of an Anglo-French squadron in the course of the Crimean War (1854). In 1850 Nikolaievsk was established at the mouth of the Amur, and eight years later, by the Treaty of Aigun (May, 1858), Muraviev obtained from China the cession of the entire Pacific seaboard between the

rivers Amur and Usur. Two years later (October, 1860) a war between England and France, on the one hand, and China on the other, resulted in large commercial concessions to the Western Powers (October, 1860). Muraviev promptly claimed similar concessions for Russia. "Hitherto inland trade between the two Empires had been confined to a point south of Lake Baikal. By a Treaty with China, signed in November, 1860, this restriction was swept away in the case of caravans of less than 200 persons, and the previous agreement of Aigun was confirmed. The Amur became a Russian river, and was protected by a chain of fortresses. At the southern bend of the Pacific seaboard, the Russians founded Vladivostok,"¹ which despite the ice which blocks it during the winter months became an important naval base and gave to the Russians a firm grip upon the Northern Pacific. Conformably with their traditional policy, the Russians proceeded to connect the extreme points of their vast land empire by an elaborate railway system. The administration of M. Witte was particularly memorable in this regard, and by the close of the nineteenth century the Russian Empire possessed no less than 41,577 miles of permanent way, of which 22,846 miles were owned by the State. Among these enterprises the most ambitious was that of the Trans-Siberian Railway, which, as we have seen, was definitely begun in 1891 with the object of connecting St. Petersburg and Vladivostok. The work was pushed on with tireless energy, and the vast system, extending over 5,542 miles, was opened for through traffic in 1902.

Long before the Trans-Siberian Railway was completed, however, the entrance of a new factor into the politics of the Far East was revealed by the outbreak of a war between China and Japan, the significance of which will be discussed in a later chapter. That war was brought to an end by the Treaty of Shimonoseki in 1895. Before that Treaty was ratified, Russia, acting in concert with France and Germany, intimated to the Japanese conquerors that they would not be permitted to reap the full harvest

¹ Skrine : *op. cit.* p. 243.

of victory. The European Powers declared that the cession of the Liaotung Peninsula would give to Japan a dangerous predominance in the affairs of China, would disturb the whole balance of power on the Pacific, and would inevitably prove a perpetual obstacle to the permanent peace of the Far East. The Liaotung Peninsula was consequently sullenly restored to China, but, foiled for the moment in her ambitious schemes, Japan immediately set to work to prepare for the greater struggle which European intervention had clearly revealed to be imminent.

Meanwhile Russia took full advantage of her new position as protectress of the integrity of China. China found herself unequal to the task of paying the war indemnity imposed upon her by Japan, and Russia therefore undertook to assist her by raising in Paris a 4 per cent. loan of 400,000,000 francs. As a price for this assistance, Russia was permitted to establish in China the Russo-Chinese Bank, with very extensive fiscal powers, including the receipt of taxes, the management of local finances, and, under concessions by the Chinese authorities, the construction of an extended system of railway and telegraph lines. Even more important was the conclusion (1896) of a secret treaty of alliance between Russia and China, under the terms of which Russia obtained the right to make use of any harbour in China, to levy Chinese troops in the event of a conflict with any Asiatic State, the free use of Port Arthur or, if the other Powers should object, of Kiaochow in time of peace, while the whole of Manchuria was thrown open to Russian officers for purposes of survey, etc.; and it was agreed that on the completion of the Trans-Siberian Railway a line should be constructed southwards to Talienwan or some other point mutually agreed upon under the joint control of Russia and China.¹

Europe
and the
Far East

Already, however, other complications were making themselves felt in the politics of the Far East. The European Powers might intervene to prevent the spoliation

¹ Asakawa : *The Russo-Japanese Conflict*, pp. 85-7 ; quoted by Rose : *op. cit.* p. 57.

of China at the hands of Japan, but the events of 1898 to 1900, to which further reference must presently be made, are a sufficient indication that the intervention was not purely altruistic. The occupation of Port Arthur by Russia, of Kiaochow by Germany, and of Wei-Hai-Wei by England (1898), marks the beginning of a fresh stage in the expansion of Europe and the opening of a new chapter in the history of Asia.

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CHAPTER VII

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AS A WORLD-POWER

THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR (1898)

The great rule of conduct for us in regard to foreign nations is, in extending our commercial relations, to have with them as little political connection as possible. . . . It is our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world.—WASHINGTON (1795).

Our first and fundamental maxim should be never to entangle ourselves in the broils of Europe; our second, never to suffer Europe to intermeddle with Cis-Atlantic affairs.—JEFFERSON (1801).

The march of events rules and overrules human action. Avowing unreservedly the purpose which has animated all our effort, and still solicitous to adhere to it, we cannot be unmindful that, without any desire or design on our part, the war has brought us new duties and responsibilities which we must meet and discharge as becomes a great nation on whose growth and career from the beginning the Ruler of Nations has plainly written the high command and pledge of civilisation.—MCKINLEY (1898).

Neutrality is no longer feasible or desirable where the peace of the world is involved and the freedom of its peoples.—WOODROW WILSON (2nd April, 1917).

America
and World-
policy

THE entrance of the United States of America into the World-War in 1917 was acclaimed as the opening of a new chapter in world-history. In one sense the instinct which so regarded it was not at fault. In 1917 the United States of America took their place side by side with great European Powers in a conflict which on a superficial view was primarily European. It is, however, a mistake to imagine that because America is separated from Europe by several thousand miles of sea, and because her statesmen, from Washington downwards, have insisted that it was no part of the business of America to intervene in the domestic politics of Europe, that America

was guiltless of a foreign policy, and had no intention of playing its part in world-affairs. "Nothing," writes Professor J. B. Moore, "could be more erroneous than the supposition that the United States has, as the result of certain changes in its habits, suddenly become within the past few years a world-power. The United States has, in reality, always been in the fullest and highest sense a world-power." And again: "As conventionalised in the annual messages of Presidents to Congress, the American people are distinguished chiefly by their peaceful disposition and their freedom from territorial ambitions. Nevertheless, in spite of their quiet propensities, it has fallen to their lot, since they forcibly achieved their independence, to have had four foreign wars, three general and one limited, and the greatest civil war in history, and to have acquired a territorial domain almost five times as great as the respectable endowment with which they began their national career."¹ The point here emphasised is one which English commentators on American politics have been curiously apt to overlook. The United States of America have had their full share in the movement towards territorial expansion which, as we have seen, has been characteristic of the Great Powers during the last century. The expansion in the case of the United States was mainly upon American soil, and the annexations were, for the most part, effected by purchase or other forms of peaceful negotiation. Consequently, the world has taken comparatively little note of them, and has been disposed to regard such transactions as coming within the sphere of domestic politics, and so has tended to minimise the part which foreign affairs have played in the politics of the American people.

Yet the facts briefly and bluntly stated must dispel any illusion on this head. The continental area of the United States is now (1920) 2,973,890 square miles. The area of the territory ceded by Great Britain to the colonies which renounced their allegiance to her was in 1783 about 827,844 square miles. Of this, considerably less than half

The
Expansion
of the
United
States

¹ *American Diplomacy*, p. 223.

belonged to the original thirteen colonies which occupied the narrow strip between the Atlantic and the Alleghanies. The larger half comprised the Hinterland, between the Alleghanies and the Mississippi, out of which were carved the States of Kentucky (1791) and Tennessee (1796), and the vast territory originally known as the North-West Territory. This territory was for many years held by the United States as Federal Domain, but was gradually, between the years 1803 and 1858, carved up into the fully constituted States of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin, and part of Minnesota. Meanwhile the United States had taken the first of many steps on the path of territorial expansion, a step which involved the absorption of a large population of Frenchmen and Spaniards. In 1803, President Jefferson purchased from Napoleon for \$15,000,000 the great Louisiana territory, out of which no less than twelve States were ultimately carved out. By this purchase, Jefferson more than doubled the area of the United States. In 1819 Florida was purchased from Spain, and in 1845 Texas was annexed. The Mexican War of 1846-48 resulted in a fresh annexation comprising nearly 600,000 square miles of territory—a territory nearly equal in area to Germany, France, and Spain. Out of this, the States of California, Nevada, and parts of Colorado and Wyoming were created. The settlement of the Oregon dispute with England in 1846 ultimately added to the union the States of Oregon, Washington, and Idaho, while the purchase of Alaska from Russia in 1867 added more than 500,000 square miles of territory to the States. These facts will at least suffice to show that the American record of expansion does not fall behind that of the leading European Powers in the nineteenth century. In less than one hundred years after the recognition of Independence, the United States had been nearly quadrupled in size. Thus, as Professor Muir has truly said: "The Imperialist spirit was working as powerfully in the democratic communities of the New World as in the monarchies of Europe. Not content with the possession of vast and almost unpeopled

areas, they had spread their dominion from ocean to ocean, and built up an empire less extensive indeed than that of Russia, but even more compact, far richer in resources, and far better suited to be the home of a highly civilised people.”¹

If, however, it be erroneous to imagine that the United States has lacked the will and the power to expand, it would be equally erroneous to ignore the truth that, throughout the greater part of the nineteenth century, the United States was even more concerned with the problem of maintaining national unity. With her successful solution of that problem, this narrative cannot concern itself. It is, however, proper to point out that the enunciation and maintenance of the Monroe doctrine largely contributed to the success. The germ of that famous doctrine may perhaps be discovered in a passage in the speech with which, in 1795, George Washington bade farewell to office. “The great rule of conduct for us in regard to foreign nations is, in extending our commercial relations, to have with them as little *Political* connection as possible. Europe has a set of primary interests which to us have none, or a very remote, relation. Hence she must be engaged in frequent controversies, the causes of which are essentially foreign to our concerns. Hence, therefore, it must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves, by artificial ties, in the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics, or the ordinary combinations and collisions of her friendships or enmities. Our detached and distant situation invites and enables us to pursue a different course. . . . Why forego the advantages of so peculiar a situation? Why quit our own to stand upon foreign ground? Why, by interweaving our destiny with that of any part of Europe, entangle our peace and prosperity in the toils of European ambition, rivalry, interest, humour, or caprice? It is our true policy to steer clear

The
Monroe
Doctrine

¹ *The Expansion of Europe*, p. 91. Mr. Pitman Potter (*American Journal of International Law*, 1920) takes exception to Mr Muir's assertion, and still more to the argument of the present chapter, the substance of which appeared in the *Edinburgh Review* (April, 1919).

of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world." On his accession to office in 1801, Jefferson reaffirmed in phrase even more trenchant the maxims first enunciated by Washington. "Peace, commerce, and honest friendship with all nations; entangling alliances with none." This principle contributed only one-half of the Monroe doctrine. To the policy of non-intervention by America in Europe was later added the complementary principle of no intervention by Europe in America. The latter half of the formula was due immediately to the revolt of the Spanish colonies in South America, and to the anxiety of George Canning, then Foreign Secretary in England, to thwart the supposed designs of the Holy Alliance, and in particular of France, upon the Spanish colonies.

The Presidential
Message
of 2nd
Dec. 1823

The Message sent to Congress on 2nd December, 1823, by President Monroe contained the following passages :—

" . . . The occasion has been judged proper for asserting, as a principle in which the rights and interests of the United States are involved, that the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for any future colonisation by any European Powers. . . . We owe it, therefore, to candour and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those Powers, to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere, as dangerous to our peace and safety. With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European Power we have not interfered, and shall not interfere. But with the Governments who have declared their independence and maintained it, and whose independence we have, on great consideration and on just principles, acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any other European Power, in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition towards the United States. . . .

"Our policy in regard to Europe . . . is, not to interfere in the internal concerns of any of its Powers; to consider the government *de facto* as the legitimate government for us; to cultivate friendly relations with it, and to preserve those relations by a frank, firm, and manly policy, meeting in all instances the just claims of every Power, submitting to injuries from none."

In this message Canning got much more than he had bargained for. All he wanted was the co-operation of the United States in warning the Holy Alliance off from South America. What he got was a general intimation *urbi et orbi* that henceforward the American Continent would be the exclusive preserve of the American people, and that no further acquisitions on American soil would be permitted to European or to other States.

From 1823 to 1917 the Monroe doctrine has been the sheet-anchor of American diplomacy. It was not, however, until the last years of the nineteenth century that the doctrine was invoked by the United States in a matter of serious importance. For many years past there had been some dispute between Great Britain and Venezuela as to the precise boundary between the latter State and British Guiana. Lord Aberdeen had attempted to effect a settlement of the question as long ago as 1844, but his suggested delimitation was declined. Thirty years later Venezuela professed its willingness to accept the Aberdeen line, but Great Britain then refused to concede it. The dispute dragged on until in July, 1895, Mr. Olney, Secretary of State under President Cleveland, insistently demanded that Great Britain should submit the whole question to arbitration, and incidentally reasserted in the most extreme form the underlying principles of the Monroe doctrine:—

"That distance and three thousand miles of intervening ocean make any permanent political union between a European and an American State unnatural and inexpedient will hardly be denied. . . . The States of America, south as well as north, by geographical proximity, by natural sympathy, by similarity of governmental constitutions, are friends and allies, commercially and politic-

The
Venezuelan
Question,
1895

The Olney
Dispatch

ally, of the United States. . . . To-day the United States is practically sovereign on this continent, and its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its interposition. . . . There is, then, a doctrine of American public law, well founded in principle, and abundantly sanctioned by precedent, which entitles and requires the United States to treat as an injury to itself the forcible assumption by a European Power of political control over an American State."

Attitude of
England

Mr. Olney's dispatch unquestionably gave a wide extension to the principle which was laid down by President Monroe, and it was needlessly provocative in tone. Fortunately, however, Lord Salisbury declined to be provoked. He did, indeed, refuse to accept unrestricted arbitration : he politely questioned the applicability of the Monroe doctrine to the particular dispute, and he insisted that the United States was not entitled to affirm "with reference to a number of States for whose conduct it assumes no responsibility, that its interests are necessarily concerned in whatever may befall those States, simply because they are situated in the Western hemisphere." At the same time, Lord Salisbury made it clear that he had no intention of allowing Great Britain to be drawn into a serious quarrel with the United States. Unfortunately the attitude of American statesmen rendered it none too easy to keep the peace. On 17th December, 1895, President Cleveland sent a special message to Congress, wherein he declared that :—

Attitude of
America

" . . . If a European Power, by an extension of its boundaries, takes possession of the territory of one of our neighbouring Republics against its will, and in derogation of its rights, it is difficult to see why, to that extent, such European Power does not thereby attempt to extend its system of government to that portion of this continent which is thus taken. This is the precise action which President Monroe declared to be dangerous to our peace and safety." Had the direction of English policy been in less wise and experienced hands, such a message might easily have provoked war. As it was, the message accentu-

ated a difficult situation and feeling began to run high in America. "Fortunately for us," writes an American publicist, "Lord Salisbury had a very good sense of humour and declined to take the matter too seriously."¹ Both Great Britain and Venezuela agreed to submit the evidence for their conflicting claims to a "committee of investigation" appointed by the United States; and the investigation issued in a Treaty of Arbitration, concluded nominally between the immediate disputants, but in reality between Great Britain and the United States. The result of the arbitration was, on the whole, to substantiate the British claim. A still more important result ensued. In January, 1897, a General Arbitration Treaty between the two great English-speaking nations was signed by Sir Julian Pauncefote and Secretary Olney. The Senate, however, refused its assent, and the treaty was not actually concluded until November, 1914.

In the meantime much had happened. The Venezuelan affair really brought to an end the period of American isolation in world-politics. "Cleveland's policy," writes an American historian, "as to the Venezuelan boundary, announced to the world with seismic suddenness and violence that the American democracy was of age."² From the position asserted by Cleveland and Olney in 1895, their countrymen could not well recede, and the position involved important corollaries. If the United States is "practically sovereign" on the American Continent, if "its fiat is law" it can hardly avoid responsibility for the doings of its neighbours and the general maintenance of order. Several of its neighbours have shown themselves both weak and turbulent, and in 1904 President Roosevelt frankly admitted that "the adherence of the United States to the Monroe doctrine may force the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of wrong-doing or impotence to the exercise of an international police Power."

As a fact the policy of isolation had been already

¹ H. Bingham : *The Monroe Doctrine*, p. 12.

² W. A. Dunning : *The British Empire and the United States*, p. 368.

The
Spanish-
American
War, 1898

abandoned. On 21st April, 1898, war broke out between the United States and Spain. Spain had for many years past been involved in difficulties with her Colonists in Cuba. A rising had occurred in 1868, and for ten years the Colony was in a state of almost perpetual insurrection. A compromise was arrived at in 1878 by the Convention of El Llanjon, but the local government was exceedingly oppressive and corrupt, and in 1895 a fresh rebellion broke out. General Weyler was sent to the Colony to restore order by whatsoever means seemed good to him. The methods he employed were as barbarous as they were ineffectual, and in view of the increasingly close business relations between the United States and Cuba it became more and more difficult for the American Government to look on unconcerned. In 1897 the United States offered its good offices to Spain, but the latter neglected to avail herself of the offer. Meanwhile, the drastic measures taken by General Weyler excited increasing indignation in the United States, and a Cuban Relief Committee was set up. At this juncture relations, already strained, were broken by an incident which may or may not have been fortuitous: the United States' cruiser *Maine* was on 15th February, 1898, completely destroyed in the harbour of Havana. The American Government declined to regard the explosion as accidental, and on 21st April declared war against Spain. The Spanish army and navy were both concentrated at Santiago, where they were blockaded both by land and sea by the American forces. The Spanish Admiral, Cervera, was ordered to run the gauntlet of the blockade, with the result that he and his entire fleet were destroyed after a few hours' engagement by the American squadron under the command of Commodore Schley (2nd July). A fortnight later the city of Santiago capitulated.

Explosion
of the
Maine

Future of
Cuba

As a result of the brief but decisive war, Porto Rico was acquired by the United States, and Spain disappeared from the Caribbean Sea. Cuba, after some years' occupation by American troops, was declared independent, as its annexation to the United States might have involved

complications with the South American Republics, and would certainly have proved embarrassing to the United States ; but the latter, by requiring that the Cuban Government should respect rights of person and property, retained a quasi-suzerainty over it.

From 1905 to 1909 Cuba, in consequence of the failure of the Cuban President, Estrada Palma, to keep order, was again occupied by an American force. During that period its affairs were administered by an American Governor. but in 1909 it was again handed over to a native administrator. The United States retain, however, certain coaling stations in the island and reserve to themselves the right of interference if the conditions, upon which Cuban independence was recognised, are not observed. Plainly that independence is exceedingly precarious, and might at any time be forfeited should the native government fail in its duties, or should strategical considerations render annexation to the United States imperative or even convenient.

The war between Spain and the United States was not, The Philip-
pines however, confined to the Atlantic. As in Cuba so in the Philippine archipelago, the rule of the Spaniards had for many years past been both tyrannical and ineffective. The missionary friars who really ruled the islands in the name of the Spanish sovereign had done useful work in days gone by, but their administration had rapidly deteriorated, and a movement for their expulsion developed among the Filipinos, who in 1896 petitioned the Emperor of Japan in favour of annexation to that country. The Emperor betrayed the plans of his would-be subjects to their legitimate rulers at Madrid, who therefore instituted a reign of terror in the archipelago. The islanders retorted by a demand for "constitutional" government, freedom of the press, equal laws, and in particular the expulsion of the friars.

Thus matters stood when war broke out between Spain Capture of
the Philip-
pines and the United States. An American squadron under the command of Admiral Dewey appeared before Manila, forced an entrance into the ill-defended harbour, and in

two hours destroyed the entire Spanish Fleet (1st May). In July an American army, under General Merritt, landed at Luzon, and in August, Manila surrendered. These disasters inclined the Spaniards to peace, which was concluded at Paris in December, 1898. The United States demanded and obtained the cession of the Philippines, but agreed to pay Spain \$20,000,000 in compensation for her loss.

The annexation of Cuba to the United States might, as we have seen, have raised complications both in the domestic politics and in the foreign relations of the Republic. It was otherwise with the Philippines, and no question was ever entertained as to their restoration to Spain, or even as to their independence. On this point the instructions given by President McKinley to the American Peace Commissioners were specific. "Without any original thought of complete or even partial acquisition, the presence and success of our arms at Manila imposes upon us obligations that we cannot disregard. The march of events rules and overrules human action. Avowing unreservedly the purpose which has animated all our effort, and still solicitous to adhere to it, we cannot be unmindful that, without any desire or design on our part, the war has brought us new duties and responsibilities which we must meet and discharge as becomes a great nation on whose growth and career from the beginning the Ruler of Nations has plainly written the high command and pledge of civilisation."

The
Filipinos

President McKinley's words were strikingly indicative of the new temper in which the United States was facing external problems, and of its new and wider outlook upon world-politics. It was not, however, all plain sailing with American policy in the Philippines. The insurgent leader, Aquinaldo, had been deported from the Archipelago under the terms of the treaty between the Filipinos and their Spanish rulers in 1897. On 19th May, 1898, however, Aquinaldo was permitted to return to Manila on board a United States man-of-war. It would seem to have been the intentions of the American authorities to employ the

insurgent leader to restore order among the islanders, and to establish some form of local autonomy under the American flag. Possibly the terms were insufficiently defined; but be this as it may, Aquinaldo proclaimed the independence of the Archipelago, and established a Philippine Republic with himself as President. In February, 1899, therefore, the United States found itself involved in a fresh war with the Filipinos. The latter could not, of course, offer any effective resistance, and by the end of 1899 an American army of 60,000 men had brought to an end all organised resistance in the Archipelago. Aquinaldo, however, was still at large, and for some two years longer the American troops had to face a considerable amount of guerilla warfare, in the course of which they suffered considerable losses, including the death of General Lawton. At last, in April, 1901, Aquinaldo was captured; on 1st July, 1901, the insurrection was officially declared to be at an end, and the Philippines were handed over to a civil government at the head of which Judge Taft was placed. The avowed intention of the American Government was to prepare the Filipinos for eventual autonomy. In 1902 a form of parliamentary government was established in which a large share was given to the natives, and in his message to Congress in 1904, President Roosevelt made the following pronouncement: "I firmly believe that you can help them (the Filipinos) to rise higher and higher in the scale of civilisation and of capacity for self-government, and I most earnestly hope that in the end they will be able to stand, if not entirely alone, yet in some such relation to the United States as Cuba now stands." Under American rule the economic prosperity of the Archipelago has developed with remarkable rapidity, and in 1916 an *Organic Act* was passed by the American Congress under which a large measure of local autonomy was granted to the Philippines.

Meanwhile American activities in the Pacific were ^{Hawaii} developing in other directions. The United States had for a full half-century manifested an interest in the future of the Sandwich Islands. As far back as 1854 a treaty for

the annexation of the islands to the United States had been concluded with the native government, but for the time being no positive results ensued. Internal feuds gave to the United States an opportunity of interference, and in 1887, King Kalakana accepted a form of government which, in fact, involved control by the white settlers. Five years later, however (1892), the native party reasserted itself, and under the championship of Queen Liliuokalani effected a *coup d'état*. Thereupon a counter-revolutionary movement was started, a republic was proclaimed, the Queen was compelled to abdicate, and appealed to Washington. A treaty of annexation was then signed at Washington with the representatives of the provisional government, and was sent to the Senate for approval. The treaty was, however, subsequently withdrawn by the President, and Commissioners were sent out to the Sandwich Islands, where a form of constitutional republic was established. Finally, in July, 1898, the islands were definitely annexed to the United States, and two years later (1900) were formally constituted the Territory of Hawaii.

Samoa In a similar way the Samoan group, or a part of it, fell into the hands of the United States. Germany had for some time past, as we have seen, been exhibiting activity in the Pacific. In December, 1885, friction arose between the German administrators and the natives, with the result that in January, 1886, Mr. Bayard, then Secretary of State at Washington, instructed the American Minister at Berlin to "express the expectation that nothing would be done to impair the rights of the United States under the existing treaty." The German reply was couched in friendly terms, and Conferences ensued between Germany, the United States, and Great Britain. A few months later, however (July, 1886), Germany suddenly declared war on the reigning King of Samoa, deposed and deported him, and set up her own nominee, Tamasese, as king, with a German commissioner, Herr Brandeis, as his "adviser." In September, 1888, the natives rose in insurrection against Tamasese and his adviser, and enthroned in

their place a chieftain named Mataafa. The Germans thereupon landed a force of marines, who were ambushed by the native forces, and suffered severe losses in killed and wounded. The Germans asserted that the ambushing force was led by an American citizen; consequently considerable friction arose between Germany and the United States, and the latter Power deemed it prudent to make considerable additions to its Pacific Fleet.

Bismarck, however, was anxious to keep the peace in the Pacific as elsewhere, and in 1889 conferences between the interested Powers were resumed at Berlin, with the result that the Samoan Islands were placed under the joint control of Great Britain, Germany, and the United States. The *Condominium* worked badly, and in 1899 a troublesome situation was cleared up by a division of the Samoan group between Germany and the United States, Great Britain receiving her compensation elsewhere. "The chief historical significance of the Samoan incident lies, as an American historian has pointed out, in the assertion by the United States not merely of a willingness to believe it right to take part in determining the fate of a remote and semi-barbarous people whose possessions lay far outside the traditional sphere of American political interests."¹

The part played by the United States in Far Eastern politics will demand and receive attention later on. It may, however, be here noted that the whole situation has been revolutionised, as far as America is concerned, by the completion of the Panama Canal. That enterprise was initiated in 1904, when the United States purchased from the Republic of Panama a ten-mile strip for the construction of a canal. The consideration was a lump sum payment of ten million dollars, and the promise of a perpetual annuity of 250,000 dollars a year, payable as from 1914. The significance of this enterprise can hardly as yet be estimated. The results upon world-politics may well prove in the future to be hardly less noteworthy than those which accrued from the discovery in the late fifteenth century of the Cape route to the East, or the opening in

¹ Professor J. B. Moore: ap. *Cambridge Modern History*, vii. p. 663.

1869 of the Suez Canal. The cutting of such a waterway can hardly fail to bring about an important shifting in the centre of political and commercial gravity.

The United
States and
*W. L.
Politik*

It remains to summarise the general effect of the events narrated in this chapter upon the position of the United States as a World-Power, and upon its relations with its new neighbours. The Spanish-American War unquestionably gave an immense impulse to, if it did not actually initiate, a new movement in American history. The United States, which in the course of a century had become a vast continental Power, mainly looking eastwards, became also a great Pacific Power, and took its place alongside the Great Powers of Europe as a participator in world-politics.

The U.S.A.
and the
South
American
Republics

The war also led to increasingly intimate relations between the United States and the Latin Republics of South America. The incidents recorded in this chapter were not, as an American scholar has pointed out, "caused by any desire to protect the sister Republics of Latin America from European interference or aggression, but by local rebellions or outrages, which have led the United States to undertake the exercise of a certain supervisory or police power over the affairs of the less stable of them. This," adds Mr. Merriman, "is perhaps the logical outcome of the passage in Mr. Olney's note which declares the United States to be 'practically sovereign on this continent, and its fiat law upon the subjects to which it confines its interposition.' But it certainly carries things much further than was contemplated in President Monroe's message in 1823. In 1904, Mr. Roosevelt expressed the views of his Government on the duties of the United States in this particular in the following words :—

"It is not true that the United States feels any land hunger or entertains any projects as regards the other nations of the Western hemisphere save such as are for their welfare. All that this country desires is to see the neighbouring countries stable, orderly, and prosperous. Any country whose people conduct themselves well can

count upon our hearty friendship. If a nation shows that it knows how to act with reasonable efficiency and decency in social and political matters, if it keeps order and pays its obligations, it need fear no interference from the United States. Chronic wrong-doing, or an impotence which results in a general loosening of the ties of civilised society, may, in America as elsewhere, ultimately require intervention by some civilised nation, and in the Western hemisphere the adherence of the United States to the Monroe doctrine may force the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such wrong-doing or impotence, to the exercise of an international police power.'"¹

By far the most significant result of the Spanish-American War was the establishment for the first time of really cordial relations between the United States and Great Britain. During that war Great Britain did something more than keep the ring for the United States. In the Philippines, a British squadron actually interposed itself between the American Fleet and German warships which were threatening to open fire upon it. That interposition alone prevented the broadening out of the petty quarrel between the United States and Spain into a conflict which might well have become world-wide. The friendly attitude of Great Britain thus conspicuously manifested had a very important bearing upon Anglo-American relations, and in particular upon the attitude of America towards the war which almost immediately ensued between Great Britain and the Dutch Republics in South Africa.

Ever since the great schism of 1783 there had been considerable and at times dangerous tension between Great Britain and the colonies which had achieved their independence. The treatment of the Empire loyalists by the American Government in 1783 constituted a legitimate grievance, and brought British Canada into being in sharp antagonism to its American neighbours. The war of 1812-14, into which the two English-speaking peoples drifted, accentuated the antagonism. To England that

England
and the
United
States

Anglo-
American
Relations,
1783-1898

¹ R. B. Merriman : *The Monroe Doctrine*, pp. 7-8.

war was almost a negligible, though none the less a regrettable, incident in a titanic struggle. To American minds it loomed much larger at the time, and it left very bitter memories behind. Since the conclusion of the Treaty of Ghent in 1814, peace was, however, consistently maintained between Great Britain and the United States. That Hundred Years' Peace, as Dr. Nicholas Murray Butler has justly said, "is of itself an eloquent testimony of the English-speaking peoples, and a noble tribute to the statesmen who have in succession guided their policies and conducted their international business. The long invisible line which separates the United States and the Dominion of Canada has been left unguarded despite the fact that two energetic, rapidly-expanding peoples have been pushing steadily westward on either side of it. This long invisible unguarded line is the most convincing testimony that the world has to offer to the ability of modern self-disciplined peoples to keep the peace."¹

Boundary
Questions

But though the sword was fortunately never drawn, there was a great deal of bad blood between the two peoples, and on several occasions, even before 1895, acute differences might easily have sharpened into war. "There have," as Dr. Butler has pointed out, "been more tempting occasions for misunderstanding and armed conflict between the British Empire and the United States than between the United States and all other nations of the earth combined." In 1830, De Tocqueville made the observation that he could conceive of no hatred more poisonous than that which the Americans then felt for England. In 1842 there was acute friction between the two peoples over unsettled boundary questions in Maine and New Brunswick. But the conclusion in that year of the Webster-Ashburton Treaty provided a settlement of all open questions as to the boundaries of British North America and the United States from the Atlantic Ocean to the Rocky Mountains. The Oregon Boundary question in 1846 provided another cause of friction, but it was not until the outbreak of the Civil War in America (1861) that the two countries came

American
Civil War

¹ ap. Dunning : *The British Empire and the United States*, p. v.

actually to the brink of war. The affair of the *Trent* was only one of several incidents which during the war between North and South might have led to an explosion. Happily war was averted at the time and more friendly relations ensued.


Neither party in America was satisfied with the English attitude. The North regarded our neutrality as rather more than malevolent. The South thought it inadequately benevolent. More specifically there was the question of the damage inflicted upon American commerce by the *Alabama* and other cruisers sailing from English ports. The latter question was, however, ultimately submitted to arbitration. After prolonged negotiation between the two Governments, the Treaty of Washington—a portentous document consisting of forty-three articles—was signed (8th May, 1871). It expressed “in a friendly spirit the regret felt by Her Majesty’s Government for the escape, under whatever circumstances, of the *Alabama* and other vessels from British ports, and for the depredation committed by these vessels. It adjusted in minute detail outstanding disputes as to fisheries between United States and Canada, and agreed to refer the question of the Vancouver boundary (involving the possession of the Island of San Juan) to the arbitration of the German Emperor, who ultimately decided against Great Britain. It accepted new principles of international law, involving greater diligence in preventing the equipment of ships in neutral harbours for use against friendly belligerents, and finally it agreed to refer the *Alabama* claims themselves to a tribunal of five persons nominated by Great Britain, the United States, Italy, Switzerland, and Brazil. In the result, Great Britain had to pay £3,250,000 in damages to the United States. Mr. Gladstone, who was largely responsible for the submission of the question to arbitration, subsequently expressed the opinion that “the sentence was harsh in its extent and unjust in its basis.” But he added, “I regard the fine imposed on this country as dust in the balance, compared with the moral value of the example set when these two great nations of England

The
Geneva
Arbitration

and America . . . went in peace and concord before a judicial tribunal, rather than resort to the arbitrament of the sword." It was finely said, and impartial history applauds the sentiment. But among contemporaries there was an uneasy sense that we had been unduly complaisant. That complaisance, however, perhaps bore fruit in the more friendly relations which, in 1898, resulted in a striking manifestation of the solidarity between the two English-speaking Powers, and which, as already indicated, inclined the American people to a more favourable view of English policy in South Africa when war broke out between Great Britain and the Boer Republics. •

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CHAPTER VIII

THE ENGLISH IN SOUTH AFRICA

In South Africa, more perhaps than in any other portion of the world, there are common questions of general interest which can only be decided with safety by a general authority expressing the considered judgment of a United South Africa.—EGERTON.

The keynote of South African history is retribution following a shirking of responsibility.—VIOLET MARKHAM.

Spasmodic violence alternating with impotent dropping of the reins: first severity and then indulgence and then severity again.—J. A. FROUDE on South Africa.

WE have traced in a preceding chapter the remarkable sequence of events by which English authority was established over Egypt and the Soudan. In March, 1899, a Treaty was concluded between England and France, by which France was confirmed in possession of a great West African Empire and at the same time acknowledged the rights of Great Britain over the whole Nile basin, from the source of the great river to its mouth. Thus the way from Cairo to the Cape, menaced momentarily by the sudden appearance of Major Marchand at Fashoda, was still left open, unblocked by any other European Power.

The South
African
War,
1899-1902

Hardly eight months had passed, however, before the position of the English in the south of the African continent was gravely threatened by the outbreak of war between England and the two Dutch Republics—the Transvaal and the Orange Free State (10th October, 1899). That war marked the culmination of a series of quarrels and misunderstandings which had characterised the relations of the two peoples, or, more strictly, of the British Government and the Dutch farmers, ever since Cape Colony had passed into British hands. A brief retrospective glance

at the history of these relations is, therefore, essential to an appreciation of the issues involved in the war of 1899-1902.

The Eng-
lish in Cape
Colony

The importance of the Cape of Good Hope in relation to the trade with the East Indies was appreciated by Englishmen from the early days of the seventeenth century, and in 1620 the English flag was hoisted at the Cape by two adventurous Englishmen, Shilling and FitzHerbert, anxious to be beforehand with the Dutch. The reluctance of the infant East India Company to face fresh responsibilities, and the absorption of James I. in the project for a marriage alliance with Spain, led to the repudiation of the far-seeing action of Shilling and FitzHerbert, and the flag was hauled down again.

The Dutch
in Cape
Colony

The Dutch East India Company, with its larger resources and broader basis, took longer views, and in 1652 the Cape was occupied in the name of the Company by a Dutch expedition commanded by Anthony Van Riebeck. From that day until the close of the eighteenth century Cape Colony remained a dependency of the Dutch East India Company, being utilised by their ships as a port of call, and by their merchants and sailors as a vegetable garden. That vegetable garden saved the lives of thousands of people, who but for it would have died of scurvy during the long voyage round the Cape. In 1795 the United Provinces became a dependency of the French Republic, and in order to save the Cape Colony from a similar fate it was occupied by a British force. Handed back to the Batavian Republic in 1802, it was again conquered by England in 1806, and at the Peace of Paris (1814) it was purchased for £6,000,000 from the Dutch Government and became the property of Great Britain. But though the Government was British, the white inhabitants were mainly Dutch. Not until after 1820 was there any considerable emigration from this country. Between the British Government, progressive in policy, and the Dutch farmers, strongly conservative in instinct, causes of friction rapidly developed—notably in regard to the treatment of the natives. The zeal of the English Government and of the English missionaries was perhaps

more obvious than their discretion, and with the enforcement of the Act for the abolition of slavery the cup of Dutch indignation overflowed. That Act was administered with flagrant disregard for the interests of the Dutch farmers and with scant respect for their vested rights. They consequently determined to shake off the dust of the British Government from their feet, and to seek freedom in the vast hinterland of South Africa. This was the meaning of the Great Boer Trek (1836-40)—the cardinal fact of South African history, and a story, in some respects, curiously romantic and pathetic. The ultimate result of the Great Trek was the establishment of two Boer States virtually independent, the Transvaal and the Orange Free State.¹

The Great
Boer Trek

Meanwhile, a handful of English colonists had established themselves at Port Natal (1824), but the Boers from the north and west of the Drakensberg range threatened their existence, and in the early 'forties it seemed probable that a third Boer State would be established between the Drakensberg and the sea. In 1843, however, Natal was formally proclaimed to be a British Colony, and the Boers after a brief struggle sullenly withdrew to the west of the Drakensberg. Down to 1856 Natal was regarded as forming part of Cape Colony, but in that year it was declared independent, and it attained to the full dignity of "responsible" government in 1893.

Natal

What were the relations between Cape Colony and the Boer States to the north? From the moment of the Trek there were two possible alternatives open to the English Government: either frankly to recognise the secession of the Boers, and in due time to acknowledge the existence of European States in South Africa independent of the British flag; or, to make it clear from the outset that no other power would be tolerated in South Africa, and that the Boer farmers, go where they would, must remain subject to the English Crown. For either policy there was something to be said. Unfortunately for the credit of British rule in South Africa we adopted neither, or, rather, we

British
and Boers

¹ Slavery abolition was only one of many causes of the Great Trek.

adopted both. Thus in 1848 Sir Harry Smith, the English Governor of Cape Colony, issued a proclamation to the effect that "the whole territory between the Orange and Vaal Rivers as far east as the Drakensberg was to be under the Sovereignty of the Queen." The Dutch farmers under Pretorius protested against this "assumption" of Sovereignty, but they were worsted in battle at Boomplatz (29th August, 1848). Some of them fled to the north of the Vaal, the rest acquiesced with no good grace, and accepted the authority of the Queen in the "Orange River Sovereignty." The Home Government was lukewarm in its support of Sir Harry Smith. In 1851 the whole force of Cape Colony was engaged in one of the perennial struggles with the Kaffirs on the eastern frontier of the Colony, and Pretorius, then an outlaw beyond the Vaal, threatened to raise an insurrection in the Orange Sovereignty unless the independence of his countrymen to the north of the Vaal was recognised.

The Sand
River Con-
vention,
17th June,
1852

Consequently, in 1852, the Sand River Convention was concluded. Great Britain thereby conceded "to the emigrant farmers beyond the Vaal River the right to manage their own affairs, and to govern themselves, without any interference on the part of Her Majesty the Queen's Government." Thus the South African or Transvaal Republic came into being as an independent State. But with two reservations: it was to be open to all comers on equal terms, and no slavery was to be permitted or practised. Meanwhile, we were involved in troubles with the Basutos, the natives to the east of the Orange River Sovereignty, and, at the close of the war, General Cathcart, the officer in command, reported that it would be necessary to station 2000 troops permanently in the Sovereignty. The Home Government were in no mind for the assumption of further military responsibilities, and preferred the alternative of withdrawal.

The Bloem-
fontein
Conven-
tion, 23rd
February,
1854

The Bloemfontein Convention was a counterpart of that concluded two years earlier with the Transvaal Boers. Thus the Orange Free State took its place side by side with the South African Republic, and it seemed as though

a definite boundary were to be set to British Sovereignty towards the north-west.¹

For nearly twenty years the policy of non-interven-
 tion was consistently maintained. Meanwhile, the Cape
 Colony itself advanced steadily towards the goal of self-
 government. During the vigorous and enlightened ad-
 ministration of Sir George Grey (1854-61), Cape Colony
 was endowed with an elected Legislature, and attained
 to "responsible" government in 1872. But Sir George
 Grey had a far wider vision than that bounded by the
 horizon of responsible government. Looking beyond the
 vacillating policy hitherto pursued by Great Britain in
 South Africa, he saw that the only possible path of safety
 lay in some form of federation. The State Paper in which,
 in 1858, he submitted his views to the Home Government
 is one of the ablest documents in the history of our Colonial
 Empire. Grey had the support of the Boers of the Orange
 River Sovereignty. Their Volksraad resolved in 1858
 "that a union or alliance with the Cape Colony, either
 on the plan of federation or otherwise, is desirable."
 The only reply of the Colonial Office was to recall Grey
 for exceeding his instructions. He was restored by the
 personal intervention of the Queen, but he returned to
 Cape Town with tarnished prestige and with gravely
 impaired authority. Had the Home Government grasped
 the problem as Sir George Grey grasped it, had they even
 had the sense to trust "the man on the spot," the whole
 subsequent course of South African history might have
 been different. Mr. F. W. Reitz, the Transvaal Secretary
 of State in 1899, wrote to Sir George Grey in 1893: "Had
 British Ministers in time past been wise enough to follow
 your advice, there would undoubtedly be to-day a British
 dominion extending from Table Bay to Zambesi."² But
 in those days the Manchester School was in the ascendant;
 in that school there was no room for statesmen of Grey's

Sir George
 Grey

¹ For the remarkably interesting Constitutions evolved by the Boer Republics during the period of independence, see Bryce: *Studies in History and Jurisprudence*.

² Quoted by Egerton: *Federations, etc.*, p. 71.

vision; the weary Titan was tired of the whole "burden" of colonial establishments and was looking forward to the happy day when "those wretched Colonies would no longer hang like millstones round our necks."

Expansion
in South
Africa

Responsibilities once assumed are not, however, so lightly shaken off. Towards the end of the 'sixties the period of masterly inactivity was drawing to a close. In 1868 the Boers on the Orange River became involved in a dispute with the Basutos to the east of them. The Basuto Chief addressed a prayer to the British Government: "Let me and my people rest under the large folds of the flag of England." His prayer was heard, and in 1869 British Sovereignty was proclaimed over Basutoland.

In 1871 Griqualand West, a native territory to the west of the Orange State, was similarly annexed to the Crown. This important acquisition gave us the diamond fields of the Kimberley district. But its importance was not measured only in diamonds. The annexation meant a new turn in the wheel of policy: the definite abandonment of the *laissez-faire* attitude which for the last thirty years had been characteristic of British policy in South Africa, as elsewhere. The acquisition of the Kimberley diamond field meant also a new strain in the social life of South Africa. "The digger, the capitalist, the company promoter jostled the slow-moving Dutch farmer and quickened the pace of life."¹

Lord Carnarvon &
Policy,
1874-77

Such was the condition of affairs in South Africa when, in 1874, Lord Carnarvon took up the reins at the Colonial Office. Lord Carnarvon was the Minister who had been officially responsible for the enactment of a Federal Constitution for British North America, and he was anxious to confer a similar boon upon South Africa. The moment appeared not inopportune, for in 1872 a Federation Commission had been appointed in Cape Colony. But Cape Colony was in the first flush of self-satisfaction at the attainment of responsible government and had no leisure for the larger problem.

¹ Lucas: *South Africa*, p. 246.

Nevertheless, Lord Carnarvon wrote to the Governor of the Cape in 1875 to propose that the several States of South Africa should be invited to a Conference to discuss native policy and other points of common interest, and to ventilate "the all-important question of a possible union of South Africa in some form of confederation."¹ The proposal was not welcomed in Cape Colony, and Mr. Froude, the eminent historian, who had been sent out to represent the Colonial Office at the proposed Conference, found his position highly embarrassing both to himself and to his hosts.² Froude put his finger with great acuteness upon the root difficulty: "If we can make up our minds to allow the colonists to manage the natives their own way we may safely confederate the whole country." Of federation, however, imposed upon them from London, the colonists would hear nothing. The Conference in South Africa never met.

Lord Carnarvon, not to be foiled, invited various gentlemen interested in South Africa to confer with him at the Colonial Office (August, 1876). The Cape Premier, Mr. Molteno, happened to be in London but was forbidden to attend; no delegate was present from the Transvaal; and Mr. Brand, President of the Orange Free State (who greatly impressed Froude), attended under strict injunctions from his Volksraad not to take part in any negotiations respecting federation, by which the independence of his own State could be endangered. Sir Theophilus Shepstone and two members of the Legislature represented Natal. As regards federation the meeting was entirely abortive.³

Despite this discouragement, Lord Carnarvon sent out to South Africa (in December, 1876) the draft of a permissive Confederation Bill, which in the session of 1877 was passed into law by the Imperial Legislature. This enabling Act contained the outline of a complete Federal Constitution. It was for the South African Colonies to fill it in if they

¹ Lucas : *op. cit.* p. 264.

² Cf. Paul : *Life of Froude*, c. vii. Eight gentlemen invited to meet him at dinner at Government House refused.

³ Lucas : *op. cit.* p. 265.

would. Lord Carnarvon, while insisting that the "action of all parties whether in the British Colonies or the Dutch States must be spontaneous and uncontrolled," informed the new Governor of the Cape that he had been selected "to carry my scheme of confederation into effect."¹ The man chosen for this high task was one of the most trusted and experienced servants of the Crown, one to whose life-work the confederation of South Africa might form an appropriate and noble crown. It was the expressed hope of his Chief that within two years he would be "the first Governor-General of South Africa." The words read ironically, for the reign of Sir Bartle Frere (1877-80) coincided, through no fault of his own, with the darkest period in South African history.

Annexa-
tion of the
Transvaal,
1877

Less than a month after Sir Bartle Frere reached Cape Town (31st March, 1877), another agent of Lord Carnarvon's took a step which opened a new chapter in British policy in South Africa. Sir Theophilus Shepstone was Secretary for native affairs in Natal, and no man had more intimate knowledge of the native problem. In October, 1876, he was sent out as "Special Commissioner to inquire respecting certain disturbances which have taken place in the territories adjoining the colony of Natal," and was authorised, at his discretion, and provided it were desired by the inhabitants, "to annex to the British dominion all or part of the territories which formed the scene of his inquiry."² The scene was the Transvaal Republic. At that moment the Boers of the Transvaal were in serious danger of annihilation at the hands of their native neighbours. More than this. The condition and policy of the Republic constituted a serious menace to the reputation and even the existence of the whole white population of South Africa. The Boers had incurred the bitter enmity of Cetewayo, King of the powerful tribe of the Zulus, as well as of the Matabele Chief, Lobengula. With another Chief, Sekukuni, they were, in 1876, actually at war. Morally and materially the Boers were bankrupt,

¹ Egerton : *Federations, etc.*, p. 72.

² Egerton : *Federations, etc.*, p. 274.

and their native enemies were only awaiting the opportunity to "eat them up." That process might begin with the Boers; it was not likely to end with them. Under these circumstances Shepstone, after three months of careful inquiry, decided that annexation was the only remedy for the disease, and on 12th April, 1877, he took over the administration of the Transvaal in the Queen's name, promising to the Boers complete self-government under the British Crown. The President, Mr. Burgers, after a formal protest, retired to Cape Town on a pension; his rival, the Vice-President, Mr. Kruger, proceeded to London and tried to persuade Lord Carnarvon to reverse the policy of his agent. This the Colonial Secretary declined to do.

That the annexation saved the Boers of the Transvaal from destruction is hardly open to question. But it left the British Government face to face, in a more acute form than ever before, with the native problem. A series of disputes with the Zulus led in January, 1879, to the outbreak of war. The history of that war may be thus briefly summarised: one grievous disaster, several deeds of heightened heroism, one great and final victory. At Isandhlwana (22nd January) a British force of 800 whites and 500 natives was literally cut to pieces. This was the disaster more than half redeemed by the heroic defence of Rorke's Drift. For eleven and a half hours, less than 100 men of the 24th, under two subalterns, Bromhead and Chard, held the Drift against 4000 Zulus. The defence of this post on the Buffalo River saved Natal. The final victory was won by Lord Chelmsford at Ulundi in the Zulu territory on 4th July. Cetewayo was afterwards captured and sent as a prisoner to Cape Town, and the power of his people was finally broken. In the course of a war, brief but full of incident, the exiled Prince Imperial of France, the heir of Napoleon III., who had volunteered to serve with the British force, was unfortunately killed in a reconnaissance (1st June), owing to the carelessness of the officer who had been entrusted with the operation.

Before the year 1879 closed, a British force destroyed

The Zulu
War, 1879

the power of Sekukuni, and this inveterate enemy of the Boers joined Cetewayo in captivity.

The Boer
War,
1880-81

The Boers could now breathe freely ; the English had destroyed their enemies. The Dutch leaders had never ceased to protest against annexation, and their visits to London led them to hope much from the rapid vicissitudes of party government. Their hopes were not destined to disappointment. In the Transvaal, Frere found in 1879 that the Boers, despite official assertions in London, were confident that their country would be given back. The history of the retrocession of the Orange Free State had taught them a lesson. Most unfortunately, there had been grave procrastination in regard to the fulfilment of Shepstone's promise of self-government. In June, 1879, Sir Garnet Wolseley was sent out to take over, as High Commissioner, supreme civil and military command. Shortly after his arrival a Crown Colony Constitution was conferred upon the Transvaal. But this was far short of the legitimate expectations of the Boers, and their disappointment was great. The new High Commissioner declared in the Queen's name that it was the will and determination of Her Majesty's Government that the Transvaal should remain for ever "an integral portion of Her Majesty's dominions in South Africa." Her Majesty's Government was about to change hands. In the autumn of 1879 Mr. Gladstone insisted in his Midlothian speeches on the insanity of "the free subjects of a Monarch going to coerce the free subjects of a Republic." On coming into power in 1880 his Government declared that "under no circumstances can the Queen's authority in the Transvaal be relinquished." Bitter was the disappointment of the Boers, and on 16th December, 1880, Messrs. Kruger, Pretorius, and Joubert issued a proclamation declaring the independence of the Transvaal Republic. The moment was well chosen. The Basuto rebellion was in full progress ; the Transvaal was almost denuded of British troops, and on 10th December some companies of the 94th were surprised and cut to pieces at Bronker's Spruit, a place about forty miles from Pretoria. Sir George Colley had succeeded

Wolseley in July, and with a small force he hurried up to Newcastle in January (1881). Checked with heavy loss at Laing's Nek (28th January) and again at Ingogo (7th February) he met his death in the disastrous defeat at Majuba Hill (26th February). Ireland combined with South Africa to compel an early meeting of Parliament (6th January, 1881), and the Queen's Speech emphasised "the duty of taking military measures with a view to the prompt vindication of my authority." Sir Frederick Roberts was sent out in command of a considerable force, but he arrived in South Africa only to find that Sir Evelyn Wood, who succeeded Colley, had signed an agreement with the Boers acknowledging their right to complete self-government under the suzerainty of the Queen (23rd March). The Pretoria Convention, in which these terms were embodied, was amended three years later by the Convention of London (27th February, 1884). The latter treaty acknowledged the "South African Republic," and, while retaining the control of external relations, deleted all reference to the suzerainty of the Queen. The whole policy of retrocession was violently assailed by the Conservative opposition in England¹ and it signally failed to achieve a final settlement in South Africa.

Between 1884 and the close of the century a series of changes, at once rapid and profound, passed over South Africa. In 1884 there began, as we have seen, a scramble for Africa among the European Powers. Partly under the impulse of European competition in Africa, partly stimulated by the discovery of diamonds and gold in great profusion, the forward movement recommenced. The method adopted in this advance involved the revival of a device which since the days of Adam Smith had fallen into some discredit. The statesmen of the seventeenth century cordially encouraged the concession of Charters to companies of merchants. Such concessions brought to the Crown a maximum of profit with a minimum of responsibility. Adam Smith

British
Expansion
in Africa

¹ Cf. in particular the remarkable speech of Lord Cairns in the House of Lords, 31st March, 1881.

condemned the confusion between political and commercial purposes, holding that the function of a merchant was inconsistent with that of a sovereign. None the less, this method of colonisation had solid advantages, and in the last decades of the nineteenth century they became increasingly obvious. The "company of merchants" took risks and tried experiments, the Crown and the nation reaped where the Company had sown. In 1885 a Protectorate was established over Bechuanaland, partly no doubt with a view of preventing over-close relations between the Boer Republics and the recently established German colonies of Namaqualand and Damaraland (German South-West Africa). In the same year a Charter was granted to the Royal Niger Company, who established a Protectorate over the Niger territory on the west coast. But chartered companies and Protectorates alike represent, as a rule, somewhat transitory phases of development, and in 1900 Nigeria was annexed to the Crown. On the east coast the Chartered Company of East Africa (1888) prepared the way for a Protectorate (1895), and later for direct sovereignty. In the same year (1888) Lobengula, King of the Matabeles, was induced to accept British protection, and in 1889 the Chartered Company of South Africa was incorporated and started on its conquering and civilising mission, establishing its sovereignty in no long time over the vast territory which stretches from the Limpopo in the south to Lake Nyassa on the east and Lake Tanganyika on the north—a territory which recalls in its modern name, Rhodesia, the memory of the great Imperial statesman whose insight and imagination conceived, and whose resolute will went far to secure, British supremacy in Africa. About the same time (1890) Portugal was induced to renounce all rights over the Hinterland which separated its possessions in the west (Angola) from Mozambique and Portuguese East Africa. In this way the two Boer Republics were virtually encircled by British territory.

Meanwhile, Africa was becoming more closely involved in European politics (see *supra*, pp. 73-90). Valuable gold

mines were discovered in 1886 on the Witwatersrand, and the discovery attracted a crowd of adventurers who introduced into the social and economic life of the South African Republic an entirely new strain. The slow-moving, intensely conservative Boer farmers deeply resented the intrusion of the miners and financiers. Oil would not mix with water, and the newly-founded city of Johannesburg, with its new Chamber of Mines, soon found itself in conflict with Pretoria and the Volksraad. The newcomers, or *Uitlanders*, peremptorily demanded political rights commensurate with their contribution to the wealth of the community. The Boer Government, at that time dominated by President Kruger, refused to grant them. In 1895 Cecil Rhodes became Prime Minister of the Cape Colony, and in December of that same year the Uitlanders of the Transvaal attempted to take by force what had been denied to their arguments. Dr. Jameson, an intimate friend of the Premier of Cape Colony, and himself the administrator of the British South Africa Company, foolishly attempted to raid the Transvaal territory with an armed force. The force, commanded by Jameson, was surrounded by the Boers at Krugersdorp and forced to surrender. Their confederates in Johannesburg were imprisoned; Jameson himself and his comrades were handed over for trial to the British Government.

Gold-mining in the Transvaal

The Uitlanders

The Jameson Raid

The fiasco of the Jameson Raid had important results. Though disavowed both by the Cape Colony Government and by the Imperial Government the Raid excited the contempt and hostility of all our rivals in Africa and our enemies in Europe, and on 3rd January, 1896, the German Emperor telegraphed to President Kruger in the following terms: "I congratulate you from the bottom of my heart on having, in conjunction with your own people, and without seeking the assistance of friendly Powers, and relying exclusively upon your own forces against the armed bands who have raided your territory, succeeded in re-establishing peace and in maintaining the independence of your country against foreign invasion."

The Kaiser and President Kruger

Treaties
between
the Boer
Republics
and Ger-
many

This telegram naturally gave great offence in England, but Jameson's Raid rendered it impossible for the paramount Power to interfere on behalf of the Uitlanders whose position became more and more desperate. Meanwhile, in March, 1897, the Transvaal Republic concluded with the Orange Free State a series of important treaties. A Convention of "Friendship and Perpetual Alliance" was concluded for the mutual defence of their rights and territories. Reciprocal facilities for commerce and naturalisation were granted, and it was agreed that each Republic should nominate delegates to a Council which was to meet in alternate years at Pretoria and Bloemfontein, charged with the duty of drawing closer the political and commercial relations of the two Republics and of preparing the way to a federal union between them. A month later the Orange Free State concluded a Treaty of Friendship and Commerce with Germany. In view of the *rapprochement* between the two Dutch Republics the significance of this new engagement hardly requires demonstration.

Towards
War

Mr. Cham-
berlain and
Lord
Milner

Events were clearly hastening towards the *dénouement* of 1899. In 1897, Sir Alfred (now Viscount) Milner was appointed to succeed Sir Hercules Robinson as Governor of Cape Colony and High Commissioner of South Africa; and in the same year Mr. Chamberlain addressed to the High Commissioner an important dispatch setting forth in detail the grievances of the Uitlanders against the Transvaal Government, and at the same time instructing him to raise specifically the question of the status of the Transvaal under the Convention of 1884. The terms of that Convention were admittedly ambiguous; the renunciation of suzerainty was a sentimental blunder and recent events rendered it imperative, if grave consequences were not to ensue, that the situation should be cleared up. The question was firmly handled, both by Mr. Chamberlain at home and by Sir Alfred Milner in South Africa. The Transvaal Government attempted, not unnaturally, to use Jameson's blunder for the purpose of securing a revision in their favour of the terms of the Convention

of London. But Mr. Chamberlain was adamant against any attempt on the part of the Dutch Republic to assert a status of complete sovereignty and independence. Meanwhile, things could not remain as they were at Johannesburg. In April, 1899, Sir Alfred Milner forwarded to the Queen a Petition, signed by 21,000 British subjects in the Transvaal, praying that the Queen would make inquiry into the grievances of which they were victims, and in particular their exclusion from all political rights. A month later Mr. Chamberlain expressed in the House of Commons his complete sympathy with the terms of the Petition. Negotiations between the two parties ensued, and in June a Conference took place at Bloemfontein between President Kruger and Sir Alfred Milner at which the latter vainly attempted to persuade the President to make some concession to the Uitlanders. The situation became so menacing that reinforcements were dispatched from England to the Cape, but in numbers insufficient to assert the British claims, though more than sufficient to provoke the apprehensions of the Boers. In October, 1899, the two Dutch Republics demanded the immediate withdrawal of the British troops, and the submission of all the questions at issue to arbitration. To concede the latter claim would have been to acknowledge the equality and sovereign status of the Transvaal Government. On the implicit refusal of the demand the two Dutch Republics declared war (10th October).

The war opened disastrously for Great Britain. The British Forces were quite inadequate to meet the Boers, who, mobilising with extreme rapidity, took the offensive in Natal. A small British force under General White checked their advance at Talana Hill and Elandsлагhte (21st October), but was compelled to fall back on Ladysmith, where for four months it was besieged by the Boers. Sir Redvers Buller was sent out in command of reinforcements, but made the serious blunder of dividing his force into three columns. The result was the Black Week of December, 1899: General Gatacre was heavily repulsed in a night attack at Stormberg (10th December). Lord

The South
African
War

The
"Black
Week,"
Dec. 1899

Methuen, moving to the relief of Kimberley, was defeated at Magersfontein (11th December); while Buller, in a dogged attempt to relieve Ladysmith by a direct frontal attack, sustained a terrible reverse at Colenso (15th December). Three days after Buller's defeat on the Tugela River, Lord Roberts, heroically responding to the call of Queen and country, accepted the Command-in-Chief, only stipulating that he should have the services of Lord Kitchener as Chief of his Staff. The two Generals landed at Cape Town on 16th January, 1900, and the army under their command was substantially reinforced by contingents dispatched to South Africa from Canada, New Zealand, and Australia.

Victory
achieved
by Roberts
and Kit-
chener

The spirit of the scene changed instantaneously. On 15th February, Roberts relieved Kimberley; on 27th February (the anniversary of Majuba) he surrounded at Paardeberg a large force of Boers under the command of Kronje and compelled them to surrender; he entered Bloemfontein on 15th March, and advancing from the Orange Free State into the Transvaal, occupied Pretoria in the first week of June. Meanwhile Buller, after repeated failures to relieve General White and his sorely-tried garrison in Ladysmith, at last turned the flank of the Boers on the Tugela by the capture of Pieter's Hill, and so was able to relieve the devoted city. In November, Roberts handed over the command to Kitchener, and returned to England just in time to report himself at Osborne to his dying sovereign. Despite rapidly-failing health, Queen Victoria's conduct during the Boer War was little short of heroic. She it was who had insisted, in December, 1899, that large reinforcements should be sent out, and that Lord Roberts should be induced to take the command; she followed closely the efforts of her soldiers in South Africa, and expressed special appreciation of the gallantry of the Colonial contingents; she went in and out among her people at home, encouraging the fighter, consoling the wounded, comforting the mourners, warning and stimulating her Ministers. But the strain of the effort was tremendous, and on 22nd January, 1901, death closed her long reign of sixty-three years.

Death of
Queen
Victoria

The war in South Africa was by no means at an end. Throughout the latter part of 1900 and the whole of 1901 it was prolonged by the brilliant tactics of Louis Botha, De Wett, and Delarey, who waged guerilla warfare with incomparable skill. Gradually, however, the grim tenacity of Kitchener bore down all resistance. Boer women and children were collected into concentration camps, and by a system of blockhouses the whole country was slowly subdued. In May, 1902, peace between Great Britain and the Boers was concluded at Vereeniging.

Guerilla
Warfare in
South
Africa

Treaty of
Vereeniging

The long contest between the two European races for supremacy in South Africa was at last ended, and ended in the only possible way. The two Burgher States were annexed to the British Crown. After the conclusion of Peace, matters began to settle down so rapidly that it was deemed possible to confer responsible self-government upon the Transvaal in 1906, and upon the Orange River Colony in 1907. But as in the case of Canada and Australia, the attainment of responsibility was but the prelude to a further constitutional development. Between the four self-governing Colonies of South Africa there was much in common, and it was natural, therefore, that attempts should have been made to effect some form of Federal Union. During the last twenty years or more the idea had, for obvious reasons, receded into the background, but after the concession of responsible government to the conquered Republics it again came prominently to the fore. "In South Africa," writes Professor Egerton, "more perhaps than in any other portion of the world, there are common questions of general interest which can only be decided with safety by a general authority expressing the considered judgment of a United South Africa."¹ Four questions in particular compelled the immediate consideration of some scheme of Union: that of Railway Rates and Communications; the Tariff Question; the Labour Question; and, above all, the fact that the two European races were hopelessly and increasingly outnumbered by the indigenous tribes of South Africa.

Union of
South
Africa

¹ *Federations and Unions in the British Empire*, p. 74.

Problems
in South
Africa

Under Colonial separatism the Railway problem presented a hopeless and apparently insoluble tangle. In the interval after the conclusion of the war, and while the Boer States were under Crown Colony administration, Lord Milner did something towards a solution of the railway problem by uniting the systems of the Transvaal and the Orange River Colony. But his scheme provided no more than a palliative. There still remained three State Railway systems, which combined all the drawbacks of State ownership with all the disadvantages of private competition. In May, 1908, a Conference came together at Pretoria to consider the closely related problems of Railway Rates and Tariffs; but it was quickly realised that no ultimate solution would be found except in a political union between the four Colonies. Six months later a Convention met at Durban, consisting of thirty-three representatives from the different Colonies. The proceedings took place behind closed doors. In December, 1908, the meetings were transferred to Cape Town, and after three months of close and continuous application a scheme was agreed upon, was embodied in a Bill, and was submitted for consideration to the several Colonial legislatures. After various amendments, the scheme now embodied in the South African Union Act was, in June, 1909, approved by all four Colonies. The scheme as finally adopted took the form, not of a Federation, but of a Political Union. Union was in the case of South Africa preferred to federalism for several reasons: the two most important being that the distinctions in South Africa run upon lines not of locality but of race, while the economic problems which, as we have seen, so urgently pressed for solution, were more readily soluble under a unitary than under a federal system.

The Union
of South
Africa

Thus was the dream of Sir George Grey and Lord Carnarvon more than fulfilled. They had dreamt of confederation. Under the new Constitution, four Colonies, Cape Colony, Natal, the Transvaal, and the Orange River Colony, agreed to merge their identity in that of United South Africa, and accept henceforward

the status of *Provinces*; but each Province still has an elected Provincial Council with a standing Executive Committee, elected by the Council and responsible thereto, under a chairman nominated by the Union Government, holding the title of administrator of the Province. Provision was also made for the admission into the Union, at a subsequent date, of other Provinces, such as Rhodesia, should it be mutually desired. The Union Legislature consists of two Houses: a Senate of 40 members, and a House of 130, of whom Cape Colony elects 51, the Transvaal 45, and Natal and the Orange Free State 17 each. The Executive Council, appointed by the Governor-General, is, in effect, a responsible Cabinet. By a clumsy but perhaps unavoidable compromise, the seat of the Legislature was fixed at Cape Town, that of the Executive at Pretoria. In the *Union Act* the final stage in the constitutional evolution of South Africa has, we may presume, been reached. "Spasmodic violence alternating with impatient dropping of the reins; first severity and then indulgence, and then severity again, with no persisting in any one system—a process which drives nations mad as it drives children." Such was Froude's summary of England's dealing with South Africa in the nineteenth century. The twentieth has opened under happier auspices.

The South African War reacted powerfully upon international relations in Europe. The sympathies of most of the European Governments and peoples were manifestly on the side of the Boers. That this should have been the case in Holland was not unnatural, and in Germany was inevitable; nor was there any reason for surprise, in view of recent events in Egypt and the Soudan, that the hostility of France to England should have been as marked as that of Germany. Italy was faithful to her traditional friendship for England, and the memory of England's friendly offices in the Spanish War was sufficiently recent to check the disposition in America towards ostentatious espousal of the Boer cause.

Had the German Empire possessed in 1900 an adequate fleet it is probable that the European War would have been

Reaction of
the South
African
War upon
European
Politics

antedated by fourteen years. In that event England's position would have been exceedingly precarious; her diplomatic isolation was almost complete; her relations with France were indifferent, while Russia's hostility was at least equal to that of Germany. Early in 1900 the German Emperor actually proposed to France and Russia that they should co-operate with him in imposing "mediation" upon England. As, however, the proposal involved the stipulation that the three Powers should enter into a mutual guarantee of their European territories, it was promptly declined by France. Later on, when the Kaiser momentarily desired the friendship of England, he had the effrontery to suggest to her that this stipulation was expressly inserted by him in order to prevent a Franco-Germano-Russian combination against Great Britain. Even the Kaiser could hardly have been guilty of an insinuation so preposterous but for the marked improvement in Anglo-German relations which, paradoxically, ensued upon the Boer War. The truth was that Germany was not yet ready for the decisive struggle, and in the meantime the Kaiser's supreme object was to avert any *rapprochement* between Russia on the one side and England and France on the other. The entanglement of the European Powers, and in particular of Russia, in the affairs of the Far East, contributed in no small measure to the achievement of his purpose.

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CHAPTER IX

WEST AND EAST

CHINA AND JAPAN. EUROPE IN THE FAR EAST. REFORM MOVEMENT IN RUSSIA

The opening or reopening by white men of intercourse by land between furthest West and furthest East is an event of first-rate historical importance.—J. D. ROGERS.

Les tsars ont cette rare fortune que l'instinct national soutient leurs calculs d'ambition. . . . La propagande révolutionnaire ne pouvait pas atteindre la Russie. . . . Rien n'y était mûr, ni pour la liberté politique, ni pour la liberté civile.—ALBERT SOBEL (1887).

What we want in Russia is not gambling in revolution with its fantastic prospects and terrible realities: we want thorough organic reforms, something like the movements of the 'sixties on a larger scale.—Sir PAUL VINOGRADOFF (1914).


*Welt-
Politik*

A GAIN and again in the course of this narrative it has been necessary to insist upon the truism that the main interest of European History in the last half-century lies largely beyond the confines of Europe. The contents of the two preceding chapters, the one carrying us from the American Continent to the Carribean Archipelago, from Cuba to the Philippines; the other dealing exclusively with South Africa, supply a sufficient commentary upon this text. The following pages will afford still further confirmation of the same truth.

Europe
and the
Far East

We must not, however, exaggerate the novelty of the situation. The history of Europe in its modern phase dates in reality from the geographical renaissance of the later fifteenth century. Among the impulses to that great movement not the least powerful was the desire to maintain and develop those trading relations between Western Europe and Eastern Asia which had been tempor-

FAR EAST. POLITICAL DIVISIONS AFTER RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR



arily interrupted by the conquests of the Ottoman Turk in the Balkans and in the countries which fringe the eastern coast of the Mediterranean. The pioneers in Eastern enterprise were the Portuguese, who reached Japan about 1542. In 1549, Francis Xavier arrived at the head of a Jesuit Mission at Kagoshima, and some forty years later Japanese Envoys visited the western capitals of Lisbon, Madrid, and Rome. The Portuguese were followed in the East by the Dutch and the English; the English East India Company established a trading factory in Japan in 1613, and another two years later on the Island of Formosa. Early in the seventeenth century, however, a domestic revolution in Japan led to the extermination of Christianity, and from that time until the middle of the nineteenth century the Japanese were able to maintain a policy of complete isolation.

Hardly less complete was the isolation of China. The diplomatic segregation of the Celestial Empire was absolute, but since 1771 foreigners had been permitted to trade, though under the severest restrictions, at Canton. The East India Company made repeated attempts to break down the embargo. Lord Macartney was dispatched on a mission to China in 1792, and obtained an audience from the Emperor. But in reply to a request for more considerate treatment, the Emperor made it clear to the British Envoy that any attempt on the part of British traders to obtain wider privileges would be peremptorily resisted. "Should your Majesty," wrote the Emperor to King George III., "fit out ships in order to attempt to trade either at Ningpo Chusan, Tientsin, or other places, I shall be compelled, as our laws are exceedingly severe, to direct my Mandarins to force your ships to quit these ports, and thus the increased trouble and exertions of your merchants would at once be frustrated."

After Macartney's mission matters somewhat improved. But foreign traders still carried on their operations at great personal risk; consequently, in 1816 another important mission was dispatched under Lord Amherst, who was instructed by the British Government to press the

Emperor of China for the "removal of the grievances which had been experienced, and for an exemption from them and others of the like nature for the time to come, with the establishment of the Company's trade upon a secure, solid, equitable footing, free from the capricious, arbitrary aggressions of the Local Authorities and under the protection of the Emperor, and the sanction of regulations to be drawn up by himself." Amherst was permitted to reach Peking, but the net result of his mission may be estimated by the message dispatched from the Chinese Emperor to the Prince Regent of England: "Hereafter there is no occasion for you to send an Ambassador so far, and to be at the trouble of passing over mountains and crossing over seas. . . . I therefore send down my pleasure to expel these Ambassadors and send them back to their own country without punishing the high crime they have committed."

The Opium
Trade

Insult was heaped upon insult and restriction upon restriction, but the foreign merchants persisted in the attempt to force their unwelcome presence upon the Chinese. Their persistence was largely explained and partially compensated by the increasing profits of the Opium Trade. With a view to mitigating the hardships endured by the merchants, the British Government decided to appoint a Superintendent of Trade who, besides controlling the commercial dealings between Englishmen and the Chinese, should also be invested with something of a diplomatic character. In 1833 Lord Napier was appointed to this difficult post. On his arrival at Canton the Governor published a Proclamation in the following terms: "A lawless foreign slave, Napier, has issued a notice. We know not how such a dog barbarian of an outside nation as you can have the presumption to call yourself Superintendent . . . according to the laws of the nation the royal warrant should be respectfully requested to behead you, and to expose your head publicly to the multitude as a terror to perverse dispositions." Napier failed to make any impression upon the Chinese and retired to Macao, where in 1834 he died, and was succeeded as Superintendent

in 1835 by Captain Elliot. Elliot could hardly fail to sympathise with the intense anxiety manifested by the Chinese Government to put an end to the opium traffic, though their methods in doing it were open to criticism. In 1837 a Special Commissioner, Lin, arrived at Canton with plenary authority to use all necessary means to put down the traffic. Previous to 1833 the trade in opium had been regulated by the East India Company, who enjoyed a complete monopoly. The Company's Charter lapsed in 1833, and on its reissue the monopoly was abrogated. As a result, the trade not only increased with great rapidity, but, being no longer regulated by a responsible Corporation, gave rise to many regrettable incidents. The Chinese, therefore, were entirely justified in trying to stop it, though the action of Commissioner Lin was exceedingly arbitrary and high-handed. Lin peremptorily demanded that all the opium in the hands of British merchants should be surrendered and destroyed; Elliot had no option but to order the merchants to comply, and a stock worth several millions sterling was destroyed. In return, Elliot gave the merchants a bond on the English Government. Commissioner Lin next demanded that henceforward all vessels engaged in the trade should be confiscated, and all traders should suffer death. Elliot naturally refused these extravagant demands; bade the merchants evacuate Canton; himself withdrew to Macao, and called upon the Governor-General of India—Lord Auckland—for armed assistance.

It would serve no useful purpose to recount in detail the ensuing acts of violence on both sides: the outrages, the reprisals and recriminations, which in 1840 eventuated in war. The whole business was, to say the least, unsavoury, but, whatever the indiscretion of British agents and the lawlessness of British subjects on the spot, no blame attaches to the Home Government. Their views on the whole question were admirably expressed in a letter written by Sir James Graham to Lord William Bentinck:¹—

“Trade with China is our only object; conquest there

First Chinese War,
1839-42

¹ 1828-35.

would be as dangerous as defeat, and commerce never prospers when force is used to sustain it. No glory is to be gained in a victory over the Chinese. Our factory there can only thrive by a ready compliance with the laws, the prejudices, and even the caprices of a nation which we seek to propitiate, and the supercargoes must not imagine that great national interests are to be sacrificed to a spirit of haughty defiance mixed with contempt for the laws and customs of an independent people. Our grand object is to keep peace, and by the mildest means, by a plastic adaptation of our manners to theirs, to extend our influence in China with the view of extending our commercial relations. It is not a demonstration of force that is required, but proofs of the advantage which China reaps from her peaceful intercourse with our nation.”¹

Treaty of
Nankin,
1842

The sentiments are almost too obviously “correct.” But it is easier to be “correct” at Whitehall than in the Far East, and the two nations drifted into a war, from which, as Graham truly said, no glory was to be reaped. But though glory was absent from the war, substantial advantages were embodied in the Treaty of Nankin by which, in 1842, the war was brought to an end. The Chinese agreed to cede Hong-Kong to England, to pay a sum of £6,000,000 sterling as “ransom,” compensation, and indemnity, and to open to the trade of the world the five port towns (henceforward known as Treaty Ports) of Canton, Amoy, Shanghai, Ningpo, and Foo-Chow-Foo. On the other hand, the Chinese, despite the plausible arguments of the English negotiators, refused to legalise the opium trade. The result was that a huge smuggling trade in the drug sprang up; the profits derived from it were in proportion to the risks, and a class of traders were attracted to it who gave much trouble in the future alike to the Chinese and to the English Government.

Two years after the Treaty of Nankin, the United States concluded a commercial treaty with China, and a large trade was gradually opened through the Treaty Ports, not only by America but by France and the other

¹ Parker : *Graham*, i. 150.

Western European Powers. The situation continued, however, to be full of difficulty and to give cause for perpetual friction.

By 1856 Great Britain was again involved in hostilities with China. The dispute arose in the familiar fashion. Under existing treaties British vessels in Chinese waters were subject only to the jurisdiction of our own Consuls. The *Arrow*, a lorch a or coasting schooner, was sailing, rightly or wrongly, under the British flag. The crew were Chinamen, and while the lorch a lay in the Canton River she was boarded from a Chinese warship, and the crew were carried off on a charge of piracy. The British Consul demanded their extradition, and Sir John Bowring, the Governor of Hong-Kong, supported him. The Chinese authorities refused reparation, and Sir Michael Seymour, with the British Fleet, proceeded to capture some of the forts on the Canton River. Bowring now seized the opportunity to demand the admission of foreigners to Canton, under the terms, hitherto neglected, of the Treaty of Nankin (1842). The Chinese made reprisals according to their wont: burnt down foreign factories, massacred European sailors, and set a price upon the heads of "the English and French dogs." Things became so serious that early in 1857 troops were dispatched from England, and Lord Elgin was sent out as plenipotentiary. The troops were diverted to India to assist in the suppression of the Sepoy Mutiny, but Canton was taken in 1858 and the English and French fleets were sent up to Tientsin to enforce the demands of the Western Powers. Not until June, 1858, was peace concluded. China agreed to permit a permanent British embassy at Peking and to establish one in London; to open the Yang-tse River and five additional ports to foreign trade, and to protect the Christian religion.

The
Second
Chinese
War, 1856

Treaty of
Tientsin,
1858

Throughout the negotiations which led up to the Treaty of Tientsin there was close co-operation between the representatives of England on the one hand, and of Russia, Germany, and more particularly France on the other. The Chinese, however, proved very reluctant to

Renewal of
Hostilities,
1860

carry out the engagements made in the Treaty, and England and France found themselves again involved in hostilities in 1860. Lord Elgin, who had left China after concluding the Treaty of Tientsin, was ordered to return, and with a large force of British and French troops reached Shanghai in June, 1860. The combined force captured the Taku Forts, and, having secured a base, marched on Peking. The brutal treatment accorded by the Chinese to British and French prisoners compelled the Allies to inflict signal punishment upon them. The Summer Palace of the Emperor near Peking was therefore burnt to the ground. The Emperor was thus brought to his senses, and on 24th October, 1860, the Convention of Peking was signed. The Treaties of 1858 were ratified; China agreed to receive a British Minister at Peking, to pay an increased indemnity, to open Tientsin to trade, and to cede Kowloon, opposite Hong-Kong, to the British Crown. A month later General Ignatieff concluded on behalf of Russia, who had taken no part in the preceding hostilities, a Convention by which a long strip of coast-line between the river Usuri and the sea was ceded to the Czar. Russia thus acquired the Primorsk Province, and so consolidated her position between Vladivostok and the Amur.

The Great
Famine,
1878

So matters continued for nearly a generation. Relations between England and China were temporarily interrupted in 1875 by the murder of Augustus Marjary, an official in the British Consular Service, but war was averted by the tact of Sir Thomas Wade, the British Representative at Peking, and China agreed to dispatch to London a special envoy who was the bearer of a humble apology to the British Crown. In the following year (1876), four additional ports were opened to foreign trade, and in 1878 the occurrence of a terrible famine in China, involving the loss of nine million lives, gave to European missionaries an opportunity of exhibiting Christianity in a favourable light to the distressed inhabitants of China. The organisation of relief on that occasion and the kindly interest manifested by the missionaries in the troubles of the

people tended not a little to improve the relations between West and East.

We must now turn from China to the Island Empire Japan destined before long to assert its superiority in the Far East. From the middle of the nineteenth century onwards persistent efforts were made by the United States to open up trade relations with Japan, and in 1853 an American squadron under the command of Commodore Perry appeared off Yokohama. Perry was the bearer of a letter from the President of the United States demanding protection for American sailors who might be driven by stress of weather, while whale-fishing in the Pacific, into Japanese ports, or wrecked upon their shores. He also demanded leave for American vessels to put into Japanese ports for repairs or supplies, and permission to dispose of their cargoes. In Japan, which for two hundred years had successfully maintained complete isolation, the delivery of this letter created nothing less than consternation. Perry was induced temporarily to withdraw, but his visit proved to be the opening of a new era in the history of Japan, and indeed in that of the Far East. According to agreement, Perry returned in 1854, and imposed upon Japan a Treaty by which the ports of Shaimoda and Hakodate were opened to the ships and traders of the United States. In the same year, similar facilities were conceded to Great Britain. Four years later, conventions were concluded between Japan on the one side, and Great Britain, the United States, France, Russia, and Portugal on the other, by which diplomatic agents were to be admitted to reside in Yedo; certain ports—Kanawaga, Nagasaki, and Hakodate—were to be opened to trade in the near future, and consuls were to be allowed to reside there.

Perry's Expedition,
1853

Reference has been made in the foregoing paragraphs to co-operation between the English and the French in the Far East, and some words must now be added as to the position which the French occupied in that region. For a century or more, France had been making somewhat fitful efforts to compensate themselves for their expulsion from India by the establishment of a French Dependency

The French in Eastern Asia

Cochin-
China and
Tonquin

further East. As long ago as 1787 Louis XVI. concluded a Treaty with the King of Cochin-China, by which in exchange for certain political and commercial privileges France restored the "legitimate" Sovereign to his throne. Owing to preoccupation in domestic politics, France was unable to follow up the advantage thus gained, but the Emperor, Napoleon III., was no sooner firmly established on the throne of France than he resumed the project for the establishment of a French Dependency in the Far East. In 1859 France acquired Saigon; established a Protectorate over Cambodia in 1862; and in the course of the years between 1859 and 1867, made herself mistress of Cochin-China. The acquisition of Tonquin in 1867 brought France into immediate contact with Southern China. In 1874 de Broglie concluded a Treaty, the object of which was to impose a Protectorate over the Emperor of Annam, the peninsula which rests on the Gulf of Tonquin and the South China Sea. The Treaty failed to define with sufficient precision either the French position in relation to Annam or the position of Annam in relation to China. China had from the first protested against the action of France in establishing a Protectorate over a kingdom which was, as she claimed, a dependency of her own, and in 1881 she denounced the Treaty concluded in 1874 between France and Annam. Simultaneously attacks were made upon the French in Tonquin by bands of undisciplined marauders who infested the Tonquin-China frontiers, and who were known as the "Black Flags." In this irregular warfare the French suffered very considerable reverses. Consequently in 1882 Jules Ferry, then in power in France, sent out a French squadron under the command of Admiral Courbet and considerable reinforcements of French troops. Courbet wrested the delta of Tonquin from the Black Flags, and compelled the Emperor of Annam to acknowledge the French Protectorate. Against this China protested, and attempted to expel the French from Tonquin. War, therefore, was declared between the two Powers. Admiral Courbet destroyed the arsenal of Foochow, seized Formosa and the Pescadores,

Franco-
Chinese
War,
1882-84

and blockaded Southern China. Negotiations for peace were then opened through the intermediation of the English resident, Sir Robert Hart. A serious disaster to the French arms near Langson threatened to impede them, but in April, 1884, peace was concluded. China definitely recognised the French Protectorate over Annam and Tonquin, and later on agreed to make certain commercial concessions to France.

An even more serious trial of strength awaited the ^{Korea} celestial Empire. For many years past, the "hermit" kingdom of Korea had been a bone of contention between Japan and China. A long and narrow peninsula dividing the sea of Japan from the Yellow Sea, Korea occupied a strategical position which invited, if it did not compel, the attentions of the Japanese on the one side, and on the other of the Chinese in Manchuria, and the Russians at Vladivostok. The political position of Korea was also ambiguous. It was claimed as a dependency by the Chinese when it suited their purpose to do so, but China was quick to repudiate any responsibility when the Koreans got into trouble with their neighbours. An incident of this kind occurred in 1875, when the Koreans fired upon a Japanese warship engaged in a survey of their coasts. The Japanese thereupon dispatched an Embassy to Peking to ascertain definitely the position of the Chinese Empire in relation to Korea. The Emperor of China disclaimed all responsibility, whereupon Japan dispatched an expedition to the Peninsula and compelled the Koreans to accept a treaty of amity and commerce and to open three of their ports to Japanese trade, though the independence of Korea was at the same time specifically recognised by Japan. A few years later (1882), Great Britain, the United States, and Germany concluded a Convention with Korea for the opening up of trade. This Convention was not to the liking either of China or Japan, who, though mutually hostile in Korea, were both deeply concerned to preserve the Peninsula from the grip of the European Powers in general and in particular from that of its nearest neighbour at Vladivostok. In the same year the Japanese Embassy

in Seoul was attacked ; the members of the Legation had to fly from the capital, and the Japanese therefore were compelled to insist upon the right to maintain troops at Seoul for the protection of their Embassy. In 1884 fresh disturbances broke out in Seoul, directed impartially against the Japanese and the Chinese. As a result a Convention was concluded at Tientsin (1885) between China and Japan under which Korea was to be left unmolested by the two Powers, but either was to have the right to send troops to the Peninsula provided due notification was given to the other. So matters remained for about ten years, but in 1894 events happened destined to exercise a profound influence upon the Far East and indeed upon the world.

Chino-
Japanese
War,
1894-95

In June, 1894, the King of Korea appealed to the Emperor of China to assist him with troops in the suppression of a serious domestic rebellion. The Emperor responded by the dispatch of a considerable force, at the same time intimating the fact, in accordance with the Treaty of 1894, to Japan. Thereupon Japan also sent an army to Seoul, and intimated to China that she refused to recognise Korea as in any sense a dependency of China. Plainly, a trial of strength between the young Power and the old could not be much longer delayed, and on 1st August, 1894, war was formally declared. General Nozu's victory at Ping Ying (15th September) cleared Korea of Chinese troops, and two days later the Japanese Navy won a decisive victory at sea near the mouth of the Yalu River. Japan was now in a position to take the offensive against China on Chinese soil. She attacked the Chinese fortresses and arsenals which guarded the Shantung and Liao-Tung Peninsulas, Wei-Hai-Wei, Port Arthur, and Talienwan. These important points were captured one by one, and on 18th April, 1895, the Chinese agreed to accept the terms imposed by Japan in the Treaty of Shimonoseki. By that treaty the absolute independence of Korea was formally recognised by both parties, and China ceded to Japan the peninsula of Liao-Tung with the fortresses of Port Arthur and Talienwan, together

Treaty of
Shimonoseki

with the islands of Formosa and the Pescadores. China also agreed to pay an indemnity of 200 million taels (about £50,000,000) and to allow Japan to occupy Wei-Hai-Wei until the indemnity was paid. Japan further stipulated that four additional cities should be opened by China to foreign traders, and that Japanese vessels should be allowed to navigate Chinese waters.

Never was the victory of one Power over another more strikingly complete, and never was a complete victory more clearly reflected in the terms of Peace. At one bound Japan had advanced to the foremost place in the Far East. The explanation of that victory must be sought in the astounding revolution which in the preceding quarter of a century had been accomplished in that country. Into the details of the revolution which, initiated only in 1868, had in the short space of twenty-five years absolutely transformed an ancient people, this narrative cannot enter. Briefly it may be said that Japan which, down to 1868, had been entirely mediæval and Asiatic, was transformed with astonishing rapidity into an up-to-date Europeanised Power. The first line of railway to connect Tokio with Yokohama was begun in 1870. Japan now possesses 6,700 miles of railways. The old feudal system of land tenure and of local government was abolished, a brand-new Constitution on European lines was adopted, and in 1890 a Japanese Parliament consisting of the orthodox two Chambers met for the first time. Popular education was introduced and developed with feverish haste, and universities were established at Tokio and Kyoto. Above all, the military system of Japan was reorganised on German models and compulsory service was introduced. No wonder that the fruits were reaped in the war against the Chinese Empire in 1894-95.

But a Europeanised Japan was now confronted by the jealousy and hostility of the European Powers. The rapidity and completeness of Japan's victory over China seemed to threaten the political equilibrium in the Far East. Russia was, of course, the Power primarily con-

The Trans-
formation
of Japan

Interven-
tion of
Russia,
France, and
Germany

cerned by Japan's conquest of Southern Manchuria, upon which Russia had herself always looked with envious eyes. Germany and France were in this matter temporarily in accord with Russia and with each other, and the three European Powers insisted that Japan must not be permitted permanently to occupy the territories on the mainland of China, ceded to her by the Treaty of Shimonoseki. The possession of Port Arthur, so it was contended, would dominate Peking, and so would prove detrimental to the maintenance of peace in the Far East. Japan, therefore, yielding ostensibly to "the dictates of magnanimity" but in reality to stern necessity, accepted the advice of the three Powers and surrendered Port Arthur and the Liao-Tung Peninsula. She received as a solatium an increased indemnity, but no money could compensate for the loss of her territorial acquisition, and she withdrew, only to cherish in her heart a bitter animosity against the Power which had been primarily instrumental in robbing her of the fruits of victory, and to prepare for the struggle *à outrance* which was bound sooner or later to come.

European
Outposts
in China

Kiaochow

Port
Arthur

The sequel to European intervention on behalf of China affords a striking illustration of the purity of political motives. In 1897 certain German missionaries were murdered in the province of Shantung. As a compensation for this brutal indignity, Germany demanded and (5th March, 1898) obtained a ninety-nine years' lease of the harbour of Kiaochow, with the surrounding territory, together with large commercial and financial privileges in the province of Shantung. Germany also stipulated for a considerable money indemnity, the repayment of all her expenses, and the infliction of condign punishment upon the actual murderers and upon the officials under whose jurisdiction the murders had occurred. Hardly was the German lease of Kiaochow signed, when Russia concluded an arrangement with China by which Port Arthur and Talienwan were granted to her on a twenty-five years' lease. It was further agreed between the two Powers that these important harbours should be opened

only to the ships of war of Russia and China. The scramble for China having thus begun, Great Britain could hardly look on unmoved. Moreover, the Chinese themselves intimated to Great Britain that as soon as the Japanese evacuated Wei-Hai-Wei (still held as security for the payment of the indemnity) Great Britain might if she chose have a lease of it. The suggestion was, from the Chinese point of view, a shrewd one; for Japan was still in possession of Wei-Hai-Wei, and in view of the Russian and German acquisitions so flagrantly defiant of the considerations which had prompted the demand that Japan should surrender her acquisitions on the Chinese mainland, Japan might be disposed to stay where she was. Great Britain agreed to take Wei-Hai-Wei on lease for so long a period as Port Arthur should remain in the hands of Russia. Accordingly, Wei-Hai-Wei was evacuated by the Japanese on 24th May, 1898, and on the 25th it was taken over by Great Britain.

Nor was foreign penetration in China by any means limited to those territorial acquisitions. Russia was gradually fastening a financial military and commercial grip upon the celestial Empire. In October, 1896, she had concluded with China the "Cassini" Treaty by which she undertook to help China to fortify the peninsula of Liao-Tung, and at the same time obtain the right of concentrating her own troops there in time of war, and of establishing there in time of peace coal depots and arsenals. About the same time Russia founded, with the aid of French capital, the Russo-Chinese Bank, and obtained concessions for the diversion of the Trans-Siberian Railway through Manchuria to Port Arthur, and for the construction of a branch line to Peking. France and other European Powers also obtained for their several nations rights of railway construction in China. Nothing, however, did more to alarm the Conservative party in China than the publication of an edict by the Chinese Government conferring at the instance of France considerable privileges upon the French Catholic Missions in that country. The Catholic Bishops were, under this edict, placed on an

Wei-Hai-Wei

Russian Penetration in Manchuria

equality with the native Viceroy and Governors of Provinces. So large a concession to the Catholic Church raised a suspicion that it might have been made by the Chinese Government actually in order to provoke hostility against all foreigners.

Anti-foreign
Movement
in China

Be that as it may, such was unquestionably the result. Not, of course, that these concessions were the sole cause of that hostility. The events of the last few years naturally

The Boxer
Rising

tended to create in the minds of a conservative and suspicious people profound resentment against those who seemed to be bent at once upon the dismemberment of the Empire, and upon a transformation of its social, religious, and industrial life. Such feelings led to the explosion known to foreigners as the rising of the Boxers. Early in 1900 the situation became so menacing that the Foreign Ministers at Peking made a formal demand to the Chinese Government for the immediate dissolution of all secret societies. As the Chinese Government did nothing in the matter, the Foreign Ministers requested their own Governments to dispatch naval squadrons to China. The arrival of their squadrons at Taku, merely served to increase the exasperation against the foreigners. In June, massacres on a large scale began in Peking, and on the 20th of that month the German Ambassador, Baron Von Ketteler, was assassinated at Peking. Thereupon his colleagues fortified their several Legations as best they could, and appealed for protection to the European squadrons at Taku. The fleets attacked the Taku forts at the end of June and captured them. The Chinese Government then threw off the mask and published an edict for the enrolment of the Boxers and the declaration of war against "the foreign devils."

International
Expedition to
Peking

Tientsin and the Peking Legations were now entirely isolated, and for two months the British Embassy, in which the other Ministers and their suites had taken refuge, was besieged. Meanwhile an international relief force was organised in which Great Britain, France, Russia, and Germany were joined by the United States and Japan. The relief column reached Peking in August, and raised the siege of the British Embassy. Condign punishment

was meted out to the ringleaders, a large indemnity was imposed upon China, but the territorial integrity of China was specifically guaranteed by the Powers. These terms were embodied in a definitive treaty which was signed in September, 1901.

Events in the Far East had moved with tremendous rapidity; how rapidly the world had hardly perhaps realised, when, in 1902, it learnt to its astonishment that the island Empire of the West had emerged from the splendid isolation which had so long characterised its foreign policy only to conclude an actual treaty with the island Empire of the Far East. On 30th January, 1902, the Anglo-Japanese Treaty was signed. The event was so important in the history of international relations that the terms of the treaty shall be quoted textually.

The Anglo-
Japanese
Treaty,
1902

“The Governments of Great Britain and Japan, actuated solely by a desire to maintain the *status quo* and general peace in the extreme East, being, moreover, especially interested in maintaining the territorial integrity of the Empire of China and the Empire of Corea, and in securing equal opportunities in those countries for the commerce and industry of all nations, hereby agree as follows :—

“ART. I. The High Contracting Parties, having mutually recognised the independence of China and of Corea, declare themselves to be entirely uninfluenced by any aggressive tendencies in either country. Having in view, however, their special interests, of which those of Great Britain relate principally to China, while Japan, in addition to the interests which she possesses in China, is interested in a peculiar degree politically, as well as commercially and industrially, in Corea, the High Contracting Parties recognise that it will be admissible for either of them to take such measures as may be indispensable in order to safeguard those interests if threatened either by the aggressive action of any other Power, or by disturbances arising in China or Corea, and necessitating the intervention of either of the High Contracting Parties for the protection of the lives and property of its subjects.

“ART. II. If either Great Britain or Japan, in the

defence of their respective interests as above described, should become involved in war with another Power, the other High Contracting Party will maintain a strict neutrality, and use its efforts to prevent other Powers from joining in hostilities against its ally.

"ART. III. If, in the above event, any other Power or Powers should join in hostilities against that ally, the other High Contracting Party will come to its assistance, and will conduct the war in common, and make peace in mutual agreement with it.

"ART. IV. The High Contracting Parties agree that neither of them will, without consulting the other, enter into separate arrangements with another Power to the prejudice of the interests above described.

"ART. V. Whenever, in the opinion of either Great Britain or Japan, the above-mentioned interests are in jeopardy, the two Governments will communicate with one another fully and frankly.

"ART. VI. The present Agreement shall come into effect immediately after the date of its signature, and remain in force for five years from that date.

"In case neither of the High Contracting Parties should have notified twelve months before the expiration of the said five years the intention of terminating it, it shall remain binding until the expiration of one year from the day on which either of the High Contracting Parties shall have denounced it. But if, when the date fixed for its expiration arrives, either ally is actually engaged in war, the alliance shall, *ipso facto*, continue until peace is concluded."¹

Significance
of the
Treaty

The significance of this treaty can hardly be exaggerated—more particularly from the point of view of Japan. At one stride Japan was admitted to terms of equality by the greatest of the world empires, and she was assured that, in the event of an attack upon her by Russia, the British Fleet would keep the ring and would intercept any possible intervention on the side of her antagonist. Great

¹ The treaty is printed by Sir R. K. Douglas in his *Europe and the Far East* (pp. 418-420), a work to which this chapter owes much.

Britain, on her part, secured a powerful naval ally in the Pacific, and converted into a friend a Power which her Australasian Colonies were beginning to dread. The Anglo-Japanese Treaty was concluded for five years; but before the period expired it was revised in two important particulars. It was agreed that each country should come to the assistance of the other if attacked even by a single Power, and the scope of the alliance, which was officially described as aiming at "the consolidation and maintenance of general peace in the regions of Eastern Asia and of India," was thus definitely extended to embrace British India. The alliance was to last for ten years. In 1911, however, the agreement was, at the instance of Great Britain, again revised in order to remove any danger of England being involved in a war between the United States and Japan. To meet this possible danger the 4th Article of the revised Treaty of 1911 was to run as follows: "Should either High Contracting Party conclude a treaty of general arbitration with a third Power, it is agreed that nothing in this agreement shall entail upon such contracting party an obligation to go to war with the Power with whom such treaty of arbitration is enforced."

Before the first revision of this famous treaty, Japan was involved in a war of the first magnitude with Russia. Russo-Japanese War, 1904-5

Towards that end things had been tending for at least a quarter of a century. The potential antagonism of Russia to Japan was plainly announced when in the year 1875 Russia in high-handed fashion seized the island of Sakhalin, loftily conceding to Japan the Kurile Islands, which indisputably belonged to the latter Power. Japan did not forget; still less did she forgive Russia for the intervention by which she had in 1895 deprived Japan of the fruits of her victory over the Chinese Empire. When, in 1898, Russia had herself seized Port Arthur and had immediately begun to convert into a strong fortress and to utilise as a naval station the port which in the hands of Japan she had denounced as a menace to Peking, the indignation of the Japanese knew no bounds. Japan, however, knew well how to wait until her military and naval

reorganisation was complete. Meanwhile Russia was pushing forward with hot haste her military and railway penetration in Manchuria. In 1900 the Russian Viceroy, Admiral Alexeieff, concluded an agreement with the Chinese Commander at Mukden, providing that China should resume her authority in Manchuria only under a Russian Protectorate. By 1903 it became evident that Russia intended to extend her occupation from Manchuria to Korea. Between August, 1903, and February, 1904, continuous negotiations proceeded on these and other disputed points between Tokio and St. Petersburg, until at last, when all her preparations were complete, Japan required Russia to name a specific date for her withdrawal from Manchuria. Negotiations were finally broken off on 5th February. By 8th February, Admiral Togo, in command of the Japanese Fleet, was on his way to Port Arthur, and on the night of 8th-9th February, the Japanese torpedoed the Russian Fleet off Port Arthur, and proceeded straightway to invade Korea. The first Japanese Army under General Kuroki, having safely landed at Chemulpo, pushed on to the line of the Yalu, and cleared Korea of Russian troops. General Oku with the second Japanese Army landed on the Liao-Tung Peninsula, cut off the communications of Russia with Port Arthur, and having opened up that fortress to the attack of a third Japanese Army under General Nogi, again turned north and drove the Russians back towards Mukden. On 1st January, 1905, Port Arthur, after suffering a terrible bombardment, on the top of a ten months' siege, surrendered to the combined attacks of the Japanese forces on sea and land. Oku, now reinforced by the army which had been besieging Port Arthur, resumed the advance on Mukden, and after tremendous fighting, inflicted a crushing defeat upon the Russian forces at the Battle of Mukden (6th-10th March). In the three days' battle, 120,000 men were killed and wounded. As a result, Russian forces evacuated Mukden, leaving 40,000 prisoners in Oku's hands.

Two months later the Russian Baltic Fleet, under the command of Admiral Rodjestvensky, made its belated

appearance in Japanese waters. It had sailed from the Baltic in October, and on the 21st of that month, finding itself in the midst of a flotilla of British fishing smacks and trawlers off the Dogger Bank, had opened fire upon them with fatal results. The incident created intense excitement in England, and might easily have led to the outbreak of war. The British Government, however, behaved with admirable restraint, and the incident was referred to an international commission, by whom it was established that the Russian admiral had mistaken the British trawlers for Japanese torpedo boats, and had fired upon them in panic. •Russia was required to apologise to Great Britain and to compensate the fishermen.

The Baltic
Fleet and
the Dogger
Bank
Incident,
21st Oct.
1904

Hardly had Rodjestvensky's fleet reached Japanese water when Togo fell upon it and annihilated it in the Straits of Tsushima (27th May, 1905). The Battle of Tsushima finished the war. Through the friendly offices of the United States, negotiations between the belligerents were opened at Portsmouth (New Hampshire), and on 23rd August, 1905, the Treaty of Portsmouth was concluded. Russia agreed to restore to Japan the southern half of the Island of Sakhalin, seized in 1875; to surrender to Japan her lease of the Liao-Tung Peninsula and of Port Arthur to evacuate Manchuria, and to recognise Korea as falling within the Japanese sphere of influence. Korea, however, was declared to be independent, and Russia and Japan mutually agreed to evacuate Manchuria. Five years later, Japan put an end to ambiguities in Korea by a definite annexation (1910).

Battle of
Tsushima
Straits,
27th May
1905

Treaty of
Portsmouth

The Russo-Japanese War was an event of resounding significance, and its reactions were far-reaching. In Asia the victory of Japan imposed a definite check upon the advance of Russia, and placed Japan herself in a position of unquestioned pre-eminence. It also exercised a powerful effect upon the domestic politics of China. China hurriedly began to Europeanise her institutions in the Japanese mode, established a parliamentary government in 1911, and in 1912 overthrew the ancient Manchu dynasty, and embarked upon the hazardous experiment of a republic.

Results of
the War
in Asia

Results of
the War
in Europe

Even more significant were the reactions of the Russo-Japanese War upon Europe—primarily, of course, upon Russia herself. The Russian autocracy had long ago appreciated the fact that for them it was a race between brilliant prestige acquired from success abroad, and an internal movement which, beginning with reform, might easily develop into revolution.

Changes in
Russia,
1870-1904

During the previous thirty years Russia had been the subject of three great movements, any one, or all, of which might be properly described as revolutionary. One was industrial, a second intellectual, and a third constitutional or political. Russia was almost the last of European countries to pass under the dominion of modern industrialism. But from 1870 onwards Russia has been moving in an industrial sense in the same direction, if not at the same pace, as the countries of Western Europe. Curiously enough a strong impulse was given to the industrial movement by the emancipation of the serfs. Not a few of those who had subsisted in comparative comfort as serfs found it impossible to make a living as free peasant proprietors. They got deeper and deeper into debt, and at last, as the only solution of their difficulties, sought and found work in the cities.

Industrial
Revolution

The progress of industrialisation was followed in Russia, as elsewhere, by symptoms of intellectual, social, and political restlessness. Owing to the autocratic form of government and the severely restrictive measures taken by the Russian police, the reform movement assumed from the first a revolutionary character. Consequently, many of the most brilliant Russian intellectuals found themselves in exile. Among them was Bakūnin, the prophet of anarchy, who in 1868 published at Geneva his *People's Business*, which was followed in 1873 by his *Statecraft and Anarchy*. The publication of these works may be taken as having initiated the movement which reached fruition in 1917.

The Con-
stitutional
Movement

Side by side with the Revolutionary movement there was a Constitutional movement which found a focus in the *Zemstva*. One of the great reforms effected by Alex-

ander II. was the reorganisation of Local Government. In 1864 there was established a system of local elected councils, representing the Nobles, the Burghers, and the Peasants. These *Zemstva* were established in each district, and the District *Zemstva* elected Provincial *Zemstva*. They were charged with such duties as the maintenance of public highways and bridges, the relief of the poor, public health, and elementary education, but their main significance lay in the fact that they trained large bodies of the people in habits of local self-government, and formed the starting-point for larger schemes of constitutional reorganisation. In 1878 a Conference of *Zemstva* met at Kieff and drafted a programme of reform which included the restoration and reorganisation of local government, reform of judicial administration, and freedom of the press; and during the next few years numberless schemes of reform were discussed. On 13th March, 1881, however, Alexander II., whose life had been more than once attempted, was assassinated in the streets of St. Petersburg.

For nearly a quarter of a century reaction reigned supreme in Russia. Not until the Japanese War revealed the entire incompetence and the gross venality of the Autocracy did the reform party venture to resume the movement which had progressed so favourably under Alexander II. In July, 1904, Plehve, the reactionary Minister of the Interior, was assassinated. The first step taken by his successor, Prince Sviatopolk-Mirsky, was to suspend the press censorship; the second was to summon a conference of *Zemstva*, which met in St. Petersburg in November, 1904. This conference not only drafted a programme of political reform, but gave a powerful impulse to political agitation throughout the country. An incident which took place on 2nd January, 1905, added fuel to the flame. On that day a procession of workmen in St. Petersburg was fired on by the troops, with results which caused the day to be known as "Red Sunday." Disturbances continued, and culminated in the summer of 1905 in a general strike. Meanwhile the Government

Reaction,
1881-1904

had already decided to summon a Representative Assembly, or Duma, endowed with merely Consultative Powers. After the general strike, however, Count Witte, who had given proof of statesmanlike qualities when appointed to the Ministry of Finance in 1892, was recalled to power. Witte, who had just negotiated the Treaty of Portsmouth, promptly decided that the proffered concessions must be enlarged, and a Duma endowed with legislative powers, and elected on a simpler and extended franchise, was summoned.

The First
Duma

The Duma met in May, 1906. There were two legislative Chambers, an Upper House, consisting of the old Council of the Empire in a reorganised form, and an elected Lower House. The majority of the Lower Chamber belonged to the party known as the Constitutional Democrats or *Cadets*, led by men like Struve and Milukov; there was also a considerable party of strong Conservatives; a Right Centre, known as the *Octobrists*, and a small Labour representation. The meeting of this first Russian Parliament was hailed with the utmost enthusiasm throughout the Empire; a new day of liberty had dawned, it was believed, for Russia. Never were high hopes destined to more bitter disillusionment. On the eve of the opening of the Duma there was issued by the Government a *Fundamental Law* which reaffirmed in the most unequivocal terms that in the Emperor alone supreme and autocratic power was vested. Of his grace he was prepared to share with the Duma his legislative functions, but in him and him alone sovereignty was to reside.

No sooner, however, was the Duma opened than the *Cadets* formulated their demands: universal suffrage; reconstruction of the Second Chamber; freedom of person, of speech, of public meeting, of combination, of the press, of conscience; compulsory and gratuitous education; fiscal reform; redistribution of landed property, and much else; but of all the demands the most fundamental was that Ministers should be responsible to the Duma, that the Legislature should control the Executive.

The formulation of such a programme recalls for English-

men the days of the early Stuarts. The essential point at issue was identical. Where was sovereignty henceforward to reside, in the Crown or in the King-in-Parliament?

Neither side would, or perhaps could, recede from the position it had taken up. Goremykin, who had replaced Count Witte as Prime Minister before the Duma met, was faced by a vote of censure, carried with only eleven dissentients. Would the Czar give way and accept a Duma Ministry? For some two months acrimonious debates proceeded; but in July, Goremykin was dismissed, only, however, to be succeeded by Stolypin, a younger and stronger man, who was charged with the duty of dissolving the recalcitrant Duma. On 21st July it was dissolved by proclamation, and the members were excluded by a body of troops from their accustomed place of meeting.

A second Duma was promptly summoned to meet in the ensuing March, and in the meantime Stolypin made it clear that while inflexibly opposed to revolution, he was not merely willing, but anxious to carry through far-reaching reforms. The condition of Russia was at this time critical in the extreme: reeling under the shock of her recent defeat; scandalised by successive revelations of the incompetence of generals, admirals, and officials; dissolved in anarchy on the one side by strikes and insurrections, on the other by savage reprisals;—such were the conditions under which the elections for the second Duma took place. Out of 470 seats the Cadets and their allies secured about 200; the Radicals and Socialists about 170; the Conservatives, 100.

Stolypin met the new Chamber with a programme of comprehensive reform, but on two points, eagerly demanded by the majority, he was adamant: he would neither expropriate the landlords nor put the Executive under the heel of the Legislature. A deadlock ensued, and the Minister proposed to solve it by a sort of "Pride's Purge"—by the exclusion of fifty of the extreme Socialists and the arrest of their leaders; but on 16th June the Czar dissolved the Duma.

The
Second
Duma,
5th March,
1907, to
16th June

The Third
Duma, 14th
Nov. 1907

A new electoral law was promptly promulgated; the franchise was varied and restricted, and a considerable redistribution of seats was effected. The result was much more favourable to the Government, and when in November the third Duma met, Stolypin found himself at the head of a good working majority which settled down to carry through, quietly and steadily, a comprehensive programme of sorely needed administrative reform.

Thus did the Japanese victory react upon the domestic politics of Russia. The following chapter will show that it reacted not less powerfully upon the international situation.

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CHAPTER X

THE DIPLOMATIC REVOLUTION (1890-1911)

GERMAN WORLD-POLICY—THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE AND THE TRIPLE ENTENTE

The wave-beat knocks powerfully at our gates and calls us as a great nation to maintain our place in our world—in other words, to pursue world-policy. The ocean is indispensable for Germany's greatness; but the ocean also reminds us that neither on it nor across it in the distance can any great decision be again arrived at without Germany and the German Emperor.—EMPEROR WILLIAM II.

Our world-policy is based upon the successes of our European policy. The moment the firm foundation constituted by Germany's position as a Great European Power begins to totter, the whole fabric of our world-policy will collapse.—PRINCE BERNHARD VON BÜLOW.

WHEN Bismarck, in 1890, yielded power if not place to the young Emperor, Germany had already forfeited the friendship of Russia, but France had not yet gained it; Austria was united by the closest ties with Germany; Italy was estranged from France, France from England, and England from Russia. Bismarck had with amazing skill conciliated his friends and divided his potential enemies. Within twenty years from his fall the Triple Alliance—Alliances and Ententes itself none too firmly cemented as regards the third partner—found itself confronted by a Triple Entente, consisting of France, Russia, and Great Britain. It is true that the Ottoman Sultan Abdul Hamid had become, to all intents and purposes, a member of the Central Europe group, and that Germany was connected by close dynastic ties with Roumania, Bulgaria, and Greece. Against this, however, must be set

the fact that the conclusion of a firm alliance between Great Britain and Japan had introduced a new and significant factor into the problem of world-diplomacy. But the outstanding fact of the diplomatic situation was that, whereas in 1890 Germany was surrounded by Powers severally and mutually isolated, and at least as friendly to her as to each other, by 1911 she was confronted by an *Entente*, equal in strength and hardly inferior in cohesion to that which Bismarck had laboriously created.

It is the purpose of the present chapter to describe and account for this transformation.

The
Emperor
William II.

Plainly the time has not yet arrived for an impartial estimate of the character, or even the achievement, of the Sovereign who for a quarter of a century was the most conspicuous figure in the world, and who is now (1921) an exile, a fugitive from justice, bankrupt in reputation, a ruined political gambler. But it is not yet possible to pronounce with any approach to historical accuracy whether the ex-Kaiser was in truth the architect of his own misfortunes or the slave of circumstances which he was powerless to control. Probably he would prefer the former interpretation of his character and reign. Who that has occupied a throne would not prefer the imputation of wickedness to that of weakness, the picture of foiled ambition to that of subservient acceptance of a policy which he knew to be fraught with disaster to himself and his people? These are questions which only posterity, with full access to documents and with complete knowledge of the facts, can decide. Contemporaries are confronted by two contradictory explanations: on the one hand, a strong-willed, clear-sighted ambitious ruler, a true scion of the stock which produced a Great Elector, a Frederick William I. (unfairly dismissed by English historians as a mere "drill-sergeant"), above all, a Frederick II.; on the other, a man impetuous rather than strong, of curiously mixed impulses; generous and crafty; pious and yet essentially unprincipled; a fervent believer in Divine right, and a regular worshipper at the shrine of Moloch; the captain

of great armies and the creator of a great navy, yet devoted to a policy of peace; a proud, unbending autocrat, but the slave of a military clique and a Court camarilla; the scion of Frederick III. rather than Frederick II., and in particular of Frederick William IV.; *au fond* a "double-minded" man, and therefore in all his ways unstable.

The verdict and interpretation must be left to those who come after; a contemporary historian must concern himself solely with the facts as thus far revealed.

William II. ascending the throne, after his father's brief and tragic reign, at the age of thirty, proclaimed himself at once and pointedly as the successor of his grandfather. He had reason for the emphasis he employed. Germany at the moment of his accession was seething with bitter animosity against the two august Englishwomen who, in German opinion, had conspired, out of mingled affection and ambition, to bring to the German throne a man whom every German physician declared to be suffering from an incurable disease.¹ The atmosphere which he first breathed as sovereign was impregnated with anti-English prejudice.

Nevertheless the first inclinations of the young Emperor seemed to be towards a good understanding with England, and England was by no means indisposed to respond. The Emperor's inclination may have been due simply to the fact that he needed time to organise his new scheme of world-policy, to foster German trade, and, above all, to create a German Navy. But be this as it may, he seemed at the outset no less bent upon the maintenance of European peace than his predecessor in power. England, then as always, was equally pacific in its disposition, nor was it quick to take alarm or offence. True it was that the Kaiser had in set terms announced that the future of Germany was on the sea. But to most Englishmen in 1890 that future seemed a distant one. True it was

¹ Recent disclosures (1933) have thrown much light on this controversial question. For details and references, cf. Marriott, *Europe from 1815 to 1923*, p. 374.

that, since 1884, German colonial expansion had been extraordinarily rapid both in Africa and in the Pacific. Nevertheless, Gladstone welcomed Germany "as a friend and ally" in the spread of civilisation, and Lord Salisbury did not hesitate to cede Heligoland in exchange for concessions in East Africa. The Berlin Conference of 1890 witnessed to nothing but goodwill on both sides, and three years later another Anglo-German agreement defined the frontiers of the two Powers in Nigeria and the Cameroons, and generally negotiated a settlement of outstanding difficulties in West Africa.

The explanation of this friendliness is, of course, to be found in the fact that the antagonism between England and Russia in the Near and Middle East was, as we have seen, unabated, while, on the other hand, the differences between England and France were never more acute than during the last two decades of the nineteenth century. It is not remarkable that, under these circumstances, England and Germany should have been disposed towards friendliness. The telegram addressed by the Emperor William to President Kruger in January, 1896, came indeed as an unpleasant reminder of latent hostility at Berlin, but it is understood that explanations were privately offered, and there was no interruption in the cordiality of the relations between the two countries down to the end of the century. On the contrary, it seemed not impossible that friendship might deepen into formal alliance, and that such an alliance might be extended so as to include the great Anglo-Teutonic Power on the other side of the Atlantic. In 1898, there was a further treaty between England and Germany in regard to Central Africa, and another in 1899 which established Germany at Samoa. To this latter agreement, Lord Salisbury alluded at the Lord Mayor's banquet of 1899. "This morning," he said, "you have learned of the arrangement concluded between us and one of the continental States with whom, more than with others, we have for years maintained sympathetic and friendly relations. The arrangement is, above all, interesting, as

Anglo-
German
Treaties of
1898 and
1899

an indication that our relations with the German nation are all that we could desire."

The English Colonial Secretary went even further than the Prime Minister. Mr. Chamberlain appeared to cherish the hope that there might come into being a triple Anglo-Teutonic alliance. "At bottom," he said, "the main character of the Teutonic race differs very little from the character of the Anglo-Saxon, and the same sentiments which bring us into close sympathy with the United States of America may also be evoked to bring us into close sympathy and alliance with the Empire of Germany. . . . If the union between England and America is a powerful factor in the cause of peace, a new Triple Alliance between the Teutonic race and the great two branches of the Anglo-Saxon race will be a still more potent influence in the future of the world." Lord Rosebery, in his unofficial situation, could be even more specific. "The Government," he said, in February, 1900, "made pressing overtures to Germany and the United States for an alliance last December." To such a result the extreme friendliness exhibited by Great Britain towards the United States in the Spanish-American War, combined with the abrogation (5th February, 1900) of the distasteful clauses of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, might well have contributed. An American publicist certainly does not exaggerate, therefore, when he says, writing of this period: "There was a dream of a sort of *Tugendbund*, an alliance of the supposedly Teutonic and virtuous countries against the decadent nations whose heritage might arouse conflicting ambitions amongst the strong States."¹

At the opening of the twentieth century, therefore, the relations between England and Germany were, as Lord Salisbury said, all that could be desired. In 1900, however, a new Chancellor came into power in Germany. Count Caprivi, who in 1890 had succeeded Bismarck in that office, was nothing more than a superior clerk. Prince
Bernhard
von Bülow,
German
Chancellor,
1900
Hohenlohe, who was in office from 1894-1900, occupied a

¹ These passages are all quoted by Seymour: *Diplomatic Background of the War*, pp. 137-138.

rather different position. But during his tenure of power there was no interruption in the friendly relations between Germany and England. In 1900, Hohenlohe was succeeded by Prince Bernhard von Bülow. Bülow has himself indited his own political testament.¹ Bülow's first act was a deliberate rejection of English advances towards Germany (1901). Nor does he leave us in any doubt as to his motive. Germany, in his view, would under such an arrangement have become "the sword of England upon the European continent." "In the event of a general conflict," he writes, "we Germans would have had to wage strenuous war on, land in two directions (France and Russia, of course), while to England would have fallen the easier task of further extending her Colonial Empire without much trouble, and of profiting by the general weakening of the continental Powers. Last, but certainly not least, while military operations were going forward on the Continent and for a long time after, we should have found neither strength nor means nor leisure to proceed with the building of our navy as we have been able to do."² In even plainer English it would have admirably suited England's book that her German ally should fight France and Russia, diverting the attentions of both opponents, not less effectually than her own, from colonial enterprises, while England was comfortably picking up unconsidered trifles in Africa and Asia. In his view, German progress, colonial, commercial, and naval, was "bound to inconvenience England, and, though the consequences of this development 'could be mitigated by diplomacy,' they could not be prevented." In other words, a struggle between Germany and England was sooner or later bound to come.

German
Sea Power

"With regard to international politics," he writes, "England is the only country with which Germany has an account." The struggle might well have come, as we have seen, during the South African War. But Bülow is deliberately of opinion that Germany was right not to

¹ *Imperial Germany* (Eng. trans.), 1914.

² *Imperial Germany*, pp. 33-34.

seize an opportunity which was so superficially favourable to her. "Even if," he writes, "by taking action in Europe we had succeeded in forcing England's South African policy, our immediate national interests would not have benefited thereby . . . our neutral attitude during the Boer War had its origin in weighty considerations of the national interests of the German Empire." Nor was the reason far to seek: the German Navy was not yet ready; a premature trial of strength might have ruined German sea power for ever. But in naval development Germany was coming on apace. In 1895 the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal had been completed, an achievement which at once doubled the effective naval force of Germany. In 1897 Admiral von Tirpitz was called to the control of German naval policy. In 1898 the first German Navy Law was passed, and a second, on a far more ambitious scale, in 1900. From that time onwards, the Navy became not less definitely than the Army "a constituent part of our national defence" (Bülow). The Kaiser had long since announced his policy in this matter. "I will never rest," he said, "until I have raised my Navy to a position similar to that occupied by my Army. German colonial aims can only be gained when Germany has become master on the ocean." Such sentiments frequently reiterated could not fail to produce an effect upon public opinion in England, however well disposed that opinion was towards Germany, and however reluctant it might be to traverse the old tradition which maintained enmity between England and France and, still more persistently in recent years, between England and Russia.

A personal change in France contributed powerfully to the same end. In 1898 Gabriel Hanatoux was succeeded at the French Foreign Office by Delcassé. Delcassé took office, firmly convinced, on the one hand, that the activity of France should be concentrated upon the Western Mediterranean, and on the other, that the diplomatic independence of his country could be established only by means of a reconciliation with Italy and with Great Britain.¹

Delcassé,
Foreign
Minister
of France,
1898

¹ Seymour: *op. cit.* p. 142.

France and
Italy

Relations between France and Italy had long been strained. Italy, no less essentially than France, is a Mediterranean Power and vitally concerned in the fate of Northern Africa. Down to the year 1871, and indeed for some time afterwards, Italy was far too busily engaged in effecting her own political unification, to have much leisure for oversea enterprise. The Unification movement in Italy left behind it, somewhat paradoxically, deep-seated resentment against France. In 1859 Napoleon III. had rendered an incomparable service to the Italian movement. But Italians felt that he had been more than amply rewarded by the cession of Savoy and Nice, and the hard bargain which he had struck with Cavour was never forgiven in Italy. Still less could Italy forget that, in order to serve the ends of domestic politics, Napoleon had vetoed the advance of Italy on Rome, that French chassepots had frustrated Garibaldi's dash on Rome in 1866, and that French troops had continued to garrison Rome in the interests of the Papacy until they had to be withdrawn to meet the German advance on the Rhine.

Colonial
Enterprise
of Italy

The seeds of rivalry between Italy and France in North Africa had been sown by the French occupation of Algeria in 1830, and that rivalry was immensely accentuated when in 1881 France occupied Tunis. That occupation, as we have seen, was cordially encouraged by Bismarck, who, with similar motives, encouraged Italy to embark upon African adventure. Consequently in 1882, the port of Assab on the Abyssinian coast was transferred from a private trading company, which had purchased it in 1870, to the Italian State. In 1885 Massowah was occupied by Italy, and was developed into the colony of Eritrea. Four years later, Italy added to her possessions in East Africa a strip of Somaliland. But "these hot and barren lands were in themselves of little value, and it was in the fertile upland hinterland of Abyssinia that Italy looked for her real compensations." Her enterprise in East Africa was, however, attended by consistent and unrelieved disaster; her troops were roughly handled by the Abyssinians in the Massowah campaign, and though Abyssinia accepted

the nominal suzerainty of Italy, little came of it, and in 1891 the Emperor Menelik tore up the Treaty of 1887, and warned the Italians that any attempt to penetrate into the interior of Abyssinia would be resisted with all his forces. The border warfare which for some years ensued, brought to Italy nothing but embarrassment, and towards the close of the century Italy was in a mood therefore to respond to the advances of France. In 1896 Italy formally recognised the French Protectorate in Tunis, and two years later, Delcassé was successful in negotiating with Italy a treaty of navigation and commerce. Italy definitely renounced her ambitions on the side of Morocco and Tunis, and turned her attentions in full accord with France towards Tripoli. Personal changes contributed to an improvement of Franco-Italian relations. Crispi had died in 1897, and in July 1900 the assassination of King Humbert placed young Victor Emmanuel III. upon the throne, and opened the door still wider to friendly negotiations with France. Two Conventions were signed in 1900 and 1902 under which France definitely engaged not to frustrate the ambitions of Italy on the side of Tripoli, while Italy assured to France a free hand in Morocco. These Conventions rendered the renewal of the Triple Alliance in 1903 a hollow formality.

Franco-
Italian
Conven-
tions,
1896-1902

Even more important from the point of view of the European equilibrium was the conclusion of an *Entente Cordiale* between France and Great Britain. This reversal of a long and persistent political tradition was partly the result of circumstances already detailed in this volume, and in part was due to the efforts of four outstanding personalities. Delcassé was, as we have seen, convinced of the necessity of Franco-British friendship, and his efforts were cordially seconded by one of the greatest ambassadors whom France has ever sent to England—Paul Cambon. On the English side the *Entente* was primarily the work of King Edward VII., who succeeded to the English throne in 1901, but he was powerfully aided by Lord Lansdowne, who in the previous autumn had taken Lord Salisbury's place at the Foreign Office.

Anglo-
French
Entente,
1904

Fashoda Fashoda also played its part in preparing the way for a closer accord between England and France. The effect, though paradoxical, was not unforeseen by Frenchmen. Prince von Bülow repeats a conversation which took place between a French ambassador—"one of the best political intellects of France"—and an Italian colleague. The latter asked "What effect Fashoda would have on French relations with England?" The Frenchman replied, "An excellent one. Once the difference about the Soudan is settled, nothing stands in the way of a complete Entente with England." Von Bülow's own comment is singularly acute. "There was," he writes, "disappointment in Paris because England would not, for the sake of French friendship, sacrifice any of her interests in the Soudan and on the Nile. But France was ready in any case, though with clenched teeth, to pay this price or even a higher one for England's friendship. The defeat in the Fashoda affair was set down in the debit account of the French policy of revenge, and finally resulted in renewed hatred of Germany rather than in hostility towards England."

Morocco That is profoundly true; but France would not so lightly have surrendered her interests on the Nile had she not been increasingly interested elsewhere. Morocco, almost the last remnant of the Ottoman Empire in Africa, had long been in a very disturbed condition. Its proximity to Algiers rendered this a matter of special interest to France, and Delcassé perceived the opportunity of a deal with England on this basis. In 1901 the Sultan of Morocco, conscious of his danger, had offered a Protectorate over Morocco to England. England, however, was in no mood, at the moment, for further African adventure, and declined the offer. France had other ideas, and in 1902 an arrangement, known as the Convention of Algiers, was concluded between the Sultan and France, under which France, with the complete assent of England, undertook certain responsibilities for the maintenance of order on the Algerian-Morocco frontier.

The improved relations between England and France were further manifested in the course of 1903 by an ex-

change of visits between Edward VII. and President Loubet. In May, 1903, King Edward paid an official visit to Paris. Received on his arrival with somewhat cold politeness, he succeeded in a few days' sojourn in completely captivating his hosts. "I have known Paris," he said, in a speech at the Elysée (2nd May), "since my childhood. I have frequently visited it, and I have always been full of admiration for the unique beauty of the city, and for the spirit of its citizens. I shall never forget, M. le President, the welcome which I have received at the hands of yourself, your Government, and the people, and it is to me a cause of happiness to believe that my visit will renew the bonds of friendship, and will facilitate such a *rapprochement* between our two countries as will conduce to the interests of both." President Loubet returned the King's visit in July, and was received with the utmost enthusiasm in London.

In the course of the year 1904, Russia, as we have seen, became involved in a struggle with Japan. The preoccupation of Russia in the Far East left France in an exposed position on the western flank of Germany. It became therefore a matter of supreme importance that France should find a new ally. Great Britain, on her side, was becoming increasingly alarmed by the development of German sea power. This was clearly recognised in Germany, but Germany drew a sharp distinction between the rising suspicion of England and the deep-seated hostility of France. "England," wrote Von Bülow, "is certainly seriously disquieted by our rising power at sea, and our competition which incommodes her at many points. . . . But between such sentiments in England and the fundamental feeling in France there is a marked difference which finds corresponding expression in politics. France would attack us if she thought she was strong enough; England would only do so if she thought she could not defend her vital, economic, and political interests against Germany except by force. The mainspring of English policy towards us is national egoism; that of French policy is national idealism. He who follows his interest will, however, mostly

remain calmer than he who pursues an idea.”¹ The observation is an acute one, but “egoism” and “idealism” concurred to bring about the Anglo-French Convention which was concluded on 8th April, 1904. By a series of Conventions and Declarations, England and France not only came to terms in regard to Morocco and Egypt, but also cleared up a number of outstanding points in reference to West Africa, Siam, Madagascar, and the New Hebrides. French fishing rights in Newfoundland had been a matter of dispute between England and France ever since the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713. By mutual concession which left to France certain fishing rights, but deprived her of any sort of monopoly, this tiresome question was settled, it may be hoped, for ever. In West Africa, England made important concessions to France on the Gambia, in Guinea, and on the Niger. Boundary questions in Siam and tariff difficulties in Madagascar and Zanzibar respectively, not to mention various small points in regard to the New Hebrides, were also included in the general settlement. The central point of the arrangement was, however, North Africa. Briefly, France recognised for the first time the actual position of Great Britain in Egypt, while Great Britain recognised the predominant claims and interests of France in Morocco. Both Governments declared that they had no intention of altering the political status of Egypt and Morocco respectively, but by a secret article attached to the Convention it was admitted that Great Britain and France might find themselves “constrained by force of circumstances to modify this policy in respect to Egypt or Morocco.” There was also a secret article in reference to Spanish claims in Morocco.

Franco-Spanish
Treaty,
Oct. 1904

A pendant to the Anglo-French agreement is found in a Franco-Spanish treaty signed on 6th October, 1904. Under the latter agreement, France and Spain arrived at a complete understanding in regard to their respective rights and interests in Morocco, and Spain formally adhered to the Anglo-French Convention of 8th April, thereby acknowledging the predominant interest of France in Morocco,

¹ *Op. cit.* pp. 89-90.

while accepting from France and England a guarantee of Moroccan independence.

The conclusion of the Anglo-French Entente was an event of first-rate importance in the history of European diplomacy. Had Germany been in pacific mood, it might well have inaugurated a long period of European and world peace. Such was undoubtedly the intention of King Edward VII. But the actual and immediate result of the Entente was seen in the words and actions of the German Emperor. Three weeks after the signature of the Anglo-French agreement, the Kaiser used these ominous words at Karlsruhe: "You have rightly suggested that the task of the German people is a heavy one. Let us think of the great epoch when German Unity was created, of the battles of Wörth, Weissenburg, and Sedan. . . . I hope that peace will not be disturbed, and that the events which we see taking place before our eyes tend to fix feelings in one direction, to clear the eye, to steel the courage, and to make us united, if it should be necessary for us to interfere in the policy of the world, so that peace will not be disturbed." A few days later, on the occasion of the opening of a bridge at Mainz, the Kaiser gave an even clearer indication of the thoughts which were moving him: "I wish from my heart," he said, "that peace, which is necessary for the further development of industry and trade, may be maintained in the future. But I am convinced that this bridge will prove completely adequate if it has to be used for more serious transport purposes." Yet almost simultaneously Prince von Bülow declared in the Reichstag (12th April, 1904) that Germany had no reason to object to the Anglo-French Entente. "We have no cause to apprehend that this agreement is levelled against any individual power. It seems to be an attempt to eliminate the points of difference between France and Great Britain by means of an amicable understanding. From the point of view of German interests we have no objection to make to it." The German Ambassador in Paris, Prince von Radolin, took a similar view. On being informed by M. Delcassé of the conclusion of the arrange-

Germany
and the
Entente

ment, he observed that he found it "very natural and perfectly justified." Meanwhile the busy mind of the Kaiser was already at work on a new European combination. Two methods of nullifying the Anglo-French Entente seem to have occurred to him. "The first was a secret intrigue with the Czar, which would draw Russia over into the orbit of German policy; this would result either in drawing France also, and in establishing a German-Russian-French combination directed against England, or it would result in rupturing the dual alliance and leave England and France face to face with the old Triple Alliance, now reinsured again as in Bismarck's day on the Russian side. To Germany it did not make a great difference which of these consequences would result, for in either case Germany's position would be strengthened, and she would win the prestige of a diplomatic success. The second method of dislocating the *Entente Cordiale* was by some diplomatic triumph over France, backed up by a policy of force which would make patent to all the world the essential hollowness of the *Entente Cordiale*, and proclaim that important arrangements in the world still could not be made without consulting Germany. These two methods, the one secret and the other open, used alternately and in combination during the next fifteen months in a series of manœuvres of extraordinary interest and intricacy, are the true explanation of the Kaiser's secret interview at Björkö and his public speech at Tangier."¹ With the intrigues which at this time took place between the Kaiser and the Czar we shall deal presently. For the moment we will follow the course of the open diplomacy which culminated in the Algeiras Conference.

The
Kaiser at
Tangier

On 31st March, 1905, the German Emperor, in accordance with Bülow's advice,² visited Tangier, and in a somewhat menacing speech ostentatiously took under his protection the independence of Morocco and the sovereignty of its Sultan. "The demand of Germany," says

¹ S. B. Fay : *The Kaiser's Secret Negotiations with the Tsar*, pp. 52-53.

² *Imperial Germany*, p. 81.

Bülow, to be consulted about Moroccan affairs, "was thus announced to the world." Morocco, however, was primarily a symbol. No one proposed to interfere with the commercial rights of Germany in Morocco, and other rights she had none. The true inwardness of German intervention is revealed by the German historian Rachfahl. "Because," he writes, "under the surface of the Morocco affair lurked the deepest and most difficult problems of power (*Macht-Probleme*), it was to be foreseen that its course would prove to be a trial of strength of the first order."¹ The visit of the Emperor to Tangier was followed, on the one hand by a demand for the summoning of an international conference, and on the other by a demand that France should repudiate her Foreign Minister, Delcassé. In the summer of 1905, Prince Henckel von Donnersmarck was sent as a special envoy from Berlin to Paris. He declared in a newspaper interview that "it had now become clear that the Anglo-French Entente had been framed for the isolation and humiliation of Germany. . . . The policy of Delcassé was aimed at the Germans who would not wait until it was completed. It was the policy of England to destroy the fleet of every rival, or better still to prevent its construction; but could the British Fleet help France? . . . Let France think better of it, give up the Minister who had made the trouble and adopt towards Germany a loyal and open policy such as would guarantee the peace of the world."²

Before this arrogant threat, France, conscious that she was not ready for immediate war, momentarily gave way. Delcassé resigned on 12th June, 1905; France immediately set to work to improve her army organisation, and the Government got a vote of sixty millions for this purpose and for the construction of strategic railways. About the same time a preliminary arrangement between France and Germany was concluded for the conduct of a Conference which was to meet at Algeciras in January, 1906.

Resigna-
tion of
Delcassé

The
Algeciras
Conference,
Jan. 1906

¹ F. Rachfahl: *Kaiser und Reich*, p. 233; quoted by Rose: *The Origins of the War*, p. 74.

² Ap. Rose: *op. cit.* p. 76.

At that Conference, in addition to Germany, France, and Great Britain, the following Powers were represented : Spain, Portugal, Italy, Austria-Hungary, Belgium, the United States, the Netherlands, Russia, Sweden, and Morocco. The mere meeting of this international Conference was undoubtedly a diplomatic triumph for Germany. It would never have been held if, on the one hand, France had been ready for war, and if, on the other, Russia had not been temporarily knocked out by her crushing defeat at the hands of Japan. The results of the Conference were regarded in Germany as satisfactory. "We succeeded," says Bülow, "in preserving the sovereignty of the Sultan, and in securing international control of the police organisation and the Moroccan National Bank, thus ensuring the open door in Morocco for German economic interests as well as for those of all other countries. . . . The decisions of the Algeciras Conference bolted the door against the attempts of France to compass the 'Tunification' of Morocco. They also provided a bell we could ring at any time, should France show any similar tendencies again." Bülow admits, however, that Germany did not attain all she wished. Less partial opinion inclines to the view that the results of the Algeciras Conference marked a decided diplomatic rebuff for Germany. The Conference was held with the definite intention of destroying in the eyes of the world the significance of the Anglo-French Entente. It served actually to demonstrate its strength, and Bülow admitted as much in a speech in the Reichstag on 14th November. "We have no thought," he said, "of attempting to separate France and England. We have absolutely no idea of attempting to disturb the friendship of the Western Powers. . . . Cordial relations between Germany and England are in perfect consonance with the Entente, if the latter combination follows pacific purposes."

Germany
and Russia

In the Anglo-French Entente there was, however, one weak spot—the continued estrangement of England and Russia. This weakness Germany was not unnaturally determined to exploit to the fullest possible extent. The Kaiser hoped for something more : to detach Russia from

the French Alliance and to reopen the wire between Berlin and St. Petersburg. To this end the secret diplomacy of the Kaiser was persistently directed from 1904 to 1906. There has lately been brought to light a series of remarkable telegrams exchanged during this period between the Kaiser and the Czar, known as the "Willy-Nicky Correspondence."¹ The Kaiser manifested the closest interest in the fortunes of Russia in her contest with Japan. He also insinuated that English neutrality was far from friendly to Russia. Thus, on 27th October, 1904, the Kaiser telegraphed to the Czar: "For some time English Press has been threatening Germany, on no account to allow coals to be sent to Baltic Fleet now on its way out. It is not impossible that the Japanese and British Governments may lodge a joint protest against coaling our ships. . . . The naval battles fought by Togo are fought with Cardiff coal." The Kaiser further suggested a Franco-Russo-German understanding against England and Japan. The Czar promptly responded: "The only way, as you say, would be that Germany, Russia, and France should at once unite in an arrangement to abolish Anglo-Japanese arrogance and insolence. Would you like to lay down and frame the outline of such a treaty and let me see it. As soon as accepted by us, France is bound to join her ally. This combination has often come to my mind; it will mean peace and rest for the world." The Czar, it will be observed, was determined to keep faith with France. The Kaiser, on the other hand, was most anxious that his alliance with the Czar should be first concluded and then that France should be informed of the accomplished fact. On 23rd July, 1905, the Kaiser met the Czar in the Björkö Sound, and on the following day a secret treaty was signed between the two autocrats. The treaty provided that if any European Power should attack either of the two Empires, the other should come to its assistance with all

The
"Willy-
Nicky Cor-
respond-
ence"

The Secret
Treaty of
Björkö,
July, 1905

¹ These telegrams were published in the *New York Herald* in September, 1917, and re-issued in book form in January, 1918, as the *Willy-Nicky Correspondence*. On the whole question, *cp.* a valuable article by S. B. Fay in *The American Historical Review*, vol. xxiv. No. 1, October, 1918.

its military and naval forces. The treaty was to become effective on the conclusion of the treaty with Russia and Japan. Peace, as we have seen, was concluded between these Powers at Portsmouth (U.S.A.) on 5th September, 1905, and thereupon the Czar informed his Foreign Minister of the secret obligations into which he had entered. Count Lamsdorf immediately protested, and, reinforced by the opinion of Count Witte, compelled the Czar to annul the treaty. Its conclusion throws, however, a peculiar and significant light upon German diplomacy at this period of European tension.

Sweden
and
Norway

The "Willy-Nicky Correspondence" also throws an interesting sidelight upon the relations between Germany and Russia on the one side, and the Scandinavian countries on the other. In 1905 a crisis was reached in the affairs of Scandinavia. For many years past the relations between Norway and Sweden had been far from easy. Norway had been unceremoniously handed over to Sweden as part of the European Settlement of 1814; but from the first the Norwegians had disliked the connection. Consequently, the Norwegian *Storthing* made repeated efforts to get an alteration of the fundamental law which defined the relations of the two countries. King Oscar on each occasion refused his sanction. Finally, however, in 1884 the Norwegians took the reins into their own hands, displaced the King's Government and installed in power a Government responsible to the *Storthing*. From that moment the only question was how soon the Home Rule, virtually attained in 1884, would issue in independence. In 1892 the *Storthing* took the further step of calling for the establishment of a separate Norwegian Consular Service. King Oscar, however, refused his assent, and not until 1903 was the claim virtually conceded. The Norwegians were still unsatisfied, and after protracted and unhappy negotiations the *Storthing* declared that King Oscar, having failed to form a new Government in Norway, had ceased, *ipso facto*, to reign, and that the union with Sweden was, therefore, dissolved. Sweden ultimately agreed to withdraw its opposition, and in

October, 1905, the constitutional tie between the two countries was finally severed.

Norway having resolved to remain a monarchical State, ^{The Kingdom of Norway} was compelled to find a new king. The choice of the *Storthing* fell upon Prince Charles of Denmark, a younger son of the Crown Prince Frederick of Denmark; and the new king, who was married to the youngest daughter of King Edward VII., ascended the Norwegian throne with the title of Haakon VII. The election gave great offence at Berlin, and was not welcomed at St. Petersburg; the idea being that it must necessarily enhance the influence of England in the Scandinavian kingdoms; consequently among the questions discussed at Björkö was the position of Denmark in the event of a European ^{Denmark} War. In the following communications to Bülow, the Kaiser purports to give the views of the Czar Nicholas: "If it is to be Charles, England by fair means or foul will stick her finger in Norwegian affairs, gain influence, begin intrigues, and finally by the occupation of Christiansund close the Skager Rack and shut us all out from the Baltic . . . a declaration of neutrality (i.e., on the part of Denmark) would do us no good, if at the same time the Danes, according to their views, considered it right to pilot enemy vessels straight into the Baltic before our ports. The enemy, in case he does not respect the neutrality of Denmark (which is to be assumed, considering the great weakness of the little country), would lay hands on it and it would be compelled to take sides with the enemy and furnish him with an excellent base for operations against our coast. Denmark is now only a Baltic State and not a North Sea Power." It is impossible to be certain, as Mr. Fay comments, how far the Czar was here giving original views of his own, and how far was merely echoing the ideas which the Kaiser put into his head. Be that as it may, the Kaiser and the Czar agreed that: "In case of war and impending attack on the Baltic from the foreign Power (obviously England), Russia and Germany will immediately take steps to safeguard their interests by laying hands on

Denmark, and occupying it during the war." The Kaiser further undertook on his way back from Björkö "to call in at Copenhagen and inform King Christian of the dispositions made in reference to his country." On arriving at Copenhagen, however, the Kaiser decided, in view of "the great number of channels leading from Copenhagen to London, and the proverbial want of discretion at the Danish Court," that it would be better not to "let anything be known about our alliance." He ascertained, however, that the Danes fully anticipated that Russia and Germany would safeguard Danish interests.

The Anglo-Russian Agreement, 1907

So the Kaiser, and perhaps the Czar, proposed. Not thus did events dispose themselves. Russian statesmen, less imprudent than their Sovereign, and less under the personal influence of the Kaiser, refused, as we have seen, to sacrifice the friendship of France for an alliance with Germany. There still remained, however, the original flaw in the new European Entente, the continued estrangement between England and Russia. In 1907 the difficulty was at last overcome, and the Dual Alliance was expanded into the Triple Entente. The foundation of the Anglo-Russian Entente was really laid at the Algeciras Conference, where Great Britain was represented by Sir Arthur Nicholson, her accomplished Ambassador at St. Petersburg. Sir Edward Grey, who had come into Office at the end of 1905, threw himself with ardour into the task of improving relations between the two countries. Sir Edward Grey started from this principle: "When the interests of two Powers are constantly touching and rubbing against one another, it is hard to find a half-way house between constant liability to friction and cordial friendship." The interests of England and Russia had, as we have seen, been rubbing against one another in Central Asia for the best part of a century. During 1906 and 1907, however, there was a frank interchange of views between London and St. Petersburg, and at last, on 31st August, 1907, the momentous treaty was concluded. The treaty covered all the outstanding questions between the two Powers in Central Asia, and in particular dealt

(a) Tibet

with Thibet, Afghanistan, and Persia. In regard to the first, both parties pledged themselves to respect the integrity of Thibet, to abstain from all interference in internal affairs, to seek no concessions for railways, roads, telegraphs, and mines, or other rights in Thibet; ~~not~~ to send representatives to Lhassa, and to deal with Thibet only through the intermediary of its suzerain, the Chinese Government. As regards Afghanistan a still more ^{(b) Afghan-} important arrangement was concluded. Subject to the consent of the Ameer (which has never, be it observed, been obtained), the Russian Government recognised Afghanistan "as outside the sphere of Russian influence; they engaged that all their political relations with Afghanistan should be conducted through the intermediary of Great Britain, and undertook not to send any agents into Afghanistan." Great Britain, on its side, declared that there was no intention of changing the political status of Afghanistan; that British influence would be exercised in a pacific sense, and that no steps were contemplated, or would be encouraged, against Russia. Finally, there was to be complete equality of commercial opportunity in Afghanistan for both countries.

Most important of all was the agreement concerning ^{(c) Persia} Persia. The two Powers engaged to respect the integrity and independence of Persia, and to keep the door open to the trade and industry of all other nations. Persia was, however, mapped out into three spheres of influence. The Russian sphere embraced the north and centre, including the chief Persian cities of Tabriz, Teheran, and Ispahan. The British sphere was in the south and east; it included the coastal district of the Persian Gulf and of the Indian Ocean to the frontiers of Baluchistan. Between the two spheres of influence was interposed a neutral zone, in which both Powers were free to obtain political or commercial concessions, while renouncing any such freedom in the spheres assigned respectively to Russia and Great Britain. The details of this arrangement were sharply criticised in both Houses of Parliament and in certain sections of the Press. Sir Edward Grey retorted

that the treaty must be judged as a whole ; and while not admitting that it was unduly favourable to Russia as regards Persia, pointed conclusively to the substantial concession made by Russia to us as regards Afghanistan.

The Basis
of the
Triple
Entente

In a retrospective view, attention is properly concentrated less upon the detail either of the Anglo-Russian or of the Anglo-French agreement, and more upon the fact that at a critical moment in the history of European diplomacy it was possible to reach agreements at all. Adverse criticism, whether in France or in Russia or in England, might possibly justify itself at the time, and yet stand utterly condemned in view of the events of the succeeding years. For France, most of all, the conclusion of the Anglo-Russian agreement was plainly an event of the highest significance ; at last the flaw in the French system of alliances was removed ; not only could France be the friend at once of Russia and of England, but Russia and England could cordially shake hands.

Germany
and the
Entente

Both these agreements were obviously defensive in character and pacific in intention ; yet candour compels the admission that even defensive treaties might cause alarm to a Power which itself is wont to interpret " defensive " in a peculiar sense. Germany felt herself to be, and in a sense was, encircled by the Triple Entente. In 1908, however, events occurred in the Balkans which gave her the opportunity of reasserting her unrivalled position on the Continent, and of inflicting a severe diplomatic humiliation upon Russia. With these events it will be more convenient to deal in the next chapter ; but it may be said at once that the net result was to give a vigorous impulse to the ascendancy of *Mittleuropa* in the Balkans, and immensely to improve the position of Pan-Germanism as opposed to Pan-Slavism in Europe. Omitting further reference for the present to the Bosnian crisis, we may pass on to notice the events which logically complete the subject of the present chapter.

Franco-
German
Agreement,
8th Feb.
1909

Confronted by the Triple Entente, the Kaiser attempted in 1909 and 1910 to revive the Reinsurance Policy of Bismarck. On 8th February, 1909, an agreement was

concluded between France and Germany on the Moroccan Question. France recognised the principle of the integrity and independence of the Shereetian Empire, while Germany admitted that France occupied an exceptional position in respect of the maintenance of order in the interior of Morocco ; but the language of the agreement was so vague that it might sustain the interpretation of something in the nature of a *condominium*. It was, however, two years before matters became really critical in Morocco. Meanwhile the Czar Nicholas had, in November, 1910, visited Potsdam and reached an understanding with the Kaiser in reference to their respective interests in Mesopotamia and Persia. The Czar undertook that Russia would not oppose the Baghdad Railway scheme ; Germany recognised the special interests of Russia in Persia, and the two Powers mutually agreed to abstain from any engagement which might injuriously affect the other.

Russo-German
Agreement,
1910

These "reinsurances" were clearly intended to effect a rupture in the Triple Entente. The stirring events of 1911 served only to consolidate it. Another crisis in Moroccan affairs reproduced, in that year, with redoubled intensity the situation of 1905-6. For a full and critical analysis of the Moroccan Question the time has hardly come ; we must be content with a summary of events.

France and
Morocco

The terms of the Act of Algeciras were sufficiently vague to give either France or Germany a specious plea for divergent interpretations. Nor did the agreement of 8th February, 1909, do much to clear up the ambiguities. That France had the right to maintain order in Morocco was unquestionable ; equally certain was it that the Sultan Moulay-Hafid was either unable or unwilling to enforce it. Consequently, in April, 1911, the French landed troops in Morocco, and on 21st May the Moroccan capital, Fez, was occupied.

The strictest injunctions were given to General Monier, who commanded the French Expedition, to abstain from any act which might seem to menace the sovereign authority of the Sultan or the integrity of his Empire ; yet with every advance of French troops, Germany became more

The coup
of Agadir

and more suspicious. "Should France find it necessary to remain at Fez," said Kiderlin-Waechter, the German Foreign Secretary, "the whole Moroccan Question will be raised afresh, and each signatory of the Act of Algeciras will resume entire liberty of action." In June the French troops commenced their retirement from Fez; but with each stage of the retirement the attitude of Germany became more menacing.

The heightened tone of German communications to France may perhaps be explained by the domestic situation both in France and England. In France every six months saw a new Ministry, while industry was dislocated by a series of syndicalist strikes; in England the constitutional struggle over the "veto" of the House of Lords reached its zenith in the summer of 1911, while a profound upheaval in the industrial world culminated, in August, in a serious railway strike. With her opponents seemingly paralysed by domestic difficulties, the opportunity seemed to Germany too good to be missed, and on 1st July the French Government was officially informed that the *Panther*, a German gunboat, had been dispatched to Agadir, an open roadstead on the west coast of Morocco, in order to protect the lives and interests of German subjects in that disorderly country.

As in 1905, so again in 1911, the motive which inspired German policy was twofold: to impose upon France, in the eyes of the whole world, a diplomatic humiliation; and to drive a wedge into the Triple Entente. In both objects she conspicuously failed. To a thinly veiled demand for the partition of Morocco between Germany, France, and Spain, France hotly retorted that she was the paramount Power behind Morocco, and had been recognised as such; but while willing to negotiate on details, would concede nothing that would touch the honour of France.

Attitude of
Great
Britain

England ranged herself solidly behind France. Speaking at the Mansion House on 21st July, Mr. Lloyd George used the following words (previously agreed upon with the Prime Minister and Sir Edward Grey): "I am bound to say this, that I believe it is essential in the higher interests,

not merely of this country, but of the world, that Britain should at all hazards maintain her place and her prestige amongst the Great Powers of the world. If a situation were to be forced on us in which peace could only be preserved by the surrender of the great and beneficent position Britain has won by centuries of heroism and achievements, by allowing Britain to be treated, where her interests were vitally affected, as if she were of no account in the Cabinet of Nations, then I say emphatically that peace at that price would be a humiliation intolerable for a great country like ours to endure."

Mr. Balfour warned Germany that she could not calculate upon party strife to paralyse England's right arm: "If," he said, "there are any who suppose that we shall allow ourselves to be wiped from the map of Europe because we have difficulties at home, it may be worth while saying that they utterly mistake the temper of the British people and the patriotism of the Opposition."

This opportune reminder checked the warlike ardour of official Germany, while it diverted the attack of the fire-eaters from France to England. Mr. Lloyd George's speech, they declared, had revealed, as by a flashlight, the real enemy of Germany. England will brook no rival; she claims to dominate the world. "It is not by concessions that we shall secure peace, but by the German sword." So spake a Reichstag orator with the unconcealed approval of the Crown Prince. "England," wrote a German paper, "poses as the arbiter of the world. It cannot go on. The conflict between us, so far from being settled, is now more than ever inevitable."¹

Meanwhile, prolonged negotiations between the two principals resulted (4th November) in the conclusion of a comprehensive treaty, divided into two parts: the *Accord Marocain* and the *Accord Congolais*.² By the former Germany virtually acknowledged a French Protectorate

Franco-German
Treaty,
4th Nov.
1911

¹ The *Germania* (29th November), quoted ap. Debidour: *Op. cit.* ii. 176.

² For the full text of these treaties, cf. P. Albin: *Les Grands Traités Politiques*, pp. 562-579.

over Morocco ; by the latter France ceded to Germany half the French Congo. So the acute crisis of 1911 was temporarily resolved. The German Emperor had, at the last moment, recoiled from the war which the Pan-Germans were eager to provoke.

Italy and
Tripoli

His prudence was justified, if it was not inspired, by a sinister development in the Near East. On 29th September Italy, after a brief period of negotiation, declared war upon Turkey. The threatened equilibrium in the Mediterranean was to be rectified by an Italian occupation of Tripoli. But Italy's move had more than local significance. An important member of the Triple Alliance had suddenly launched an attack upon one of the sleeping partners of the same firm. What might her action not portend ?

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CHAPTER XI

THE PROBLEM OF THE NEAR EAST (1888-1911)

A NEW FACTOR. "MITTELEUROPA" AND THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

The attempt to dominate the East forms the keystone of German *Weltpolitik*.—G. W. PROTHERO.

Ce qui modifie l'évolution de la question d'Orient, ce qui bouleverse complètement les données du problème et par conséquent sa solution possible, c'est la position nouvelle prise par l'Allemagne dans l'Empire ottoman. . . . Hier, l'influence de l'empereur allemand à Constantinople n'était rien, aujourd'hui elle est tout; silencieusement ou avec éclat, elle joue un rôle prépondérant dans tout ce qui se fait en Turquie.—ANDRÉ CHÉRADAME (1903).

We have carefully cultivated good relations with Turkey. . . . These relations are not of a sentimental nature. . . . For many a year Turkey was a useful and important link in the chain of our political relations.—PRINCE BERNHARD VON BÜLOW.

THE Italian expedition to Tripoli opened a new phase in the development of the Eastern Question. The Balkan kingdoms were encouraged by the embarrassments of the Sultan first to combine against and then to attack him. On the day that the Sultan signed a Treaty of Peace with Italy at Lausanne (18th October, 1912), Greece declared war upon the Porte. The Balkan Wars had begun. Ere they were ended a still greater conflict was in sight.

We broke off our review of Near Eastern affairs at the "Thirty Days' War" of 1897.¹ In order to make clear

¹ Cf., *supra*, Chapter III

New
Factor in
Eastern
Problem

the sequence of events, a somewhat prolonged retrospect is, therefore, essential. In the year 1889 there entered into the problem of the Near East a new factor. Down to that time the Eastern Question had hardly come within the orbit of Prussian or German diplomacy, though Austria, as was natural, had long been interested in the Balkans. Bismarck's attitude was one of ostentatious aloofness and professed impartiality. At the Berlin Congress Bismarck played, as we have seen, the rôle of the honest broker. For aught he cared, Russia might go to Constantinople, a move which would have the advantage of embroiling her with England. Only on one point was he resolute. Austria must not come out of the business empty-handed. Austria therefore, to the intense disgust of Russia, was charged with the administration of Bosnia and the Herzegovina. Prince Gortchakoff never forgave his pupil for this affront; Russia and Germany drifted further apart; the *Dreikaiserbund* collapsed, and its place was taken by the Triple Alliance. In 1883 the Hohenzollern King of Roumania was introduced into the firm as a sleeping partner, and in 1887 the election of a Coburg to the Bulgarian throne decidedly strengthened Teutonic influence in the Balkans.

A Vacancy
at Constantinople

To the end, however, Bismarck maintained his attitude of aloofness. The change came with the accession of the Emperor William II. Count Hatzfeld, who had been German Ambassador to the Sublime Porte in the early 'eighties, persuaded his master that there was a vacancy at Constantinople. From the sixteenth century to the nineteenth, France had occupied a unique position at the Porte. But from the days of Canning to those of Beaconsfield, England was a constant and fairly successful competitor for the *beaux yeux* of the Sultan. England's popularity at Constantinople did not, however, long survive the conclusion of the Cyprus Convention (1878); it was further impaired by Mr. Gladstone's policy (1880-81); and was finally shattered by the British occupation of Egypt. Hence the vacancy at Constantinople. The Kaiser determined to fill it.

The first ceremonial visit paid by the Emperor William II. and his Empress to a European sovereign was paid in 1889. The ruler selected for this honour was the Sultan Abdul Hamid. The visit was repeated in 1898 at a moment when the hands of Abdul Hamid were red with the blood of the massacred Armenians. The Turkish Army, thanks to the training which for twelve years it had received under Baron von der Goltz, had lately inflicted a crushing defeat upon the Greeks. The success of von der Goltz's pupils in Thessaly afforded a natural excuse for a congratulatory visit on the part of von der Goltz's master. The visit of 1898 was extended from Constantinople to the Holy Land. At Jerusalem the Kaiser inaugurated with great pomp a Protestant Church; favour was also shown to the Roman Catholics; while at Damascus the Kaiser ostentatiously took under his protection the Moslem peoples of the world. "His Majesty the Sultan Abdul Hamid and the three hundred million Mohammedans who reverence him as Kaliph may rest assured that at all times the German Emperor will be their friend." Well might those who listened to the Kaiser's audacious utterance hold their breath. Was it intoxication or cool calculation? One auditor, Dr. Friedrich Naumann, the author of *Mittleuropa*, discerned in his Emperor's speech a secret calculation of grave and remote possibilities. "It is possible," he wrote in 1899, "that the World-War will break out before the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire. Then the Kaliph of Constantinople would once more uplift the standard of a holy war, the sick man would raise himself for the last time to shout to Egypt, the Soudan, East Africa, Persia, Afghanistan, and India, 'War against England.' . . . It is not unimportant to know who will support him on his bed when he rises to utter this cry." But the Kaiser's tour not only opened out remote possibilities, but yielded immediate profit. During his sojourn in the East, the *German Company of Anatolian Railways* received from the Sultan the concession of the port of Haïdar Pasha.

The
Kaiser's
Visits, 1889
and 1898

The concession was supremely significant. German

Germany
and Mesopotamia

diplomacy in the Near East has been from first to last largely railway diplomacy, and Asia Minor and Mesopotamia have provided its most fruitful soil. For many years past, German savants and publicists had been calling the attention of their countrymen to the favourable opening for German enterprise in those regions. In 1896 the Pan-German League published a brochure with the suggestive title, *Germany's Claim to the Turkish Inheritance*. The field in Asia Minor and Mesopotamia was virtually open to Germany. There had indeed been various projects launched in England for the exploitation of those regions, and in 1880 an Anglo-Greek Syndicate had obtained from the Porte certain rights for railway construction in Asia Minor. After 1880, however, England concentrated her energies upon Egypt and the Suez Canal; in 1888 the rights of the Anglo-Greek Syndicate were transferred to two German banks, and in the following year the *Ottoman Company of Anatolian Railways* was promoted under their auspices. Between 1889 and 1902 further concessions were obtained, and finally a Convention was concluded for the construction of a railway from Constantinople to Baghdad. This railway was to form one link in the long chain stretching from Hamburg to Vienna, and thence by way of Budapest, Belgrade, and Nish to Constantinople, with the possibility of ultimate extension from Baghdad to Basra. Thus would Berlin be connected by virtually continuous rail with the Persian Gulf. The conception was one not unworthy of a scientific and systematic people. Had it materialised, it would have turned the flank of the great Sea-Empire, just as in the fifteenth century Portugal, by the discovery of the Cape route to India, turned the flank of the Ottoman Turks.

The
Bagdad-
bahn

The Young
Turks, 1908

For the first twenty years of his reign all went well with the policy of the Kaiser in the Near East. But everything depended upon the personal friendship of the Sultan, Abdul Hamid, and upon the stability of his throne. It was an unsafe foundation. For some years past the party of reform had been gaining ground at Constantinople. In 1891 a committee, afterwards known as the *Young Turks*,

was formed at Geneva, whence it was ultimately transferred to Salonika. To transform the Ottoman Empire into a modern European State; to give to Turkey a genuine Parliamentary Constitution; to proclaim the principle of religious and intellectual liberty; to emancipate the Press; to promote intercourse with the progressive nations of the world; to encourage education; to promote trade; to eradicate the last relics of Mediævalism—such was the programme with which the Young Turks astonished and deluded Europe in the summer of 1908.

On 23rd July the Committee of Union and Progress suddenly raised the standard of revolt at Salonika, and demanded the restoration of the abortive Turkish Constitution of 1876. Abdul Hamid rendered the application of force superfluous by conceding everything demanded of him. He protested that the Committee had merely anticipated the wish dearest to his heart; he promptly proclaimed the Constitution in Constantinople; summoned a Parliament; guaranteed personal liberty and equality of rights to all his subjects, irrespective of race, creed, or origin; abolished the censorship of the Press, and dismissed his army of 40,000 spies.

The Turkish Revolution was welcomed with cordiality in all the liberal States of Europe, and with peculiar effusiveness in Great Britain. But the brightness of a too brilliant dawn quickly faded. The Young Turks soon learnt that the introduction of European institutions into an Empire essentially Asiatic is less easily accomplished than they had supposed. The Sultan, Abdul Hamid, was even more acutely conscious of this truth, and on 13th April, 1909, he felt himself strong enough to effect a counter-revolution. But his triumph was shortlived. The Young Turkish troops promptly marched from Salonika, and on 24th April occupied Constantinople. On the 27th, Abdul Hamid was formally deposed by a unanimous vote of the Turkish National Assembly, and his younger brother was proclaimed Sultan in his stead, with the title of Mohamed V. On the 28th the ex-Sultan was deported to Salonika and interned there.

Revolution
and
Counter-
Revolution
in Turkey

1908

Meanwhile events of great moment had been taking place in other parts of the Balkan Peninsula. On 5th October, 1908, Prince Ferdinand proclaimed the independence of Bulgaria; on the 7th, the Emperor Francis Joseph announced the formal annexation of Bosnia and the Herzegovina to the Habsburg Empire; on the 12th, the Cretan Assembly voted the union of the island with the kingdom of Greece. All these events were directly attributable to the success achieved by the Young Turks in Constantinople. Ferdinand of Bulgaria had, indeed, long entertained the ambition to renounce the suzerainty of the Sultan and himself to assume the ancient title of Czar of Bulgaria. The Young Turk Revolution precipitated his resolution and gave him the opportunity of carrying it out, and on 19th April, 1909, the Turkish Government formally recognised the independence of Bulgaria.

Austria-
Hungary
and the
Balkans

Much more serious, alike in its immediate and its remoter consequences, was the action taken by Austria-Hungary in regard to Bosnia and the Herzegovina.

Of all the Great European Powers, Austria-Hungary was most closely, if not most vitally, concerned in the solution of the Balkan problem. England's interest was vital, but remote, and may be deemed to have been secured by the annexation of Egypt and Cyprus, and by her financial control over the Canal. Russia's interest also was vital. On no account must any Power, potentially hostile, be in a position to close the Straits against her. But the interests of Austria-Hungary while not less vital were even more direct.

The new
Departure
in Habs-
burg
Policy

The Habsburgs had, in Bismarck's phrase, been gravitating towards Budapest ever since the virtual destruction of the Holy Roman Empire in the Thirty Years War (1618-48). As a fact, gravitation was for many years equally perceptible towards the Adriatic and the Lombard plain. But the new departure in Habsburg policy really dates, not from the Treaty of Westphalia, but from the Treaty of Prague (1866). When Bismarck turned Austria simultaneously out of Germany and out of Italy, he gave her a violent propulsion towards the south-east. The

calculated gift of Bosnia and the Herzegovina, supplemented by the military occupation of the Sanjak of Novi-Bazar, increased the momentum. Novi-Bazar not only formed a wedge between the Slavs of Serbia and those of Montenegro, but seemed to invite the Habsburgs towards the Vardar valley and so on to Salonika.

For twenty-five years Serbia appeared to be acquiescent. Had Serbia been in a position at the Congress of Berlin to claim Bosnia, or even Novi-Bazar, Balkan politics would have worn a very different aspect to-day. But Serbia had not yet found her soul, nor even her feet. Her geographical position as defined in 1878 was a hopeless one. And she had other troubles. Prince Milan assumed a royal crown in 1882, but his policy was less spirited than his pretensions; he took his orders from Vienna, a fact which widened the breach between himself and the Queen Natalie, who, being a Russian, had strong Pan-Slavist sympathies. But Queen Natalie had grievances against Milan as a husband no less than as a king, and Court scandals at Belgrade did not tend to enhance the reputation of Serbia in European society. Position of Serbia

The disastrous war with Bulgaria (1885) still further lowered her in public estimation. The grant of a more liberal Constitution in 1888 did little to improve the situation of a country not yet qualified for self-government, and, in 1889, King Milan abdicated.

His son, King Alexander, was a child of thirteen at his accession, and though not devoid of will he could not give Serbia what she needed, a strong ruler. In 1893 he suddenly declared himself of age, arrested the regents and ministers, and abrogated the prematurely liberal Constitution of 1888. This act, not in itself unwise, threw the country into worse confusion, which was still further increased when, in 1900, the headstrong young man married his mother's lady-in-waiting, a beautiful woman but a *divorcée*, and known to be incapable of child-birth. The squalid story reached a tragic conclusion in 1903, when the king, Queen Draga, and the queen's male relations were all murdered at Belgrade with every circumstance of calculated brutality.

This ghastly crime sent a thrill of horror through the Courts and countries of Europe. Politically, however, it did not lack justification. Serbia gained immeasurably by the extinction of the decadent Obrenovic dynasty, and the reinstatement of the more virile descendants of Karageorgevic; the pro-Austrian bias of her policy was corrected; and under King Peter she regained self-respect and resumed the work of national regeneration.

Austria-
Hungary
and the
Southern
Slavs

That work was watched with jealous eyes at Vienna, and still more at Budapest; and not without reason. The development of national self-consciousness among the Southern Slavs seriously menaced the whole structure of the Dual Monarchy. Expelled from Germany in 1866, the Emperor Francis Joseph came to terms with his Magyar subjects in the *Ausgleich* of 1867. Henceforward the domestic administration of Austria and her dependencies was to be entirely separate from that of Hungary; even the two monarchies were to be distinct, but certain matters common to the Austrian Empire and the Hungarian kingdom—foreign policy, army administration, and finance—were committed to a joint body known as the “Delegations.” But the essential basis of the formal reconciliation thus effected between Germans and Magyars was a common hostility to the third racial element in the Dual Monarchy, the element which outnumbers both Magyars and Germans, that of the Slavs.

Out of the 51,000,000 subjects of the Emperor Francis Joseph, about 10,000,000 were Magyars—these forming a compact mass in Hungary; about 11,000,000 were German; about 26,000,000 were Slavs. Of the latter, about 7,000,000 belonged to the Serbo-Croatian or Southern Slav branch of the great Slav family.

Since 1867 it had been the fixed policy of the leading statesmen of both Vienna and Budapest to keep the Slav majority in strict subordination to the German-Magyar minority. The inclusion of Bosnia and Herzegovina, with a compact population of nearly 2,000,000 Slavs, rendered this policy at once more difficult, and, at

least in the eyes of the timorous minority, more absolutely imperative. In proportion, however, as Habsburg methods became more drastic, the annexed provinces tended to look with more and more approbation upon the Jugo-Slav propaganda emanating from Belgrade. To meet this danger the Austrian Government promoted schemes for the systematic German colonisation of Bosnia in much the same way as Prussia encouraged colonisation in Poland. But neither the steady progress of colonisation nor the material benefits unquestionably conferred upon Bosnia by Austrian administration availed to win the hearts of the Bosnian Serbs, nor to repress the growing intimacy between Serajevo and Belgrade.

This fact, too obtrusive to be ignored, led some of the more thoughtful statesmen of the Ballplatz to advocate a new departure in Habsburg policy. To maintain, in perpetuity, the German-Magyar ascendancy over the Slavs seemed to them an impossibility. But was there any alternative, consistent, of course, with the continued existence of the Habsburg Empire? Only, it seemed to them, one; to substitute a triple for the dual foundation upon which for half a century the Habsburg Empire had rested; to bring in the Slav as a third partner in the existing German-Magyar firm.

Trialism •
Dualism

On one detail of their programme the "Trialists" were not unanimous. Some who favoured "trialism" in principle wished to include only the Slavs who were already subject to the Dual Monarchy; others, with a firmer grip upon the nationality idea, advocated a bolder and more comprehensive policy. To them it seemed possible to solve by one stroke the most troublesome of the domestic difficulties of the Habsburg Empire, and the most dangerous of their external problems. The Jugo-Slav agitation had not, at that time, attained the significance which since 1912 has attached to it. Serbo-Croat unity was then a distant dream. While the nationality sentiment was still comparatively weak, the religious barriers between Orthodox Serbs and Roman Catholic Croats were proportionately formidable. Whether, even then, the Slavs

could have been tempted by generous terms to come in as a third partner in the Habsburg Empire it is impossible to say ; but from the Habsburg point of view the experiment was obviously worth making, and its success would have been rightly regarded as a great political achievement. With Serbia and Montenegro added to Bosnia, and the Herzegovina to Dalmatia and Croatia-Slavonia, the Habsburgs would not only have been dominant in the Adriatic ; the valley of the Morava would have been open to them, and Salonika would have been theirs whenever they chose to stretch out their hands and take it. Greece would certainly have protested, and might have fought, but at that time there would have been Crete and Epirus, and even western Macedonia to bargain with. Bulgaria might easily have been conciliated by the cession of western Macedonia, including, of course, Kavala, and perhaps the vilaye of Adrianople. The Macedonian problem would thus have been solved with complete satisfaction to two out of the three principal claimants, and to the incomparable advantage of the Habsburg Empire.

The Arch-
duke
Franz
Ferdinand

If it be true that the heir to the throne, the late Archduke Franz Ferdinand, had identified himself with this large scheme of policy, it would go far to stamp him as a great statesman ; it would also go far to explain the relentless hostility with which he was pursued by the party of Magyar-German ascendancy.

1903

Things seemed to be shaping, in the first years of the present century, in that direction. Serbia, distracted by domestic broils, was in the slough of despond ; a generous offer from the Habsburgs might well have seemed to patriotic Serbs the happiest solution of an inextricable tangle. Austria, on the other hand, had reached at that moment the zenith of her position in the Balkans. The year which witnessed the palace revolution at Belgrade witnessed also the brilliant culmination of Habsburg diplomacy in the conclusion of the Mürzteg Agreement.¹

¹ By this the Czar Nicholas II. and the Emperor Francis Joseph agreed (1903) upon a comprehensive scheme of reform in Macedonia.

Russia was on the brink of the Japanese War. Great Britain had just emerged with damaged prestige from the war in South Africa. The brilliant diplomacy of King Edward VII. had not yet succeeded in bringing England and France together, still less in laying the foundation for the Triple Entente between the Western Powers and Russia.

The moment was exceptionally favourable for a bold *coup* on the part of the Habsburgs in the Balkans. The Mürzteg Agreement seemed almost to imply an international invitation to attempt it. But the opportunity was lost. What were the forces which were operating against the Trialists? At many of them we can, as yet, only guess. But there are some indications which are as sinister as they are obscure. In 1909 a corner of the curtain was lifted by a *cause célèbre*. In December of that year the leaders of the Serbo-Croat Coalition brought an action for libel against a well-known Austrian historian, Dr. Friedjung of Vienna. Dr. Friedjung had accused the Croatian leaders of being the hirelings of the Serbian Government, but the trial revealed the amazing fact that a false accusation had been based upon forged documents supplied to a distinguished publicist by the Foreign Office. Dr. Friedjung was perhaps the innocent victim of his own nefarious Government; the real culprit was Count Forgach, the Austrian Minister at Belgrade, a diplomatist whose ingenuity was rewarded by an important post at the Ballplatz. Incidents of this kind showed to the world the direction of the prevailing wind. The archduke was already beaten. Baron von Aerenthal was in the saddle.

During six critical years the direction of the external policy of the Habsburg Empire lay in the hands of this masterful diplomatist. The extinction of the Obrenovic dynasty in Serbia was a considerable though not a fatal blow to Habsburg pretensions. The tragedy itself was one of several indicative of the growth of an anti-Austrian party. The bad feeling between the two States was further accentuated by the economic exclusiveness of

Baron von
Aerenthal,
1906-12

the Habsburg Government, which threatened to strangle the incipient trade of Serbia, and in particular to impede the export of swine upon which its commercial prosperity mainly depended. The friction thus generated culminated in the so-called "Pig-war" of 1905-6, which convinced even the most doubting of Serbian politicians that no free economic development was possible for the inland State until she had acquired a coast-line either on the Adriatic or on the *Ægean*. The latter was hardly in sight; only two alternatives were really open to Serbia. The Albanian coast is with reference to the hinterland of little economic value. Besides, the Albanians are not Serbs; nor have they ever proved amenable to conquest. Unless, therefore, Serbia were content to resign all hope of attaining the rank even of a third-rate European State, one of two things was essential, if not both. Either she must have some of the harbours of Dalmatia, pre-eminently a Slav country, or she must obtain access to the Adriatic by union with Bosnia and the Herzegovina.

Annexa-
tion of
Bosnia and
the Herze-
govina

All hope of the latter solution was extinguished by Aerenthal's abrupt annexation of these Slav provinces in 1908. Austria-Hungary had been in undisputed occupation since 1878, and no reasonable person ever supposed that she would voluntarily relax her hold. But so long as the Treaty of Berlin remained intact, so long as the Habsburg occupation was technically provisional, a glimmer of hope remained to the Pan-Serbians. Aerenthal's action was a declaration of war. In the following year he did indeed throw a sop directly to the Turks, indirectly to the Serbs, by the evacuation of Novi-Bazar. He took to himself great credit for this generosity, and the step was hailed with delight in Serbia. We now know that it was dictated by no consideration for either Turkish or Serbian susceptibilities; it was taken partly to conciliate Italy, the third and most restless member of the Triple Alliance; but mainly because the Austrian general staff had come to the conclusion that the Morava valley offered a more convenient route than the Sanjak to Salonika.

Could Serbia hope to shut and lock both these doors Feeling in
Serbia against the intruding Habsburgs? That was the question which agitated every Chancellery in Europe at the opening of the year 1909. In Belgrade the action of Austria-Hungary excited the most profound indignation, and the whole Serbian people, headed by the Crown Prince, clamoured for war. Feeling in Montenegro was hardly less unanimous. The Serbian Government made a formal protest on 7th October,¹ and appealed to the Powers for "justice and protection against this new and flagrant violation, which has been effected unilaterally by *force majeure* to satisfy selfish interests and without regard to the grievous blows thus dealt to the feelings, interests, and rights of the Serbian people." Finally, in default of the restoration of the *status quo*, they demanded that compensation should be given to Serbia in the Sanjak of Novi-Bazar.

The Powers were not unsympathetic, but urged Serbia to be patient. Upon the most acute of English diplomats the high-handed action of Austria had made a profound impression. No man in Europe had laboured more assiduously or more skilfully for peace than King Edward VII. Lord Redesdale has recorded the effect produced upon him by the news from the Balkans. "It was the 8th of October that the King received the news at Balmoral, and no one who was there can forget how terribly he was upset. Never did I see him so moved. . . . Every word that he uttered that day has come true."² The Great War of 1914 was implicit in the events of 1908.

Meanwhile, the peace of Europe depended upon the attitude of Russia. Her Balkan partnership with Austria-Hungary had been dissolved, and in 1907 she had concluded an agreement respecting outstanding difficulties with Great Britain. That agreement virtually completed the Triple Entente, the crown of the diplomacy of King

¹ 1908.

² Lord Redesdale: *Memories*, i. 178-179. Cf. also *The Recollections* (ii. 277) of John, Viscount Morley, who was Minister in attendance at Balmoral at the time, and formed a similar opinion as to the knowledge and shrewdness of King Edward VII.

Edward VII. In June, 1908, King Edward and the Czar Nicholas met at Réval, and a further programme for the pacification of Macedonia was drawn up. Whether the Réval programme would have succeeded in its object any better than the Münzberg agreement, which it replaced, the Young Turks did not permit Europe to learn. But at least it afforded conclusive evidence that a new era in the relations of Russia and Great Britain had dawned.

Russia and
Germany

In the Balkan question Russia was, of course, profoundly interested. To her the Serbians naturally looked not merely for sympathy but for assistance. Russia, however, was not ready for war. She had not regained her breath after the contest with Japan. And the fact was, of course, well known at Potsdam. All through the autumn and winter (1908-9) Serbia and Montenegro had been feverishly pushing on preparations for the war, in which they believed that they would be supported by Russia and Great Britain. Austria, too, was steadily arming. With Turkey she was prepared to come to financial terms: towards Serbia she presented an adamant front. Towards the end of February, 1909, war seemed inevitable. It was averted, not by the British proposal for a conference, but by the "mailed fist" of Germany. In melodramatic phrase the German Emperor announced that if his august ally were compelled to draw the sword, a knight "in shining armour" would be found by his side. At the end of March, Russia was plainly informed that if she went to the assistance of Serbia she would have to fight not Austria-Hungary only but Germany as well. Russia, conscious of her unpreparedness, immediately gave way. With that surrender the war of 1914 became inevitable. Germany was intoxicated by her success; Russia was bitterly resentful. The Serbs were compelled not merely to acquiesce, but to promise to shake hands with Austria. The Powers tore up the twenty-fifth Article of the Treaty of Berlin. Turkey accepted £2,200,000 from Austria-Hungary as compensation for the loss of the Serbian provinces, and in April, 1909, formally assented to their alienation. Bulgaria

compounded for her tribute by the payment of £5,000,000. Thus were the "cracks papered over," and Europe emerged from the most serious international crisis which had confronted her since the Russo-Turkish War (1877-78).

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CHAPTER XII

THE BALKAN LEAGUE AND THE BALKAN WARS

Italy will not draw the sword because she knows that, if she does attack us, all Europe will eventually be drawn into the greatest struggle of history.—HAKKI PASHA, Turkish Grand Vizier, in 1911 (conversation related by H. A. Gibbons, *New Map of Europe*).

The problem now is not how to keep the Turkish Empire permanently in being . . . but how to minimise the shock of its fall, and what to substitute for it.—VISCOUNT BRYCE.

The War of the Coalition can claim to have been both progressive and epoch-making. The succeeding War of Partition was rather predatory and ended no epoch, though possibly it may have begun one: it is interesting not as a settlement but as a symptom.—“DIPLOMATIST,” *Nationalism and War in the Near East*.

The Turks, who have always been strangers in Europe, have shown conspicuous inability to comply with the elementary requirements of European civilisation, and have at last failed to maintain that military efficiency which has, from the days when they crossed the Bosphorus, been the sole mainstay of their power and position.—LORD CROMER.

Italy in the
Mediterranean

THE cracks papered over in the spring of 1909 revealed themselves again in the autumn. In October the diplomatic world was startled to learn that the Czar Nicholas was about to pay a ceremonial visit to the King of Italy. That visit proved to be the prologue to the last act in the drama of the Near East. Russia was, at the moment, smarting under the humiliation imposed upon her by the Paladin of Potsdam. Italy was looking with unconcealed uneasiness at the advance of the Habsburgs in the Balkan Peninsula. Consequently, after 1909, Italy and Russia tended to draw together. Italy was also, as we have seen, drawing closer to France. As far back as 1901, France, in return for the concessions made to her in Tunis, had agreed to give Italy a free hand in Tripoli; and from that time onwards there was a general under-

standing among the European Chancelleries that when the final liquidation of the Ottoman Estates was effected, Tripoli would fall to the share of Italy. Her reversionary rights were tacitly recognised in the Anglo-French agreement of 1904, and again at Algeciras in 1906.

Those rights were now menaced from an unexpected Tripoli quarter. The scientific interest which German geologists and archaeologists had lately developed in Tripoli aroused grave suspicion at Rome; and the descent of the *Panther* upon Agadir convinced Italy that unless she was prepared to forgo for all time her reversionary interests in North Africa, the hour for claiming them had struck.

For many years past Italy had pursued a policy of economic and commercial penetration in Tripoli, and had pursued it without any obstruction from the Turks. But there, as elsewhere, the revolution of 1908 profoundly modified the situation. The Young Turks were as much opposed to Christians in Tripoli as elsewhere. At every turn the Italians found themselves thwarted. It might be merely the Moslem fanaticism characteristic of Young Turk policy. But the suspicion deepened that between the fanaticism of the Moslem and the scientific enthusiasm of Teutonic researches there was more than an accidental connection. Be this as it might, Italy deemed that the time had come for decisive action.

That action fell, nevertheless, as a bolt from the blue. On 27th September Italy suddenly presented to Turkey an ultimatum demanding the consent of the Porte to an Italian occupation of Tripoli under the sovereignty of the Sultan, and subject to the payment of an annual tribute. A reply was required within forty-eight hours, but already the Italian transports were on their way to Tripoli, and on 29th September war was declared.

Italy found in Tripoli no easy task. She occupied the coast towns of Tripoli, Bengazi, and Derna without difficulty, but against the combined resistance of Turks and Arabs she could make little progress in the interior. The Turks, trusting that the situation would be relieved for them by international complications, obstinately refused

Turco-
Italian
War, 29th
September,
1911, to
18th Octo-
ber, 1912

Italy and
the Porte

to make any concessions. But between her two allies Germany was in a difficult position. She was indignant that Italy should, without permission from Berlin, have ventured to attack the Turks; but, on the other hand, she had no wish to throw the third partner in the Triple Alliance into the arms of the Triple Entente. Italy, however, was determined to wring consent from the Porte, and in the spring of 1912 her navy attacked at several points; a couple of Turkish warships were sunk off Beirut; the forts at the entrance to the Dardanelles were bombarded on 18th April; Rhodes and the Dodecanese Archipelago were occupied in May. To the bombardment of the Dardanelles Turkey retorted by closing the Straits. This proved highly inconvenient to neutrals, and after a month they were reopened. Throughout the summer the war went languidly on, entailing much expense to Italy and very little either of expense or even inconvenience to the Turks.

In two ways the war was indeed advantageous to the policy of the Young Turks. On the one hand, "by reconciling Turk and Arab in a holy war in Africa, the Tripoli campaign healed for a time the running sore in Arabia which had for years drained the resources of the Empire."¹ On the other, the naval operations of Italy in the *Ægean* aroused acute friction between the Italians and the Greeks, whose reversionary interests in the islands were at least as strong as those of Italy upon the African littoral. That friction would be likely to increase, and in any case could not be otherwise than advantageous to the Turk.

Treaty of
Lausanne

But suddenly a new danger threatened him. The Tripoli campaign was still dragging its slow length along, and seemed as though it might be protracted for years, when the conflagration blazed up to which Tripoli had applied the first match. In view of the more immediate danger the Porte at last came to terms with Italy, and the Treaty of Lausanne was hastily signed at Ouchy on 18th October. The Turks were to withdraw from Tripoli;

¹ *Nationalism and War in the Near East*, p. 159.

Italy from the Ægean Islands; the Khalifal authority of the Sultan in Tripoli was to remain intact; he was to grant an amnesty and a good administration to the islands; Italy was to assume responsibility for Tripoli's share of the Ottoman debt. The cession of Tripoli was assumed *sub silentio*. The withdrawal of the Italian troops from the islands was to be subsequent to and consequent upon the withdrawal of the Turkish troops. Italy has contended that the latter condition has not been fulfilled, and she remains, therefore, in Rhodes and the Dodecanese. Her continued occupation has not injured the Turks, but it has kept out the Greeks.

On the same day that the Treaty of Lausanne was signed, Greece declared war upon the Ottoman Empire. This time she was not alone. The miracle had occurred. The Balkan States had combined against the common enemy.

The idea of a permanent alliance or even a confederation among the Christian States of the Balkans was frequently canvassed after the Treaty of Berlin. But the aggrandisement of Bulgaria in 1885, and the war which ensued between Bulgaria and Serbia, shattered the hope for many years to come. M. Tricoupis, at that time Prime Minister of Greece, made an effort to revive it in 1891, and with that object paid a visit to Belgrade and Sofia. The Serbian statesmen welcomed his advances, but Stambuloff, who was then supreme in Bulgaria, was deeply committed to the Central Powers and through them to the Porte, and frowned upon the project of a Balkan League.

The real obstacle, however, to an entente between the Balkan Powers was their conflicting interests in Macedonia. Bulgaria, as we saw, consistently favoured the policy of autonomy, in the not unreasonable expectation that autonomy would prove to be the prelude to the union of the greater part if not the whole of Macedonia with Bulgaria. Neither Serbia nor Greece could entertain an equally capacious ambition, and from the first, therefore, advocated not autonomy but partition.

Between 1910 and 1912 there were various indications of some improvement in the mutual relations of the

The
Balkan
League

Difficulties
in Mace-
donia

The En-
tente in the
Balkans

Balkan States. In 1910 the Czar Ferdinand, the shrewdest of all the Balkan diplomatists, paid a visit to Cettigne to take part, together with the Crown Prince of Serbia and the Crown Prince of Greece, in the celebration of King Nicholas's jubilee. At Easter, 1911, some three hundred students from the University of Sofia received a cordial welcome at Athens. In October, M. Gueshoff, Prime Minister of Bulgaria, had a confidential interview with M. Milanovanic, the Prime Minister of Serbia.¹ In February, 1912, the several heirs apparent of the Balkan States met at Sofia to celebrate the coming of age of Prince Boris, heir to the Czardom of Bulgaria.

All these things—the social gatherings patent to the world, the political negotiations conducted in profoundest secrecy—pointed in the same direction, and were designed to one end.

Serbo-
Bulgarian
Alliance,
13th March,
1912

A favourable issue was not long delayed. On 13th March, 1912, a definite treaty was signed between the kingdoms of Serbia and Bulgaria. This was in itself a marvel of patient diplomacy. Not since 1878 had the relations between the two States been cordial, nor were either their interests or their antagonisms identical. To Serbia, Austria-Hungary was the enemy. The little land-locked State, which yet hoped to become the nucleus of a Jugo-Slav Empire, was in necessary antagonism to the Power which had thrust itself into the heart of the Balkans, and which, while heading the Slavs off from access to the Adriatic, itself wanted to push through Slav lands to the *Ægean*. Bulgaria, on the other hand, had no special reason for enmity against Vienna or Budapest. The "unredeemed" Bulgarians were subjects not of the Emperor Francis Joseph but of the Ottoman Sultan. And if the antagonisms of the two States differed their mutual interests clashed. To Thrace and eastern Macedonia Serbia could of course make no claim. Bulgaria could not dream of acquiring Old Serbia. But there was a considerable intermediate zone in Macedonia to which both could put forward substantial pretensions. The

¹ See Gueshoff : *op. cit.*, pp. 15 sq.

treaty concluded in March, 1912, reflected these conditions.

By that treaty the two States entered into a defensive alliance; they mutually guaranteed each other's dominions and engaged to take common action if the interests of either were threatened by the attack of a Great Power upon Turkey; at the same time they defined their respective claims in Macedonia should a partition be effected.

Serbo-Bulgarian Treaty, March, 1912

Two months after the signature of the Serbo-Bulgarian Treaty an arrangement was reached between Greece and Bulgaria. It differed from the former in one important respect. Between Greeks and Bulgarians nothing was said as to the partition of Macedonia. Further, it was expressly provided that if war broke out between Turkey and Greece on the question of the admission of the Cretan deputies to the Greek Parliament, Bulgaria, not being interested in the question, should be bound only to benevolent neutrality.

Greco-Bulgarian Treaty, 10th May, 1912

There was good reason for this proviso. The Cretan difficulty had become acute, and, indeed, threatened to involve revolution in Greece. The situation was, however, saved by the advent of a great statesman. M. Venizelos had already shown his capacity for leadership in Crete. When, in February, 1910, he arrived in Athens to advise the Military League, he remained to advise the King. When, in October, the League overturned the Dragoumis Ministry, King George invited the Cretan statesman to form a Cabinet. M. Venizelos accepted the difficult task, effected a much-needed revision of the Constitution, and propounded an extensive programme of domestic reforms.

The Cretan Question

Eleutherios Venizelos

But the execution of such a programme predicated peace, internal and external, and in addition a certain basis of financial stability and commercial prosperity.

The Young Turks were quite determined that neither condition should be satisfied; and repeated manifestations of the extreme and persistent hostility of the "New Moslems," combined with their refusal to acquiesce in

the alienation of Crete, at last compelled Greece to the "impossible" alliance with Bulgaria.

Greco-
Bulgarian
Military
Conven-
tion, 22nd
September,
1912

The defensive alliance signed in May was followed in September, as in the case of Serbia, by a detailed military convention. Bulgaria was to supply at least 300,000 men to operate in the vilayets of Kossovo, Monastir, and Salonika. If, however, Serbia should come in, Bulgaria was to be "allowed to use her forces in Thrace." Greece was to supply at least 120,000 men; but the real gain to the alliance was of course the adhesion of the Greek fleet, whose "chief aim will be to secure naval supremacy over the Aegean Sea, thus interrupting all communications by that route between Asia Minor and European Turkey."

The
Albanian
Factor

The crisis was now at hand. It was forced generally by the condition of Macedonia, and in particular by the revolt of the Albanians. Both Greece and Serbia were becoming seriously alarmed by the unexpected success achieved by the Albanians, who now openly demanded the cession to them of the entire vilayets of Monastir and Uskub. Unless, therefore, the Balkan League promptly interposed, Greece and Serbia might alike find the ground cut from under their feet in Macedonia. Bulgaria was less directly interested than her allies in the pretensions put forward by the Albanians, but she was far more concerned in the terrible massacres of Macedonian Bulgars at Kotchana and Berana. In the midst of the excitement aroused by these massacres there arrived from Cettigne a proposal for immediate action. None of the Balkan States was more whole-hearted in the Balkan cause than Montenegro, and none was so eager for a fight. In April an arrangement had been concluded between her and Bulgaria; the proposal which now reached Sofia was the outcome of it. On 26th August the die was cast; Bulgaria agreed that in October war should be declared.

The
Powers
and the
Balkans

While the Turks and the Balkan States were mobilising, the Powers put out all their efforts to maintain the peace. They urged concession upon the Porte and patience upon the Balkan League. It was futile to expect either. Nothing but overwhelming pressure exerted at Con-

Constantinople could at this moment have averted war. Instead of exerting that pressure, the Powers presented an ultimatum simultaneously at Sofia, Belgrade, Athens, and Cettigne. In brief, the Powers would insist upon the reforms adumbrated in the Treaty of Berlin; but the Balkan States must not fight; if they did, the Powers would see that they get nothing by it.

This masterpiece of European diplomacy was presented at the Balkan capitals on 8th October, 1912. On the same day King Nicholas of Montenegro declared war at Constantinople. The other three States presented their ultimatum on the 14th. On the 18th the Porte declared war upon Bulgaria and Serbia; and on the same day Greece declared war upon the Porte.

Then, as M. Gueshoff writes, "a miracle took place. . . . Within the brief space of one month the Balkan Alliance demolished the Ottoman Empire, four tiny countries with a population of some 10,000,000 souls defeating a Great Power whose inhabitants numbered 25,000,000." Each of the allies did its part, though the brunt of the fighting fell upon the Bulgarians.

The success of the Bulgarians in the autumn campaign was, indeed, phenomenal. On 22nd October the Bulgarian Army attacked at Kirk Kilisse, a position of enormous strength to the north-east of Adrianople. After two days' fighting the Turks fled in panic, and Kirk Kilisse was in the hands of their enemies. Then followed a week of hard fighting, known to history as the Battle of Lule Burgas, and at the end of it the Turks were in full retreat on Constantinople. One Bulgarian army was now in front of the Tchataldja lines, another was investing Adrianople. On 4th November, the Porte appealed to the Powers for mediation. Bulgaria refused to accept it; but no progress was thereafter made, either towards Constantinople or towards the taking of Adrianople. Bulgaria had shot its bolt; it had won an astonishing victory over the Turks, but politically had already lost everything which it had set out to attain. On 19th November orders came from Sofia that the attack upon the Tchataldja lines must be sus-

Outbreak
of War

The War
of the
Coalition,
Oct.-Dec.
1912

Bulgaria's
Part

pended. What did that order import? Before we seek an answer to this question, we must turn to the achievements of Serbia.

Serbia's
Part

Hardly less astonishing, though on a smaller scale than the victories of Bulgaria, were those of the Serbs. The Serbian forces, which were about 150,000 strong, were divided into three armies. One marched into Novi-Bazar, and, after a week's stiff fighting, cleared the Turks out of that no man's land. Having done that, a portion of it was dispatched down the Drin valley into Albania. A second army occupied Pristina (23rd October), while the third and main army, under the Crown Prince, made for Uskub. The Turks barred the way to the ancient capital of the Serbs by the occupation of Kumanovo, and there on the 22nd of October the two armies met. Three days of fierce fighting resulted in a complete victory for the Serbs. At last, on that historic field, the stain of Kossovo was wiped out. Patiently, for five hundred years, the Serbs had waited for the hour of revenge; that it would some day come they had never doubted; at last it was achieved. Two days later the Turks evacuated Uskub, and on 26th October the Serbs entered their ancient capital in triumph. Now came the supreme question. Should they press for the *Ægean* or the *Adriatic*? Europe had already announced its decision that under no circumstances should Serbia be allowed to retain any part of the Albanian coast. But was the will of diplomacy to prevail against the intoxicating military successes of the Balkan League?

Meanwhile the main body of the Serbs flung themselves upon the Turks at Prilep, and drove them back upon Monastir, and from Monastir they drove them in utter confusion upon the guns of the advancing Greeks. The capture of Ochrida followed upon that of Monastir. Serbia, having thus cleared the Sanjak of Novi-Bazar, old Serbia, and western Macedonia, now turned its attention to Albania, and, with the aid of the Montenegrins, occupied Alessio and Durazzo before the end of November.

Armistice
of 3rd Dec.

On 3rd December the belligerents accepted an armistice proposed to them by the Powers; but from this armistice

the Greeks were, at the instance of the League, expressly excluded. The League could not afford to permit the activity of the Greek Fleet in the *Ægean* to be, even temporarily, interrupted.

On land the part played by the Greeks, though from The Greek Part their own standpoint immensely significant, was, in a military sense, relatively small, and on 6th November the Greeks entered Salonika.

Hardly had the Greek troops occupied Salonika when the Salonika Bulgarians arrived at the gates. Only after some demur did the Greeks allow their allies to enter the city, and from the outset they made it abundantly clear, not only that they had themselves come to Salonika to stay, but that they would permit no divided authority in the city, which they claimed exclusively as their own. From the outset a Greek governor-general was in command, and the whole administration was in the hands of Greeks. In order still further to emphasise the situation, the King of the Hellenes and his Court transferred themselves to Salonika.

Meanwhile the Greek Fleet had, from the outset of war, The Greek Fleet established a complete supremacy: practically all the islands, except Cyprus and those which were actually in the occupation of Italy, passed without resistance into Greek hands. But Greece looked beyond the *Ægean* to the Adriatic. On 3rd December the Greek Fleet shelled Valona, where its appearance caused grave concern both to Italy and to Austria-Hungary. Both Powers firmly intimated to Greece that though she might bombard Valona, she would not be permitted to retain it as a naval base.

Austria-Hungary had already made similar representations to Serbia in respect to the northern Albanian ports. The Adriatic Coast It was obvious, therefore, that the forces of European diplomacy were beginning to operate. But the military situation of the Turks was desperate, and when the armistice was concluded on 3rd December, the Turks remained in possession only of Constantinople, Adrianople, Janina, and the Albanian Scutari. Outside the walls of those four cities they no longer held a foot of ground in Europe.

The London Conference,
Dec. 1912-Jan. 1913

The centre of interest was now transferred from the Balkans to London. Ten days after the conclusion of the armistice delegates from the belligerent States met in London. Negotiations between the representatives of the Ottoman Turk and those of the Balkan allies were exceedingly difficult, but by 22nd January, 1913, Turkey had agreed to accept as the boundary between herself and Bulgaria a line drawn from Midia on the Black Sea to Enos at the mouth of the Maritza on the Ægean, thus surrendering Adrianople. On the following day the Young Turks effected a *coup d'état* which brought the London negotiations to an abrupt conclusion, and on 1st February the Conference broke up. The armistice had already been denounced by the allies (29th January), and on 4th February the Bulgarians resumed the attack upon Adrianople. Not, however, until 26th March did the great fortress fall, and the Bulgarians had to share the credit of taking it with the Serbians. Meanwhile the Greeks had won a brilliant and resounding victory. On 6th March the great fortress of Janina, the lair of the "Lion," and hitherto deemed impregnable, fell to their assault; the Turkish garrison, 33,000 strong, became prisoners of war, and 200 guns were taken by the victors.

Enver's
coup d'état,
23rd Jan.

Resumption
of War

Scutari

Adrianople and Janina gone, there remained to the Turks, outside the walls of Constantinople, nothing but Scutari in Albania. Already (2nd March) the Porte had made a formal request to the Powers for mediation. On the 16th the Balkan League accepted "in principle" the proposed mediation of the Powers, but stipulated for the cession of Scutari and all the Ægean islands as well as the payment of an indemnity.

Albania

Scutari was indeed the key of the diplomatic situation. Montenegro was determined to take Scutari, whatever the decision of the European Powers. The latter had, indeed, decided, as far back as December, 1912, that Scutari must remain in the hands of Albania. The latter was to be an autonomous State under a prince selected by the Great Powers, assisted by an international commission of

control and a gendarmerie under the command of officers selected from one of the smaller neutral States.

Whence came this interest in the affairs of Albania? On the part of Austria and Italy it was no new thing. An autonomous Albania was an essential feature of Count Aehrenthal's Balkan policy, and upon this point Austria-Hungary was supported by Italy and Russia. Italy's motives are obvious, and have been already explained; those of Russia are more obscure.

There was, however, another Power supremely interested, though in a different way, in the future of Albania. Nothing which concerned the future position of Austria-Hungary on the Adriatic could be a matter of indifference to Berlin. But Germany had a further interest in the matter. If the argument of the preceding chapter be accepted as sound, little pains are needed to explain the action of Germany. The Young Turk revolution of 1908 had threatened to dissipate the carefully garnered influence of Germany at Constantinople. That danger had, however, been skilfully overcome. Not Abdul Hamid himself was more esteemed at Berlin than Enver Bey. Far more serious was the set back to German ambitions threatened by the formation of the Balkan League, and still more by its rapid and astonishing victories in the autumn of 1912.

Germany
and the
Balkan
League

Hardly had the League entered upon the path of victory when Serbia received a solemn warning that she would not be permitted to retain any ports upon the Adriatic. This was a cruel blow to her national ambitions; but it was something more. It was a diplomatic move of Machiavellian subtlety and skill. If Serbia could be effectually headed off from the Adriatic; if the eastern boundaries of an autonomous Albania could be drawn on sufficiently generous lines, Serbia would not only be deprived of some of the accessions contemplated in her partition treaty with Bulgaria (March, 1912), but would be compelled to seek access to the sea on the shores of the Ægean instead of the Adriatic. A conflict of interests between Serbia and Bulgaria would almost certainly ensue

in Macedonia ; conflict between Serbia and Greece was not improbable. Thus would the solidarity of the Balkan League, by far the most formidable obstacle which had ever intervened between *Mittleuropa* and the Mediterranean, be effectively broken. How far this motive did actually inspire the policy of Germany and Austria-Hungary at this momentous crisis cannot yet be decided ; but the subsequent course of events has rendered the inference almost irresistible.

To return to Scutari. With or without the leave of the Powers, Montenegro was determined to have it, and on 6th February, 1912, the town was attacked with a force of 50,000 men, of whom Serbia contributed 12,000-14,000. But Scutari resisted every assault and inflicted heavy losses upon its assailants. On 24th March the Montenegrins so far yielded to the representations of the Powers as to allow the civil population to leave the town ; but as for the possession of the town and the adjoining territory, that was a matter between Montenegro and the Porte, with which the Powers had no right to interfere.

Fall of
Scutari

The Powers, however, were not to be denied. On 4th April an international squadron appeared off Antivari and proceeded to blockade the Montenegrin coast between Antivari and the Drin River. Still Montenegro maintained its defiance, and at last, after severe fighting, Scutari was starved into surrender (22nd April). The Turkish garrison, under Essad Pasha, was allowed to march out with all the honours of war and to take with them their arms and stores, and on 26th April, Prince Danilo, Crown Prince of Montenegro, entered the town in triumph. But his triumph was brief. The Powers insisted that the town should be surrendered to them ; King Nicholas at last yielded, and Scutari was taken over by an international force landed from the warships. The pressure thus put upon Montenegro in the interests of an autonomous Albania had an ugly appearance at the time, and subsequent events did not tend to render it less unattractive.

A few days before the fall of Scutari an armistice was concluded between Turkey and the Balkan League, and the next day (21st April) the League agreed to accept unconditionally the mediation of the Powers, but reserved the right to discuss with the Powers the questions as to the frontiers of Thrace and Albania, and the future of the Aegean islands. Negotiations were accordingly reopened in London on 20th May, and on the 30th the Treaty of London was signed. Everything beyond the Enos-Midia line and the island of Crete was ceded by the Porte to the Balkan allies, while the questions of Albania and of the islands were left in the hands of the Powers.

Treaty of
London,
30th May
1913

The European Concert congratulated itself upon a remarkable achievement: the problem which for centuries had confronted Europe had been solved; the clouds which had threatened the peace of Europe had been dissipated; the end of the Ottoman Empire, long foreseen and long dreaded as the certain prelude to Armageddon, had come, and come in the best possible way; young nations of high promise had been brought to the birth; the older nations were united, as never before, in bonds of amity and mutual goodwill. Such was the jubilant tone of contemporary criticism.

Yet in the midst of jubilation, notes of warning and of alarm were not wanting. Nor were they, unfortunately, without justification. Already ominous signs of profound disagreement between the victors as to the disposal of the spoils were apparent. As to that, nothing whatever had been said in the Treaty of London. Whether the temper which already prevailed at Sofia, Belgrade, and Athens would have permitted interference is very doubtful: the Treaty of London did not attempt it. In effect the belauded treaty had done nothing but affix the common seal of Europe to a deed for the winding-up of the affairs of the Ottoman Empire in Europe. How the assets were to be distributed among the creditors did not concern the official receivers. Yet here lay the real crux of the situation.

The Victors
and the
Spoils

The problem was, in fact, intensified by the sudden collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the unexpected success achieved by each of the allies. The Balkan League might have held together if it had been compelled to fight rather harder for its victory. Greece and Serbia, in particular, were intoxicated by a success far greater than they could have dared to anticipate. Bulgaria's success had been not less emphatic; but it had been achieved at greater cost, and in the wrong direction. The Bulgarians were undisputed masters of Thrace; but it was not for Thrace they had gone to war. The Greeks were in Salonika; the Serbs, in Uskub and Monastir. For the victorious and war-worn Bulgarians the situation was, therefore, peculiarly exasperating.

Dissensions
among the
Allies

Bulgaria's exasperation was Germany's opportunity. To fan the fires of Bulgarian jealousy against her allies was not difficult, but Germany spared no effort in the performance of this sinister task. The immediate sequel will demonstrate the measure of her success. Bulgaria and Greece had appointed a joint commission to delimit their frontiers in Macedonia on 7th April; it broke up without reaching an agreement on 9th May. Roumania, too, was tugging at Bulgaria in regard to a rectification of the frontiers of the Dobrudja. On 7th May an agreement was signed by which Bulgaria assented to the cession of Silistria and its fortifications, together with a strip of the Dobrudja. Notwithstanding this agreement a military convention was concluded between Serbia, Greece, and Roumania, and on 28th May, Serbia demanded that the treaty of partition concluded between herself and Bulgaria in March, 1912, should be so amended as to compensate her for the loss of territory due to the formation of an autonomous Albania. The demand was not in itself unreasonable. It was impossible to deny that the formation of an autonomous Albania had profoundly modified the situation, and had modified it to the detriment of Serbia in a way which had not been foreseen by either party to the treaty of March, 1912. On the other hand, the demand was peculiarly irritating to Bulgaria, who found herself bowed out of Macedonia by Greece.

The situation was highly critical when, on 8th June, the Czar of Russia offered his services as arbitrator. Taking advantage of the position assigned to and accepted by him in the treaty of March, 1912, the Czar appealed to the Kings of Serbia and Bulgaria not to "dim the glory they had earned in common" by a fratricidal war, but to turn to Russia for the settlement of their differences; and, at the same time, he solemnly warned them that "the State which begins war would be held responsible before the Slav cause," and he reserved to himself "all liberty as to the attitude which Russia will adopt in regard to the results of such a criminal struggle."

Interven-
tion of the
Czar
Nicholas

Serbia accepted the Czar's offer; but Bulgaria, though not actually declining it, made various conditions; attributed all the blame for the dispute to Serbia, and reminded the Czar that Russia had long ago acknowledged the right of Bulgaria to protect the Bulgarians of Macedonia.

Events were plainly hurrying to a catastrophe. Greece had made up its mind to fight Bulgaria, if necessary, for Salonika; Serbia demanded access to the *Ægean*. "Bulgaria is washed by two seas and grudges Serbia a single port." So ran the order of the day issued at Belgrade on 1st July. Meanwhile, on 2nd June, Greece and Serbia concluded an offensive and defensive alliance against Bulgaria for ten years. Serbia was to be allowed to retain Monastir. The Greeks did not like the surrender of a town which they regarded (as did the Bulgarians) as their own in reversion, but Venizelos persuaded them to the sacrifice, on the ground that unless they made it they might lose Salonika. Bulgaria, in order to detach Greece from Serbia, offered her the guarantee of Salonika, but M. Venizelos had already given his word to Serbia, and he was not prepared to break it.

The War
of Partition

On the night of 29th June the rupture occurred. Acting, according to M. Gueshoff,¹ on an order from headquarters, the Bulgarians attacked their Serbian allies. M. Gueshoff himself describes it as a "criminal act," but declares that the military authorities were solely responsible for it;

¹ Gueshoff: *op. cit.* p. 92.

that the Cabinet was ignorant that the order had been issued, and that as soon as they learnt of it they begged the Czar to intervene. We cannot yet test the truth of this statement, but M. Gueshoff is a man of honour, and it is notorious that the army was in a warlike mood. But wherever the fault lay the allies were now at each other's throats; the War of Partition had begun.

It lasted only a month; but the record of that month is full both of horror and of interest. The Serbs and Greeks, attacking in turn with great ferocity, drove the Bulgarians before them. Serbia wiped out the stain of Slivnitza; the Greeks, who had not had any real chance for the display of military qualities in the earlier war, more than redeemed the honour tarnished in 1897. In the course of their retreat the Bulgarians inflicted hideous cruelties upon the Greek population of Macedonia; the Greeks, in their advance, retaliated in kind. But the Bulgarians had not only to face Serbs and Greeks. On 9th July Roumania intervened, seized Silistria, and marched on Sofia. Bulgaria could offer no resistance and wisely bowed to the inevitable. Three days later (12th July) the Turks came in, recaptured Adrianople (20th July), and marched towards Tirnova. Bulgaria had the effrontery to appeal to the Powers against the infraction of the Treaty of London; King Carol of Roumania urged his allies to stay their hands; on 31st July an armistice was concluded, and on 10th August peace was signed at Bucharest.

Treaty of
Bucharest,
10th Aug.
1913

Bulgaria, the aggressor, was beaten to the earth and could not hope for mercy. By the Treaty of Bucharest she lost to Roumania a large strip of the Dobrudja, including the important fortress of Silistria; she lost also the greater part of Macedonia which she would almost certainly have received under the Czar's award, and had to content herself with a narrow strip giving access to the Ægean at the inferior port of Dedeagatch. Serbia obtained central Macedonia, including Ochrida and Monastir, Kossovo, and the eastern half of Novi-Bazar; the western half going to Montenegro. Greece obtained Epirus,

southern Macedonia, Salonika, and the seaboard as far east as the Mesta, thus including Kavala.

But the cup of Bulgaria's humiliation was not yet full. She had still to settle with the Porte, and peace was not actually signed between them until 29th September. The quarrel between the allies put the Ottoman Empire on its feet again. The Turks were indeed restricted to the Enos-Midia line, but lines do not always run straight even in Thrace, and the new line was so drawn as to leave the Ottoman Empire in possession of Adrianople, Demotica, and Kirk Kilisse. Having been compelled to surrender a large part of Macedonia to her allies, Bulgaria now lost Thrace as well. Even the control of the railway leading to her poor acquisition on the Ægean was denied to her.¹ The terms dictated by the Porte were hard, and Bulgaria made an attempt by an appeal to the Powers to evade payment of the bill she had run up. The attempt though natural was futile. The Powers did go so far as to present a joint note to the Porte, urging the fulfilment of the Treaty of London, but the Sultan was well aware that the Powers would never employ force to compel Turkey to satisfy a defeated and discredited Bulgaria, and the joint note was ignored.

For the loss of Adrianople, Demotica, and Kirk Kilisse, Bulgaria blamed the Powers in general and England in particular. It was believed at Sofia that England was induced to consent to a variation of the Enos-Midia line by Turkish promises in regard to the Baghdad Railway. There was no ground for the suspicion, but it was one of several factors which influenced the decision of Bulgaria in 1915.

We may now briefly summarise the results of the two Balkan Wars. The two wars were estimated to have cost, in money, about £245,000,000, and in killed and wounded, 348,000. The heaviest loss in both categories fell upon Bulgaria, who sacrificed 140,000 men and spent £90,000,000; the Turks, 100,000 men and £80,000,000; the Serbians 70,000, and £50,000,000; while the Greeks, whose gains

Bulgaria
and Turkey

Bulgaria
and Eng-
land

Results of
the Balkan
Wars

¹ Gibbons : *op. cit.* p. 325.

were by far the most conspicuous, acquired them at the relatively trifling cost of 30,000 men and £25,000,000.

In territory and population Turkey was the only loser. Before the war her European population was estimated to be 6,130,200, and her area 65,350 square miles. Of population she lost 4,239,200, and she was left with only 10,882 square miles of territory. Greece was the largest gainer, increasing her population from 2,666,000 to 4,363,000, and her area from 25,014 square miles to 41,933. Serbia increased her population from just under three millions to four and a half, and nearly doubled her territory, increasing it from 18,650 square miles to 33,891. Roumania added 286,000 to a population which was and is the largest in the Balkans, now amounting to about seven and a half millions, and gained 2,687 square miles of territory, entirely, of course, at the expense of Bulgaria. The net gains of Bulgaria were only 125,490 in population and 9,663 square miles; while Montenegro raised her population from 250,000 to 480,000, and her area from 3,474 to 5,603 square miles.¹

Greece The significance of the changes effected in the map of "Turkey in Europe" cannot, however, be measured solely by statistics.

The settlement effected in the Treaty of Bucharest was neither satisfactory nor complete. Of the recent belligerents Greece had most cause for satisfaction. To the north-east her territorial gains were not only enormous in extent, but of the highest commercial and strategic importance. The acquisition of Salonika was in itself a veritable triumph for the Greek cause, and Greece would have been well advised to be content with it. The insistence upon Kavala, whatever her ethnographic claims may have been, is now recognised as a political blunder. To have conceded Kavala to Bulgaria would have gone some way towards satisfying the legitimate claims of the latter in Macedonia, without in any way imperilling the position of Greece. If Greece had followed the sage advice of Venizelos the concession would have been made. To her undoing

¹ Robertson and Bartholomew : *Historical Atlas*, p. 24.

she preferred to support the hot-headed demands of the soldiers and the King. On the north-west Greece acquired the greater part of Epirus, including the great fortress of Janina, but she was still unsatisfied. For many months she continued to urge her claims to portions of southern Albania, assigned by the Powers to the new autonomous State. But to press them would have brought Greece into conflict with Italy. "Italy," said the Marquis di San Giuliano, "will even go to the length of war to prevent Greece occupying Valona; on this point her decision is irrevocable"¹ On that side Greece, therefore, remained unsatisfied. There remained the question of the islands. Of these, incomparably the most important was Crete. Crete was definitely assigned to Greece, and on 14th December, 1913, it was formally taken over by King Constantine, accompanied by the Crown Prince and the Prime Minister, M. Venizelos. Thus was one long chapter closed. The question as to the rest of the islands was reserved to the Powers, who ultimately awarded to Greece all the islands of which the Porte could dispose, except Imbros and Tenedos, which were regarded as essential for the safeguarding of the entrance to the Dardanelles, and were, therefore, left to Turkey. The Sporades, including Rhodes, remained in the occupation of Italy. Greece, therefore, had reason for profound satisfaction. Not that even for her the settlement was complete. Some 300,000 Greeks still remained under Bulgarian rule in Thrace and eastern Macedonia, while in the Ottoman Empire—mainly, of course, in Asia—Greece still claimed some 3,000,000 "unredeemed" co-nationals. But no settlement could achieve ethnographic completeness, least of all one which was concerned with the Balkans, and Greece had little cause to quarrel with that of 1913.

Nor had Roumania. In proportion to her sacrifices her gains were considerable, but for the satisfaction of her larger claims the Balkan Wars afforded no opportunity. The "unredeemed" Roumanians were the subjects either of Austria-Hungary or of Russia. Transylvania,

¹ Kerofilas : *Venizelos*, p. 155.

the Bukovina, and Bessarabia were the provinces to which Roumania laid claim.

Bulgaria Bulgaria's position in 1913 was less favourable ; but her misfortunes were largely of her own making, not the less so if her shrewd German king was pushed on to the destruction of his country by subtle suggestions from Vienna and Berlin. When the Treaty of London was signed in May, fate seemed to hold for Bulgaria the promise of a brilliant future. Despite the secular hostility of the Greeks and the rivalry of the Latins, Bulgaria was then first favourite for the hegemony of the Balkans. The Bulgarians lacked some of the cultural qualifications of their neighbours ; they were the latest comers into Balkan society, but they had given proof of a virile and progressive temper, and were advancing rapidly in the arts both of peace and war. Then suddenly, owing, if not solely to their own intemperate folly, then to their inability to resist subtle temptation or to restrain the impatience of their co-nationals, they flung away in a short month the great position secured to them by the patient labours of a generation. Had they but been able to resist provocation and to await the award of the Russian Czar, the greater part of central as well as eastern Macedonia must have fallen to them. As it was, they got an area relatively circumscribed, with a wretched coast-line bounded by the Mesta, and in Dedeagatch a miserable apology for an Ægean port ; above all, they lost the coveted districts of Ochrida and Monastir. The impartial judgment of history will probably incline to the view that in defining so narrowly the share of Bulgaria, Greece and Serbia alike showed shortsightedness and parsimony. Even on the admission of Philhellenists Greece blundered badly in pressing her claims against Bulgaria so far. The latter ought at least to have been allowed a wider outlet on the Ægean littoral, with Kavala as a port. Nothing less could reconcile Bulgaria to the retention of Salonika by Greece.

Serbia Serbia, too, showed herself lacking in prudent generosity. But while Greece was without excuse Serbia was not. What was the Serbian case ? It may be stated in the

words of the general order issued by King Peter to his troops on the eve of the second war (1st July, 1913). "The Bulgarians, our allies of yesterday, with whom we fought side by side, whom as true brothers we helped with all our heart, watering their Adrianople with our blood, will not let us take the Macedonian districts that we won at the price of such sacrifices. Bulgaria doubled her territory in our common warfare, and will not let Serbia have land not half the size, neither the birthplace of our hero King Marco, nor Monastir, where you covered yourselves with glory and pursued the last Turkish troops sent against you. Bulgaria is washed by two seas, and grudges Serbia a single port. Serbia and her makers—the Serbian Army—cannot and must not permit this." ¹

The gains of Serbia were, as we have seen, very considerable. The division of Novi-Bazar between herself and Montenegro brought her into immediate contact with the Southern Slavs of the Black Mountain, while the acquisition of Old Serbia and central Macedonia carried her territory southwards towards the *Ægean*. But Serbia's crucial problem was not solved. She was still a land-locked country; deprived by the subtle diplomacy of the German Powers of her natural access to the *Ægean*, and pushed by them into immediate conflict with the Bulgarians, perhaps into ultimate conflict with Greece. Disappointed of her dearest ambition, flushed with victory, duped by interested advice, Serbia can hardly be blamed for having inflicted humiliation upon Bulgaria, and for having yielded to the temptation of unexpected territorial acquisitions.

Montenegro shared both the success and the disappointment of her kinsmen, now for the first time her neighbours. To Scutari Montenegro could advance no claims consistent with the principles either of nationality or of ecclesiastical affinity. But King Nicholas's disappointment at being deprived of it was acute, and was hardly compensated by the acquisition of the western half of Novi-Bazar. His

¹ Gueshoff: *op. cit.* p. 102.

position as regards seaboard was less desperate than that of Serbia, but he too had an account to settle with the European Concert.

The
Powers
and
Albania

To have kept the harmony of that Concert unbroken was a very remarkable achievement, and the credit of it belongs primarily to the English Foreign Secretary. Whether the harmony was worth the trouble needed to preserve it is an open question. There are those who would have preferred to see it broken, if necessary, at the moment when the German Powers vetoed the access of the Serbs to the Adriatic. It must not, however, be forgotten that this masterpiece of German diplomacy could hardly have been achieved had it not appeared to coincide with the dominant dogma of English policy in the Near East, the principle of nationality. Macedonian autonomy had so long been the watchword of a group of English politicians and publicists that little pains were needed to excite them to enthusiasm on behalf of an autonomous Albania.

Albania

If Macedonia was a hard nut to crack, Albania was, in a sense, even harder. That the idea of autonomy was seductive is undeniable. Such a solution offered obvious advantages. It might stifle the incipient pretensions of Italy and Austria-Hungary; it might arrest the inconvenient claims of Greece upon "northern Epirus"; it might interpose a powerful barrier between the Southern Slavs and the Adriatic; it might, above all, repair the havoc which the formation of the Balkan alliance had wrought in German plans in regard to the Near East. Nor was it the least of its advantages that it could be commended, without excessive explanation of details, by democratic Ministers to the progressive democracies of Western Europe.

Of the conditions which really prevailed in Albania little was or is accurately known. But the decree issued that it should be autonomous, and on 23rd November a German prince, a Russian soldier, a nephew of the Queen of Roumania, Prince William of Wied, was selected for the difficult task of ruling over the wild highlanders of Albania. On 7th March, 1914, he arrived at Durazzo, where he was

welcomed by Essad Pasha, the defender of Scutari, and himself an aspirant to the crown. Prince William of Wied never had a chance of making good in his new principality. The ambitious disloyalty of Essad Pasha; the turbulence of the Albanian tribesmen, among whom there was entire lack of coherence or of unity; the intrigues of more than one interested Power, rendered his position from the first impossible. The Prince and his family were compelled to take refuge temporarily on an Italian warship on 24th May, and in September they left the country. The government then fell into the hands of a son of the ex-Sultan Abdul Hamid, Bushan Eddin Effendi, who appointed Essad Pasha grand vizier and commander-in-chief. When the European War broke out no central authority existed in Albania. The authority of Essad Pasha was recognised at Durazzo; the Greeks took possession of southern Albania or northern Epirus; the Italians promptly occupied Valona. For the rest, there were as many rulers in Albania as there are tribes.

Besides Albania two other questions were left out-Armeniastanding after the Peace of Bucharest. The settlement of the *Ægean* Islands has already been described. That of Armenia demands a few words. If "autonomy" be a word to conjure with in regard to Albania, why not also in regard to Armenia? But the former has at least one advantage over the latter. Albania exists as a geographical entity; Armenia does not. Nor is there, as Mr. Hogarth has pointed out, any "geographical unit of the Ottoman area in which Armenians are the majority. If they cluster more thickly in the vilayets of Angora, Sivas, Erzeroum, Kharput, and Van, i.e., in easternmost Asia Minor, than elsewhere, . . . they are consistently a minority in any large administrative district."¹ Where, then, as he pertinently asks, is it possible to constitute an autonomous Armenia? The question has never been answered quite satisfactorily. In February, 1914, the Porte agreed to admit to the Ottoman Parliament seventy Armenian deputies, who should be nominated by the

¹ *The Balkans*, p. 384.

Armenian Patriarch, and to carry out various administrative and judicial reforms in the Anatolian vilayets inhabited largely by Armenians. But the outbreak of the European War afforded the Ottoman Government a chance of solving a secular problem by other and more congenial methods. Massacres of Armenian Christians have been frequent in the past; but the Turks have been obliged to stay their hands by the intervention of the Powers. That interference was no longer to be feared. An unprecedented opportunity presented itself to the Turks. Of that opportunity they are believed to have made full use. A policy of extermination was deliberately adopted, and has been consistently pursued. It is at least simpler than autonomy.

Mittel-
europa and
the Peace
of Bucha-
rest

For the conclusion of peace at Bucharest one Power in Europe took special credit to itself. No sooner was it signed than the Emperor William telegraphed to his cousin, King Carol of Roumania, his hearty congratulations upon the successful issue of his "wise and truly statesmanlike policy." "I rejoice," he added, "at our mutual co-operation in the cause of peace." Shortly afterwards King Constantine of Greece received at Potsdam, from the Emperor's own hands, the baton of a Field-Marshal in the Prussian Army.

If the Kaiser had been active in the cause of peace his august ally at Vienna had done his utmost to enlarge the area of war. On 9th August, 1913, the day before the signature of peace at Bucharest, Austria-Hungary communicated to Italy and to Germany "her intention of taking action against Serbia, and defined such action as defensive, hoping to bring into operation the *casus fœderis* of the Triple Alliance."¹ Italy refused to recognise the proposed aggression of Austria-Hungary against Serbia as a *casus fœderis*. Germany also exercised a restraining influence upon her ally, and the attack was consequently postponed; but only for eleven months.

¹ Telegram from the Marquis di San Giuliano to Signor Giolitti: quoted by the latter in the Italian Chamber, 5th December, 1914 (*Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 401).

Germany was not quite ready: on 22nd November, however, M. Jules Cambon, the French Ambassador at Berlin, reported that the German Emperor had ceased to be "the champion of peace against the warlike tendencies of certain parties in Germany, and had come to think that war with France was inevitable."¹

France, therefore, would have to be fought: but the eyes of the German Powers, and more particularly of Austria-Hungary, were fixed not upon the west but upon the south-east.

Serbia had committed two unpardonable crimes. she had strengthened the barrier between Austria-Hungary and Salonika; and she had enormously enhanced her own prestige as the representative of Jugo-Slav aspirations. Serbia, therefore, must be annihilated.

Attack
upon
Serbia

But Serbia did not stand alone. By her side were Greece and Roumania. The association of these three Balkan States appeared to be peculiarly menacing to the Habsburg Empire. Greece, firmly planted in Salonika, was a fatal obstacle to the hopes so long cherished by Austria. The prestige acquired by Serbia undoubtedly tended to create unrest among the Slavonic peoples still subject to the Dual Monarchy. And if Jugo-Slav enthusiasm threatened the integrity of the Dual Monarchy upon one side, the ambitions of a Greater Roumania threatened it upon another. The visit of the Czar Nicholas to Constanza in the spring of 1914 was interpreted in Vienna as a recognition of this fact, and as an indication of a *rapprochement* between St. Petersburg and Bucharest.

If, therefore, the menace presented to "Central Europe" by the first Balkan League had been effectually dissipated, the menace of a second Balkan League remained. One crumb of consolation the second war had, indeed, brought to the German Powers: the vitality and power of recuperation manifested by the Ottoman Turk. So long as the Turks remained in Constantinople there was no reason for despair. The key to German policy was still to be found upon the shores of the Bosphorus.

The
German
Powers
and the
Ottoman
Empire

¹ *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 142.

Constantinople and Salonika were the dual objectives of Austro-German ambition. Across the path to both lay Belgrade. At all hazards the Power which commanded Belgrade must be crushed. In order to annihilate the Serbs—to displace the “guardians of the Gate”—Europe was to be involved in the greatest war in history.

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CHAPTER XIII

THE WORLD-WAR (1914-18)

ITS ANTECEDENTS AND AN OUTLINE OF ITS COURSE

La guerre est l'industrie nationale de la Prusse.--MIRABEAU.

Just as the greatness of Germany is to be found in the governance of Germany by Prussia, so the greatness and good of the world is to be found in the predominance there of German culture, of the German mind—in a word, of the German character.—TREITSCHKE.

All which other nations attained in centuries of natural development—political union, colonial possessions, naval power, international trade—was denied to our nation until quite recently. What we now wish to attain must be fought for, and won, against a superior force of hostile interests and Powers.—BERNHARDI.

After bloody victories the world will be healed by being Germanised.—PROFESSOR LAMPRECHT.

§ 1. CAUSES AND ANTECEDENTS OF THE WAR

THE events of the last six years (1914-20) are too recent, the memories they evoke are too poignant, to permit the writing of impartial history. One of the most brilliant of English diplomatists uttered many years ago a warning which we shall ignore at our peril. "Do not allow yourself to have your judgment of the *Welthistorische* warped by the accidental, however all-absorbing and terrible that accidental may be." It is easier to recall Sir Robert Morier's caution than to observe it. The safest plan is to set down a plain tale and let the facts speak for themselves. Yet those who have read the preceding chapters might fairly complain if no attempt was made to draw the moral which their contents seem to suggest, and to analyse the immediate antecedents

of the catastrophe in which the events of the last half-century have culminated.

The Antecedents
of the
World-War

What Aristotle said of Revolution is true also of War. "It is not the causes of revolution which are unimportant, but only the occasions." The "occasion" of the Great War is doubtless to be found in the assassination on 28th June at Serajevo of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, the heir to the Austrian Empire and the Kingdom of Hungary. What were the causes of the war?

General
Causes of
the War

The general causes are writ large over all the preceding pages of this book. If, as Bismarck affirmed, the war of 1870 with France lay in "the logic of history" after the war of 1866 with Austria, if Sedan was implicit in Sadowa, so the war of 1914 followed logically from that of 1870-71. Not solely nor mainly by reason of the disputed borderlands of Alsace and Lorraine. The wound caused by the dismemberment of France had never indeed healed. But whether France would ever have drawn the sword solely for the recovery of Alsace and Lorraine, had other circumstances made for peace, is doubtful. Had Germany not shown a disposition to meddle in Morocco, Frenchmen might perhaps have found at least material compensation for the loss of those provinces in the growth of a North African Empire. If the war of 1914-18 lay in the womb of 1870-71, it was rather that the Franco-German War led Germany to drink too deeply of the Prussian spirit; that it justified those who taught that "he who succeeds is never in the wrong"; that it identified morality with victory.

The
Prussian
Spirit

"War," said Mirabeau, "is the national industry of Prussia." That is the literal fact. Prussia has been created out of the most unpromising materials by the genius of its Hohenzollern princes and by their persistence in a policy of war. Modern Prussia, as Lord Salisbury pointed out, is the result of the spoliation of its neighbours. Poles, Danes, Germans, Frenchmen have contributed to its territorial growth, and to its strategic solidarity. But war is more than the national industry of Prussia; it is the characteristic *ethos* in which the genius of Prussia

expresses itself; and with this *ethos*, Prussia has since 1870 impregnated Germany. Unified not by parliamentary votes and parchments but by blood and iron, Germany has yielded herself and all for which in the period of *Kleinstaaterei* her States formerly stood to the Moloch set up by Prussia. The State, so Treitschke taught, is Power. "To care for its power," he wrote, "is the highest moral duty of the State. Of all political weaknesses that of feebleness is the most abominable and despicable; it is the sin against the Holy Spirit of Politics." Nietzsche taught a similar doctrine with not less unflinching logic. "Ye say, a good cause will hallow even war? I say unto you: a good war hallows every cause. War and courage have accomplished greater things than love of your neighbour." Such was the political philosophy with which the younger generation in Germany has been indoctrinated; and History set herself to illustrate the teachings of Philosophy. A long succession of eminent historians,—the so-called Prussian school,—Dahlmann, Häusser, Droysen, Sybel, above all Treitschke, devoted unsurpassable industry and learning to the task of justifying to Germans the ways of Prussia and the Hohenzollern. Treitschke's *History of Germany in the Nineteenth Century* is as much a national epic as was Virgil's *Æneid*. Thus were Philosophy and History alike prostituted to the service of Politics. Science, in another way, was pressed into the same service and the whole educational curriculum was based upon a syllabus designed to suggest a similar conclusion.

Such topics may seem to be remote from the World-War. In fact they are strictly relevant: for it was with an "armed doctrine," as Burke phrased it, that from 1914-18 we and our Allies were at war. Hence the imperative necessity for a conclusive issue; in a struggle for territory compromise is possible; in a conflict between opposing and mutually exclusive principles it is not. It was essential to the future peace of Europe and the world that a nation which had learnt to worship false gods should be taught to know them for what they were.

The root cause of the war must be found then in the

permeation of Germany by the Prussian spirit, and her resolution to make that spirit prevail in world-politics.

Material
Causes

More material causes were not, however, lacking. Among a large number three stood out prominent: the race for armaments; the grouping of the European Powers in two armed and opposing camps; and the rapid decay of the Ottoman Empire in Europe and its satellites in Africa. Of these enough has been said in preceding chapters. It only remains therefore to summarise the immediate antecedents of the war.

Immediate
Causes

At the end of June, 1914, a bolt fell from a sky which, if not cloudless, was clearer than it had been of late. The news circulated throughout Europe that the heir to the Habsburg Empire had, with his consort, been assassinated at Serajevo. What was the motive which had inspired this dastardly crime? Could we answer that question with certainty much light would probably be thrown on the origin of the Great War. The crime was committed in the Bosnian capital. The assassins, though not Serbian subjects, were Serbs, and the attempt, therefore, was made quite naturally to fix the responsibility upon Serbia. Serbia had reasons enough, as the preceding pages have shown, for desiring revenge upon the Habsburgs. But why upon this particular member of the house—a man who was notoriously pro-Serb in sympathy? In the absence of positive evidence the mystery deepens—unless one hypothesis be adopted—the more it is considered. But we must retrace our steps.

The Crime
of Serajevo,
28th June,
1914

The
German
Emperor
and the
Austrian
Archduke

On 12th June, 1914, the German Emperor, accompanied by Grand Admiral von Tirpitz, visited the Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his consort, the Duchess of Hohenberg, at their castle of Konopisht in Bohemia. What passed between the august visitor and his host must be matter for conjecture. Mr. Wickham Steed has, however, given currency to a story—and few men are in a better position to unravel the mystery which surrounds these events—that the object of the Kaiser's visit was to arrange an inheritance for the two sons of the Duchess of Hohenberg, and at the same time to pave the way for the

eventual absorption of the German lands of the house of Habsburg into the German Empire.¹

The Archduke Franz Ferdinand was heir to the Dual Monarchy, but his marriage was morganatic, and his children were portionless. Both he and his wife were the objects of incessant intrigue alike at Vienna and at Budapest, where the Archduke was profoundly mistrusted by the dominant German-Magyar oligarchy. Ever since the *Ausgleich* of 1867 the Germans and Magyar minority in the Habsburg Empire had, as we have seen, united against the Slav majority. The Archduke was popularly credited with the intention of overthrowing this autocratic dualism and of substituting for it some form of federalism which should give to the Slavs and other subject races of the Empire a real voice in the determination of its policy. To the autocrats of Vienna, still more to those of Budapest, above all to Count Tisza, the masterful and unscrupulous Premier of Hungary, such a policy was anathema. The man who could entertain it, the man who during the Balkan Wars had manifested his sympathy with the Serbs, was an actual danger to the Dual Monarchy.

On 28th June that man was removed by the hand of an assassin in the streets of Serajevo. None of the usual precautions for the safety of royal visitors had been taken. On the contrary, the police of Serajevo received orders that such precautions were unnecessary, since the military authorities were to be responsible for all arrangements. As the Imperial visitors drove from the station a bomb was thrown at the carriage by the son of an Austrian police official. On arriving at the Town Hall the Archduke is said to have exclaimed: "Now I know why Count Tisza advised me to postpone my journey."² Still no precautions were taken to safeguard the Archduke, though the town was known to be full of conspirators. On their way

Assassination of the
Archduke
Franz
Ferdinand

¹ Cf. "The Pact of Konopisht," by H. Wickham Steed: *Nineteenth Century and After*, February, 1916; but other stories are current.

² Stated by Mr. Steed on the authority of the *Times* correspondent at Serajevo.

from the Town Hall to the hospital, the Archduke and his wife were mortally wounded by three shots deliberately fired by a second assassin. It is reported that the Archduke, in his last moments, exclaimed: "The fellow will get the Golden Cross of Merit for this." True or not, the story points to a current suspicion. No steps were taken to punish those who had so grossly neglected the duty of guarding the Archduke's person, though the *canaille* of Serajevo were let loose among the Serbs, while the Austrian police stood idly by. The funeral accorded to the Archduke served to deepen the mystery attending his death. Prince Arthur of Connaught was appointed to represent King George, but he did not leave London. The German Emperor announced his intention of being present, but when the time came he was indisposed. The funeral of the heir to the Dual Monarchy was "private." The satisfaction evoked by the tragedy in certain quarters in Vienna and Budapest was hardly concealed.

Formal responsibility was, of course, fixed upon the Government at Belgrade. The latter challenged proof, never yet furnished, of its complicity or connivance in the crime. It also pointed out that it had previously suggested the arrest of the assassins, but that the Austrian Government had deprecated the precautionary step. Nevertheless, Serbia was to be punished.

Reopening
of the Kiel
Canal

Meanwhile on 23rd June the Kiel Canal, recently reconstructed so as to permit the passage of the biggest *Dreadnoughts*, was reopened. Shortly afterwards the Kaiser went off on a yachting cruise to the Norwegian fiords. On 23rd July the Austro-Hungarian Government dispatched its ultimatum to Belgrade.

Austrian
Ultimatum
to Serbia,
23rd July

It is surmised that the dispatch of the ultimatum was delayed in order to enable Germany to complete her preparations for war. The ultimatum itself required that a humiliating declaration dictated by the Austrian Government should be published to the Serbian Army as an order of the day by the king. The declaration admitted that the Serajevo assassinations were planned in Belgrade, and that the arms and explosives with which the murderers

were provided had been given them by Serbian officers. The Serbian Government was further required to undertake to suppress all propaganda calculated to excite contempt against the Habsburg monarchy; to dismiss all officers and functionaries deemed by the Austro-Hungarian Government to be guilty of such propaganda; and to permit the Austrian Government to collaborate with that of Serbia for the suppression of the agitation for a greater Serbia. There were various other matters of similar import. Forty-eight hours only were permitted for a reply. Serbia did its utmost to avert war. It accepted at once eight out of the ten principal points; it did not actually reject the other two, and it offered to submit the whole question at issue between the two Governments, either to the Hague tribunal or to the Great Powers. No submission could have been more complete or even abject. But nothing could avail to avert war. The Central Powers were convinced that the hour had come; they were ready for war, and had resolved to make it.

From the mass of diplomatic correspondence, two almost casual telegrams may be unearthed. On 25th July the British Ambassador at Rome telegraphed to Sir Edward Grey, "There is reliable information that Austria intends to seize the Salonika Railway." On the 29th a telegram arrived from the British Embassy at Constantinople, "I understand that the designs of Austria may extend considerably beyond the Sanjak and a punitive occupation of Serbian territory." Plainly English diplomacy was awake to the fact that Austria was looking beyond Serbia to Salonika.

§ 2. THE WAR ON LAND

Austria declared war upon Serbia on 28th July, and two days later Belgrade was occupied. Even so late as the 30th there seemed, however, a possibility that the area of the war might be confined to the Balkans by means of direct negotiation between Vienna and St. Petersburg. Outbreak
of War

That possibility was quickly ruled out by the delivery (31st July) of a German ultimatum to Russia. On 1st August, Germany declared war upon Russia, and on 3rd August upon France.

Russia

In the meantime the British Government had been making every possible effort, in the first place, to avert war, and failing that, to circumscribe the conflict. Russia was willing to stand aside and leave the question in the hands of England, France, Germany, and Italy. That, however, did not suit Germany's game. She was determined either to inflict upon Russia through Serbia a diplomatic humiliation, not less pronounced than that of 1909, or to compel her to fight. The Russian autocracy could not afford a second humiliation, and the alternative was accepted.

Great
Britain

Russian intervention on behalf of Serbia necessarily brought in France. But what of England? On 25th July, St. Petersburg urged that war could be averted only if Great Britain would take her stand firmly with Russia and France. Opinion is still divided as to whether a firm declaration to that effect would at that late hour have averted a general war. On the one hand, it is certain that Germany was not prepared for the immediate intervention of England. Had she been assured of it, it might have given her pause. On the other hand, it must be remembered that the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia and the German ultimatum to Russia represented, not the first, but the fourth attempt within a decade on the part of Germany to inflict humiliation upon her neighbours. In 1905, France had been compelled at her bidding to dismiss one of the most brilliant of her foreign Ministers; in 1909, Russia had recoiled before the insolent menace of the Knight of Potsdam; in 1911, only the firm attitude of England had prevented the humiliation of France in Morocco. Could the Kaiser have afforded in 1914 a second Agadir? If, as was freely asserted, the Kaiser in 1914 was pushed on to war by domestic forces which had got beyond his own control, nothing that England could have done would have averted war.

England's attitude was finally determined by another consideration. On 2nd August, Germany announced her intention to march through Belgium, and if her advance were opposed to treat Belgium as an enemy. On the following day the King of the Belgians made a supreme appeal to Great Britain, one of the signatories by whom the independence and neutrality of Belgium were guaranteed, to save her from outrage at the hands of another co-signatory. Apart from "the scrap of paper," the integrity and independence of the Low Countries have been objects of profound concern to England for at least five hundred years. Four times in the course of four centuries has the equilibrium of Europe and the national independence of the several States been menaced by the domination of a single Power: in the sixteenth century by the Habsburgs; in the late seventeenth by the French Bourbons; a century later by Napoleon Buonaparte; in the twentieth by the Hohenzollern. In each great crisis the European equilibrium was preserved by the efforts of England; in each England's intervention was stimulated by an attack upon the Low Countries; in each her military operations were mainly concentrated upon the Franco-Belgian frontier.

Violation
of Belgian
Neutrality

On 3rd August, England announced that she would be faithful to her plighted word and to her traditional policy. An ultimatum was presented to Germany on 4th August, and in the absence of a reply war between Great Britain and Germany began at midnight on 4th August. On the same day, Germany declared war on Belgium, and in accordance with her prearranged plan commenced to "hack her way through" to Paris. The British Fleet had already (29th July) taken up its war stations in the North Sea.

England
and
Germany
at War,
4th Aug.

Germany's supreme object in the Great War was to challenge the world supremacy of the British Empire, and to achieve that purpose by turning the flank of the great sea Empire by means of a continuous railway from the German Ocean to the Persian Gulf. "The war," wrote a German publicist in 1916, "comes from the East; the war

German
Aims

is waged for the East; the war will be decided in the East."¹ This view is not unchallenged, but it receives support both from Russian and from French authorities. "The war," wrote Paul Milyoukov, "might have begun from various causes, and on many pretexts on the part of Germany. But, as a matter of fact, it began by reason of the Eastern Question being reopened." "The Pan-German scheme," wrote André Chéradame, "constitutes the sole reason for the war." Of that scheme, the pivot is to be found in the Near Eastern policy of Germany, and in her determination to connect Berlin not only with Constantinople, but with Baghdad and Basra. The key to the whole position was therefore in the keeping of Belgrade. To wrest the key from Serbia and to secure her line of communications, on the one hand with Constantinople, on the other with Salonika, was for Germany not merely the pretext but the reason for the war.

The
German
Plan

For the moment, however, the Balkans could be left to her ally. The German plan was by a rapid thrust at Paris to overwhelm France before slow-moving Russia could render her Western ally effective assistance. France once humbled in the dust, deprived, perhaps of her Channel ports, certainly of much of her overseas Empire, Germany could turn to meet and to repel the onslaught of Russia. To a straight fight between the Central Powers and Russia, with France laid out and England neutral, there could be but one issue. With Russia out of the way, the Central Powers could work their will upon the Balkans. England might, by that time, have awakened to the danger, but it would have been too late. The whale could not single-handed have opposed the progress of the elephant.

Belgium's
Stand

Germany's precise calculation was upset by the resolution of England to take her stand beside Belgium, France, Serbia, and Russia.

Paris, it was hoped, might be taken in a month. That could have only been done, however, if the way through Belgium was rapidly cleared. Belgium, to her eternal honour, but to the intense chagrin of the Germans, made an

¹ Ernst Jackh : *Deutsche Politik*, 22nd December, 1916.

heroic resistance. Liège barred the way for nearly a week. The city itself surrendered on 7th August, but not until the 15th was the last of its forts taken. The fall of Liège opened the way to Brussels, and the Belgian Government was consequently compelled to withdraw to Antwerp (17th August). On the 20th the Germans occupied Brussels, and on the 24th the great fortress of Namur, on which many hopes depended, was after a bombardment of twenty-four hours surrendered. The fall of Namur gravely disarranged the French scheme of defence; but Joffre, who commanded the French Army, was not to be diverted from his main plan. Instead of rushing to the relief of Belgium and the defence of north-eastern France, he attacked the Germans in Alsace and Lorraine. The Germans, meanwhile, were giving in Belgium an example of the calculated frightfulness which they were afterwards to exhibit on many fields. Louvain, Malines, and Termonde, though undefended, were ruthlessly destroyed. Then came the turn of the French.

Trusting confidently in the Navy, England did not hesitate to denude herself of troops and to throw all her available forces into the field. Lord Kitchener was appointed Secretary of State for War on 5th August, and two days later the embarkation of British troops began. In ten days the whole Expeditionary Force, consisting of one cavalry and six infantry divisions—less than 110,000 men in all—had been landed on French soil without accident or hitch of any kind. The disembarkation was concluded on 16th August, and exactly a week later (23rd August) the British troops found themselves in the firing-line at Mons. Then began the famous fortnight's retreat. Hopelessly outnumbered, lacking transport and supplies, not yet established on French soil, out of touch with their allies, the British forces were compelled to fall back in some confusion. Nevertheless, their extrication from Mons reflected high credit on the generals in command—Sir John French, Haig, Smith-Dorrien, and Allenby—and proved again and to all time the heroism and endurance of the British soldier. Not until 5th September was the retreat arrested. In the meantime the Aisne had been forced by the Germans; the

England's
Effort

The
Retreat
from Mons

The Battle
of the
Marne,
6th-12th
Sept.

French had been driven out of Amiens, and Laon occupied by the enemy (30th August). The Germans were now within striking distance of Paris, and on 3rd September the French Government transferred itself to Bordeaux. Meanwhile the German commander, Von Kluck, had commented his critical manœuvre. On 31st August instead of continuing his march in a south-westerly direction he turned sharp to the left across the British front. On 5th September he crossed the Marne, and on that same day Joffre issued his famous order that the retreat was at an end, that "no man must go back any further, but each be killed on the spot rather than give way an inch." The order was obeyed, and for a week (6th-12th September) the hosts of France, England, and Germany were engaged in one of the decisive battles of the world—the Battle of the Marne. That battle marked the turn of the tide; on the 9th the British crossed the Marne; the Germans were driven back to the Aisne and there dug themselves in. For many a long month the Germans and the Allies faced each other in trenches, attacking, counter-attacking, but virtually immovable. The second phase of the War had begun.

Antwerp

The Belgians meanwhile were in terrible plight. Antwerp had always been regarded by England as a point of supreme importance to her. That Antwerp should be in friendly hands has been always one of the traditional maxims of British statesmanship. But for Antwerp, so Napoleon declared, he need never have gone to St. Helena. Antwerp was now in imminent danger from the Germans. On 5th October we landed in Antwerp a miserably equipped and miscellaneous force of some 8,000 sailors and marines, with a large admixture of untrained civilians. About the same time a 7th division of the Expeditionary Force—under the command of General Rawlinson—was landed at Ostend. The idea was that at all costs the enemy must be headed off from the coasts of France and Flanders, and for this purpose the British force was transferred from the Aisne to the Lys and Yser. Antwerp, however, fell on 9th October and the Belgian

Government was transferred to Havre. A few days later the great battle began around Ypres. It lasted until the middle of November. When it ended the British Expeditionary Force had almost ceased to exist, but Ypres had been held, and the holding of Ypres denied the Germans access to the Channel ports. Had Ypres fallen, the Germans would have been within striking distance of Dover. No words, therefore, can estimate the debt which England and the world owes to the heroes who laid down their lives in the long-drawn-out battle of October and November, 1914.

First Battle
of Ypres,
Oct.-Nov.

The services of Russia at this juncture of the war must not be forgotten. Russia, mobilising with unexpected rapidity, gave ear to the call for help from Belgium and France, and thrust forward a force into East Prussia in the first days of August, and so gave a great fright to the citizens of Berlin. On 26th August, however, Hindenburg—a “dug-out” of 70—inflicted a crushing defeat upon the Russians on the historic field of Tannenberg.¹ The Russian invaders were cleared out of East Prussia, and before the end of the first week of September the Prussians in their turn were on Russian soil. The main Russian attack, however, was delivered in Poland. Lemberg was captured on 1st September by the Russians, who quickly made themselves masters of Galicia; then Hindenburg, having cleared East Prussia, attacked in Poland and thus relieved the Russian pressure upon Austria and Hungary. Austria herself was cutting a very poor figure in the war. Even against Serbia her success was evanescent. In the autumn of 1914 she launched a terrific attack upon Serbia, and after four months of sanguinary fighting succeeded (2nd Dec.) in again capturing Belgrade; but her triumph was shortlived. By an heroic effort the Serbians three days later recaptured their capital; the Habsburg assault was repelled, and for the first half of 1915, Serbia enjoyed a respite from the attack of external enemies. An epidemic of typhus fever wrought terrible havoc, however, upon an exhausted, ill-fed, and in places congested popula-

¹ Where, in 1410, the Poles had defeated the Teutonic Knights.

tion. From this danger Serbia was rescued by the heroism of English doctors and English nurses. Had the methods of diplomacy been as energetic and effective as those of the Medical Service, Serbia might still have escaped the terrible fate in store for her. Judged by results, nothing could have been more inept than the efforts of English and allied diplomacy in the Balkans throughout the year 1915.

To resume and recapitulate: by the end of 1914 the position may be summarised thus: The Germans instead of finding themselves comfortably in Paris, dictating humiliating terms to a defeated France, were entrenched on the Aisne. Instead of shelling Dover and Folkestone from the Channel ports, they were still pinned behind Ypres. Instead of invading Russia, Prussia had herself suffered invasion, and her help was sorely needed to save her Austrian ally from annihilation at the hands of Russia. Above all, not a single German merchantman remained at sea.

The
Western
Front in
1915

Second
Battle of
Ypres

The Western front witnessed during 1915 few incidents of which a narrative so brief as the present can take account. During the whole year the Allied and German hosts were confronting each other in long lines of entrenchments, stretching almost from the Channel to the frontier of Switzerland. A great battle raged in the spring from 22nd April to 11th May round the devoted city of Ypres. In the result Ypres was held. In the autumn there were terrific battles between the British and the Germans at Loos, and between the French and Germans in Champagne. The losses on both sides were enormous, but the military results were not commensurate with the shedding of blood. The Germans on the Western front were undoubtedly weakened by the tremendous effort directed against Russia on the Eastern front, as a result of which Warsaw was captured on 4th August, Kovno (17th), Brest-Litovsk (25th August), Grodno (2nd September), and Vilna (18th).

At the end of the second year of war, Germany unquestionably found herself in a strong position. By a series of shattering blows the *morale*, even more than the

military strength, of Russia had been gravely impaired ; two spirited enterprises initiated by England, the one on the Gallipoli peninsula, the other in Mesopotamia, had been frustrated by the Turks ; true, the Turks had suffered defeat at the hands of Russia in the Caucasus, but the Russian effort had not availed to save their English allies, and the Caucasus campaign had little effect on the ultimate issue of the war. England still held command of the surface of the sea, and in the more distant theatres of war the Dominion forces were clearing the Germans out of every colony they had ever acquired ; but, nearer home, the submarines were doing their deadly work, and on the Western front the Allies, despite the weakening of the German forces opposed to them, had definitely failed to break through.

The year 1916 was remarkable on the Western front for 1916 the terrific battle waged between the Germans and the French round the great fortress of Verdun. Opening in February, the battle lasted until July ; by that time the German attack was definitely repulsed, and at the very end of the year (15th December) French arms won a brilliant victory over the Germans on that historic field. Meanwhile in July the British, aided by the French, had taken the offensive on the Somme. The Somme battle raged from July until November, and in respect of men engaged was up to that date the greatest battle in recorded history. But the end of the fighting of 1916 seemed to have resulted on the Western front in stalemate. It is not, therefore, surprising that Germany should (12th December) have made certain "Peace Proposals," or that Mr. Wilson, the President of the United States, should have been moved to formulate a Peace Note (20th December).

We must now turn, however, from the West to follow the course of events in the more distant theatres of the World-War.

First we turn to the Near East. The war in that theatre presents many problems and suggests many questions. Whether by a timely display of force the Turk could have been kept true to his ancient connection with Turkey and the War

Great Britain and France ; whether by more sagacious diplomacy the hostility of Bulgaria could have been averted, and the co-operation of Greece secured ; whether by the military intervention of the Entente Powers the cruel blow could have been warded off from Serbia and Montenegro ; whether the Dardanelles expedition was faulty only in execution or unsound in conception ; whether Roumania came in too tardily or moved too soon, and in a wrong direction : these are questions of high significance, but the time for a final answer has not yet come.

Meanwhile, it must suffice to summarise events.

On the outbreak of the European War (August, 1914) the Porte declared its neutrality—a course which was followed, in October, by Greece, Roumania, and Bulgaria. The Allies gave an assurance to the Sultan that, if he maintained neutrality, the independence and integrity of his Empire would be respected during the war, and provided for at the peace settlement. That many of the most responsible statesmen of the Porte sincerely desired the maintenance of neutrality cannot be doubted ; but the forces working in the contrary direction were too powerful. The traditional enmity against Russia ; the chance of recovering Egypt and Cyprus from Great Britain ; the astute policy which for a quarter of a century the Kaiser had pursued at Constantinople ; the German training imparted to the Turkish Army ; above all, the powerful personality of Enver Bey, who, early in 1914, had been appointed Minister of War—all these things impelled the Porte to embrace the cause of the Central Empires. Nor was it long before Turkey gave unmistakable indications of her real proclivities. In the first week of the war the German cruisers, the *Goeben* and the *Breslau*, having eluded the pursuit of the allied fleet in the Mediterranean, reached the Bosphorus, were purchased by the Porte, and commissioned in the Turkish Navy. Great Britain and Russia refused to recognise the transfer as valid, but the Porte took no notice of the protest. Meanwhile, Germany poured money, munitions, and men into Turkey ; German officers were placed in command of

the forts of the Dardanelles; a German General, Liman Pasha, was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Turkish Army, and on 28th October the Turkish Fleet bombarded Odessa and other unfortified ports belonging to Russia on the Black Sea. To the protest made by the ambassadors of the allied Powers the Porte did not reply, and on 1st November the ambassadors demanded their passports and quitted Constantinople. A few days later the Dardanelles forts were bombarded by English and French ships, Akaba in the Red Sea was bombarded by H.M.S. *Minerva*, and on 5th November Cyprus was formally annexed by Great Britain. For the first time Great Britain and the Ottoman Empire were really at war.

The German anticipation was that by means of the Turkish alliance she would be able to exploit Mesopotamia, to penetrate Persia commercially and politically, to deliver a powerful attack upon the British position in Egypt, and to threaten the hegemony of Great Britain in India. For all these ambitious schemes Constantinople was an indispensable base.¹

The Pan-German Plan

Nothing, therefore, would have done so much to frustrate German diplomacy in south-eastern Europe as a successful blow at Constantinople. In February, 1915, an English fleet, assisted by a French squadron, bombarded the forts of the Dardanelles, and high hopes were entertained in the allied countries that the passage of the Straits would be quickly forced. But the hopes aroused by the initiation of the enterprise were not destined to fulfilment. It soon became evident that the Navy alone could not achieve the task entrusted to it. Towards the end of April a large force of troops was landed on the Gallipoli Peninsula; but the end of May came, and there was nothing to show for the loss of nearly 40,000 men. On 6th August a second army, consisting largely of Australians, New Zealanders, and English Territorials, was thrown on to the Peninsula. The troops displayed superb courage, but the conditions were impossible; Sir Ian Hamilton, who had

The Dardanelles Expedition

¹ Cf. a powerful speech by Earl Curzon of Kedleston in the House of Lords, 20th February, 1917.

commanded, was succeeded by Sir C. C. Munro, to whom was assigned the difficult and ungrateful task of evacuating an untenable position. To the amazement and admiration of the world the feat, deemed almost impossible, was accomplished before the end of December, without the loss of a single man. How far the expedition to the Dardanelles may have averted dangers in other directions it is impossible to say; but, as regards the accomplishment of its immediate aims, the enterprise was a ghastly though a gallant failure.

The failure was apparent long before it was proclaimed by the abandonment of the attempt. Nor was that failure slow to react upon the situation in the Balkans.

Greece

On the outbreak of the European War Greece proclaimed its neutrality, though the Premier, M. Venizelos, at the same time declared that Greece had treaty obligations in regard to Serbia, and that she intended to fulfil them. But in Greece, as elsewhere in the Near East, opinions if not sympathies were sharply divided. The Greek kingdom owed its existence to the Powers comprising the Triple Entente; the dynasty owed its crown to their nomination; to them the people were tied by every bond of historical gratitude. No one realised this more clearly than M. Venizelos, and no one could have shown himself more determined to repay the debt with compound interest. Moreover, M. Venizelos believed that the dictates of policy were identical with those of gratitude. The creator of the Balkan League had not abandoned, despite the perfidious conduct of one of his partners, the hope of realizing the dream which had inspired his policy in 1912. The one solution of a secular problem at once feasible in itself and compatible with the claims of nationality was and is a Balkan Federation. A German hegemony in the Balkans, an Ottoman Empire dependent upon Berlin, would dissipate that dream for ever. To Greece, as to the other Balkan States, it was essential that Germany should not be permitted to establish herself permanently on the Bosphorus. If that disaster was to be averted mutual concessions would have to be made, and Venizelos was

statesman enough to make them. Early in 1915 he tried to persuade his sovereign to offer Kavalla and a slice of "Greek" Macedonia to Bulgaria. He was anxious also to co-operate in the attack upon the Dardanelles with allies who had offered to Greece a large territorial concession in the Smyrna district. To neither suggestion would King Constantine and his Hohenzollern consort listen. Venizelos consequently resigned.

If Venizelos desired harmony among the Balkan States, so also, and not less ardently, did the Allies. Macedonia still remained the crux of the situation. Had his advice been followed Bulgaria would have gained a better outlet to the Aegean than that afforded by Dedeagatch. Serbia possessed no statesman of the calibre of Venizelos. But the situation of Serbia was in the last degree hazardous, and under the pressure of grim necessity Serbia might have been expected to listen to the voice of prudence.

Not, however, until August, 1915, was Serbia induced to offer such concessions to Bulgaria in Macedonia as might possibly have sufficed, in May, to keep Bulgaria out of the clutches of the Central Empires. In Bulgaria, as elsewhere, opinion was sharply divided. Both groups of Great Powers had their adherents at Sofia. Had the Russian advance been maintained in 1915; had the Dardanelles been forced; had pressure been put by the Entente upon Serbia and Greece to make reasonable concessions in Macedonia, Bulgaria might not have yielded to the seductions of German gold and to the wiles of German diplomacy. But why should a German king of Bulgaria have thrown in his lot with Powers who were apparently heading for military disaster; whose diplomacy was as inept as their arms were feeble? What more natural than that when the German avalanche descended upon Serbia in the autumn of 1915 Bulgaria should have co-operated in the discomfiture of a detested rival?

Yet the Entente built their plans upon the hope, if not the expectation, that Bulgaria might possibly be induced to enter the war on the side of the Allies against Turkey.¹

¹ Cf. speech of Sir Edward Grey in House of Commons, 14th October, 1915.

Serbia was anxious to attack Bulgaria in September, while her mobilisation was still incomplete. It is generally believed that the Allies intervened to restrain the Serbians, hoping against hope that a concordat between the Balkan States might still be arrived at. To that hope Serbia was sacrificed.¹

The Chastisement of Serbia

A great Austro-German army, under the command of Field-Marshal von Mackensen, concentrated upon the Serbian frontier in September, and on the 7th of October it crossed the Danube. Two days later Belgrade surrendered, and for the next few weeks von Mackensen, descending upon the devoted country in overwhelming strength, drove the Serbians before him, until the whole country was in the occupation of the Austro-German forces. The Bulgarians captured Nish on 5th November and effected a junction with the army under von Mackensen; Serbia was annihilated; a remnant of the Serbian Army took refuge in the mountains of Montenegro and Albania, while numbers of deported civilians sought the hospitality of the Allies. On 28th November Germany officially declared the Balkan campaign to be at an end. For the time being Serbia had ceased to exist as a Balkan State.

Balkan Policy of the Entente Powers

What had the Allies done to succour her? Russia was not, at the moment, in a position to afford any effective assistance, but on 4th October she dispatched an ultimatum to Bulgaria, and a few days later declared war upon her. On 5th October the advance guard of an Anglo-French force, under General Sarraill and Sir Bryan Mahon, began to disembark at Salonika. The force was miserably inadequate in numbers and equipment, and it came too late. Its arrival precipitated a crisis in Greece. As a result of an appeal to the country in June, King Constantine had been reluctantly compelled to recall Venizelos to power in September. Venizelos was as determined as ever to respect the obligations of Greece towards Serbia, and to throw the weight of Greece into the scale of the Allies. But despite

King Constantine and M. Venizelos

¹ Cf. the *Times*, 22nd November, 1915; but for a contrary view cf. Dr. E. J. Dillon—no apologist for English diplomacy—*ap. Fortnightly Review*, January, 1916.

his parliamentary majority he was no longer master of the situation. The failure of the Dardanelles expedition, the retreat of Russia, the impending intervention of Bulgaria on the Austro-German side, the exhortations and warnings which followed in rapid succession from Berlin, above all, the knowledge that von Mackensen was preparing to annihilate Serbia, had stiffened the back of King Constantine. Technically the landing of an Anglo-French force at Salonika looked like a violation of Greek neutrality, and Venizelos was compelled by his master to enter a formal protest against it. But the protest was followed by an announcement that Greece would respect her treaty with Serbia, and would march to her assistance if she were attacked by Bulgaria. That announcement cost Venizelos his place. He was promptly dismissed by King Constantine, who, flouting the terms of the Constitution, effected what was virtually a monarchical *coup d'état*.

The King's violation of the Hellenic Constitution was the opportunity of the protecting Powers. They failed to seize it, and King Constantine remained master of the situation. From an attitude of neutrality professedly "benevolent" he passed rapidly to one of hostility almost openly avowed. That hostility deepened as the year 1916 advanced. On 25th May, in accordance with the terms of an agreement secretly concluded between Greece, Germany, and Bulgaria, King Constantine handed over to the Bulgarians Fort Rupel, an important position which commanded the flank of the French Army in Salonika. A few weeks later a whole division of the Greek Army was instructed to surrender to the Germans and Bulgarians at Kavalla. Kavalla itself was occupied by King Constantine's friends, who carried off the Greek division, with all its equipment, to Germany. Nearly the whole of Greek Macedonia was now in the hands of Germany and her allies, and the Greek patriots, led by Venizelos, were reduced to despair. In September a Greek Committee of National Defence was set up at Salonika, and in October Venizelos himself arrived there.

By this time the Balkan situation had been further complicated by the military intervention of Roumania on

Roumanian
Interven-
tion

the side of the Allies. In Roumania, as elsewhere, opinion was, on the outbreak of the war, sharply divided. The sympathies of King Carol were, not unnaturally, with his Hohenzollern kinsmen, and, had he not been, in the strict sense of the term, a constitutional sovereign, his country would have been committed to an Austro-German alliance. Nor was the choice of Roumania quite obviously dictated by her interests. If the coveted districts of Transylvania and the Bukovina were in the hands of the Habsburgs, Russia still kept her hold on Bessarabia. A "Greater Roumania," corresponding in area to the ethnographical distribution of population, would involve the acquisition of all three provinces. Could Roumania hope, either by diplomacy or by war, to achieve the complete reunion of the Roumanian people?

In October, 1914, the two strongest pro-German forces in Roumania were removed, almost simultaneously, by death: King Carol himself, and his old friend and confidant Demetrius Sturdza. Roumania had already declared her neutrality, and that neutrality was, despite the natural affinities of the Roumanians towards France and Italy, scrupulously observed until August, 1916. But on the 27th of that month Roumania declared war, flung a large force into Transylvania, and in a few weeks a considerable part of Transylvania had passed into Roumanian hands. But the success, achieved in defiance of sound strategy, and also, it is said, in disregard of warnings addressed to Roumania by her allies, was of brief duration. In September Mackensen invaded the Dobrudja from the south, entered Silistria on 10th September, and, though checked for a while on the Rasova-Tuzla line, renewed his advance in October and captured Constanza on the twenty-second.

Meanwhile, a German army, under General von Falkenhayn, advanced from the west, and on 26th September inflicted a severe defeat upon the Roumanians at the Rothen Thurm Pass. The Roumanians, though they fought desperately, were steadily pressed back; at the end of November von Mackensen joined hands with Falkenhayn,

and on 6th December the German armies occupied Bucharest.

Thus another Balkan State was crushed. Throughout the year 1917 there was little change in the situation. The Central Empires remained in occupation of Roumanian territory up to the line of the Sereth, including, therefore, the Dobrudja and Wallachia, and from this occupied territory Austria-Hungary obtained much-needed supplies of grain. Meanwhile, the Roumanian Government remained established in Jassy, and from its ancient capital the affairs of Moldavia were administered. Into Moldavia the Central Powers made no attempt to penetrate, being content to await events. Nor was it long before their patience was rewarded.

The military collapse of Russia in 1917 sealed the fate of Roumania. From no other ally could succour reach her. Perforce, therefore, Roumania was compelled to concur in the suspension of hostilities to which the Russian Bolsheviks and the Central Empires agreed in December, 1917.¹ Roumania, nevertheless, announced that though she agreed to suspend hostilities she would not enter into peace negotiations. But the logic of events proved irresistible; on 9th February, 1918, Germany concluded peace with the Ukraine, and on 5th March the preliminaries of a peace were arranged with Roumania. The definitive Treaty of Peace was signed at Bucharest on 7th May. The terms of that treaty were humiliating and disastrous to Roumania. The Dobrudja, except a corner of the Danube delta, was surrendered to Bulgaria, and the whole of the economic resources of Roumania, in particular her grain and oil, were to be at the disposal of the conquerors, who were further to enjoy the right of military transport through Moldavia and Bessarabia to Odessa. Germany acquired, by means of this corridor, command of two of the most important ports in the Black Sea, giving her alternative routes to the Middle East. Roumania was prostrate at the feet of Germany and her allies.

Meanwhile, the German victories in the north-east of

Treaty of
Bucharest,
7th May,
1918

¹ Cf. *infra*, p. 288.

The
Allies and
King Con-
stantine

the peninsula naturally reacted upon the situation in the south-west. Towards the end of November, 1916, a Serbian army, re-formed and re-equipped, had the gratification of turning the Bulgarians out of Monastir, and the Allies still held a corner of Greek Macedonia. For the rest, Germany* and her allies were in undisputed command of the Balkan peninsula from Belgrade to Constantinople, from Bucharest to the valley of the Vardar. Even the hold of the Allies on Salonika was rendered precarious by the increasing hostility of Constantine and his friends at Athens. The patience with which his vagaries were treated by the allied governments tended to evoke contempt rather than gratitude in Athens. 'Whatever the nature of the obstacles which impeded the dealings of the Allies with the Hellenic Government, the results were disastrous. We discouraged our friends and put heart into our enemies. King Constantine, obviously playing for time, was allowed to gain it. The attitude of his partisans in Athens towards the Allies grew daily more insolent, until it culminated (1st-2nd December, 1916) in a dastardly attack upon a small Franco-British force which Admiral de Fournet landed at the Piræus. To the landing there may have been no alternative, but its results, as Venizelos pointed out, were singularly unfortunate. Momentarily there was some improvement in the relations between Constantine and the "protecting" Powers. An apology for the insult to the French and British flags was tendered and accepted, and the King withdrew his army from Thessaly, where it plainly menaced the security of the allied forces at Salonika. Essentially, however, the situation was an impossible one. The authority of Venizelos, firmly established at Salonika, was gradually extended in the spring of 1917 to Corfu and the other islands; while in Athens the King's position was apparently unassailable. The Allies for a while looked on helplessly, but on 1st May an Hellenic Congress in Paris called upon them to facilitate the summoning of a constituent assembly in Athens and to recognise a republic which it was believed the Assembly would proclaim. Almost simultaneously the Venizelists at Salonika demanded

the immediate deposition of King Constantine. At last the Allies resolved to take action. On 11th June King Constantine was required to abdicate and to hand over the government to his second son, Alexander; Constantine and his Prussian Queen, with the Crown Prince, were deported to Switzerland; Venizelos returned to Athens, and on 30th June, 1917, the Hellenic kingdom broke off its relations with the Central Empires and at last took its place in the Grand Alliance.

The adhesion of Greece greatly improved the military situation in Macedonia. The allied army at Salonika was reinforced by the Greeks, who gained some important ground on the Vardar. Matters still tarried, however, on the Salonika front until in June, 1918, the command was taken over by General Franchet d'Espérey. By September his preparations were complete; after a week's brilliant fighting the Bulgarian Army was routed, and, after a harrying retreat in which the Serbs played a foremost part, Bulgaria sued for peace. On 30th September, barely a fortnight after the commencement of the advance, Bulgaria made unconditional surrender and handed over her troops, her railways, her stores, and her government into the hands of the Allies. On 12th October the Serbians occupied their old capital, Nish, and so cut the Berlin-Constantinople railway at one of its most vital points. The Allies were on the point of advancing on Constantinople itself when the Sultan sued for peace and an armistice was concluded (October 30th).

From the Near East we may pass to the Middle East. Early in the war (21st November, 1914) Basra, at the head of the Persian Gulf, was occupied by the 6th Indian Division. From Basra, the force advanced up the Tigris; Kurna, at a confluence of the two rivers, was occupied in December, and in April, 1915, a heavy defeat was inflicted on the Turks at Shaiba. Reinforced from India, the troops again advanced, captured Amara, and from Amara advanced on Kut, which was taken on 28th September, 1915. Against his own better judgment, General Townshend, who was in command, continued his

march towards Baghdad, but after a brilliant attack at Ctesiphon (22nd-25th November) was compelled by lack of ammunition to withdraw with a loss of nearly half his force to Kut. There he was besieged for five months (3rd December, 1915, to 29th April, 1916). Three efforts were made to relieve Townshend and his gallant garrison, but in vain, and, on 29th April, 1916, Kut was surrendered, and some 8,000 survivors, of whom 6,000 were Indian troops, fell into the hands of the Turks. The British prisoners were shamefully maltreated, and more than half of them died in captivity.

Sir Stanley
Maude

The British Government took prompt measures to retrieve this grave disaster. Sir Stanley Maude was appointed to the command in Mesopotamia; the force was reorganised and re-equipped, and after a skilful advance Kut was recovered on 24th February, 1917. Advancing rapidly from Kut, Maude inflicted a crushing defeat upon the Turks, and on 11th March entered Baghdad. On 18th April the Turks suffered a further defeat, and the British Army took possession of the Baghdad Railway as far as Samarra, nearly seventy miles north of Baghdad. In November Maude died of cholera, but the campaign was successfully carried on by Sir William Marshall, who finally reached Mosul on 3rd November, 1918. By that time, however, the Turk had been utterly defeated and had sued for an armistice.

Egypt and
the Canal

Not only in the Balkans and in Mesopotamia were British arms victorious over the Turk. From the opening of the war it was realised that of all the vital points in our "far-flung battle line" the most vital, perhaps, was the Suez Canal. After the Porte had definitely thrown in its lot with the Central Empires it was deemed wise to depose the Khedive of Egypt, Abbas II. (November, 1914). Turkish sovereignty was denounced; Egypt was declared a British Protectorate; and the Sultanate was conferred (18th December, 1914) on Hussein Kamel. At the same time Cyprus was formally annexed to the British Crown. In February, 1915, the Turks made the first of several attacks upon the Suez Canal, but they were all repulsed

with heavy loss. Stirred up by German intrigue, the Senussi gave us some trouble in Western Egypt, though they were heavily punished in several actions at the end of 1915 and the beginning of 1916.

In March, 1916, another phase of the war opened : Sir Archibald Murray began his advance on the eastern side of the Canal. A patient march through the desert brought him into Palestine at the beginning of 1917, but in April he was heavily repulsed by the Turks at Gaza. In the summer, Murray was relieved of his command and succeeded by Sir Edmund Allenby, who, reinforced from India and Salonika, inflicted a tremendous defeat upon the Turks at Beersheba, which he captured on 31st October. He stormed Gaza (7th November), Askalon a few days later, Jaffa surrendered to him on 16th November, and on 9th December a brilliant campaign was crowned by the capture of Jerusalem. Early in 1918 General Allenby established communications with the Arabs and the King of the Hedjaz, whose allegiance had been secured to us by Colonel Lawrence, and on 21st February captured Jericho. Owing to the success of the German offensive in France he was then compelled to dispatch his best troops to the Western front, and it was not until September that he was ready to make his final assault upon the enemy opposed to him. On the 19th, however, he fell upon the Turks and broke them, and on the following day Nazareth was occupied. Having effected his junction with the Arabs, Allenby then advanced on Damascus, which surrendered on 1st October. At Damascus 60,000 prisoners and 300 guns were taken. Advancing from Damascus, Beirut was taken on 8th October, and in rapid succession Sidon, Tripoli, Homs, and Aleppo (26th October). The annihilation of the Turkish forces was now complete, and Palestine and Syria, like Mesopotamia, passed into English keeping.

It is time to retrace our steps and return to Europe. We have already followed the course of the war on the Western front down to the close of 1916. Certain political events must, however, be briefly noticed. Early in

Palestine,
1916-18

The Irish
Rebellion,
1916

December of that year Mr. Asquith resigned the Premiership in England and was replaced by Mr. Lloyd George. Mr. Asquith's position had been shaken by the rebellion which at Easter, 1916, had broken out in Ireland. At the outbreak of war, Irish feeling was keenly aroused on behalf of the Belgian Roman Catholics, and it seemed not impossible that the Catholic South might fling itself into the struggle against Germany with not less ardour than the Protestant North. During 1915 that hope faded. The disloyal section of the Irish Catholics gained the ascendant, entered into treasonable correspondence with Germany, and, relying upon the promised assistance of England's enemies, raised the standard of rebellion in April, 1916. Unhappily, the episode was not without precedent. England's difficulty had always been Ireland's opportunity. But the rebellion of 1916 came as a shock to those in England who had complacently imagined that the passing of a Home Rule Bill for Ireland would suffice to heal the secular discord between the two countries. The rebellion was of course crushed, but its eruption added to the anxieties of the British Government. It could not paralyse their activities.

Compul-
sory Ser-
vice in
England,
May, 1916

In May, 1916, Great Britain had tardily adopted compulsory service for all able-bodied men between the ages of 18 and 41. Hardly was the new Act on the Statute book when the great soldier who had reorganised the whole military system of his country and had, in the language of the street, given his name to the new army, met his doom amid the storms and shadows of the North Sea. On June 5, 1916, the *Hampshire*, bound for Archangel, went down with Lord Kitchener and every soul on board. Deep called to deep, but not one echo ever reached the shore. In 1918, the age-limit for conscripts was raised to 51. The new recruits were badly needed. In 1917 a strenuous and sustained effort was made to bring the war on the Western front to an end. The effort was not unattended by brilliant military successes. On 9th April a terrific attack, launched at Arras, resulted in the capture of Vimy Ridge, and two months later a second victory not less brilliant was

The
Campaign
of 1917

won at Messines Ridge. A further advance was timed to begin at the end of July. On the day it began (31st July) the weather broke, and the operation was conducted under impossible conditions. Some ground was gained, but at an enormous sacrifice of life, and the objective—to clear the Flanders coast of Germans—was not attained.

Events remote from the Western front were powerfully reacting upon the war in France and Flanders. Of these the most direct were the outbreak of revolution in Russia (12th March); the intervention of the United States in the World-War (6th April); and the defeat of the Italians at Caporetto (24th October). To these events we must now turn: dealing first with the last.

In August, 1914, Italy, though a member of the Triple Alliance, declined to regard the Austro-German attack upon their neighbours as a *casus fœderis*, and declared her neutrality. In February, 1915, she informed Austria that any further action in the Balkans on the part of Austria-Hungary would be regarded by Italy as an unfriendly act. Germany was very anxious to avoid a rupture with Italy, and offered her large concessions—at the expense of Austria; but early in May Italy denounced the Triple Alliance and on 23rd May declared war on Austria-Hungary.

Italy was determined to seize the opportunity for completing the work of the *Risorgimento*, for rectifying her frontier on the side of the Trentino, for securing her naval ascendancy in the Adriatic, and for “redeeming” the islands of the Dalmatian archipelago and those districts on the eastern littoral of the Adriatic which had for centuries formed part of the Republic of Venice. Her quarrel, therefore, was not primarily with the Hohenzollern, but with the Habsburgs, who since 1797 had been in almost continuous occupation of these portions of the Venetian inheritance. But the pretensions of Italy, however well justified politically and historically, introduced a considerable complication into the diplomatic situation. In particular they aroused grave perturbation among the Southern Slavs, and especially in Serbia. In the eastern part of the Istrian Peninsula, and along the whole coast

from Fiume to Albania, the population is predominantly Slav. The dream of a Greater Serbia would be frustrated were Italy to acquire the Dalmatian coast and islands. Rather than see Italy established there, the Serbs would prefer to leave Austria-Hungary in occupation. The situation was an embarrassing one for the Triple Entente. Southern Slav opinion was strongly roused, and became still more acute when the rumour spread, in May, 1915, that in order to secure the adhesion of Italy the Powers of the Entente had conceded her claims to northern Dalmatia and to several of the islands of the archipelago. Still, Italy adhered to the alliance of which Serbia formed an integral part.¹

For Italy, as for other belligerents, sunshine alternated with shadow during the next three years. On the whole she somewhat improved her position during the campaign of 1916; she tasted triumph in the summer of 1917, but in the autumn of that year it was her fate to learn the bitterness of defeat. Neither politically nor in a military sense could Italy present a united front to the enemy. Not only had she to count on the hardly disguised hostility of the Papacy, but there was a considerable pro-German party among the upper classes, and a very strong section of "internationals" among the socialists of the cities. Italy went into the war, as we have seen, with definite territorial aims: the Trentino, Trieste, Istria, and the Dalmatian coast and archipelago. Her enemy, therefore, was not Germany but Austria. Unaided by Germany, Austria would have been hardly worthy of her steel, but in August, 1916, Italy declared war upon Germany, Germany reorganised the Austrian armies, and, in October, 1917, the Austro-German attack was delivered.

The Defeat
of Capor-
etto, Octo-
ber, 1917

Poltroonery or treachery left open a gap in the Italian line; the second Italian army was compelled to fall back; the retreat became a rout; the rout of the second army involved the retreat of the third, and within three weeks the enemy had captured 2,300 guns and taken nearly 200,000 prisoners. The fourth army then made a stand

¹ The rumour, as we now know, was substantially accurate. Cf. *infra*, p. 309.

on the line of the Piave, and on the holding of that line the safety of Venice, Verona, and Vicenza depended. The moment was intensely critical, but England and France realised the danger to the common cause, and large reinforcements were promptly dispatched from the Western front. The arrival of French and English troops, commanded by General Fayolle, Sir Herbert Plumer, and Lord Cavan, stiffened the Italian defence, and when the Austrians again attacked, somewhat tardily, in June, 1918, they were gallantly repulsed. Lord Cavan in command of a mixed British and Italian force, and General Diaz in command of a re-equipped Italian army, took the offensive in their turn in October, and, in a brief but brilliant campaign, chased the Austrians out of Italy. On 4th November, Austria begged for an armistice.

Italian
Recovery,
1918

The Anglo-French assistance so spontaneously given to Italy had a fine moral as well as material effect. Meanwhile a terrible blow had fallen upon the Grand Alliance by reason of the defection of Russia. In the first months of the war, Russia had rendered invaluable service to the cause of the Allies, but her troops were badly equipped; she lacked guns and munitions; above all, her effort in the field was paralysed if not by actual treachery, at least by gross mal-administration. Under the Grand Duke Nicholas, Russia won a succession of victories against the Turks in the Caucasus in 1916, and the capture of Erzerum (16th February, 1916), of Trebizond (7th April), and Erzincan (25th July) raised the hope that she might render effective assistance to our own hard-pressed forces in Mesopotamia. Early in 1917, however, the domestic situation became very threatening, and on 13th March the long-delayed Revolution actually broke out. That resounding event cannot be adequately treated in a brief summary of the war, nor indeed has the time come for a critical analysis; it must suffice to say that the Czar Nicholas was compelled to abdicate on 15th March, and after being held captive for some time was with his wife and children foully murdered by his captors. With the overthrow of Czardom, the whole structure of Russian autocracy fell

The
Russian
Revolution,
March,
1917

with a crash to the ground ; a Republic was proclaimed, and a real effort was made by the moderate Progressives to re-organise the Republic at home and to wage war at the front. The effort was wholly in vain. Power was quickly usurped by the extreme Communist party led by a German agent and generously supported by German gold ; the Russian sailors mutinied and murdered their officers ; the Russian soldiers flung down their arms and raced home with all speed to secure the loot which the social revolution promised.

On the military results of the Russian revolution it is superfluous to dwell. Germany was able to withdraw great armies from the East, and fling them into the line against the Allies on the West ; Austria was, as we have seen, free to concentrate on the Italian front. It ought, however, to be said that, with or without the Revolution, similar results might have ensued, for there is reason to suspect that the Autocracy was already contemplating a separate and therefore a shameful peace. Such a peace was actually concluded by the Bolshevik Government at Brest-Litovsk in February, 1918. The terms imposed by Germany upon Lenin and Trotsky possess only a passing interest, and need not detain us. Russia was definitely out of the war, and France and England were left to encounter the full force of the German hurricane.

Treaty of
Brest-
Litovsk,
9th Febru-
ary, 1918

Interven-
tion of the
U.S.A.,
April, 1917

Not however alone. Almost at the moment that Russia failed us, a new ally, morally if not militarily worth a dozen Russias, came into the field against Germany. The attitude of the United States during the first two years of the war had been gravely disappointing not only to the Allies, but to vast numbers of their own citizens. President Wilson essayed to play a mediating part in the world-conflict. Not even the sinking of the *Lusitania* could drive him from the position he had assumed. But the more doggedly President Wilson persisted in the policy of neutrality, the more daring became the German attacks upon neutral shipping. At last, in February, 1917, Germany proclaimed "unrestricted submarine warfare": any ship trading with Great Britain was to be sunk at sight. This culminating insult was too much even for the patience

of the American President, and on 6th April, 1917, the United States declared war on Germany. "With the entrance of the United States into this war, a new chapter opened in world history." So spake Lord Bryce. "The entrance of the United States into the war was the greatest mental effort and spiritual realisation of truth which has occurred in the whole course of secular history." The words are Mr. Churchill's, and they anticipate the verdict of posterity. That America should so far abandon her traditional policy and fling all her weight, moral and material, into the World-War was, in truth, an event of solemn significance. The military effect of her intervention was not, however, felt until the closing months of the war, when it did much to turn the scale against Germany; the moral effect was felt from the moment when President Wilson made his famous speech to Congress on 2nd April. The American point of view is admirably expressed by an American historian in words reminiscent of Abraham Lincoln. "The world was too small to contain two fundamentally hostile principles of life . . . the world cannot permanently exist or longer live half-slave and half-free."¹ Others quoted, somewhat tardily it is true, Mazzini's famous aphorism, "Neutrality in a war of principles is mere passive existence, forgetfulness of all which makes a people sacred, the negation of the common law of nations, political atheism." The pity was that America had not heeded Mazzini two years earlier.

How badly American help was needed, the story of 1918 will tell. Between March and July the Germans on the Western front launched four terrific attacks. The first (21st March) opened near St. Quentin, and resulted in the defeat of the 5th British Army under Sir Hubert Gough. Six hundred thousand Germans attacked the weakest point in the Anglo-French line, and by the mere weight of numbers pierced it. Bapaume and Peronne, Albert, Montdidier, Noyon—all the expensive fruits of the sacrifices on the Somme were lost; but in front of Amiens the German advance was stayed. The crisis was

The
German
Offensive
in 1918

¹ Professor McLaughlin.

valiantly met. Foch was invested with supreme command of the allied forces ; all the available British reserves were hurried across the Channel ; troops were summoned from Palestine ; America was urged to expedite the dispatch of her forces. Thanks in large measure to the British Navy, the Americans soon began to pour across the Atlantic. Over 80,000 were sent off in March, nearly 120,000 in April, over 245,000 in May, nearly 280,000 in June, over 300,000 in July, over 285,000 in August, and 257,000 in September. In all, forty-two American divisions were landed in France. 51 per cent. of the troops were carried in British, 46 per cent. in American vessels ; and out of the vast total, only two hundred men were lost through the attacks of enemy submarines. Germany was astounded, having believed the feat to be impossible of accomplishment.

Meanwhile, on 9th April, Germany launched a second attack south of Ypres. The offensive lasted for three weeks, and was very costly both to the Germans and to the Allies. A third attack, opened on 26th May, brought the Germans once more on to the Marne, but at Château-Thierry their advance was stayed by Foch (11th June). The enemy attacked again on 15th July, and were permitted by the great French soldier to cross the Marne. But on the 18th, Foch let loose his reserves, and the Germans were driven back with immense slaughter.

The
Counter-
Offensive,
Aug.-
Nov.

On 8th August the British counter-offensive began. The fierce fighting between that date and 11th November may be regarded as one almost continuous battle, in the course of which the British armies captured nearly 200,000 prisoners and not much short of 3,000 guns ; 140,000 prisoners and nearly 2,000 guns fell to the French ; 43,000 prisoners and 1,400 guns to the Americans ; while the gallant remnant of the Belgian Army also claimed its modest share in the greatest battle of all recorded history. The details of the fighting must be sought elsewhere. The result may be chronicled in a sentence. The great military machine of Germany was at last broken into fragments ; the sailors mutinied at Kiel ; the German

Germany
"Cracks"

people turned in anger upon the dynasty (9th November) ; the Emperor abdicated, and, with the Crown Prince, fled for safety to Holland. Already the terms of an armistice had been agreed upon by the Allies at Versailles (4th November), and on 11th November they were accepted by the accredited envoys of Germany. The Great War was over.

To this result many convergent causes had contributed. The gallant resistance of Liège ; the superb courage and unyielding tenacity of the French armies and the French people ; the dogged endurance and the heroic sacrifices of Britons from many lands ; the tardy but effective help of America—all these were factors of immense significance ; but not one of them would have availed had Great Britain lost command of the sea ; how gravely that command was imperilled in the spring of 1917 may now be confessed.

The In-
fluence of
Sea Power

§ 3. THE WAR AT SEA

The influence of sea power upon the issue of such a war can be demonstrated only by a detailed analysis, impossible in this place. One dramatic result may, however, be summarily indicated. Before the end of 1917, Germany had ceased to own one foot of territory beyond the confines of Europe. Her Pacific possessions were swept up in the first months of the war. German Samoa was occupied by a force from New Zealand on 29th August ; the Bismarck Archipelago and German New Guinea fell to the Australians in September ; the Japanese took the Marshall Islands, and on 7th November Kiauchow surrendered to the combined attack of Japanese and British forces. In West Africa, Togoland was taken by British and French forces in August, 1914, and was divided between the captors. The Cameroons was attacked by French troops from the French Congo and by a small British force from Nigeria in the same month. Not, however, until February, 1916, was it actually taken. Meanwhile General Botha had been busy in the south of the continent. His first business was to suppress an

The
Capture of
German
Colonies

insurrection headed by De Wet in his own country. That task accomplished, he led an army into German South-West Africa and captured Windhuk, its capital, on 12th May, 1915. On 9th July, the Germans agreed to an unconditional surrender, and the most important of their African Colonies passed into the keeping of the Union of South Africa.

The
Campaign
in East
Africa

Arduous as was Botha's campaign in South-West Africa, it was neither so arduous nor so prolonged as the fight for the possession of German East Africa. Strategically the East was even more important than the South-West. Could Germany have held it with adequate naval as well as military forces, she would have threatened the British Empire's line of communications at a vital point. Our naval supremacy averted this danger; but Germany had made elaborate preparations to defend her own Colony, and if occasion offered to attack British East Africa. General von Lettow-Vorbeck commanded a force of 3,000 Europeans and 12,000 well-equipped and well-disciplined Askaris. A British attack on Tanga was repulsed in November, 1914, and not until General Smuts took over the command of the British forces at the beginning of 1916 was any effective progress made. Dar-es-salaam was captured in September, 1916, but another fourteen months of hard fighting were required before the Germans were cleared out of the Colony. They took refuge in Portuguese East Africa, and thence in the autumn of 1918 made their way into Northern Rhodesia; nor did they surrender until compelled to do so by the terms of the Armistice.

The
Victory
at Sea

To return to the war at sea. No attempt can be made to tell the heroic story in detail, even were details as yet available; nor indeed in outline: partly from lack of space, partly because in the history of naval warfare the World-War was unique. "Barring a few naval actions between surface vessels, such as the battles of Jutland and of the Falkland Islands, the naval war was for the most part a succession of contests between single vessels or small groups of vessels." So writes Admiral Sims of the United

States Navy.¹ The English victory at sea was won for the most part by silent but unrelaxing pressure in the North Sea, and by vigilant watch in the Channel, the Mediterranean and the Eastern Atlantic. On 28th August, three German cruisers had indeed been sunk in an engagement in the Bight of Heligoland, but on 22nd September we in turn lost three fine cruisers, *Aboukir*, *Hogue*, and *Cressy*, by submarine attack. Further afield, two British cruisers, *Good Hope* and *Monmouth*, were sunk (1st November) by the German Pacific Squadron, commanded by Von Spee, off the coast of Chile, when Admiral Cradock went down with fourteen hundred officers and men. But the German triumph was shortlived. A squadron was promptly sent out from England under the command of Sir Doveton Sturdee, who, making all possible speed, arrived off the Falkland Isles on 7th December. On the very next day Admiral Sturdee fell in with Von Spee, and *Gneisenau*, *Scharnhorst*, *Leipzig*, *Nürnberg* were sunk after a gallant fight; only the *Dresden* escaped. The British loss was only seven men killed. The *Dresden* was caught and sunk three months later. Much damage to British merchantmen in the Far East had meanwhile been done by the German cruiser *Emden*, which sailed from China early in August; but she was at last hunted down and sunk off Cocos Island (10th November) by the Australian cruiser *Sydney*.

The first months of 1915 were marked by the opening of a new phase in the war at sea. On 15th February a blockade of the British coasts was declared by Germany, and was to some extent enforced by her submarines. On 1st March, Great Britain retorted by Orders in Council which established a blockade of the German coast; but partly owing to a desire to avoid offence to neutrals, partly owing to the mischievous provisions of the "Declaration of London" (1908), the blockade did not become really effective until, in July, 1916, the Declaration of London was denounced. On 7th May, 1915, Germany committed one of the greatest crimes and perhaps the

The
Submarine
Menace

¹ *The Victory at Sea*, p. xii.

greatest blunder of which even she has ever been guilty. Her submarines torpedoed the great Atlantic liner the *Lusitania*, with the loss of over a thousand non-combatants, men, women, and children. Had Germany's ultimate fate ever been in doubt, that great crime had sealed it. From that moment the conscience of the American people was aroused, and it was only a matter of time how soon outraged moral feelings would translate themselves into effective military action.

The only action of the war in which great fleets were engaged was the battle of Jutland. Of the Grand Fleet under Admiral Sir John Jellicoe little had been heard during the first eighteen months of the war. During that time it was mostly at sea for the simple though almost incredible reason that there was no defended east coast harbour ready for its reception. After the opening of war the defences of Rosyth, in the Firth of Forth, abandoned half-finished in a fit of penury, and those of Scapa Flow in the Orkneys, were rapidly pushed forward; before the end of the war they had been rendered virtually impregnable against German attacks. But not only were defended harbours lacking; the Germans had the superiority in guns (save for our 15-inch guns), in mines, in Zeppelins (incalculably useful for naval scouting), in submarines, and in high explosive shells; nor were they markedly inferior in gunnery; but the Grand Fleet was virtually unassailed, and the German Fleet did not come out.

Battle of
Jutland

At last, however, it resolved to try conclusions, and on 31st May, 1916, the fleets of England and Germany met in the mighty conflict which to all time will be known as the battle of Jutland. One hundred and forty-five British ships and 110 German ships were engaged. Of Dreadnoughts we had 28 against 16; of cruisers of various types, 40 against 16; of destroyers, 77 against 72; but Germany had in addition 6 pre-Dreadnought battleships. As to the result of the battle, experts are still disputing; a layman can only note the fact that the German Fleet never showed itself again until it sailed, under custody, to shameful captivity. When ordered to put out in the

last days of the war, the crews mutinied. Yet one of the greatest of the allied experts holds that the German Admiralty were entirely right; that in harbour the German Fleet was doing work which it could not have done had it come out. To have come out would have meant almost certain annihilation for itself, and the setting free the flotilla of British destroyers for convoy work, and for the hunting down of German submarines. The German Fleet in harbour was effectually protecting German submarines; so long as it was in being the British destroyers urgently needed elsewhere must stay to screen the Grand Fleet. Yet there is a converse to the picture, as the same expert has pointed out: "In April, 1917, the allied navies while they controlled the surface of the water did not control the sub-surface . . . yet the determining fact . . . was that their control of the surface was to give us the control of the sub-surface also. Only the fact that the battleships kept the German Fleet at bay made it possible for the destroyers and other surface craft to do their beneficent (convoy) work."¹

Yet in the spring of 1917 the allied position was unspeakably grave. Literally, everything depended on British sailors and British ships. On 31st January the war at sea had entered upon a new phase: Germany carried out her threat of "unrestricted" submarine warfare—the sinking of unarmed merchantmen, hospital ships—anything afloat, without warning. For many months the new method proved terribly effective. By April, 1917, British ships had carried, in comparative safety, no less than 8,000,000 troops over sea; they had kept open the allied lines of communication in the Channel, in the Atlantic, in the Mediterranean (with the help of French, Italian, and a few Japanese ships), in the Indian Ocean, and the Pacific; they had brought to the Allies food and munitions. But they had accomplished this wonderful task at a high cost in lives and ships, and the strain upon their resources was intense.

In the early summer of 1917 the strain came perilously

¹ Sims: *op. cit.* p. 98.

near the breaking point. "A year ago it was supposed that England would be able to use the acres of the whole world, bidding with them against the German acres. To-day England sees herself in a situation unparalleled in her history. Her acres across sea disappear as a result of the blockade which submarines are daily making most effective around England." These words, uttered by Dr. Karl Helfferich, the German Secretary of the Interior, in February, 1917, were no idle boast. The real facts were carefully and properly concealed from the British and allied peoples, but Helfferich spoke truth. The total sinkings of British and allied ships amounted to 536,000 tons in February, to 603,000 tons in March, and in April to nearly 900,000 tons. The facts were known in Germany, where it was calculated that the end must come in July or at latest by 1st August. Unless the submarine peril could be countered, surrender, according to the British official view, could not be postponed beyond November.

The
United
States
Navy in
the War

Happily for the world, countered it was by the adoption of the "convoy" system and the advent in rapidly increasing numbers of American destroyers. The first American flotilla of six destroyers reached Queenstown on 4th May, 1917; by 5th July, thirty-four had arrived and were at the disposal of Admiral Sir Lewis Bayly, commanding at Queenstown. In all, the United States contributed to the naval forces of the Allies some 70 destroyers, 120 submarine chasers, 20 submarines and other small craft, besides mine-sweepers (13), mine-layers (9), and auxiliary craft of various descriptions. The aid they rendered to the allied cause came at a critical moment, and its value can hardly be overestimated.¹

In December, 1917, four American Dreadnoughts joined Admiral Beatty at Scapa Flow, and these, with a fifth which arrived later, formed the 6th battle squadron of the Grand Fleet, with which it acted during the remaining ten months of the war as an integral unit. The American ships "adopted the British systems of tactics and fire

¹ The part played by the American Navy is described most vividly and with characteristic modesty by Admiral Sims in *The Victory at Sea*.

control, and in every other way conformed to the established practices of the British." The fine spirit shown by Admiral Rodman and the officers and men under his command was cordially acknowledged in a farewell speech by Sir David Beatty, who spoke of the "wonderful co-operation and the loyalty you have given to me and to my admirals," and thanked them "again and again for the great part the 6th battle squadron played in bringing about the greatest naval victory in history."

Perhaps the most notable contribution of the American Navy to the ultimate victory at sea was the construction of the great North Sea barrage. The idea of such barrages to catch the German submarines before they could reach their hunting grounds off the Irish coasts had frequently been mooted, and had indeed been partially carried out. Not, however, until America came in was the appropriate mine invented, nor could it before then have been manufactured in sufficient quantities; but in 1917 the Americans flung themselves into the work with marvellous energy, and in the summer of 1918 they laid 57,571 of the newly invented mines between the Orkneys and Norway, while the British during the same period laid 13,546. The barrage, intended to cover the whole distance of 250 nautical miles, was not completed when the Armistice was signed. A similar though, of course, much smaller barrage was constructed by the Americans to close the channel between Scotland and Ireland. How far these barrages contributed to dispel the submarine menace can never be exactly known; but the mutiny in the German Navy (2nd November) is commonly accepted as an eloquent testimony to the terror they had inspired among the crews. The actual losses of the American Navy were few and insignificant, but before the close of the war they had in all about 380 ships in European waters with a personnel of over 80,000 officers and men.

Due appreciation of the American effort must not, however, be permitted to disguise the plain fact that the victory at sea was, in the main, the superb achievement of the British Navy and the British Mercantile

Marine. Words cannot express the debt which the Allies owed to the latter no less than to the former. The losses suffered by the Merchant Service were relatively the highest in the war. No less than 9,031,000 tons of British merchant shipping were sunk, and more than 44,500 men were killed, drowned, or severely wounded; of whom 14,661 were killed or drowned. The naval casualties amounted to 27,175, of whom no fewer than 22,258 were killed or drowned. The heroism of the men of the Mercantile Marine is attested by the fact that before the close of the war many men had been torpedoed five or six times, and yet there is no single instance on record of a man having refused to ship.

The
"Dover
Patrol"

When all did such magnificent service it is almost invidious to mention particular units or individual exploits; but a French admiral has not hesitated to describe the raid on Zeebrugge as "the finest feat of arms in all naval history of all times and all countries."¹ This was the work of the "Dover Patrol," and was accomplished by a flotilla—mostly very light craft—of 142 ships, under the command of Sir Roger Keyes. The night selected for this daring exploit was St. George's Day (23rd April, 1918); the object of it was to seal up the most important of the German submarine bases. In the case of Zeebrugge the object was largely attained; the attack on Ostende for the moment miscarried, but on 10th May it was renewed with considerable though not complete success. From that moment the submarine attacks rapidly decreased. Of the 200 German submarines known to have been sunk or captured in the course of the war, 90 per cent. fell to British seamen.

The defeat of the submarines was, however, only a fraction of the task they accomplished. To have kept inviolate (save for a few tip-and-run raids early in the war) the coasts of Great Britain; to have transported across thousands of miles of ocean millions of men from Canada, Australia, New Zealand, India, South Africa, the West Indies, and the United States; to have carried

¹ Quoted by Fletcher : *op. cit.* p. 125.

them to and from the half-dozen theatres of war ; to have safeguarded the commercial routes and to have kept Great Britain and her Allies supplied with food, with raw materials, and munitions ; to have kept open the long lines of communication in the Atlantic, the Pacific, the Indian Ocean, and the Mediterranean—such was the superb achievement, largely silent and half unperceived, of the British Naval and Merchant Services.

To Britain, therefore, it was fitting that the German Navy should be surrendered. The first batch of the surrendered submarines reached Harwich on 19th November ; two days later the High Seas Fleet was handed over at Rosyth. On that day (21st November) Admiral Beatty signalled to the Fleet : " The German flag will be hauled down at sunset to-day, and will not be hoisted again without permission." So ended the war at sea.

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CHAPTER XIV

THE SLATE AND THE WRITING (1918-1939)

Quand Dieu efface, c'est qu'il se prépare à écrire.—BOSSUET.

§ 1. THE PEACE SETTLEMENT


The
Peace
Treaties

THAT the World-War wiped the slate clean is certain ; in the destruction of the autocracies, in the fall of the Empires of Germany, Austria, Russia, and Turkey many people discovered the finger of Providence. Comparatively few profess themselves able to detect similar guidance in the fresh writing on the cleansed slate.

Yet the settlement of 1919 does not deserve all the hard things said of it. The Peace-makers went to Paris determined to avoid the errors ascribed by nineteenth-century critics to the Peace settlement at the close of the Napoleonic Wars. In particular they resolved to give full play to the principles of liberty and nationalism, to redraw the frontiers of the European States in deference to the dogma of Self-determination.

In a task where complete success was impossible they achieved more than is commonly recognised. No other Treaty has ever "emancipated" so many people living under an alien yoke. Whereas in 1914 there were 45,000,000 people in that unhappy position, the number was reduced in 1919 by nearly two-thirds—perhaps to some 16,000,000. Mr. Herbert Fisher reckoned that only three per cent. of the whole population of Europe was left under alien rule. So long as the Nation State survives, ethnic anomalies can never be entirely eliminated, no readjustment of frontiers can completely solve the problem of minorities.

CENTRAL & SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE 1921



But in 1919 every precaution was taken to protect minorities from oppression, and the League of Nations was charged to exercise special vigilance on their behalf.

The critics have, however, been more numerous or at least more vociferous than the apologists. Two may be selected as typical. The less informed—more violent—regards the conduct of the Peace-makers as “diabolical” and attributes the failure of the interwar years to the “ignorance and savagery of the victorious democracies in 1918.” Even the better informed is severe upon the “hypocrisy” of the Peace Conference and though admitting that the hypocrisy was not “conscious,” complains that the Treaty “was guilty of disguising an imperialistic peace under the surplice of Wilsonism” and that it suffered from the “curse of compromise” due largely to a vain attempt to square awkward facts with (mainly irrelevant) principles, emphasised by a pedant imperfectly acquainted with European affairs.

How far do the facts sustain these criticisms?

Take Germany. She was compelled to acknowledge Germany her responsibility for the war; to pay a large indemnity (ultimately fixed at £6600 millions) and was virtually disarmed, at sea, on land, and in the air. The right bank of the Rhine was to be permanently demilitarised, and the left bank to be occupied by the allies for fifteen—subsequently reduced to ten—years. France was compensated for the wanton destruction of her coal-mines by the cession to her of the Saar coalfields, while the whole of the Saar basin was to be left under the administration of the League of Nations for fifteen years. Germany had to surrender all her overseas possessions; to restore Alsace-Lorraine to France and Prussian Poland to Poland. But the victors gave signal proof of their adherence to the principle of “Self-determination” by allowing the inhabitants of East Prussia, Upper Silesia, and Northern Schleswig to decide for themselves by plebiscite their own ultimate adherence. The plebiscites gave East Prussia to Germany, divided Upper Silesia between Germany and Poland, and Northern Schleswig between

Germany and Denmark. Holstein and Southern Schleswig were restored to Germany.

Did these terms err on the side of severity? The "War Guilt lie" was indeed bitterly resented in Germany: whether it was worth while to affirm it is doubtful, its truth is not. The indemnity was denounced—not by Germans only—as "grotesque"; but Germany escaped payment by almost complete and probably fraudulent repudiation, and spent upon rearmament what France and the other allies failed to extort. Disarmament was, at first, fairly complete, but the only ultimate result was to destroy obsolete equipment and to give Hitler the opportunity—which he did not neglect—of rearming Germany with the most up-to-date weapons which modern science could invent. The plebiscite to decide the fate of the Saar basin was taken, as required by the Treaty, in 1935, and resulted in its restoration to Germany.

Poland

Poland presented an almost insoluble problem. The Allies were deeply pledged to its restoration, but they could fulfil the pledge only by depriving the criminals who had partitioned it of their spoils. About the shares respectively of Russia and Austria there was no difficulty. About Prussian Poland there was much—particularly about Dantzic. Dantzic was predominantly German, but without it Poland could not have access (as promised by President Wilson) to the sea. An awkward solution was found in making Dantzic a Free City and vesting its administration in the League of Nations. To secure access to Dantzic a strip of territory which came to be known as *the Corridor* was assigned to Poland. Unfortunately the "Corridor" divided East from West Russia, consequently Poland's acquisition of it was deeply resented by Germany, and combined with the loss of Dantzic to supply the occasion if not the cause of the renewal of the World-War in 1939. Poland's position during the inter-war period was never easy or assured. Intoxicated by a restoration effected not by their own efforts but by the solicitude of their friends—not unmingled (on the part of France) by the promptings of self-interest—the Poles

in 1920 invaded Russia, but having twice refused terms offered by the Bolsheviks were in turn invaded and driven back in confusion up to the walls of Warsaw itself. The Poles despairingly appealed to the Western Democracies, but the "Red Menace" was at work both in France and England; the "Hands-off-Russia" movement was in full swing, and all that the British and French Governments could do was to send to Warsaw (July 1920) a mixed civil and military mission headed by Lord D'Abernon and General Weygand who had served as Chief of Staff to Marshal Foch. Having with General Weygand's invaluable help driven back the Bolsheviks in headlong flight from the gates of Moscow, Marshal Pilsudski imposed upon them at Riga terms of peace by which Poland recovered its frontier of 1793.

Pilsudski did more than save Poland from the Bolsheviks. He saved Poland from herself. Although, like other dictators, Pilsudski had started his career as a revolutionary Socialist, he perceived that the ultra-democratic constitution adopted by the Poles in 1921 was wholly unsuited to a people inexperienced in the difficult art of parliamentary government. Consequently he resigned his position as head of the Executive in 1921, only to emerge again in 1925 and to put an end to the confusion by a *coup d'état* which virtually established him as dictator. Like Oliver Cromwell, Pilsudski was willing to retain Parliament merely as a legislative body, so long as it did not attempt to control the Executive. The Executive Pilsudski, like the great Puritan dictator, retained in his own hands, though his power (again like Cromwell's) really rested in the army. He retained power, and with it the affection of a grateful people, until his death in 1935.

Thus the Poles who had never ceased to be a nation, even in dispersion, were once again established as an independent State. But wholly without frontiers, exposed to attack from both east and west, their position was precarious, and neglecting to rearm themselves with modern weapons, they succumbed, despite an heroic resistance, to the simultaneous attack of their two powerful

neighbours. In 1939, Hitler having taken Memel (23rd March), demanded that Dantzic should be restored to Germany, and that the latter should have an "extra-territorial" road and rail connection between West and East Prussia—in other words that the Polish Corridor should be abolished. In return, Hitler made a "generous offer" to Poland, a guarantee of her existing frontiers, and free harbour and commercial rights in Dantzic itself.

This characteristically impudent suggestion Poland promptly rejected. She trusted, if not to her own right arm, to the friendship of Great Britain and France who plainly informed Hitler that if he attacked Poland they would defend her. A British Trade Mission was actually in Moscow and in June a Foreign Office expert had been sent to the Russian capital to expedite the Anglo-Russian negotiations. In vain. On the 23rd August Hitler and Stalin concluded their famous Pact; though as late as March Germany had invited Poland to join the Anti-Comintern Pact and to collaborate with her against Soviet Russia. Would Poland have been wiser to accept the invitation? She preferred to put her trust in the Western Democracies, neither of which could give her effective help. On 1st September the Germans invaded Poland, and once again that unhappy country has suffered all the agonies which a ruthless conqueror can impose upon her. Yet once more the Polish nationals, despite the submersion of the Polish State, have reaffirmed their national faith, and live in the certain hope of national resurrection.

To return, after a prolonged parenthesis, to the Peace Conference in Paris.

France

France rejoiced in the recovery of Alsace-Lorraine; it acquired the Saar coalfield; and it looked forward hopefully to getting (as was its due) the lion's share of reparations from Germany. But it was apprehensive about the security of its eastern frontier. Foch insisted that the bridge-heads of the Rhine were essential to effective defence. That safeguard was denied to France by Mr. Lloyd George and Mr. Wilson, but in default Great Britain

and the United States guaranteed France against a German attack. The American Senate refused, however, to ratify the agreement concluded by its President, and the joint agreement consequently lapsed. The mood of France, then, was a mixture of elation and apprehension. The settlement as a whole combined with her own armed strength and the disarmament of Germany to give France hegemony on the Continent, but she lived in perpetual fear lest the recovery of Germany would some day again deprive her of that hegemony, and threaten her security. Hence she was anxious to "bleed Germany white" as Germany had attempted to bleed her white in 1871.

Great Britain, on the contrary, tardily realising that Germany could not pay large reparations to her without injuring British trade, was anxious to nurse her "best customer" into convalescence. The annihilation of Germany as a colonial Power still further assured the supremacy of the British Empire in Africa and Oceania. The broad result was that by 1923 the Anglo-French accord had sensibly weakened, while both the two great European Allies were justly exasperated by the refusal of the United States to honour the signature appended by their President to the Peace Treaties, or to adhere to the League of Nations for which he had been so largely responsible.

Belgium obtained from Germany some 400 square miles of territory, designed to strengthen her eastern frontier, and, in accord with her own ambitions, achieved "complete independence and full sovereignty." The treaties of 1839 were abrogated and she henceforth ceased to be either protected or neutralised. She was also gratified by receiving a "mandate" for a portion of German East Africa. At the same time Luxemburg was emancipated from the economic control of Germany, and, like Belgium, abrogated the status of neutrality.

The Habsburg Empire had already broken into fragments before the Peace Conference met, and it only remained for the Treaty to confirm the accomplished fact and to define the frontiers of the States that arose on

the ruins of that "ramshackle Empire." Austria was thus left in a pitiable plight: a state of only 6,000,000 people but still saddled with the maintenance of a capital once the gayest and always one of the loveliest in Europe and containing 2,000,000 inhabitants. Forbidden by the Treaty to unite with Germany, cut off from access to the sea, encompassed by a ring of small states, self-contained, highly protectionist and none too friendly; deprived of her supplies of coal and iron, of her munition factories and of her only important industrial district in Bohemia, of her natural sources of agricultural supplies in Hungary and of all access to external markets, Austria excited the pity, and presently evoked the financial assistance, of a Europe which forgave, if it could not forget, Austria's large share of responsibility for the outbreak of the World-War.

Czecho-
slovakia

On the ruins of the Habsburg Empire arose the somewhat artificial State of Czechoslovakia, consisting of the historic kingdom of Bohemia, together with Moravia and Slovakia. This meant an area of some 60,000 square miles and a population of 14,000,000, of whom $6\frac{1}{2}$ millions were Czechs, 3 millions Germans, 2 millions Slovaks, while the balance was made up of Hungarians, Ruthenians, and Poles. The new State proclaimed itself an independent Republic on 15th November, 1918, and elected as President Professor J. P. Masaryk, who with another Professor, Edouard Bênes, were the chief sponsors of the infant Republic. Czechoslovakia quickly enlisted the sympathetic interest of the Western Democracies, particularly of the "left" parties. Great Britain was naturally flattered by the adoption of a constitution modelled, *mutatis mutandis*, on British Parliamentary Democracy. As a thorn in the side of Germany, Czechoslovakia was of special interest also to France; as a co-partner in the dismemberment of Hungary it was naturally allied with Yugoslavia and Rumania with whom it concluded treaties in 1920 and 1921, while the "Little Entente" was completed by a treaty (1921) between Yugoslavia and Rumania. As a barrier against Germany's *Drang*

nach Osten the integrity of Czechoslovakia was important to Europe as a whole, and in particular to the Balkan nations. Treaties concluded between France and Poland (1921) provided mutual guarantees against the aggression of Germany; between Poland and Rumania against that of Russia (1921), and finally between France and Czechoslovakia (1924) against any infraction of the Treaty of Trianon by Hungary, and against a possible restoration of the Habsburgs.

By the Treaty of Trianon (1920) the Peace-makers had ^{The Balkans} compelled Hungary, which had proclaimed its independence on 31st October, 1918, to make large territorial concessions to Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Yugoslavia—concessions which, while correcting some anomalies created others, and in particular deeply offended the pride of the Magyars. Bulgaria had to pay the penalty for espousing the cause of the Central Empires by territorial concessions to Greece and Yugoslavia. Rumania and Yugoslavia, on the contrary, were rewarded for their adhesion to the Western Allies by large acquisitions. The former acquired Bessarabia (from Russia) as well as Hungarian Transylvania, the Bukovina (from Austria) and part of the Banat of Temesvar. She was thus more than doubled in area and population, and with a population of 17,000,000 (increased to 19,000,000 by 1939), emerged from the first World-War as the largest but the least homogeneous and perhaps the most vulnerable of the Balkan States.

Enlarged by the acquisition of Bosnia, the Herzegovina, ^{Yugoslavia} Croatia-Slavonia, parts of Styria, Carinthia, the Banat, and practically the whole of Dalmatia, Yugoslavia with a population of 14,000,000 came next to Rumania in size. In flattering but rash emulation of Great Britain the young Yugoslavia adopted a parliamentary constitution under a limited Monarchy. For peoples so recently united, lacking the conditions of cohesion, and, still more conspicuously, the traditions and experience essential to success in that difficult form of Government, the experiment was foredoomed to failure. Croatia threatened to secede from Serbia, and in order to avert

disruption King Alexander in 1928 suspended the democratic constitution and established a Royal dictatorship.


Racial passions, never far from the surface in the Balkans, were revealed when in 1934 King Alexander was assassinated during a visit to France; and though Prince Paul, as Regent, has done his utmost to assuage internal dissensions, and to protect his country against external aggression, his success has been only partial. Six and a half million Orthodox Serbs are bitterly opposed by three and a half million Roman Catholic Croats. The Triune State is also distracted by its German, Italian, and Magyar minorities, whose loyalty is given, not to the State in which they are unwillingly incorporated but to its enemies. Yet Yugoslavia remains officially a proud member of the Anti-Axis alliance, and hopes to share in the fruits of its victory.

Greece

Greece is in similar plight. Thanks to the services rendered by Venizelos to the Western Allies, to his own popularity and persuasiveness, and not least to the goodwill of England and the partiality of Mr. Lloyd George, Greece emerged from the Great War laden with spoils assigned to her by the Treaty of Sèvres (1920)—spoils that she had not earned and was not strong enough to retain.

Italy

Italy particularly resented the assignment of Smyrna and its district to Greece, and, apart from that, deemed herself to have been "robbed by her allies of the fruits of victory," to the achievement of which she naturally exaggerated her contribution. Having broken faith with Germany and Austria, her partners in the Triple Alliance, she had plunged into the war in 1915 on the strength of a bargain struck with Russia and the Western Democracies, and registered in the Pact of London (28th April, 1915), the terms of which were revealed only by the Russian Bolsheviks in January, 1918. Under that Pact Italy was to receive the district of Trentino, the Southern Tyrol up to the Brenner Pass, the city and district of Trieste, the Istrian peninsular including Pola, the Istrian Archipelago, a great part of Dalmatia (also claimed by Yugo-



slavia), and most of the Adriatic Islands, and was to retain Valona as well as Rhodes with the rest of the Dodecanese. All these promises, despite President Wilson's opposition, were fulfilled at the Peace Conference. Unfulfilled, however, was the further promise that "in the event of France and Great Britain increasing their colonial territories in Africa at the expense of Germany, these two Powers agree in principle that Italy may claim some equitable compensation, particularly as regards the settlement in her favour of the questions relative to the frontiers of the Italian colonies of Eritrea, Somaliland and Libya, and the neighbouring colonies of France and Great Britain." At Paris, Italy received not one square inch of African soil. Her resentment at such treatment was therefore not unintelligible. The bargain struck in the Pact of London had been supplemented by the Treaty of St. Jean de Maurienne (1917), under which the Vilayet of Smyrna, together with a large part of the coast and even some of the hinterland of Asia Minor, was provisionally assigned to Italy. But in the spring of 1919 Italy was creating difficulties at Paris about Fiume, and Venizelos, adroitly seizing the opportunity of Italy's temporary withdrawal from the Conference, obtained the sanction of the Allies to a Greek occupation of Smyrna. Italy was deeply and naturally offended; though she must very soon have been consoled by the fact that the occupation of Smyrna brought nothing but disaster upon Greece.

Fiume presented a difficult problem to the Peacemakers at Paris. Together with Spalato, Ragusa, Cattaro, and other Adriatic ports, Fiume had been assigned by the Treaty of London (as Italy admitted) to the States presently united as Yugoslavia, to which Fiume was of capital importance. In 1919, however, Italy advanced claims to it mainly on sentimental and cultural grounds. The question was further complicated by the intervention of the poet D'Annunzio, who seized it and defied both the Italian and Yugoslav Governments to turn him out. Ultimately, however—but not until 1924—a compromise was reached by the two States primarily interested. The

settlement left Italy virtually mistress of the Adriatic while giving the Triune Kingdom access to that sea.

Turkey

The question of Turkey remained. A decision about the future of the Ottoman Empire was deliberately postponed by the Peace Conference in the hope that the United States might be persuaded to accept if not the guardianship of Constantinople and the Straits, at least Mandates for Mesopotamia and Palestine. The hope was entirely vain and in August, 1920, the Allies dictated to the Porte the terms of the Treaty of Sèvres; but as this treaty never came into effect its terms need not detain us. The dangers of procrastination were already manifest. On 15th May, 1919, the Greeks, supported by the warships of Great Britain, France, and the U.S.A., had occupied Smyrna. That was the day of fate alike for Greece and for Turkey. The occupation of the city by the despised and detested Greeks aroused the deepest resentment among the Turkish "nationalists," a party that was coming rapidly to the front under the vigorous leadership of the "Saviour of the Dardanelles," the most brilliant soldier in the Turkish army, Mustapha Kemal Pasha.

Kemal's moment had come. In May, 1919, Kemal left Constantinople to take up his work as Inspector-General of the Turkish forces in Eastern Anatolia. But his activities alarmed his Government and he was recalled. He refused to return; was outlawed, and henceforward ignored all orders from Constantinople. He appealed instead to the new spirit of Turkish nationalism which was intensified by the allied occupation of Constantinople (16th March, 1920), and even more by the conclusion of the Treaty of Sèvres which the Kemalists promptly denounced. Meanwhile, a National Assembly summoned by Kemal met at Erzeroum (July, 1919) and transferred the Nationalist headquarters to Angora, then a wretched little town in the Anatolian highlands.

At Angora the Grand National Assembly was inaugurated in April, 1920, and elected Kemal as its President.

At that moment the Greeks were advancing from triumph to triumph. Having occupied Smyrna, and

defeated the Turks in a brilliant campaign in Anatolia, the Greeks occupied Brusa, the ancient capital of the Ottomans (5th July); they then made good their position on the opposite shore, and on 26th July the young King Alexander of Greece made his triumphal entry into Adrianople. On 10th August the Sultan signed the Treaty of Sèvres.

In 1921, however, the tide of war turned against the Greeks. By a treaty negotiated by M. Franklin-Bouillon France surrendered to Turkey, in return for certain commercial concessions, the whole stretch of the Baghdad Railway between French Syria and Mesopotamia; Italy also came to terms with the Angora Government; and Kemal, appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Turkish Army, not only arrested the Greek advance towards Angora, but taking the offensive swept the whole of the Greek forces into the sea. Flushed by their victories over the Greeks the Kemalists not only occupied Smyrna which was delivered over to fire and plunder, but advancing towards the Straits threatened the British garrison which, encamped at Chanak, held the southern shore of the Dardanelles. The position at Chanak soon became critical. Great Britain, deserted by the French and the Italians and opposed by the Turks, appealed to the Dominions, but their response was uncertain, and that war was averted was due almost entirely to the combined firmness and tact of Sir Charles Harington, the allied Commander at Constantinople.

Meanwhile, about 1,000,000 Greek refugees from all parts of Asia Minor had escaped on board Greek and allied ships, but the débacle of the Greek army was complete; their dream of an Ionian empire was shattered; King Constantine—who, amid signs of exuberant enthusiasm, had been recalled to this throne in December, 1920—was, after the disaster at Smyrna, again expelled and replaced by his son George II. But the latter kept his uneasy seat on the throne only until 1924, when a Republic was proclaimed and Venizelos was restored to power—though only for a month. A dictatorship established in 1926 by General

Unrestful
Greece

Pangalos, a successful soldier, 1928, lasted only two years. In 1928 Venizelos emerged from his retirement in his native Crete to resume office as Prime Minister and for four years ruled Greece with eminent success. Friendly agreements were made with Italy and Yugoslavia, and, more wonderful still, a visit to Kemal at Angora (1930) resulted in a Treaty of Friendship and Admiration between Greece and the Turkish Republic.

But the Greek royalists were gathering strength; the old statesman's grip on affairs was loosening; and after an attempt on his life he foolishly allowed himself to become involved (1933) in a revolutionary movement. He fled the country, was condemned to death in absence, and by a plebiscite taken in the same year the country decided on a restoration of the monarchy. King George II., after an exile of nearly twelve years, spent chiefly in England, returned to his country, re-established constitutional monarchy, and issued an amnesty in which Venizelos was included. But the latter never returned to Greece, and in 1936 died in Paris. Despite many faults and some egregious follies Venizelos was a real patriot, and that his life should have closed amid dark shadows was pitiful. Fond as the Greeks are of debating, parliamentary government has never taken root among them, and the country was not greatly perturbed when (1936) General Metaxas, a powerful minister, suspended Parliament, and established a monarchial dictatorship. Whether after long years of turmoil, and many sudden turns of the wheel of fortune, the restored monarchy would have been able to establish stability is a question rendered academic by the renewal of the World-War in 1939 and its tragic consequences for Greece. They are the more truly tragical since the internal position of Greece had, in the last pre-war years, notably improved. The Pact of 1933 promised to assuage the enmity which had subsisted for centuries between Turks and Greeks; to both, as well as to Yugoslavia and Rumania, the Balkan Pact of 1934 guaranteed the territorial order then established in the Balkans, while so late as November, 1939, a Pact of Friendship and

Non-aggression was concluded between Greece and Italy.

To return to Turkey.

The brilliant victories of Mustapha Kemal gave the *coup de grâce* to the abortive Treaty of Sèvres. On 11th October, 1922, an armistice was signed by the Kemalists, the Greeks, and the Allies, and on 20th November a Conference for the conclusion of a definitive Peace met at Lausanne. Mustapha Kemal

Meanwhile events of historic significance had taken place. On 1st November the National Assembly at Angora issued an edict abolishing the office of Sultan; on the 17th, Mohammed VI., the last of the Ottoman Sultans, left Constantinople on board a British warship; and on the 18th, his cousin, Abdul Majed, was elected Caliph. But he enjoyed the distinction only until March, 1924, when the Caliphate itself was abolished by the National Assembly. In the previous October Turkey had been proclaimed a Republic, with Mustapha Kemal Pasha as its first President, and Angora as its capital.

No single act in Kemal's wonderful career was more characteristic, more courageous, and ultimately more significant than the transference of the capital from Constantine's lovely city on the Golden Horn to the bleak highlands of Anatolia. Bleak they might be, but they were clear of the miasma of Constantinople, and if Kemal wished, as he did, to break with tradition, ecclesiastical and political, nothing could have been more wise and effective than the spectacular means he actually adopted.

The Conference at Lausanne opened in a difficult atmosphere, which even Lord Curzon of Kedleston, the British Foreign Minister who presided, found it difficult to dispel. The Treaty of Lausanne (1923) If the Turk had in the past so often managed to evade the consequences of defeat, he was unlikely to forgo, in the day of his triumph, the fruits of a victory as dramatic as it was complete. And at Lausanne he held all the trump cards, diplomatic as well as military. He could count on the traditional hatred of Italy for Greece, and could turn to his own advantage the increasing tension between

England and France. What wonder then if his tone was lofty to the verge of insolence. After two months of difficult negotiation agreement was nevertheless nearly reached when in January, 1923, the Conference was broken off by the demand of the Turks for further delay. It reopened, however, in April. Peace was at last signed on 24th July.

The Greeks had perforce to pay the penalty for overweening political ambition and a disastrous military defeat. To Turkey they lost Eastern Thrace with Adrianople and the important islands of Imbros and Tenedos, but were allowed to retain the rest of the Turkish islands and Western Thrace up to the Maritza. Turkey retained Smyrna and the rest of the Anatolian peninsula but gave up all claims upon Cyprus (retained by Great Britain), Egypt and the Sudan, Syria, Palestine, Mesopotamia and Arabia. The problem of minorities had been to a great extent solved by the simple method of extermination, but for survivors the Turks agreed to follow the lines laid down in the Peace treaties. Provision was also made for a vast interchange of Greek Moslems and Turks of the Orthodox Church in Eastern and Western Thrace. Two questions remained. The "capitulations" which ever since the sixteenth century had afforded protection to foreigners in Turkey, but were naturally humiliating to Turkish pride, were abolished; Constantinople, in default of an alternative tenant, was left to the Turks, though abandoned by them as a capital; the narrow Straits were neutralised, demilitarised, and placed under the guarantee of the League of Nations.

The Treaty of Lausanne completed the series which constituted the Peace Settlement. For the Settlement as a whole the cement was provided by the League of Nations; to each Treaty the Covenant of the League was prefixed.

For four centuries every great war has been followed by a project for the organisation of peace. Yet, with the exception of the Holy Alliance (1815), the League of Nations was the first project actually to be brought into

operation. Much thought had been devoted to the elaboration of its details before the Paris Conference met. As approved by the Conference the scheme was mainly the work of General Smuts, Mr. Wilson, Lord Cecil, and M. Léon Bourgeois. Fifty-six Sovereign States ultimately joined the League which was designed to organise peace and avert war. The Government of the League was vested in a small Council, and a General Assembly, representing all the States. Day-to-day administration was entrusted to a permanent Secretariat which under Sir Eric Drummond and his successors did admirable work. The Assembly set up several technical organisations and advisory commissions, the most important commissions being those dealing with Mandates and with the reduction of armaments. The League also set up a Permanent Court of International Justice, which sat annually at the Hague, and, within its prescribed limits, functioned in the main satisfactorily.

Its primary functions the League hoped to fulfil by a limitation of armaments, by a mutual agreement not to resort to arms until an attempt had been made to settle the dispute by peaceful means, and by a mutual guarantee of territorial integrity and independence. In particular no member of the League might make war upon another member without submitting the dispute to arbitration, and without an interval of three months after the announcement of the award. Should any State break this central article of the Covenant, all the other members were pledged to break off all relations, including commercial and financial relations, with the offending State, and to resort, if necessary, to armed force. It was a fatal flaw in the Covenant that it did not specify how force was to be applied; but in any case the League was doomed from its birth by the refusal of the United States to honour the signature of President Wilson. Thus in General Smuts' scathing words, "the father of the League left the baby on Europe's door-step."


The boldest innovation in the Covenant was the device ^{Mandates} (suggested by General Smuts) for dealing with the colonial

possessions of the defeated Powers. By Articles 118 and 119 of the Treaty of Versailles Germany renounced in favour of the "Principal Allied and Associated Powers" all her rights over her oversea possessions. To whom should they pass? According to Wilson's formula there were to be "no annexations"; accordingly, Article XXII. laid it down that to confiscated colonial territories "which are inhabited by people not yet able to stand by themselves . . . there should be applied the principle that the well-being and development of such people form a sacred trust of civilisation," that their tutelage should be entrusted to "advanced nations" conveniently situated and well-equipped for the discharge of the responsibility, and that such trustees should act as "Mandatories of the League."

The Mandate for "German" South-West Africa was accordingly assigned to "His Britannic Majesty to be administered on his behalf by the Union of South Africa," German East Africa was divided between Great Britain and Belgium, and German West Africa between Great Britain and France, to be held in all cases under Mandate. At Paris, Mr. Hughes, Prime Minister of Australia, made a great fight to obtain for Australia the direct control of all the Pacific islands surrendered by Germany, but ultimately the islands north of the Equator went (with Kiaochow) to Japan, those south of the Equator to Australia and New Zealand—except Nauru, which went to the British Empire—in all these cases under Mandate. How much trouble might have been averted had more heed been paid to Mr. Hughes in 1919 it is easy to conjecture but impossible to prove.

The Turkish *vilayets* of Palestine, Mesopotamia, and Syria were also surrendered, but they were obviously not "backward" countries in the same sense as the African and Pacific Colonies. Consequently, the Mandates for the first two were assigned to Great Britain, and for Syria to France, in a form which clearly contemplated "the complete and final enfranchisement of the peoples so long oppressed by the Turks and the establishment of national

AFRICA. POLITICAL DIVISIONS 1921



Er. T. A. B. S. H. M.

governments" therein. In Syria and Palestine the paths of the Mandatory Power proved difficult, and the consummation anticipated in 1919 has not yet been attained. In Mesopotamia (Iraq) the Mandate expired in 1932 when that country was admitted as a Sovereign and independent State to the League of Nations.¹ •

The League of Nations came formally into being at the same time as the Treaty of Versailles (1920), of which, indeed, it was an integral part. Was the League from the first a failure, or is Lord Cecil justified in claiming 'hat for the first ten years of its existence the League was a success? Unquestionably the League and its creature the Hague Court settled a good many disputes, but all, with one exception, between the smaller States; in a few cases it averted war; it successfully administered the Saar district until its reunion with Germany; through various subsidiary organisations—notably the International Labour Office at Geneva—it collected and disseminated valuable information on economic matters; it supervised the *Mandates* experiment; it saved the children from malnutrition, perhaps from starvation, in more than one capital, and it promoted—internationally—social and humanitarian legislation, as, for instance, in regard to the "White Slave" traffic, the sale of noxious drugs, etc. Certain gaps in the Covenant were stopped by the Locarno Pact (1925) and by the *General Act* of 1928, and the U.S.A. made some amends for its major defection by joining with France to promote the Pact of Paris—familiarily known as the Briand-Kellog Pact—renouncing war "as an instrument of national policy." To this Pact fifteen States, including Germany, adhered (1928). Nevertheless the League failed to achieve its fundamental object. There was, unfortunately, too much truth in the bitter aphorism of Señor de Madariaga: "The Powers are intent on seeing that the path to international hell is paved with good intentions."

¹ For the different forms of Mandate, see Cmd. 1201, 1202, 1203, 1204 (1921), 1284, and 1350. For the Mandate system, cf. Lord Lugard ap. *Ency. Brit.* new Volumes II.

§ 2. CONVALESCENCE

The inauguration of the League of Nations was intended to crown the Peace Settlement. The period that intervened before the renewal of general war in 1939 falls into two sharply contrasted decades. Until 1929-30 there was some hope that Europe and the world might be slowly nursed into convalescence, and perhaps ultimate recovery. After 1930 that hope quickly vanished, and the descent into the abyss was rapid.

Anglo-
French
Relations

The war had restored the primacy of France in Europe ; it had confirmed the world-primacy of the British Empire. The hope of permanent or even prolonged peace depended on their cordial concurrence and co-operation, and hardly less upon the establishment of friendly relations between those two Powers and Germany. Real cordiality has never, save spasmodically, existed between France and England. There was little cordiality after the signature of the Peace Treaties. In regard to Germany the interests of the two countries were perhaps divergent and their policy was certainly opposed. France thought that England had "betrayed" her in regard to the Rhine frontier. England thought that France cared little about the trade interests of England, so long as France could extort the last penny of reparations from Germany. Industrially and commercially an England dependent on foreign trade had suffered far more severely than a France which was largely self-contained and self-sufficient, and where the peasant and the craftsman were still more important than the factory worker. France, it is true, grieved over her devastated areas, but England too had vast areas devastated by unemployment. If France had communists and syndicalists, in England, too, there was a party threatening "direct action" and attempting to coerce the community by strikes in the coalfields and on the railways. But despite some similarity of conditions there was little fellow-feeling between England and France, especially

after Raymond Poincaré at the head of the *Bloc National* succeeded Briand as Prime Minister (1922).

Poincaré, who had been President of the Republic throughout the war and the Peace Conference (1913-20), was a typical Lorrainer, profoundly hostile to Germany, and anxious to "bleed her white."

Germany was slowly emerging from her troubles. She ^{Germany} had dispelled the "Red Menace" and broken her own revolutionary Socialists. She had in the Weimar Constitution devised a scheme of parliamentary democracy which though doctrinaire in conception and ill-suited to the political genius of Germany, was at least indicative of her desire to break with the "Prussian" tradition and to take her place among the progressive and peaceful democracies. Moreover, there came into power in 1921 a new Government under Dr. Wirth, whose principal colleague was Dr. Walter Rathenau, an able, wealthy, and intensely patriotic industrialist. The policy of the new government was "Fulfilment," and their attempt to pay some part at least of the bill (£6,600,000) for reparations was perhaps stimulated by the occupation in 1921 of Duisburg and Dusseldorf by allied troops. The Wirth-Rathenau Government had, however, to face the hostility of both extreme parties, Right and Left. To the army and the Junkers Rathenau in particular was detestable alike by reason of his Jewish origin and as the negotiator of a treaty with the Russian Bolsheviks. Although the Treaty of Rapallo (1922) was calculated to bring great commercial advantages to Germany, to the extreme German nationalists, both the Treaty and its author were anathema; for a too enlightened policy Rathenau paid with his life (June 1922).

The murder of Rathenau was a grievous blow to ^{The Ruhr} Germany and to the cause of world-peace. It was followed by another, struck at German recovery. In December 1922 the Reparation Commission, prompted by Poincaré, declared Germany to be in default on its deliveries of coal and timber. Thereupon, despite a strong protest from Great Britain, French and Belgian troops occupied the

region of the Ruhr, the most important mining and industrial district in Germany. The inhabitants offered passive resistance; reparation payments ceased; mining, industry, and railway traffic were brought to a standstill. Germany suffered much; she sank deeper and deeper, day by day, into financial and industrial chaos; France and Belgium gained little or nothing.

The situation was retrieved by a great statesman Gustav Streseman, a wealthy business man, a convinced believer in the monarchy, but a realist in politics, came into power in August, 1923, and at once called off passive resistance.

The
"Rhine-
land
Republic"


Another scheme, supported if not initiated by Poincaré, was also collapsing. In 1923-24 an attempt was made to set up a Rhineland Republic. For a "Middle Kingdom" between France and Germany there is, and always has been, much to be said, but the "Rhineland Republic" of 1923 was a grotesque fiasco which only brought discredit upon all concerned in it. Apart from all this, however, Poincaré's popularity in France was waning, and the General Election of May, 1924, put the *Cartel des Gauches* into power under Herriot as Premier.

The further and final coils in the tiresome imbroglio of reparations can be briefly unravelled. Whether Germany ever meant to pay is doubtful; after the Ruhr fiasco it is certain that, unassisted by external help, she had not the power. With the help of a loan of £40,000,000 raised mainly in New York, Germany did, under successive schemes devised by American financiers, pay something, but the onset of the economic blizzard (1930) rendered the whole question academic, and in 1932 a Conference at Lausanne agreed to complete if not formal remission.

Locarno

Much had happened in the meantime. Lord D'Abernon, the British ambassador at Berlin, had agreed with Gustav Streseman upon a plan which secured the cordial support of Aristide Briand and Austen Chamberlain who had fortunately become Foreign Ministers of France and England respectively in 1924. The Locarno Agreement was the outcome of the co-operation of these three states-

SOUTH-WESTERN PACIFIC



men. Great Britain, France, and Germany, joined with Italy and Belgium to guarantee, "collectively and severally" the inviolability of the frontiers between Germany and France and Germany and Belgium as defined by the Treaty of Versailles. Complementary Treaties were at the same time concluded between Poland and Czechoslovakia. The obligations of Great Britain were limited to the western regions, and from those obligations the British Dominions were (save with their own consent) excluded. The Locarno Pact was signed in London on 1st December, 1925, amid great jubulations and special congratulations to Sir Austen Chamberlain. The King gave him the Garter, and the Nobel Peace Prize for 1925 was awarded to him. In 1928 the Nobel Prize was divided between Gustav Stresemann and Aristide Briand.¹

Locarno temporarily dispersed the international storm-clouds, and for the next five years a patch of blue sky was discernible. There were other favourable omens. Significant changes had taken place in Russia. With the defeat of the "White Armies" and the counter-revolutionary movement supported by foreign intervention (1918-20) the first fury of the Bolshevik revolution had spent itself. A constitution was devised for the U.S.S.R. (1923), and though the political structure supplied no more than the façade of government it gave a certain aspect of stability to the new régime. More important was Lenin's frank recognition of the truth that the gospel of Marx was ill-adapted to a country of peasants, and that the practical experiment in communism had in large measure proved a failure. To modify the experiment and adopt the "New Economic Policy" (N.E.P.), called, nevertheless, for courage no less than wisdom.

The new policy was eminently successful, and on Lenin's death (1924) his successor, Stalin, was wise enough to go further. He fell back on the idea of Economic Nationalism: Henry Ford, the apostle of mass-production, displaced Marx as the national idol. Stalin resolved to beat the

¹ There is a delightful account of the Locarno negotiations and sketch of his co-signatories in A. Chamberlain's *Down the Years*, pp. 51 f.

champions of Capitalism at their own game and in 1928 launched the "Five Year Plan." It was so far successful that in 1933 a second programme was announced, which by 1937 was almost completed and a Third was arranged to begin in 1938.

Not less significant was the improvement in the international situation of Russia. In 1917 the Bolsheviks, following the French precedent of 1792, had proclaimed world-revolution. That Russia succeeded in creating some labour unrest in England, in Italy, in Germany and in France, and much more in Hungary, is undeniable. But the collapse of the General Strike in England in 1926 convinced Stalin that the "citadel of capitalism" was unassailable. In 1927 Trotsky, Zinoviev, and the other chief apostles of world-revolution were expelled from the Communist Party, and those who did not or could not escape from Russia paid for their opposition to Stalin's new policy with their lives.

Foreign Powers had already shown their appreciation of the improvement in the international manners of the Bolsheviks. *De jure* recognition of the U.S.S.R. was given by Germany (thanks to the two Jews, Rathenau and Litvinov, who in 1922 had concluded the Treaty of Rapallo), and Germany's lead was followed by Poland, Turkey, Persia, and Afghanistan. Great Britain, where for the first time the Socialist party had attained office (1924), also recognised the Soviet government; Italy, Greece, Austria, Hungary, the three Scandinavian kingdoms and several non-European States followed suit; and before the year ended the adhesion of France completed the diplomatic circle of Europe. Not, however, until 1933 did the U.S.A. follow the example of Europe.

Hungary

Hungary's recognition was especially significant, since in the early days of the Bolshevik revolution it had suffered from the "Red Menace" more perhaps than any other country. In 1919 Béla Khan, a Gallician Jew with an unsavoury reputation, actually succeeded in establishing for a short time a Soviet government in Hungary, but thanks chiefly to Admiral Horthy (who in 1920 was

appointed Regent) and Count Stephen Bethlen (Premier 1921-31) the revolutionary movement was crushed, and order was gradually restored. But the constitutional position in Hungary was, and remains anomalous. In 1921 the Archduke Charles, the heir to the Habsburg monarchy, made two attempts to regain the throne, but under pressure from the Allies (perhaps unwisely exercised) the Hungarian Assembly, while affirming the right of the Hungarian nation to elect its King by its free choice, abrogated the rights of the Habsburg dynasty.

Hungary, however, remained a "dissatisfied Power." The unyielding opposition of the *Little Entente* defeated (until 1938) all the repeated attempts of Hungary to obtain a revision of the Treaty of Trianon (1920) by which so much of her territory had gone to Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Yugoslavia. It was, therefore, hardly surprising that after ceremonial visits paid by the Regent to Rome (1935) and Berlin (1937) Hungary should (1938) have joined the Anti-Comintern Pact and have withdrawn from the League of Nations to which in 1923 it had been proud to be admitted.

In Italy, as in Hungary, much that happened in 1919-29 must be ascribed to Bolshevik propaganda; much that happened in 1935-40 to resentment at the treatment she had received at the Peace Conference. Great Britain did, indeed, concede after much haggling a strip of Jubaland which was annexed to Italian Somaliland in 1924; but as a fulfilment of the Treaty of London (1915) the concession was in Italy naturally regarded as derisory. But other things besides fear of Bolshevism and disappointment about the Peace Treaties contributed to the establishment of the Fascist dictatorship. Fascism, in truth, represented the culmination of forces which had been operating ever since "Italy entered Rome" (1871). Unification had accentuated rather than mitigated social, economic, and political grievances. Constitutional monarchy was not a native growth but a foreign importation; parliament and the whole administration, central and local, were honeycombed with corruption, and the in-

aptitude the politicians displayed was equalled only by the weight of taxation they imposed.

Primarily, however, it was to combat Bolshevism and to conserve for Italy the fruits of the sacrifices she had made in the war, that in 1919 Benito Mussolini, ex-soldier, ex-socialist, organised the *Fascio di Combattimento*—a sort of British Legion with political aims.¹ During the next two years the Fascists, though not without the loss of 2000 lives, defeated the repeated efforts of the Communists, culminating in the General Strike of 1922, to establish revolutionary Syndicalism. In that year the Fascists having defeated the forces of revolution made a peaceful entry into Rome. The King appointed as Prime Minister Mussolini, who from that day to this has ruled Italy as a dictator. Parliament has been abolished, and by the organisation of the "Corporative State" the industrial system has been revolutionised on lines which are a blend of nationalism, co-operation, and private enterprise.

The
Lateran
Treaties

Mussolini's greatest achievement in domestic affairs was, however, the adjustment of the relations between Church and State. For more than a thousand years the Papacy had claimed Temporal as well as Spiritual Sovereignty. Consequently, the Pope was deeply affronted when, in 1871, the House of Savoy made Rome the capital of the mushroom kingdom of Italy. The Pope thenceforward posed as the "prisoner of the Vatican" and for a time prohibited Catholics from accepting the rights, or performing elementary duties, of citizenship. Pius XI., however, was a liberal-minded Pope, and when in 1926 the Duce initiated negotiations for a comprehensive and final settlement of the long standing problem of Church and State, the Pope did not reject them.

The Lateran Treaty (1929) consists of three parts: a Political Treaty, a Financial Convention, and a Concordat. Italy "recognised the Sovereignty of the Holy See in the international field" and its sovereignty over the

¹ For further details, cf. Marriott's *Makers of Modern Italy*, 2nd Edit. (1937) and *Dictatorship and Democracy*, 2nd Edit. (1937).

"Vatican City"—a territory of about 100 acres and inhabited by 500 people. The Holy See recognised "the Kingdom of Italy under the dynasty of the House of Savoy, with Rome as the capital of the Italian State." It accepted 750,000 lire in cash and 1,000,000 lire in 5 per cent. Italian bonds in liquidation of all its financial claims, and made a reasonable compromise with the State on all such matters as marriage, education, and jurisdiction over ecclesiastics.

The settlement was a triumph of good sense and high statesmanship on the part both of the Pope and the Puce. Whether it has finally solved the problem to the satisfaction of Church and State time alone can tell.

§ 3. THE DESCENT TO AVERNUS

The Lateran Treaty appropriately crowned the period of appeasement and hopefulness. The League of Nations, though by no means uniformly successful, had not yet demonstrated its complete incapacity to achieve its main purpose. Russia was ceasing to trouble the domestic affairs of other peoples. Austria had been set on its feet again. Poland and Czechoslovakia were prospering under their respective dictatorial and democratic régimes. The turbulent Balkans were rather less restless than usual. Kemal Atatürk was regenerating Turkey. In England the decisive but good-humoured defeat of the General Strike had greatly eased the industrial situation and the concession of "Dominion Status" to Ireland had, it was hoped, solved a problem which ever since the extension of the franchise (1885) had been increasingly obstinate. Portugal prospered under a beneficent dictatorship; Spain was still under its ancient monarchy. No fewer than fifty-four States had adhered to the Briand-Kellog Pact in a solemn renunciation of war. France had stabilised her franc, and her relations with Germany were more friendly than they had ever been since the German Empire had come into being.

But the lull was delusive. The sky became suddenly overcast and with incredible rapidity the storm broke. The rest of this narrative is accordingly nothing but a bare catalogue of disasters.

Aristide
Briand

The first disaster was the break-up of the benevolent triumvirate which had been responsible for Locarno. Dr. Streseman died in October, 1929; Sir Austen Chamberlain retired from official life in 1931; Aristide Briand died in 1932. Briand was not perhaps in the front rank of statesmanship, but he was a great orator, a most lovable man, and one of the few elements of stability in French post-war politics. Between 1909 and 1929, he was eleven times Prime Minister, and of all the eight ministries which followed his last resignation of the premiership (in 1929) he was a leading member. His plan for a "United States of Europe," adumbrated at Geneva in 1929, anticipated many of the features of "Federal Union," though it was broadly hinted by hostile critics that the Europe which Briand wished to stabilise was a "Gallicised Europe" and that the "Good European" was in his case but a thin veneer over the shrewd Frenchman. Yet his death meant a great loss for France and for the cause of goodwill in Europe, and it was the more disastrous since it synchronised with the onset of the "Economic blizzard."

The
Economic
Blizzard

The symptoms of coming disaster had first appeared in New York, where there was a financial crisis in autumn 1929. By 1931 the whole world was involved. England went off gold, and was saved from imminent disaster, if not from bankruptcy, only by the action of King George V. in calling for the formation of a national government in August, 1931.

In September, 1931, Japan suddenly launched an attack upon Manchuria, and within six months had established a firm hold upon that great Chinese province. She defied the verdict given against her by the League of Nations, and gave notice to withdraw from a League which had shown its incapacity either to protect the victim of aggression or to deprive the aggressor of his booty.

Hitler

Though not immediately recognised as a symptom of deterioration in the European situation, but ultimately to

prove its most disturbing phenomenon, was the advent to power in Germany of Adolf Hitler. Austrian by birth, a house-painter by trade, an ex-corporal in a Bavarian regiment, Hitler had suffered poverty and humiliation in Vienna, had received little formal education but possessed a magnetic personality, indomitable will-power, and a clear vision amounting to genius. In the economic and political chaos that ensued on the occupation of the Ruhr he saw his chance and seized it. A short imprisonment in a fortress following on an abortive rising in Munich gave Hitler the opportunity of thinking out a philosophy of politics, and formulating in *Mein Kampf* a programme (1925-26). That programme he has, in precise sequence, carried out. Gradually and by superb mob oratory he reorganised the German Workers Party (*Nazis*), secured for it a predominant position in the Reichstag, and in January, 1933, imposed himself upon President Hindenburg as Chancellor of the Reich. Fastening upon the Communists the crime of burning down the Reichstag buildings he won the support of the alarmed industrialists and then induced the Reichstag to vest absolute power in the Chancellor and destroy the Weimar Constitution. The rights of the *Länder*—the old States—were transferred to the Reich and put under Governors responsible only to the Chancellor. Thus did Hitler, completing the work of Bismarck, unify Germany under the heel of Prussia. By a drastic purge on 30th June, Hitler struck terror into the hearts of all possible rivals or opponents, and when on 2nd August Marshal von Hindenburg died, a bill was promptly passed to unite the offices of Reich Chancellor and Reich President in the person of Adolf Hitler. With the help of Dr. Joseph Goebbels the programme of *Mein Kampf* was then systematically carried through; the *Gestapo* or Secret Police destroyed every vestige of personal liberty; education was reorganised on lines designed to produce a nation of Nazis; 6,000,000 unemployed were absorbed into the armed forces or munition factories; Jews were ruthlessly eliminated; all who could not prove their devotion to the new order were rounded up

into concentration camps; Germany was rearmed and page by page the Treaty of Versailles was torn up.

Re-
armament

In 1933 Germany withdrew from the League of Nations; in 1934 the Disarmament Conference after sitting for two years finally adjourned, its complete failure confessed; in 1935 the British rearmament programme was announced; in the same year France extended the period of Compulsory Service and Germany reintroduced conscription. Austria was the first country to give a warning of the coming storm.

Austria

Before the advent of the Nazi dictatorship many Austrians had been in favour of union with Germany, but that union was—perhaps mistakenly—forbidden by the Treaty of Versailles, and even a Customs union proposed by Germany in 1931 was, though approved by England, frustrated on purely selfish grounds by France. That was the last chance for Austria. In 1931 a great financial institution in Vienna (the *Credit-Anstalt*) failed; a month later Mr. Hoover, President of the U.S.A., announced one year's moratorium for all debtors, and very soon the whole world was involved in dire economic catastrophe. In 1932 Dr. Dollfuss, the leader of the Christian Socialists in Austria, had in the "Fatherland Front" united all the conservative elements against the Austrian Nazis, and succeeded to the Chancellorship. In 1933 he established himself as Dictator, and in February, 1934, he inflicted a crushing, though far from bloodless, defeat on the Viennese socialists. Whether the socialists brought this heavy chastisement upon themselves or were provoked to insurrection by the Austrian Fascists is uncertain, but certain it is that it cost Dollfuss his life. On 29th July, 1934, he was foully murdered by the Austrian Nazis. They reaped no advantage from their crime. To meet a threat from Berlin, Mussolini, the friend and patron of Dollfuss and the protector, at that time, of Austria's independence, sent three divisions up to the Brenner. If Hitler was then contemplating the immediate annexation of Austria he decided to defer it. With Kurt von Schuschnigg, the friend and successor of Dollfuss, and like

him determined to maintain Austria's independence, Hitler came to an agreement (11th July, 1936). By this Hitler guaranteed the independence of Austria, though Austria "acknowledged herself to be a German State" and imprudently agreed to sanction the existence of Nazi organisations in Austria.

French politics were at this time falling into ever deepening confusion. In January, 1934, a Russian Jew, who had been involved in a number of financial scandals, committed suicide in order to avert arrest. The "Stavisky Scandal" revealed that the whole administration—the police, the civil service, even the Legislature—was honeycombed with corruption, and Gaston Doumerge (President, 1924-31) was recalled from his retirement to save the State. But Doumerge's strong policy raised a suspicion that he meant to establish a dictatorship, and after six months he was replaced by a much weaker man, M. Flandin, with M. Barthou at the Foreign Office. In October, 1934, Barthou was assassinated at Marseilles along with King Alexander of Yugoslavia, the guest of the French Republic.

Italy, though probably as much responsible for the crime as the Hungarian assassins who actually perpetrated it, escaped censure, owing perhaps to the ripening friendship between M. Laval (Barthou's successor) and Mussolini. Italy was, at the moment, about to start her attack on Abyssinia. Hailé Selassie, the ruler of Abyssinia, invoked the intervention of the League (to which, on the initiative of Italy, Abyssinia had been admitted) but in vain (March, 1935). In April, Ramsay Macdonald and Sir John Simon met Laval and Mussolini and established the "Stresa Front" (so called from their *rendezvous*), with the object of restraining the threatened attack of Hitler upon Austria. But in June France was dismayed to learn that Great Britain, without notifying her Stresa allies, had concluded with Germany an agreement for the limitation of naval armaments. In October Mussolini, supposing from the conversations at Stresa that neither England nor France was seriously concerned about Abyssinia, and not deterred by the condemnation of Italy pronounced at the instance of

the two Western Democracies at Geneva, launched his attack upon Haile Selassie.

Although the League of Nations promptly passed a sentence of outlawry ("Sanctions") against Italy, it soon became obvious that the responsibility for forcible action would fall solely upon Great Britain. In December, Laval and Sir Samuel Hoare (British Foreign Minister) agreed to propose to the belligerents a compromise which would have saved Mussolini's honour and Haile Selassie's throne. The plan went awry; it was prematurely (perhaps by Laval's calculated "indiscretion"), disclosed, and Sir Samuel Hoare was sacrificed to the clamour which the disclosure aroused in England. The sole beneficiary was Hitler who, on 7th March, 1936, occupied the demilitarised Rhineland. It is now known that if France and England had "called Hitler's bluff," Germany would have withdrawn. Hitler's bluff was not called; England and France acquiesced in this flagrant breach of the Locarno Treaty; Hitler had won the first round. In May Italy annexed Abyssinia; in July "Sanctions" were formally lifted; in October Italy formed with Germany the Rome-Berlin Axis.

The
Spanish
Vortex

Three months earlier (July 1936) a rehearsal of the coming tragedy had begun in Spain. In sharp contrast with Portugal where since 1928 Salazar had exercised a dictatorship wholly beneficent and unaggressive, Spain was falling into dire confusion. The Spanish Parliament was dominated by gangs of politicians as corrupt as they were inefficient; Morocco was a running sore, and in 1923 Primo di Rivera, supported by the army, set up a monarchical Dictatorship. During the next six years he regenerated his country; he crushed the urban communists; he resisted the separatist movement of which Barcelona—always disaffected—was the centre; he encouraged agriculture; he restored the financial and industrial equilibrium; and he delivered Spain from the mill-stone which Morocco had so long threatened to hang round her neck. But in 1930 King Alphonso XIII. weakly dismissed his loyal but dictatorial minister, whose reforms

had aroused the hostility of the all-powerful army. The dismissal of Primo di Rivera sealed the fate of the monarchy, and in 1931 King Alphonso preferred to leave Spain rather than plunge his country into Civil War.

Civil War, however, was only deferred. It broke out in 1936 and raged until 1939. The issue was somewhat confused, but General Francisco Franco, a distinguished soldier who having done some good service in Morocco had in 1935 returned from banishment to Spain at the head of a large body of Moorish troops and legionaries, had by 1939 gradually overcome the resistance of the parliamentary republicans. To Franco's victory Mussolini claimed to have contributed 100,000 Italians, completely equipped, and including a large air force. Germany made a similar if smaller contribution. To the Republicans the Russian-Soviet gave all possible support; France and Great Britain preserved to the end, despite the pressure of their respective Socialists and despite some impudent submarine attacks upon French and English ships, in a policy of non-intervention. As no one dared to confess to the ownership of the offending submarines, an agreement signed at Nyon (1937) promptly put an end to these attacks.

Both France and England were, in truth, desperately anxious to prevent the extension of the area of the conflict. They succeeded, but only for a time. In the interval there was one symptom of sanity in a mad world.

Between 1923 and his death in November, 1938, Kemal Atatürk accomplished for new Turkey a work to which there are few parallels in modern history. Under his rule Turkey was literally reborn. Upon the new nation which he created on Asiatic soil he imposed a wholly new culture. In government, in agriculture, trade, industry, law, education, social customs (notably those affecting women), central and local administration, sanitation and public health, and indeed in every conceivable respect the Ghazi transformed Turkey. To Turkish foreign policy he gave a new orientation: Turkey was admitted to the League of Nations in 1932, negotiated a Balkan Pact in 1934, and concluded an agreement with Iraq, Iran, and Afghani-

The New
Turkey

stan in 1936. But the crown of Kemal's diplomatic activities was the negotiation of the Straits Convention at Montreux (1936). By a procedure strictly "correct" Turkey regained the right to fortify the narrow Straits, and for the first time since 1833 became entirely mistress in her own house.¹

Austria

Apart from Turkey the descent to Avernus was unchecked: a bare enumeration of the steps thereto must suffice.

On 12th February, 1936, Hitler summoned the Austrian Chancellor to Berchtesgaden, and after inflicting mental and moral torture upon an inoffensive and sensitive man, ordered him to give the Austrian Nazis complete control of domestic affairs and to conduct the foreign policy of Austria at the German Führer's dictations. Having announced a plebiscite for 13th March to decide Austria's future, Dr. Schuschnigg was compelled by Hitler's orders to revoke it. On 12th March, 1938, the German army marched into Vienna, and Austria was annexed to the German Reich.

Czechoslovakia

The annexation of Austria exposed the flank of Bohemia to German attack. But the well-fortified northern bastion still presented a formidable obstacle to Germany's *Drang nach Osten*. Hitler resolved to remove it. An agitation among the Germans of the Sudetenland was stimulated from Berlin, and Hitler made unmistakable preparations to annex the country. Russia and France were pledged to assist Czechoslovakia, but on 30th September the British and French Prime Ministers made an eleventh-hour effort to avert war, met Hitler and Mussolini at Munich and, without consulting Russia, agreed to the successive annexation of zone after zone of Bohemian territory by Germany. In March, 1939, Hitler threw away the last portion of his mask and annexed the whole of Bohemia and Moravia. He occupied Memel in the same month, and then demanded Dantzig from Poland.

Albania

On 7th April Italy occupied Albania, and in May con-

¹ For details, cf. Marriott *The Eastern Question* (4th Edit. 1940), pp. 559-575.

cluded a military alliance with Germany. Great Britain and France pledged themselves to protect Poland, Greece, and Rumania (March and April).

Thereupon Great Britain made an inexplicably belated attempt to come to terms with Soviet Russia, who had been admitted to the League of Nations in 1934, but had been pointedly ignored by Great Britain in all the diplomatic negotiations which ensued. On 23rd August it was announced that Russia, flouting the advances of Great Britain, had concluded a Pact of Non-Aggression with Germany. On 1st September Germany invaded Poland. On the 3rd, England and France, in the hope of saving Poland from annihilation, declared war on Germany. They could in truth do nothing to prevent Hitler from wreaking his wicked will on the Poles, who, entirely unequipped for modern warfare, nevertheless offered a resistance as heroic as it was vain. The world had reached Armageddon. On that field the battle of the nations was joined, and with ever increasing fury still rages.

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